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Executive summary 
This thesis examines the challenges that the Federal and Amhara National Regional 
State (ANRS)1 Courts of Ethiopia face in the realisation of legal and social justice. 
The Ethiopia Constitution (1995) under Article 43 declares that Ethiopian people 
have the right to improved living standards and sustainable development where the 
basic aim of development activity is to enhance, through their full participation, 
citizens’ capacity for development and the meeting of their basic needs. The 
Constitution underlined this as the ‘North Star’ of social justice which would be 
meaningless unless dispute resolution mechanisms empower litigants and the 
people in gaining social justice and thus the attainment of the Constitutional 
objective.   
The attainment of the social justice is however problematic as the legal justice the 
formal court is administering does not meet the people’s Constitutional 
expectations. The mismatch between legal and social justice, coupled with the legal 
history and the prevalence of justice pluralism, tends to force the People of Ethiopia 
to use non-formal systems of dispute resolution. Thus, there is a need to refine the 
formal and non-formal systems and to align them with the Constitutional 
imperative of social justice. Judicial reform is being implemented, with the help of 
international institutions like the World Bank, but the underlining concern is 
whether the World Bank proposals on judicial and legal reform will meet these 
needs or whether they are too located in Western values, the suggestion being that 
they may suffer from the same problems as other modernisation projects.  
There also lies a tension between the Constitutional expectation, the 
conceptualisation of justice by professionals and clients, and the overall purpose of 
securing justice and preventing injustice. Litigants’ preference for justice is itself in 
conflict with other litigants and the diverse institutional understanding of justice 
that made the attainment of social justice a difficult exercise. The area is found to 
be so problematic that there is a need to re-connect the practical conceptualisation 
of justice with the Constitutional conceptualisation of social justice which the 
Federal and ANRS courts require the redoing of justice so that the conceptualisation 
of justice would not cause irreversible damage to people’s societal, economic, and 
ecological demands and to the sustainability of justice and development. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The Region is located in Central, Northwestern and Northern part of the Country, population 
approximations are around 23 million people (the second largest population in Ethiopia), 
overwhelmingly Christian (over 90%), and determined the present boundaries of Ethiopia. 
 
xii 
 
Acronyms 
ADRMs Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
ANRS Amhara National Regional State. 
BPR Business Process Reengineering 
BSC Balanced Score Card. 
CARP Court Administration Reform Programme 
CBSP Capacity Building Strategic Programme 
CCMS Court Case Management System 
CDF Comprehensive Development Framework. 
CIDA Canadian International Development Assistance. 
CILC Center for International Legal Cooperation. 
CMS Case Management System 
CRS Case Recording System 
DSBP Democratic System Building Policy. 
EACC Ethiopian Arbitration Conciliations Center. 
EPRDF Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front 
EU European Union 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
FDRE 
FFIC Federal First Instance Court. 
FHC Federal High Court. 
FSC Federal Supreme Court. 
GTP 2 Growths and Transformation Plan 2. 
IBD International Bank for (Reconstruction) and Development. 
ILO International Labor Organization 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
xiii 
 
JLSRI Justice and Legal System Research Institute. 
JSRP Justice System Reform Programme 
JSRPO Justice System Reform Programme Office 
MDG Millennium Development Goal. 
MoCB Ministry of Capacity Building. 
NEP National Expansion Programme 
NJRSC National Justice Reform Steering Committee 
NSHC North Shewa High Court. 
ROL Rule of Law 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme. 
USAID United States Agency for International Development. 
WGHC West Gojjam High Court. 
 
 
  
xiv 
 
Introduction 
The Ethiopian Constitution under Article 43 of Human and Democratic Rights 
declares that its people have the right to improved living standard and sustainable 
development which is envisaged as the enhancement of the capability of citizens 
for development and meeting their basic needs.  
The corollary duty of this right is laid down upon dispute resolution bodies when 
Article 9 and Article 13 of the Constitution declare that judicial bodies shall have the 
responsibilities and duty to respect and enforce provisions relating to human and 
democratic rights. Further the Constitution declares that any decision by a 
government department and customary practice contravening the Constitution 
shall have no legal standing. Thus, non-formal courts (non-formal in the sense that 
they operate outside the formal government structure) envisaged under Article 37 
and Article 78 of the Constitution are also expected to contribute positively in 
sustaining development, or at least are expected not to negatively damage the 
sustainability of development. 
Formal dispute resolution mechanisms may primarily focus on resolving disputes 
and providing legal justice while non-formal mechanisms may primarily focus on 
settling disputes. A question that arises is whether the resolution or settlement of 
disputes has economic, social and environmental benefits to the litigant and the 
people. Secondly, whether the legal justice provided can provide social justice as 
per the Constitutional imperative. Thirdly, inquiring whether the judicial and legal 
reform programme that is being implemented in Ethiopia can end up with the 
realisation of the Constitutional expectations. Amid the lack of comparable duties 
imposed on the judicial bodies by the laws establishing them, the formal courts are 
expected to contribute to sustaining development by gradually reacting to 
individual cases brought before them.  
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The law stipulates various incentives and disincentives towards legal and social 
justice via its litigation administration. The legal incentives include the right to a 
speedy trial, fair access to justice, low judicial fees, ease of the arrangement of 
mobile benches, speedy enforcement of decisions, and the upholding of the 
Constitutional guarantee towards the protection of unlawful deprivation of 
property rights (particularly land rights) and the use of non-formal systems in 
resolving certain kinds of dispute. The disincentives include the allocation of 
burdens and accountability among those making illegitimate use of dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
The incentives and disincentives have various underlying assumptions towards the 
realisation of social justice. The basic assumption is that the prevalence of social 
justice is to lifting people out of poverty.2 Secondly, they are assumed to assist 
market friendly transactions so that investment is attracted towards the economic 
development of the country. It is assumed that the attainment of social justice via 
the courts would improve the living conditions of parties, the wellbeing of the 
community, and create an atmosphere of cooperation to benefit clients socially, 
economically and ecologically. When the courts’ operation is inline, it is hoped, that 
it would contribute to the prevention of injustice and contribute to the building of 
an integrated economic and social order of the country. Thirdly, the process and 
outcome of litigation would generate harmony and peace in the country so that 
social ties of the litigants would be strengthened and environment would be 
managed properly and not be degraded. 
The assumptions behind the disincentives include the avoidance of frivolous 
litigation so that litigants would only appear before the formal courts with 
legitimate and genuine claims, reduction in rent seeking3 behaviour that is revealed 
in litigation, the production of genuine evidence before the courts and the 
                                                          
2
 Otherwise poverty would lead to the disintegration of Ethiopia. 
3
 Rent seeking in this study is understood to mean using government power or getting connected 
with people in power so as to get profits which otherwise one cannot get in a free market (FDRE, 
Struggle to Build Democratic System and Revolutionary Democracy, March 2007: 2, Addis Ababa).  
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prevalence of good governance in the country.4 The cumulative effect of the 
assumptions is the realisation of social justice. 
Following this objective reform, documents and plans promised the litigants and 
the people that the formal courts would effectively administer their responsibility in 
a way which enhances social justice for the economic benefit of litigants and the 
people and that the formal courts would halt the degeneration of property (such as 
land) and gives meanings to societal values towards social justice. These benefits 
and promises call for accessibility, predictability, efficiency, transparency, 
independence, and accountability on the part of courts that are intrinsically good in 
themselves but more importantly are instrumental to the basic aims of the 
Constitution. 
This study examines these normative stipulations, various laws and practical 
applications of the judicial reform programme concerning the realisation of social 
justice. More specifically it examines how dispute resolution mechanisms 
procedurally and substantively help to promote capabilities of parties and the living 
standards of the people. 5  It also examines the goals of the judicial reform 
programme in this respect, the opportunities provided by the reform programme 
and the normative orders and the challenges dispute resolution mechanisms face in 
the discharge of Constitutional expectations. This necessitates a clear and 
contextualised reform agenda, legal regimes and a strong body making effective 
decisions. The study examines these issues in the context of formal and non-formal 
dispute resolution mechanisms where the people brings claims of litigation that 
interface economic, social and environmental elements with the corresponding 
challenges in the process and outcome of the claims. 
                                                          
4
 FDRE, Struggle to Build Democratic System and Revolutionary Democracy (1
st
 Edition, Addis Ababa, 
2007). 
5
 Unless otherwise stipulated this is intended to include the formal and non-formal ways of doing 
justice. 
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Furthermore it is necessary to consider the extent to which the existing culture of 
the courts places constraints on these assumptions of the new Ethiopian State 
developmental role and in particular whether particular interests dominate decision 
making. Thus, there is a need to address the issue of how the social, economic and 
environmental equilibrium can be achieved and if the decision making bodies could 
do so in the current administration of justice networked and connected locally and 
globally. There is a need to address whether and how the desire to resolve or settle 
disputes by the dispute resolution mechanisms can target the provision of social 
justice and whether this goal can be achieved in the current performance of dispute 
resolutions and the judicial reform programme. 
Research questions 
This research mainly explores if and how the then and now cry of social justice is 
being served by dispute resolution bodies. The main focus is how these bodies 
discharge their responsibilities towards justice. In particular the research involves 
theoretical and empirical: 
1. Examination of the gap between the legal and social justice in the legal 
history of Ethiopia; 
2. Examination of social justice as per the Constitutional imperative and 
inquiry as to the realization of social justice by the dispute resolution 
mechanisms; 
3. Analysis of legal justice in the principles and practice of dispute 
resolution mechanisms in relation to the gap between legal justice and 
social justice; 
4. Analysis of the role of aid funded judicial reform programmes in general 
and the Ethiopian judicial reform programme in particular in improving 
the gap between legal and social justice and the relationship between 
formal and non-formal dispute settlement mechanisms; 
xviii 
 
5. Examination of people’s reaction to an ineffective dispute resolution 
mechanism and the possible harmonization between formal and non-
formal ways of dispute resolution mechanisms; 
6. Examination of the connection between different factors affecting legal 
justice (including legal history of Ethiopia, litigation rate and litigation 
culture, prevalence of legal pluralism, ability of decision making bodies, 
and global impacts) and the realization of basic needs and standards of 
living of the people and reduction of poverty. 
Theoretical framework 
The theoretical part of the thesis is covered in Chapters One to Four. The chapters 
examine the connection between decision making bodies and social justice. This 
theoretical part builds upon the conception of development under the Ethiopian 
Constitution. It considers improving capabilities and living standards as central 
issues of justice and uses these elements as outcomes to be attained in the 
activities of decision making bodies.  
Accordingly it involves the search for and building able institutions and systems 
towards effective administration of social justice. This cannot be done without 
exploring the roots of current thought in justice. Thus Chapter One examines the 
relationship among decision making bodies, the laws and justice in the context of 
Ethiopian legal history from two dimensions: the history of reform movements and 
the history of decision making bodies. It examines the challenges in the making of 
the legal institutions and laws of Ethiopia and connects the existing challenges of 
the laws, reform programme and courts with the legal history of the country.  
Chapter Two is an attempt to link the past and the present by making clear 
institutional roles and the understanding of justice. It addresses how the challenges 
of the past could yield lessons to the judicial reform programmes of the present and 
the future. It employs various approaches and theories to balance the past and the 
present. In an attempt to capture an idea of justice benefiting the thesis 
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(particularly the discussion on the judicial reform programme) it deals with issues of 
institutions and of justice.  
This part of the study benefits from the Constitutional imperative regarding the 
right to development which encompasses raising the living standards and basic 
needs of the people. These elements of development would get realized through 
the judicial reform programme that hopefully benefits institutions in processing and 
ending litigation towards justice. The discussion benefits from the conceptions of 
institutions of the old times (Barker 1959, Kraut 2002) and World Bank and 
economists conception of institutions informed by discussions from (Change 2007, 
North 1981, Risse 2004 and others). Liberal conceptions of institutions and justice 
will supplement the discussion on the institutions discourse and serve as a spring 
board to a discussion on the conception of justice (Sen 2009, Rawls 2005, Pogge 
2004, 2005). Some discussion is also made on the critiques of these theory and 
ideas of justice including Aristotelian notion of living humanly and Nussbaum’s 
capabilities (Chimini 2008 and Nussbaum 1997, 2005).  
In the sphere of judicial reform programmes issues of law and development have 
benefited from informed discussion that makes the discourses on institutional 
reforms clear. Particularly the involvement of International Monetary Institutions 
informs the discussion of institutional reforms from an economist perspective 
(Mattis 2009, Caney 2010, Thorsby 2009, Galenter and Trubeck 1972, Nader 2005, 
2007, Tamanaha 1995, Marryman 1977). To this effect law and development 
movements and the slogan ‘’Institution Matters’’ enlightens the discussion (Messick 
1983, Dokalias 1996, World Bank 2004, Risse 2004, Hammergren 2005, Twining 
2007). Sen’s comprehensive approach to development provides the view from 
another angle. In its own way a bottom up approach to institutional reform has 
made an opposite view of institutional reform possible (Baxi 2007, Faundez 2010, 
2011, Pratiksha 2007). Some discussions on the meaning of the developmental 
state are made to connect the various discourses of reform with the Ethiopian 
developmental state conception (Evans 1989, Woo-Cummings 1999).  
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The discussion on the various dimensions of development understood in the 
Constitutional context includes discussions on discourses of judicial reform 
programmes and the interconnection between the judicial reform programme and 
social justice. This part of discussion in particular highlights the various movements 
in the reform agenda (particularly the law and development movement) and the 
various approaches to judicial reform programmes that influenced the Ethiopian 
program. Accordingly it examines the neo-liberal approaches to reform, the 
developmental theories approach to reform, the institutional role of reform, Sen's 
conception of capability and functionings, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, Pogge's 
conception of negative duty on severe poverty and Rawl's conception of the original 
position. In an attempt to show the connection, reconnection and disconnection of 
justice reforms and institutions the Aristotelian and other ‘naturalists’ conception of 
justice is briefly discussed highlighted. 
The discussion on the Ethiopian judicial reform programme takes account of the 
country’s legal history and the theoretical discussion on reforms (Haile 2002, MoCB 
2002, CILC 2005). The discussion is informed by the base lines studies conducted in 
Ethiopia to this effect, the solutions recommended and the contents of the 
programme. This part of the discussion is an attempt to see the applications of 
theories in the reform of judiciaries in a country having complex legal system. It is 
highly informed by local documents and sources and investigates the extent to 
which the reform programme is disconnected from the challenges raised by the 
legal history of the country, the extent it is disconnected from the top-down 
approach to development and reform and the extent it gives meaning to lives of 
litigants and beyond. 
Methodology and methods 
The research encompasses the discussion of theoretical, reform, legal and practical 
issues in the attainment of justice in Ethiopia. The theoretical part mainly examines 
various theoretical aspects of justice and institutions in line with the laws and 
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judicial reform documents. It tries to investigate the issue of justice from 
sociological, economic and environmental context at a wider level and narrows the 
discussion to the more specific examination of the issues in the Ethiopian context. 
Accordingly, the discussion is followed by exploration of the Constitutional 
imperatives of social justice and the laws and reform documents to this effect. It 
further specifically examines the themes in the context of Ethiopian decision 
making bodies.  
The empirical work covered in Chapters Four to Six supplements the theoretical 
work in a number of ways. It will be conducted on nine Federal and ANRS courts of 
Ethiopia located in three areas.6  
The main focus of the field work is conducting interviews with key informants, 
administering questionnaires, observing decision making bodies and analysis of 
cases. The purpose is getting first-hand information on how justice is being 
understood by different bodies, including the parties, the implication of this in the 
rendering of justice and its effect on the process and outcome of decision making 
bodies and investigating how justice is being (not) served by different bodies.  
Outline of the thesis 
The study is composed of seven chapters. The chapters are arranged logically and 
help to develop comprehensive contextual argument regarding the realisation of 
social justice by decision making bodies. The following is a brief description of the 
general outline of the study. 
Chapter One provides a brief account of the legal history of Ethiopia. It categorises 
the various periods of the history and focuses on the laws and decision making 
bodies of the country during the various periods. The discussion begins from an 
earlier era when laws were written in the ‘hearts of the people’ to ends of harmony 
and peace in the community and continues to discuss various periods of 
                                                          
6
 The details about their location and selection as well as method and methodology are given in 
Chapter Six.  
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modernization. The study of the modernisation periods explores the attempts to 
build the empire and institutions matched by the integration of formal and non-
formal systems of doing justice. Efforts to connect law and practice and to integrate 
the formal and non-formal systems of dispute resolution mechanisms will be 
discussed. The historical roots of current challenges towards realising legal and 
social justice will be identified. 
Chapter Two focuses on the nature and meanings of institutions and justice. It 
discusses what and how institutions and justice are understood. This chapter mainly 
explores two meanings of institutions. On the one hand Douglass North’s 
identification of concepts of contract and property as institutions for the market is 
explored. More broadly and importantly, (administrative) institutions will be 
qualified as those able to shaping behaviors of people towards social justice. The 
chapter considers the conceptualisation of social justice by Sen, Rawls, Pogge and 
Nussbaum, as well as that of Aristotle, towards connecting the legal justice of 
institutions with the social justice of the Constitution. The chapter also discusses a 
failed attempt made to make law (one kind of institution) as an instrument of 
development. Thus the chapter is an attempt to develop a coherent theory of 
institutions and justice which serves as an underlying basis for judicial reform 
programmes. The discussion on institutions and justice perpetuate the discussion 
on institutional reforms and goals of reforms. 
Chapter Three is a discussion of reforms in the context of justice. It explores two 
thematic areas of the study: the attempts to reform the judiciary following the 
failed attempt to reform laws as instruments of development and the different 
discourses in institutional reform. The attempt to reform both the laws and 
institutions mainly suffers from the ’one-size-fits-all’ approach that benefits neither 
the formal courts nor the non-formal systems of doing justice nor the people. This 
challenge raises the query how reform efforts would be sustainable towards 
realising social justice and explores different discourses to this effect. This 
necessitates the need to redesign the approach to reform with the realization of 
xxiii 
 
social justice in a more contextual approach. The chapter develops a coherent 
approach to effective reform programmes for Ethiopia.  
Chapter Four examines the attempts made in Ethiopia to reform its judicial system. 
The chapter mainly explores two issues. In the first place it examines if the judicial 
reform programme of Ethiopia solves the challenges that its legal history brought 
about regarding legal and social justice. Secondly, it examines whether the reform 
programme is embedded the Constitutional and local values of the country so that 
it may not suffer from imposed values. As Chapter Three discusses reform 
programmes lack sufficient theoretical explanations (that is one reason why they 
fail in a number of countries) this chapter discusses the potential for using lessons 
from other failures to develop a coherent approach. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven explore the empirical discussion on what and how 
social justice is perceived in Ethiopia and how is it related to decision making 
bodies. The chapter carries on the empirically works so that the challenges of the 
country’s legal system are eased through the theories in Chapters Two, Three and 
Four creating an impact on peoples’ live. Chapters Five and Six deal with contextual 
accounts of the theory developed in the previous chapters.  
Chapter Five: deals with the achievements, opportunities and challenges of the 
Ethiopian judicial reform towards legal and social justice. The discussion is mainly 
based on litigation profile of the country and performance measurement 
mechanism developed by the reform programme. It is informed by the data 
including cases opened, disposed and transferred that are generated from the 
databases of the courts.   
Chapter Six involves a case study concerning whether and how legal and social 
justice is realised in the formal and non-formal system. It is informed by the earlier 
discussions but relies on the empirical findings of the study. It provides an empirical 
account of how the actors of justice give meaning to justice in the day to day 
activity of disputing in the context of formal and non-formal dispute resolution 
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mechanisms. It also explores the contextual connection between the reform 
programme, conceptualisations of justice and decision making bodies. It empirically 
explores the challenges in the realisation of legal and social justice in this context. 
The attempt is to see how the performance of the formal system contributes to 
realising social justice in the context of Ethiopia. 
Accordingly it explores achievements and challenges of the dispute resolution 
mechanism from those involved in its operation and those affected by it. It also 
considers the success and failure of the ongoing judicial reform programme from 
these angles.  Discussing both procedure and substance, it identifies sites in 
decision making bodies for an effective delivery of social justice and potential 
improvement.   
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter and stresses the need to redefine judicial 
role vis-a-vis the conception of justice developed with two objectives: poverty 
alleviation and sustainable development. It suggests an open but clustered list of 
capabilities for court performance, and further suggests the need to give priority to 
measuring quality to numeracy. Thirdly it suggests the need to sequence and plan 
reform activities to the benefit of litigants and the people (and a planned 
developmental state) as one solution to prevent reform failures. It indicates that 
jam packed reforms yield failures. The fourth conclusion is related to enforcement 
of contracts and notes that current records in enforcement of contracts discourage 
investment. The need for judges to engage deeply in the litigation process, the need 
for disconnecting from a web of de-capacitating attitudes, conviction and beliefs 
are noted as the fifth and six conclusions.  
The attainment of social, economic and environmental justice cannot be attained 
under the current practice of isolated and disoriented move of the courts.  These 
conclusions indicate that the current reform and change instruments of courts 
cannot be sustained unless they connect with the real Ethiopian lives. Accordingly 
the last conclusion pertains to a need to realisation-focused synchronisation 
between the formal and non-formal systems of disputing. This conclusion in 
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particular benefits from the pros and cons of the two systems and the great positive 
attitude in the Ethiopian judiciary towards the non-formal system. The intention is 
to consider ways in which socio-economic justice can be achieved through the 
development of a legal system which provides appropriate inter-connection and 
synchronicity between the formal and non-formal systems. It suggests that this 
process will involve sharing the deep rooted principles in the non-formal system 
with and to the benefit of the formal system. 
 
1 
 
1 
Development of laws and the legal system of Ethiopia in the context of its 
political history 
This chapter introduces the legal history of Ethiopia as one of the causes for the gap 
between legal and social justice as well as for non-principled engagement of the 
formal system. In analysing the relationship between dispute resolution 
mechanisms and social justice, a workable progress cannot be made unless 
contemporary challenges of social justice are investigated in light of historical 
experience. The conception of effectiveness as theory of social justice has to base 
its analysis on the parameters of theories and conceptions of social justice in 
Ethiopia under its legal history as current problems associated with the judiciary 
have their roots in the near and distance past. The past can yield some lessons to 
expand the current ‘’territory of knowledge’’ to benefit the current effort at judicial 
reform, conception of effective judiciary and the space that shall be accorded to the 
non-formal dispute resolution mechanisms dominantly prevailing in the country. 
A discussion of Ethiopia’s unique legal history also reveals the emergence of a 
complex legal system based on a mix of Ethiopian and foreign civilization.78 History 
reveals that third party reliance in settling disputes or for the purpose of getting 
decision was not uncommon in Ethiopia. There was a merger of formal and non-
formal mechanisms of dispute resolution during the period of feudalism and the 
Empire until the onset of modernisation during the Haile Selassie period. However, 
the two systems were either isolated or ignored particularly during and after 
socialism. These facts indicate the lack of principled engagement with the nature 
and role of dispute resolution mechanisms. 
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 See Abera 1998: 1, 3. According to Abera, despite non-colonised, its development is relatively 
autonomous which in many respects ties to the larger family of Romano-Germanic law.The people 
however developed a culture which ‘may be termed as Ethiopian’ which ‘differed markedly from 
that of surrounding people.  
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This chapter has two parts. Following a brief account of the country’s political 
economy and its level of development the first part discusses the history of laws 
while the second part discusses the history of decision making bodies. This is 
followed by a brief conclusion. 
Country profile in brief: Ethiopia 
The first serious problem in discussing the (ancient) history of Ethiopia9 is the 
identification of the exact location of the country and the name it bears thereof.10 
With the lack of consensus as what ‘’Ethiopia’’ covers, different writers at different 
times named it either the land of the South, or country of Nhsie, Kush, Punt, Kam, 
or of Semitic.11 The purpose of the research did not allow us to go into that detail. 
Currently named as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereafter FDRE) it 
is located in what is traditionally called the horn of Africa. Covering 1.1 square 
kilometers12 it is bounded by Eritrea (to the north and north east), Kenya (to the 
south), Sudan and South Sudan (to the west and southwest) and Djibouti and 
Somalia (to the east). 
According to the Central Statistics Agency, Ethiopia has a population of over 
81,755,000 (the second largest population in Africa) with a population increase of 
2.6% per annum. 83.9% of the total population lives in rural parts of the country. 
The population consists of the Oromos(40%), Amharas(30%), Somaliians(9%), 
Tigrians(6%), Sidama(2%), Gurage (4%), and the Afar (1%). The country officially 
                                                          
9
 Ethiopia is credited for being the cradle of mankind. It is ‘’one of the oldest human inhibited areas’’.  
Australopithecus Afarensis (which means ‘southern ape of Afar’) is discovered in 1974 by 
anthropologists in what is now called Afar National Regional State. It is estimated to be more than 
3.5 millions year old. Twenty years later a much older fossil, Australopithecus Ramidus, believed to 
be aged 4.4 million years old, is discovered in the same place in 2008 (Library of congress, Country 
Profile, Ethiopia 2005: 1 , Abera 1998: 12, Wikipedia Ethiopia April 2/2010). 
10
 This included Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, or the present Ethiopia containing ‘’a 
mélange of Hamitic, Mediterranean and Negroid people’ who speak more than 77 different 
languages (Lewis 1956:257, Tekletsadik 1965: 2-7, Nathan 1974:2). 
11
 The history of Ethiopia goes back to the days of ‘’antiquity’’-its name being referred in the Bible 
and in Greek literature (twice in Olliad and three times in Odyssey) as a place and people of ‘’burnt 
face’’ living south of Egypt. The long history has with it the persistent draught the country was hit by. 
12
 This is almost twice the size of Texas. 
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recognised more than 80 Nations Nationalities and Peoples with their own distinct 
languages and different dialects. There are 69 Nation, Nationalities and Peoples 
have seats in the House of Federation.13  
The country’s GDP (for the year 2008-2009) was 2.3 billion USD with a government 
estimate annual growth rate of 9.9%. Agriculture14 covers 45% of the GDP while 
trade and industry cover 13% of the GDP. A total of 42% of the GDP is covered by 
the service sector.15 The national life expectancy is 53 years of age for males and 56 
years of age for females.  
Ethiopia’s unique legal system 
Ethiopia had developed a unique legal system throughout the ages. Factors 
including its isolation, topography and power struggles contributed to this 
development. Ethiopia had remained isolated from the rest of the world for a long 
period of time. The isolation together with its unique geography (being 
mountainous with a high central plateau which slopes down through Sudan and 
Somalia-with a number of rivers crossing the plateau) forced Ethiopia to develop its 
own geo-jurisprudence.16 The fragmented nature of Ethiopia highlands played an 
important part in the country’s political and cultural history (Adejumobi 2007: 5). 
The geographic isolation also created a spirit of relative independence in many 
areas where the pattern of life has remained unchanged for hundreds of years, and 
where the central government still has only limited influence (Adejumobi 2007: 5, 
6) According to Lewis, despite the plurality in the polity, these features ‘’has 
permitted the country to maintain its own identity for more than 2000 years’’ 
(Lewis 1956: 257). This on its part shaped the kind and quality of Ethiopian laws and 
the quality of the institutions applying the laws.  
                                                          
13
 House Federation www.hofethiopia.gov.et, last visited on April 8/2011. 
14
 90 to 95% of the crops grown in the country depends to a large extent on kiremt (from June to 
September) rain. 
15
 State Department Report of America, 2008. 
16
 The slope range between 1,828 and 3,048 meters, with the longest rift valley and the Danakil 
Depression to sink to more than 93.5 m-one of the lowest points on earth. 
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The continuous power struggle between rulers in the polity is another factor that 
had contributed to shaping the legal system of the country. Despite the continuous 
power struggle for centuries between the centralised authority and feudal nobility 
(Doran 1994: 2), the polity was largely based on ‘’social cohesions’’ and ‘’dynamic 
political institutions’’ that made a community based on common economic 
resources difficult (Lewis 1956: 258). It was Emperor Menelik’s (1875-1898) military 
conquest that unified and established ‘’a strong central government’’ and hence a 
centralised legal system (Lewis 1956: 257). This struggle to maintain centralization 
with an increase in decentralisation, and the desire to remain united with an 
increase in diversification, impacted the legal system of Ethiopia to a great extent. 
The following sections illustrate the contribution of these factors in shaping the 
laws, the institutions and the behaviour of dispute resolution mechanisms of 
Ethiopia. For the purpose of the research the legal history of the country is 
categorised under four important historical periods. The periods are categorised 
based on structural changes in laws, the importance given to laws and the purpose 
of the change. The periods are:   
Priod of Pre-Zara Yacob (pre- 1468) 
Priod of Writing (1468-1955) 
Period of Modernisation (1955-1991) and the 
Period of Post-Modernization (Post 1991). 
1.3. The Legal History of Ethiopia 
1.1.1 The laws 
1.3.1.1 Pre-Zara-Yacob period (before 1468) 
This period began when the Sabeans (one of them called Habesha) travelled from 
South Western Arabia to the present day Ethiopia and established the Axumite17 
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 Axum was at trading state that dominated the Red Sea and commerce between the Nile Valley 
and Arabia and between the Roman Empire and India (Library of Congress, Supra note 7 p. 2). 
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State at Adulis in the 750 BC-500 BC.  When the kingdom became stronger, its seat 
of capital shifted to Axum where rock hewn funerary obelisks of Axum (which were 
built to worship the sun or moon) were built (Atkinson, 3). During this period the 
legendary Queen of Sheba18 established the Solomonic Dynasty19 and Christianity 
was introduced into Ethiopia at the 4th Century AD. During King Ezana’s reign20 
Islam was also introduced at the 7th Century AD and Ge’ez spread widely replacing 
Greek language (Atkinson, 2, 5). Later the power of the Kingdom was usurped by a 
non-Christian prince, Yodit (Gudit) until her last successor was overthrown by Mara 
Takle-Haymanot, founder of the Zagwe Dynasty (Bahiru 2002: 7, Adejumobi 2007: 
10, 14) who shifted the Kingdom and its seat from Axum to Roha (present day 
Lalibela). The Kingdom also shifted from Axumite (Solomonic) to the Zagwe Dynasty 
(Atkinson 8). Though Axum faded, it bequeathed to its successor its Semitic 
language, Christianity and the concept of a multi-ethnic empire-state ruled by a 
King of Kings. 
The Zagwe Dynasty is well known for its religious and architectural contributions 
(built the 11 rock-hewn churches at Lalibela in 1250 AD (Atkinson, 9). However, King 
Yokno Amlak (1263-1278 AD) restored the Solomonic Dynasty and made Tegulet 
(present day Shewa) the seat of the Capital city. Subsequently Amdetsion (1307-
1337 AD) expanded the boundary so far as Awash in the South, Gonder, Gojjam and 
Shewa.1  
Historic books, religious books and chronicles of the Kings are written during King 
Amdetsion’s era with other key books also translated during this time (Adejumobi 
2007: 10). 
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 The kebra Negast (Book of the Glory of Kinks) describe how Solomon seduced Sheba (who was 
called to the throne in the 10
th
 Century BC) who felt inadequate to the throne and journeyed to 
Jerusalem to observe and learn from the wise and beneficent rule of king Solomon, who had 
relationship with Sheba to produce a son-Menelike the first who was the founder of the Aksumite 
civilization and Solomonic dynasty (Kebre Negest, Adejumobi 2007: 12,). 
19
 This was the source of the ruling dynasty at that time. (until the Zagwe dynasty took power from 
1143-1263). 
20
 He is the first African King to embrace Christianity and has made this faith the official religion of 
the empire (Adejumobi 2007: 13, Atkinson, 4). 
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This period has significantly contributed to the history of Ethiopia but little is known 
and written about its legal history. Save for some works on the war and spiritual life 
of the rulers, work has not been done on the tradition of the people and the 
administration of justice by the government (Tekletsadik 1965: 31). Except the list 
of rulers (which at times is incomplete and disordered), it is almost impossible to 
get information on what the rulers did as judges or the system they established for 
the administration of justice (Tekletsdik 1965: 14, 17). Therefore, it is necessary to 
look into different sources to understand what Ethiopians perceive of laws during 
this period.  
Before Christianity, the Kingdom was largely based on ‘’traditional local and 
mystical beliefs’’ and practiced ‘’a polytheistic religion.’’21 Astar was the main god of 
the pre-Christian Aksumite.22 Homer (9th Century BC) and Herodot (6th Century BC) 
described Ethiopians as ‘’just and pious’’, loved by gods for their justice, as uttering 
no falsehood (Tekletsadik 1965: 24). 
According to the introduction of kebre-Negest,23 Ethiopians’ sense of justice was 
equated with the punishment of the sinners and acquittal of the ‘’purest.’’ Those 
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 The exact date of this is also contested. It is believed to be at the Era of Ezana (325-360 C.E) when 
he declared to protect Astar, Beher and Meder while he referred in other inscription to ‘’the Lord of 
Heaven’’ and made Christianity the state religion. While others held that the time is 333 AB or 356 
AB. (Moore, Christianity in Ethiopia 1936: 272, 275). The 1955 Constitution declares that it is 
founded in the 4
th
 Century AD on the doctrine of Saint Mark (Art. 126 of the Constitution, Abera 
1998: 6. 
22
 Like Egyptians the sun (common to all Ethiopians), warka (kind of tree), mountains, rivers (Nile), 
and Eagles were their gods. The most uncivilized worship the tree and the mountain, the civilized 
one believes in a deity symbolized by the sun or the moon. Ox, Ship, Eagle were also believed as 
things where the gods dwell (Tekletsadik 1965: 33, 41). 
23
 The exact date of its writing is not known. The content of the book reveals that it is written after 
the New Testament. It was written in a ‘’kibti’’ (a local) language, then translated in to Arabic and 
then back in to Ge’ez. It has secured high respect among the nobilities and the people. It has got 117 
sections. Kibre-Negest has served as a national Constitution of Ethiopia for more than 700 years. The 
power of the kings who ruled Ethiopia from 1270-1966 was delimited as per the dictates of the 
Kibre-Negest. It has got provisions concerning the source of government power, persons eligible to 
such power, responsibilities of government officials, rights and duties of the people, historical and 
cultural relationship that should exist between Ethiopia and foreign nations, etc. Accordingly source 
of power is supernatural (divine) and quotes the Bible (2 Samuel 7: 12-17, Psalms 89: 4, Psalms 
132:11) for this purpose. 
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who transgressed the law shall be punished according to the degree of their sin and 
the ‘’purest’’ shall be tried and acquitted. 
In the Kebre-Negest it was the rule to ‘’do good’’ and to ‘’preserve the body from 
fornication’’ and it was against the law to do what god hated‘’-pride, boastfulness 
of speech, self-adulation, calumniation, false accusation and the swearing of false 
oaths.’’24 Kebre-Negest, under Section 100 (13), also dictates that ‘the demon has 
no power of commanding, arresting, beating, holding or of pulling other than 
inserting evil thoughts into the human mind’. These laws were not written but were 
called Hige-libona literally meaning laws written in hearts.25 This was the dominant 
law despite some laws promulgated by law makers whenever the law maker 
thought ‘necessary and urgent’ (Assefa 1973: 22). This was the law for social 
interaction and justice by way of reconciliation was conceived of as administering 
such ‘’law’’. 
The Hige-libona, especially the duty to preserve the body ‘’pure’’ implies that 
humans are assumed to be naturally good according to which a man is expected to 
cultivate himself before being instructed from outside to be good the breach of 
which primary duty creates oppositions and made him not good. The people 
believed in the existence of evil spirits, tempted a man to breach his primary duty 
towards the Creator and against which one had to constantly be mindful. Those 
who did evil created disharmony within themselves, the people and their 
ecosystem. Humans’ adjustment to this ‘harmony’ was suggested to lead to order, 
happiness and peace whilst acting contrary was suggested to lead to chaos, 
disorder and misfortune. Their harmonious relationship with the world was 
conducive to their well-being and this is significant for the resolution of conflicts 
and oppositions. Oppositions lead to conflict which has to be effectively reconciled.   
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 The Kibre-Negest Chapter 7: concerning Noah. 
25
 Interview with Elder ‘A’ on Oct. 25/2015, Bahir Dar. Informants in this research are given codes for 
the reasons indicated in Chapter six. See also Abera 1998: 27. 
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In light of this, people were expected to create harmony first with themselves and 
then with nature. It was suggested that peace in oneself must be extended to 
others so that people wouldn’t be self-centered and conflict wouldn’t arise. Selfish 
pursuit of profit would be the sources of conflict and killings. The rulers 
responsibility lies in creating this harmony in the changing world. They were 
responsible for creating harmony in family matters which is the basis for societal 
harmony. The harmony created paved the way to alleviating poverty, and even to 
the distribution of material resources and the reduction of possible oppositions 
(disputes).  
Later the introduction of Christianity made the polity to a large extent based on 
‘’two pillars’’: the office of the Emperor and the established Orthodox Church.’’ 
These were the ‘’jural postulates’’ or ‘’grundnorm’’ of the system (Doren 1994: 10). 
Kebre-Negest contains accounts of ‘’conversion of the Ethiopians from the worship 
of the sun, moon, and the stars to that of the ‘’Lord God of Israel’’ during this 
period. An Ethiopian was described in the Old Testament as a ‘’man of high moral 
standard’’26 who had respect for ‘’what is right’’ and for whom the kingdom of 
heaven is not closed.  
This introduction of Christianity in to the polity added another source of law and 
looking for laws other than those found in ‘hearts’ intensified. The church law in the 
book began to govern social lives together with the earlier natural rules written in 
hearts. They were believed to maintain social order which was ‘’good’’ and could be 
created and maintained through hierarchical control deriving ultimately from God 
(Gidey 2004:38). There was a belief of ‘’being kept constantly in check.’’ Conflict is 
thus viewed as destabilising the natural balance. Though conflict is ‘’a way of life’’ in 
Amhara society (Levine 1972) it had to be managed in a way as to restore the 
natural balance among the triumvirate of God, parties and the natural 
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 The assumption is that a man is morally good from within which could help him respect what is 
right from without. 
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environment. The good spirit acting against the evil is believed to do justice of this 
sort. 
Furthermore the introduction of Islamic law at the 7th Century AD also multiplied 
the sources of laws that governed the social order in the country. Mohammed is 
said to have advised his followers, who were prosecuted by Quraish of Mecca, to 
flee to Ethiopia where they could find the ‘’land of righteousness.’’ 27  The 
implication was that the followers of Mohammed, with their religious laws, could 
peacefully live with people of Ethiopia.  
This period thus witnessed a strongly mystical and religious Ethiopia where the 
rules, the rulers and the ruled are interconnected with a belief in supernatural 
forces. There was disparity between converts and non-converts who followed 
different rules in their life and it is difficult to trace a common authority between 
them. 
There were different opinions as far as the quality of the law before the 
introduction of religious laws is concerned. One line of opinion correlates the laws 
with the then civilization. History tell us that during this period (4th-6th Century AD) 
the country reached its peak of ‘’civilisation’’. The Kingdom was powerful during 
ancient and medieval times. During the 3rd Century AD the kingdom of Aksum was 
‘’highly developed’’ and ranked third ‘’among the Great Powers, and was the 
greatest sovereign state of the world.’’ Having had ‘’very great and powerful’’ 
people, the ruler was referred to with the rarely used honorific title of ‘’basileus’’ 
(Nathan 1974: 34, Doran 1994: 2, 4).  
The Kingdom was ‘’rich in heritage’’ where through the port of Adulis there were 
considerable imports and trade. The Kingdom was a ‘’major player in the commerce 
between the Roman Empire and Ancient India.’’ It was also a center of culture. The 
wide spread use of different coins, the extent of foreign trade and development of 
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 As a land of justice, Justin 1 (518-65) also requested the kingdom to rescue people who were 
persecuted for adopting the Jewish faith, Nathal 1974: 12-19. 
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irrigation systems provide signs of the level of civilization had attained (Adejumobi 
2007:30, 39-42). The Kingdom was not only ‘’a rich and well run polity’’ but strong 
enough to keep safe vessels dispatched by Emperor Heraclius in 575-641 AD when 
threatened by the Persian invaders (Nathan 1974:43). Foreign trade and irrigation 
were widely practiced. Ethiopia was identified with the values of justice, civilization 
and rightness. It can be presumed that some sort of laws governing the export 
driven administration, agricultural sector and foreign trade was attracting 
foreigners and enhancing civilization.  
Contrary to this the people were also perceived as ’savage’ whilst cultivating none 
of the practices of a ‘’civilised life’ (Nathan 1974: 10-11). During the era of King 
Solomon (Queen of Sheba-10th Century BC) the country was perceived as a ‘’far-off 
place’’ found in the ‘’utter most part’’ of the world. This perception persisted until 
the Aksumite period (4th Century AD).28 When Christianity was first introduced to 
the country during this period, the mission was said to be effective ‘’as far away as 
Ethiopia’’ (Nathal 1974:46) in terms of space and time. Generally speaking one can 
hold for this period that: 
1. There were no defined set of laws in this period and religious edicts 
were unwritten and connected to the religious life of the people rather 
than state legal system. Supernatural forces were believed to be sources 
of the laws and foreign laws (Christianity and Islam) did not or could not 
replace the earlier indigenous or mystical beliefs. There was no legal 
system in the strict sense of the word, rather the de facto legal pluralism 
was the rule of the day (Abera 1998: 2). Later law was only broadened to 
include other sources of law, such as religious law by using the authority 
of the Office of the Emperor. Therefore Ethiopia was governed entirely 
by a set of traditional and religious laws. 
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 As much of the beginning of the period in general, and of the Axumite kingdom in particular is not 
known, its end is also as ‘’much of a mystery’’. Some believe, however that the fall of the kingdom 
could be attributed to one or a combinations of ‘’persistent drought, overgrazing, deforestation, 
plague, shift in trade route’’ which occurred during the later period of the kingdom. 
11 
 
2. Whatever the source of the law, it was too general to bear a single 
definition. Doing ‘good’ was the rule of the day. Justice was perceived as 
a virtue in action and the conceptions of justice, rightness and goodness 
were more or less complementary terms for the same concept. 
3. The Kingdom reached its peak of civilisation while it was conceived to be 
a seat of culture. It proves the possibility of securing peaks of civilisation 
and culture at the same time. Though difficult to make a direct link 
between the law and the civilisation, history shows some kind of 
correlation between them. The decline of the Kingdom can be attributed 
to the social and economic problems which the polity faced. The way 
social and economic justice was balanced was making or breaking of the 
Kingdom. 
4. Since religious edicts were introduced from abroad it can easily be seen 
how global factors served as one source of law and easily penetrated the 
system at all levels.  
1.3.1.2 Period of writing (1468-1955) 
At the beginning of this period Zara Yakob attempted to rule the polity under 
written law. It marked the underlying bases where one finds a ‘’native ideological 
and institutional framework for the development of law’’ in the country. It provides 
the first modernisation and building effort for the empire and covers much longer 
period of time. This is because there is greatest similarity in the laws and their 
application during this period. This period covers the time when King ZeraYakob, 
Emperor Tewodros, Emperor Yohannes, Emperor Menelik II and Emperor Haile 
Silassie stand out as key figures in the modernisation attempts of the empire.  
The era of Zara Yakob (1435-1469) had caused the production of different books 
written in Ge’ez (often his time was called era of writings in Ge’ez) and introduced a 
new tax system (Atkinson 12). In establishing religious nationalism and the 
12 
 
Ethiopian identity, king Zara Yakob was a prolific author of numerous religious and 
philosophical books (Adejumobi 2007: 22).  
After a long period of isolation, the second contact with Europeans happened 
during this period (Atkinson 13). More importantly contacts began after the middle 
of the 19th Century AD during which Ethiopia was under ‘’Zemene Mesafint’’ until 
Emperor Tewodros (1856-1869) aimed to organize the polity under imperial 
unification reform. Owing to this, Emperor Tewodros declared himself as the King of 
Kings in the traditional manner of the Gonder, Gojjam, Tigray and Shewa (Atkinson 
22, 23, Abejumobi 2007: 17, 24). Emperor Tewodros moved the seat of the capital 
to Debre Tabor and began the modern Ethiopian Empire (Atkinson 22, Adjomobi 
25). The modernisation effort was continued during his successor, Emperor 
Yohannes, but he was not as successful in bringing about change.  
Tewodros’s efforts to modernize were more effective during the reign of Emperor 
Menelik II in 1890 (Bahiru 2002: 29, 66, Atkinson 28, Adejumobi 2007: 27, 28). 
Emperor Menelik’s  efforts to get in contact with the outside world resulted in the 
signing a treaty with Italy whose interpretation on the treaty raised concerns of 
sovereignty29 and ended up in the battle of Adwa in 1896. The victory at Adwa 
exposed the country to more global contacts. His seat was in Ankober later moved 
to the present day Addis Ababa in 1987 making Addis Ababa the third capital city of 
Ethiopia in its history.30 
In the next ten years after the battle of Adwa, Emperor Menelik opened the country 
to wider global influences including the development and introduction of electricity, 
telecommunications, modern hospitals, new vaccination programme, postal 
services, education, abolishment of slavery, introduction of banking system, new 
railway links and the creation of modern bridges in Awash and Gojjam (Atkinson 31, 
                                                          
29
 The treaty raised issues relating to the disposition of diplomatic relations between the two states. 
While the Amharic clause suggested that the Abyssinian (another name for Ethiopia) could use Italy 
as an agent in foreign relations if it desired, the Italian version claimed that Abyssinian was obliged 
to go through Italy in its foreign relations (Treaty of Wuchale, 1890, article 17). 
30
 Next to Axum and Gonder, see Atkinson 30, Bahiru 2002, 75.  
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33-34). Thus he laid the foundation for further development and modernisation. His 
further expanded the territory and doubled the size of the empire whilst under his 
control by occupying areas which include north eastern, south western and western 
parts of modern day Ethiopia (Adejumobi 2007: 28, 29).  
A close relative of Emperor Menelik, Haile Silassie (later Emperor Haile Silassie) who 
had served as a regent31 succeeded to the office of Emperor in 1930 following Lij 
Eyasu (1914-1917) and Empress Zewditu (1917-1930) and began to introduce 
various western inspired reforms. These modernisation efforts, deemed the second 
wave of modernisation, were largely underway when Italy controlled the country 
between 1936 and 1941 but continued after the restoration under a policy of 
centralisation. His reign tested the theories and practice of domestic and 
international liberal reforms (Adejumobi 2007: 35). Nevertheless, the slow pace of 
the reforms led to the 1960 attempted coup which prompted unrest thereafter 
until the feudal system that had lasted for more than 2000 years was overthrown 
by the Derg32 who introduced a new Marxist model of modernization. 
The period is a turning point in the study of the development of Ethiopian law as 
the quantity and quality33 of law increased during this period. The written law 
however existed with other norms of ordering which include natural law, religious 
law, academic scholars, treaties and customary laws. The following sections take a 
brief look at the laws and the languages of writing.  
1.3.1.2.1. Natural Law 
Natural law is recognised by Ethiopians as ‘hige-libona’, literally meaning law 
written in the heart or ‘’fithe-fitretawi’ literally meaning ‘’natural justice’’ (Abera 
                                                          
31
 As Haile Silassie explained in his book he began thinking of having the 1930 Constitution while he 
was a regent (Haile Silassie 1937: 148). 
32
 This means Provincial Committee constituting of members from different departments of the 
military. 
33
 As much as hundred written laws and the first written Constitution were promulgated during this 
period. Subsidiary legislations also emerged-such were issued by the Addis Ababa Municipality and 
other ministries like Ministry of Agriculture and Finance. The country is also admitted to the League 
of Nations during this time (1923). 
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1998: 27). The law can be found in all kinds of right conduct where good is to be 
done and evil is to be avoided (Abera 1998: 28). This had much continuity from the 
first period and was believed to be universal, immutable, indispensable and obvious 
to all. This was the basis of the justice as provided for by man and God (Abera 1998: 
29). The law was unwritten and maintained only by ‘quene’ (a poem with two or 
more semantic layers with two-fold meanings) and by idiomatic expressions (Abera 
1998: 28-29). It embodied a minimum conception of the idea of natural justice or 
fiteh-fitretawi where everybody could base their claim. 
According to Abera this law was applied by the road-side34 judge before the 
introduction of formal court systems in Ethiopia. Idiomatic expressions by the 
people like: 
‘’The law ties together the shabby garment of the poor with the finest outfit 
of the rich’’ 
‘’A chicken lost without justice is more a curse than a mule gone fairly 
judged’’ 
‘’Justice is given by a man according to his own view and by God because He 
is all-knowing’’ 
‘’How dare you move when you are requested to stop in the name of law? 
Even dashing water ceases to flow when so demanded’’35 
These are all indications of such applications. The expressions indicate that 
principles of equality, fairness and legality tied-up with elements of subjectivity are 
some of the principles that decision making bodies were applying.  This law was 
applied before the application of any other ‘legal norms’ and later became 
integrated into customary laws (Abera 1998: 28, 31-32).  
                                                          
34
 A tradition where a man found on a street was expected to give decision on the matter before 
him, a subject of discussion in the section dealing with history of dispute resolution below. 
35
 For further discussions on natural law and customary laws see Abera: 1998 29-31.  
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1.3.1.2.2. Religious Edicts 
Religious books and chronicles36 were another seat of ‘legislative’ enactments of 
the period. Christian and Islamic law had much of their continuity from the past. As 
natural law continued in common usage the continuity of the Testaments and of 
Sharia law (on areas like marriage, inheritance, maintenance, guardianship, gifts) 
was visible during the period,37 so did the teachings of religious scholars. The 
teaching of law was a matter principally within the exclusive competence of the 
Ethiopian Church and the Mosque (Vanderlinden 1974: 250). 
Scholars were experts in interpreting and giving advice to decision making bodies. 
This can be seen as one of the bridges where by the traditional law and foreign law 
dynamics become interconnected. Spiritual and mystical beliefs continue to play 
their role during this period. Despite the hindrance to the ‘’uniform application of 
secular laws’’ these group of laws co-exist throughout the period (Vanderlinden 
1974: 253, Abera 1998: 34).  
1.3.1.2.3. Customary Laws 
Customary laws of different ethnic groups were also applied to civil and criminal 
matters. Customary law also known as ‘pure people’s law’ was a major body of law 
in Ethiopia at this time. Until the promulgation of the civil code the country ‘lived in 
observance of a wholly customary and extremely fragmented law’ (David 1985: 85). 
These have been maintained ‘because of the indigenous Ethiopian sense of justice’ 
(Abera 1998: 11). Moreover Brietzke held that ‘effective every day social control 
was maintained under the traditional laws which are misunderstood and mistrusted 
by professional and academic lawyers alike’ (Brietzke 1974: 155). It was not easily 
                                                          
36
 Ser’ate Mengist (literally the law of the State) contains twenty-one articles consisting mostly of 
enactments on the organization of Ethiopia Royal Court and some on matters of civil procedure-
which procedure in turn is connected with members of the royal court. According to it when the 
Queen accuses somebody or is accused by someone, the judge shall be called to sit in court in her 
house (Scholler 2005: 12). 
37
 There were also legislative enactments by the Catholic Church which were accepted by the 
Ethiopian Church (Vanderlinden 1974: 231). 
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affected by edicts from the capital or by local governors (Perham 1969: 142). Such 
customary law remained as ‘one of the traditional and deeply rooted law traditions 
of Ethiopia (Abera 1998: 39).  
In contrast to the natural law, customary laws were applied to a certain 
communities and lack national application. Their legitimacy was based on the 
‘’participation and consensus’’ of the community to whom they applied; they were 
not hegemonic top-down impositions. They would get a status of wider application 
when applied by higher courts as ‘’good means of solving disputes’’. They were 
‘’unwritten’’ to a large extent and were ‘unknown to most people’ including the 
judiciary (Abera 1998: 39-40). In contrast to natural law, which is believed to be 
universal, customary laws belong to an ethnic group in the locality to which it is 
applied. Accordingly customary laws were applied by the traditional institutions like 
Gadda, Sani, Ayyana, and Kallu for centuries (Gidey 2004: 1). ‘’Over 80 kinds of 
customary law’’ were applied in over 80 ethnic groups (Abera 1998: Introduction). 
When the unwritten laws were applied by the people it pulled them in many 
directions, thus the application of religious, customary and natural law was 
complex. 
1.3.1.2.4 Treaties 
This was a source of law to be found during the latter part of the period. It was 
found in treaties concluded between Ethiopian Sovereigns (particularly local kings) 
and foreign powers. The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements of 184138 and 184939 were 
the first among the treaties (Vanderlinden 1974: 230). Some of the treaties 
influenced the legal structure of the country. For example the 1849 treaty by Article 
XVII established Consular Courts in Ethiopia. The court had exclusive jurisdiction 
over British subjects both in civil and penal matters (Vandelinden 1974: 23).  
                                                          
38
 This is signed between British Government and Emperor Sahle Silassie. 
39
 This is signed between British Government and Ras Ali. 
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1.3.1.2.5. Written laws 
A large body of written laws also appeared during this period. These bodies of laws, 
with few exceptions, were not known to the common people. The laws were found 
either in religious books or chronicles40 or in non-legal texts such as travel reports, 
newspapers and general studies about Ethiopia; most were very short and optative. 
The laws were also general in the sense that they were applicable to the whole of 
the Ethiopian Empire at the time of their promulgation (Vanderlinden 1974: 227, 
230); the most important of which are organized and will be explained below. 
As a turning period in the legal history of the country this was a period when law 
began not only to be written but also to be codified. From 1434 to 1960 three 
important laws and the first written Constitution appeared in the form of codes.41 
The three important laws were Fewuse- Menfesawi (literally translated as spiritual 
remedy), Fetha Negest (litarally translated as the Law of the Kings) and the 1930 
Penal Code. 
Fewuse-menfesawi was the first law in the legal history of the country to appear in 
a compiled form. It was compiled by the Orthodox Church leaders around 1450 
under the order of King Zara Yakob (1434-1468).42 The main source of the law was 
‘’religious precept’’ from the Church.43 The rules governed more spiritual matters 
than secular ones, but according to scholars, the purpose of the law was the 
intention of the King to bring the administration of the Church under centralized 
                                                          
40
  The most important chronicles of which are four-of Aste Zera Yakob (1418-1452), Aste Be’ede 
Mariam (1452-1462), Aste Gelawdios and Aste Susinious (interview with Judge ‘Q’ and Priest and 
Elder ‘A’. Judge ‘Q’ is senior judge at the federal courts and senior student at the theology 
department of Addis Ababa University, while Elder ‘A’ has served in this capacity as an elder for 
more than 30 years). 
41
 As an exception to this one finds important written laws (like the Ser’ate Mengist) during the 
earlier time of the period. 
42
 The previous kings focused on importing knowledge from abroad by translating foreign books in to 
Ge’ez. Zera Yakob has got many books written with religious leaders and other personnel around 
him (Getachew, Dekike Estifanos 2010:27). Ge’ez literature flowered during his reign, exerted effort 
to control highly decentralized administrative system, he himself wrote a book entitled ‘’metsafe-
Milad’’ (the book of Nativity) (Abera introductory part). 
43
 Having 62 articles, Old Testament, Didascalia Apostolorum, The Epistle of Peter to Clement, the 
Synodos and Canons of Hippolyptus are the sources (Abera 1998: 184). 
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Canon Law or alternatively a desire to rule the  ‘’realm by written law rather than by 
amorphous customary law and oral tradition’’ (Abera 1998:183-185). Far from 
being comprehensive, its application on matters it intends to govern ‘’remained 
uncertain’’ and was ‘’not able to resolve’’ many of the legal problems it was 
intended to resolve. Its impact was short-lived and lacked the far-reaching 
consequences that were required (Abera 1998: 184).  
Dissatisfied with this result, and with a renewed intention to rule by written laws, 
King Zara Yakob ordered the import of another significant piece of ‘’legal science’’, 
Fetha Negest, in the middle of the 15th Century AD (Abba Paulos 2009: xxxvii, 
Vanderlinden 1974: 250). It was translated from Greek to Arabic and then to Ge’ez44 
and applied to lead both secular and spiritual life in Ethiopia (Abera 1998: 168, Abba 
Paulos 2009: xxxvii). It contained 21 religious articles and 29 civil and criminal 
articles. The secular part of the law had four books, with the source of the fourth 
being the Old Testament.45 While some parts were influenced by Islamic law, Sand 
suggested that Roman civil law emerged as the dominant source (Sand 1980:71-81). 
Ethiopian tradition suggests that the book ‘’fell from heavens during the reign of 
Constantine’ (Sand 1980: 74).  
The code (Fetha Negest) was originally written to help Christians lead a Christian life 
in a Muslim society (Redden 1968: 41, Doren 1994: 4). Thus, it did not reflect the 
realities of the country. According to Abera despite the attempt to ‘incorporate the 
most suitable legal principles which could be conceived in the epoch of its 
emergence’ its content had the ‘purpose of keeping Ethiopia under the ecclesiastic 
jurisdiction of the Coptic Church (Abera 1998: 189).  
Fetha Negest was said to be accessible and understandable only to those who 
continuously studied it i.e. the clergy (Abera 1998: 189). The religious edicts, to 
which the Fetha Negest was accessible were in the service of assisting the decision 
                                                          
44
 Ge’ez is the predecessor to Amharic and Tigrigna languages. 
45
The source of part three is the ‘’Canon of the Kings’’. 
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making system through their monopolised expertise.46 Leaving the controversy to 
legal historians, it was only readable to the few ‘’educated clergyman’’ who could 
read Ge’ez (Abba Paulos 2009: 9). The law was not well organised to locate the 
most relevant provisions necessary to settle a dispute and thus, the edicts service 
was required for judges and the Emperors to dispose of a case. This was natural as 
the non-formal judges were not as equally acquainted with the laws as the religious 
leaders were.  
This may be comparable to the interpretations given by juris consults around 3rd 
Century BC and the Glossators and commentators of Europe in the 11th and 13th 
Century. As Fetha Negest was monopolised by the edicts47 the daily life of the 
common people was regulated by their customary law (Abba Paulos 2009: 9). It 
could not completely replace the customary laws of the country and its application 
was ‘partial and random’ (Abera 1998: 186, Doren 1994: 4). It lacked the meaningful 
impact on the people it was intended to serve. Despite that, Sand held that it is 
‘’one of the most striking historical examples of a ‘transplant’ which illustrated the 
potential trans-cultural migrative adaptive potential of legal systems (Sand 1980: 
81).  
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 This was so during latter times. For instance, during the era of Zera Yakob religious leaders 
accused of Dekike Estifanos for an alleged preach breaching religious (Orthodox) teachings-for doing 
not good. Dekike Estifanos was given a chance to speak against the charges which he did elaborately. 
The king ordered the edicts and monks to give their verdict. Finally the king gave not only his verdict 
but also passed a promulgation to the effect that anybody wishing to follow the teachings of the 
accused is not prohibited as the accused is only preaching what the Gospel dictates as loved by the 
King (Getachew 2010: 82-91). Kings have their own armies to execute decisions. Zera Yakob has, for 
example Ye’tor Serawit, Ye’bitir Serawite and Ye’alenga Serawit (Getachew 2010: 215). They execute 
punishments like Girfat, Raqut Megiref, Tsegur Menchet, Esir, Banbese ena bewusha Masibelat, 
Masaded ena Gidya (Daniel (2015) Aratu Hayalan, pp. 92-101). 
47
 For example in the memories of Ze-Aleka Lema Haile, one can see that those experts in the 
religious knowledge are also experts in the Fetha Negest. Their knowledge in the Old Testament was 
comparable to their knowledge in the Fetha Negest (Mengistu Lema, 2nd ed., 2003: 29, 54, 83, 102, 
106, 119, 121, 123, 136, 140,148,152, 155, 209). Their interpretation was even required by judges of 
a high court to dispose of a case. The experts in this respect were called ‘’Lique’’ and use one of the 
three ways of interpretation-YandimTirgum (interpretation by alternatives), Netela Tirgum (literal 
interpretation), and YemistirTirgum (idiomatic interpretation) (Abera 1998: 35). It was never 
promulgated but thought in schools where laws were thought. 
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However because of its limited accessibility and the lack of meaningful impact it had 
on the people it is difficult to consider it as a good example of legal transplantation, 
adaptation or migration. The exact date it had been recognized and applied, and 
ceased application is not known. It did not establish official recognition of the land 
for a long time. It received official recognition only in 190848 when Emperor Menelik 
gave power to the Ministry of Justice (established in the same year) to control 
‘’whether every decision by courts was given’’ in accordance with Article 2 of a 
Decree in 1908. Its criminal provisions were applied until 1930. According to 
Vanderlinden the importance of the law was such that it practically precluded any 
development of legal science outside of its sphere of influence (Vanderlinden 1974 
251).  
However, during the later part of the period it inspired the promulgation of ‘civil 
and penal law’ in Ethiopia (Adejumobi 2007: 17). Abera also holds that the book 
‘received a prominent place in the legal history of Ethiopia’ as it served as a 
‘transitional law’ and contributed ‘a number of principles’ to the civil and criminal 
law (Abera 1998: 185).  
After a long period of time the second serious attempt to modernize the country 
was made when Emperor Haile Silassie came to power. The beginning of his reign is 
marked by measures such as incorporation of many western political modernisation 
ideas. Ethiopia abolished slavery, introduced a two house parliamentary system and 
ended the practice of brutal punishments for crimes. The promulgation of the 1931 
Constitution is particularly significant. This marked the starting point of 
modernisation and centralisation reform process of Ethiopia.49 The Constitution 
was proclaimed in the second year of Haile Silassie’s reign of his free will without 
the request from the population or the nobility (Messing 1955: 417). Consisting of 
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 It was in a very systematic way that the laws played their role in building system (1908), in the 
enforcement of government economic policies (in particular) and bring about social changes. 
49
 However, the reform was resisted by ‘’provincial nobility, great landlords and the church officials’’ 
(Abera 1998: introduction). 
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55 articles,50 the Constitution was adopted from the Japanese Meiji Constitution 
(Doren 1994: 9). Article 6 of the Constitution dictates that government power in 
Ethiopia rests in the hands of the Emperor whose power is ‘’indisputable’’. 
The codification of the 1930 penal code also signifies another serious attempt to 
modernise the country. It came a year before the Constitution was promulgated 
and after Emperor Haile Silassie came into power. 51  It runs short of 
comprehensively defining crimes and penalties but also governs civil matters. 
Drafted by a Frenchman, it was highly inspired by the Fetha Negest52 Siamese (the 
former name of Thailand) and Indio-China penal codes. By harmonizing, adjusting 
and modernizing the Code was promulgated to lead the development of a modern 
society.53 It attempted to adapt ‘’tribal law into modern conditions with the 
preamble of the law clearly indicating that was highly influenced by Western law 
and the Fetha Negest (Perham 1969: 41). In some cases like cases of (like 
responsibility) the code attempted to follow the declaration in paragraphs 4 and 9 
of the Preamble in the Fetha Negest. Thus, the Fetha Negest was a key constituent 
of the promulgation in the 1930 penal code (Abera 1998: 191). Ethiopian tradition 
has also bore its influence. The Code, in its preface allowed judges to decide 
according to their ‘’conscience’'. This wide discretion given to judges is an indication 
of the influence that the tradition bore on the Code. It came before the 1931 
Constitution and was applied until the 1955 Constitution. It had a total of 488 
articles and was amended by proclamation Nos. 3/1942, 16/1942 and 86/1947.54 
                                                          
50
It made a distinction between statutes (art.34), decrees (art.9) and orders (art 10). 
51
 He immediately embarked on a nationwide modernization programme; however he failed to carry 
through a major reform and relied greatly on political manipulation and military force. According to 
Haile Silassie the 1930 penal code has avoided the wide discretionary power of the judges (Haile 
Silassie 1937: 47).  
52
 See its preamble paragraph 4 and 9 which indicates its intention to balancing the Fiteha Negest 
and the European Laws. 
53
 Redden 1968: 44, see also the preface of the Code. 
54
 All these laws amended the 1930 penal code. The laws in particular amended the penalties to be 
imposed on those who committed theft and robbery, damaging vehicles (including ships, airplane) 
and crimes against foreign state (respectively). The effect of proclamation No. 86/1947 was 
retroactive. 
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1.3.1.2.5. Further Developments 
As a further development a move towards organising the country’s government 
function along European lines began. A Decree in 1908 defining the functions of 
various Ministers was the first move. The law making process assumed a more 
defined function than it had in earlier. Despite that more general imperial 
declarations55 closest in content and design to the ancient law also appeared. 
This period is also the time when the foreign laws began to be applied more 
directly. For example, Emperor Menelik in 1908 promulgated the law of the 
Administration of Addis Ababa. According to the proclamation, French laws (the 
Napoleon Civil code) could be resorted into the administration of Addis Ababa 
when local law was silent. Ministries were also promulgating subsidiary legislations 
in the form of public notices during this period. These legislation was prepared by 
foreigners assigned to advise each Ministry thus during this period foreigners began 
to directly draft Ethiopian law. Another important contribution of this period is the 
establishment of the first official law Gazzeta of Ethiopia (the Negarit Gazzeta) in 
1941. Proclamation No. 1/1941 established the Gazetta and declared that it shall 
contain forward all legislative enactments promulgated in Ethiopia. It has been 
published ever since in English and Amharic. 
As shall be discussed in Section 1.4, the institutional weakness and structural 
arrangement was not in a position to apply these laws. The formal Judges, even in 
the 1950s, were free to apply their own legal wisdom established by the principles 
of justice and equity (Vanderlinden 1968: 256) without being tied by the letter of 
the law. The implication is that the supposed codes designed to modernise and 
develop the country could then be by passed when justice dictated. Thus, 
modernisation was not necessarily correlated with the written laws. It was clear to 
                                                          
55
 For example the regulation concerning Afer-Sata on August 4/1933 which restricts the application 
of the system, and regulation concerning Wager on September 21/1908 have similar approaches. 
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see the continuity of the conception of justice regardless of the written law with the 
intention to appear modernized and therefore reformed.   
Another important development during the period was the introduction of 
procedural justice. Historians claim that the equivalent of the word ‘’law’’ in local 
languages (hig, se’reat, and fethe) had their origins in Ge’ez (Sumner 1973: 159-
160). The inclusion of the word se’reate (meaning a ‘procedure’) into the existing 
concepts of law (hig), and justice (fethe) shows a new broader conception of 
procedural justice had developed during the period within the new written law. 
The laws so far discussed were enacted to modernise the country. They were 
written by foreigners and influenced by many foreign sources which made the 
tracing of a determinable source somewhat difficult. Independent from colonialism 
and direct rule, the country but voluntarily inherited and depended on foreign law 
in providing guidance for its written law. Despite that the application of customary 
laws with its conception of justice remained noticeably present throughout this 
period (Doran 1994: 6). Thus, the intention of writing laws was to be ‘’better off 
with the code than was the case without it and the respect was for ‘writing’’ than 
‘contents’ (Doran 1994:5, Sedler 1964: 18).  
1.3.1.2.6. Perceptions 
The country during this period was perceived in three different ways: just, unjust 
and as a country impossible to explain. It is not only the ‘oldest republic’ but also 
one of the three ‘’independent black nations’’ during the period (Adejumoy 2007: 2, 
Abera 1998: 56, Bahiru 2002: 125). This contributed in making the country a symbol 
of ‘identity’ and ‘’grassroots activism’’ for the black population (Adejumobi 2007: 
2). The polity remained with in perfect harmony with the free people’ and in 16th 
Century AD Ethiopians were alleged to possess a level of development which was 
on par with its European counterparts (Diodorus quoted in Nathal 1974: 4-8).  
The country was perceived by others as uncivilised and lagging far behind. The 
Portuguese presence was short-lived due to their intolerance of local beliefs. 
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Despite the lack of frequent contact and long periods of isolation, traveling to 
Ethiopia was considered as getting an opportunity to ‘’travel to a distance time’’ 
and to a place still in a Biblical era’’ or into ‘’a medieval world (Nathal, 1974: 3). In 
1922 the Italians, viewing Ethiopia as ‘’uncivilized and primitive’’, led what was 
termed as a ’civilisation mission’ to the country. An application by Ethiopia to join 
the International Postal Union in 1895 was opposed by Italians using a similar 
justification (Nathan 1974: 11). While Menelik’s rule was perceived as ‘superhuman’ 
and the people as ‘civilized’, others were seriously considering the substitution of 
the rule by a more sensible ‘’human Government’’  and considered missions to 
‘civilise’ the country into how they imaged it should be.  
Thus despite the will to rule and/or modernize the country through its law, the 
reality and the perception of the Country remained contradictory: just/unjust, 
independent/dependent, civilized/uncivilized, unknown/perfectly peaceful. The 
legal problems of the past continued to multiply which indicates that the mere 
arrangement of law could not singularly bring about social justice. 
1.3.1.2.7. Remarks 
The law of the pre-Zara Yakob period with the exception of the Fewse-menfesawi, 
were imported from abroad, most notably from Romano-Greek influenced 
countries. While Fewse-Menfesawi and Fetha Negest were written to rule the 
polity, all the remaining imported laws were intended to modernise the polity but 
failed to reflect changes to the Country’s people. The written law was general in its 
approach and was not restricted in terms of its application to specific regions and 
groups of the people. For example the Fetha Negest governs both secular and 
religious matters. The 1930 Penal Code governed both penal and civil matters. Thus, 
the adopted law and treaties led to a further broadening of the sources of law and 
conceptions of justice.  
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1.3.1.3. Period of Modernisation (1955-1991) 
This was a period when the pre 1945 global ‘civilisation’ missions moved forward 
with revised impetus, thereby entering the ‘’decade of development’’ by the UN, 
‘’socialism’’ by the Soviet Union, ‘’dependency’’ by Latin Americas and the rapid 
economic growth by the USA (Wallerstein 2005). In the context of Ethiopia large 
swaths of laws ‘’were imported’’ from Western countries (Doran 1994: 5) during 
this period.  
By the 1950s, Emperor Haile Silassie embarked on securing his political 
administration through a balancing act that consisted of gradual integration into the 
world capitalist system whilst holding onto the conservative trappings of an 
autocratic empire (Adejumobi 2007: 97).  Accordingly the polity, through a desire to 
modernize develops the country through legal reform and took serious actions to 
modernize including the enactment of the Second Constitution. This is reflected by 
developing the country’s long term plans and by adopting the Six Codes. The period 
marked the start of a ‘real legal science’’ and establishment a law faculty at the 
Addis Ababa University (Scholler 2005: 20). The main efforts of law reform are 
indicated in the following sections.   
1.3.1.3.1. The 1955 Constitution 
Inspired by the USA Constitution, the 1955 revised Constitution suspended the 
1931 Constitution and devoted more than a quarter of its provision to matters of 
imperial secession and powers of the Emperor. The drafting committee of the 
Constitution was comprised of three American advisors and two Ethiopians. The 
source of power for the Emperor was a legitimate claim to be a direct heir of the 
‘’Solomonic dynasty’’ who would then be anointed by the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church (Doran 1994: 10). Articles 126 and 127 of the Constitution affirm this source 
of power in clear terms.56 The Emperor was duty bound to profess the Orthodox 
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 The 1955 Constitution, See also Doran 1994: 10 who argued that this was the rule and the ‘jural 
pustulate’ throughout the Monarchial regimes. 
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faith and defend the Church. It made the classification of law more precise and 
defined laws under Article 88-90, Decrees under Article 92 and Orders under Article 
26-28, 33, 34 and 36.  
With the lack of focus on social justice, the main purpose behind the Constitution 
was the ‘’consolidation of absolutism’’. Human rights provisions were ‘’inserted for 
the sake of form’’ rather than to reflect any desire in standards (Bahiru 2006: 206). 
John Spencer, the American member of the drafting committee, held that the 
Constitution was a ‘’screen behind which conservative positions were entrenched’’ 
(Bahiru 2002: 206). The power of the Emperor was made to be ‘’absolute and above 
the law’’ (Abera 1998:17). In its language and content the law was a ‘Trojan horse’ 
and as far as social justice was concerned it was not ‘’worth the paper it was written 
on’’ (Doran 1994: 10). 
1.3.1.3.1.2. Government Plans 
The polity developed consecutive plans to effect modernisation. The development 
plan (1957-1961) hinged on development with a special emphasis on 
transportation, construction and communication, although ‘’development was 
restricted to the major cities thus ignoring the much needed improvement in the 
quality of life for people in disparate and peripheral areas (Abejumobi 2007: 100). 
The second plan (covered 1962 and 1967) focused on changing the agricultural 
economy into an agro-industrial one. The third and final plan of this era ran 
between 1968 and 1973 and included the same goal. Critics argue that the strategy 
led to the ‘’systematic marginalisation of its denizens by starving them of economic 
and political opportunities (Abejumobi 2007: 101).  
It was for this reason that the ‘’Land to the Tiller’’ campaign was triggered by the 
wide spread poverty, Ethiopia was experiencing. Chronic underdevelopment 
manifested in violent competition for scarce resources, peasant rebellions and an 
increase in the population (Abejumobi 2007: 230-236). The modernisation and 
reform efforts left the hereditary nobility, most notably in relation to land rights, 
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contracts, and appointments contributed to the prevalence of weak institutions and 
a stagnation of economic growth (Abejumobi 2007: 101). 
1.2.1.3.1.3. Adoption of (six) Modern codes 
The period involved the adoption of a series of modern codes.57 Hence a second 
wave of legal reform took place: the commercial code promulgated to ‘’assist in the 
swift and orderly development of Ethiopia’s economic life, the Civil Code aimed ‘’to 
facilitate further growth and development and to contribute to the progress’’ of the 
Empire and the people (described in the Preamble to that code). However, the laws 
were not to establish the meeting of the country’s aspirations. Much to the contrary, 
the results (coupled with other causes) were disappointing and resulted in the 
downfall of the State. The modern codes failed to reach ‘’the hearts’’ of those to 
whom they were addressed and the much needed development of the peoples’ 
needs, custom including the improvement of natural and social justice.  
All the codes were inspired and drafted by foreign parties. While the Penal Code 
was influenced by the codes of various countries (Switzerland, Italy, France, 
Yugoslavia, Norway, Denmark, Poland) its primary source was the 1937 Swiss Penal 
Code and the pre-1957 Swiss jurisprudence (Abera 1998: 197). This was mainly 
because it was drafted by Jean Graven, a Swiss draftsman. It was acclaimed as one 
of the most ‘’modern and sophisticated criminal codes in the world’’ (Abera 1998: 
197). However it exposed inconsistencies in the system. The Code’s concept of 
crime, its purpose and the definition of suitable punishment was individualised, 
whereas the people’s conception of crime was traditionally communal. Customary 
dispute resolution mechanisms of investigation, policing and decision making were 
dominantly throughout the time the code was promulgated and enforced.58 
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 The codes are the 1960 civil code, the 1960 commercial code, the 1957 penal code, the 1962 
criminal procedure code, the 1960 maritime code and the 1960 civil procedure codes. 
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 For an elaborated discussion on this see Fisher 1971, Traditional Criminal Procedure in Ethiopia, 
African Studies Series. 
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The most important code governing the civilian life of the people, the 1960 Civil 
Code, was drafted by a French comparative lawyer Rene David. The source of the 
code was from the civil law countries of France, Switzerland, Egypt, Portugal, and 
Israel and the common law countries of the UK, USA and India.  As it was 
inconsistent with the prevailing customary norms, it tried to replace ‘’customary 
laws and enactments.59 Accordingly, Article 3347 of the Code repealed customary 
laws and reserved limited discretion to customs. Custom could, for example, be 
applied when the law is silent or only when the law expressly permits its inclusion. 
It was designed as a means to ‘’regulate relationships’’ so as to ‘’guide social 
development’’ (Abera 1998: 200). According to David Ethiopians were looking 
forward to the ‘’total transformation’’ of the legal landscape and this was, 
according to him, a point well taken while drafting the Code. Thus, it was aimed ‘at 
the perfection of society and tried to renew the ‘’frozen social level’’ of the people 
and create the ‘’material conditions for economic development’’ (David 1962: 204). 
This contradicts with what Abera held as the purpose of the Code. According to him 
the Civil Code of 1960 was of French origin with two missions: the modernisation 
drive of the Emperor coupled with the desire to ‘’remain faithful to a venerated 
tradition’’. It was also a ‘’blend of modern civil law jurisprudence with traditional 
Ethiopian concept of justice (Abera 1998: 200). The preamble of the code re-
enforces this when it declares the code to be in line with the well-established 
tradition of the Empire.  
In reality the Code did not reflect the Ethiopian reality and did not promote 
development, in fact rural development in its country of origin (France) or in 
Ethiopia (Brietzke 1994: 49, 123). Just as with the Penal Code, the people neglected 
the civil code and adhered to prevailing customary norms. 
The other codes also suffered from similar inconsistencies. In a mostly agricultural 
society, the commercial code (one of the best of its time) was ‘’ineffectual, and 
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 That is one reason why the civil code of 1960 boldly declares that ‘’all rules whether written or 
customary previously in force concerning matters provided for in this code shall be replaced by this 
code and are hereby repealed’’. 
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proved to serve only the ‘’tiny commercial elite’’ in the country.60 Inconsistency also 
lay among the codes themselves. While the substantive codes were ‘’received’’ 
from civil law countries, the civil and criminal procedural laws were influenced by 
the prevailing common law countries of the time.61 The inconsistencies made the 
people ‘’confused and cynical’’ after being pulled in many directions by the new and 
poorly understood laws’’ (Briezcke 1994: 49: Doran 1994: 5). Thus, the new rules 
proposed by the Government were disposed by the people.  
1.3.1.3.1.4. Remarks 
Generally speaking the modern codes were eclectic ‘’western flavored’’, ‘’fantasy 
laws’’ which were ‘’nominal, semantic and unauthenticated according to scholars 
(Abera 1998: 1, Fisher 1971: 709). They proposed to create wealth and engineer the 
society towards modernisation, but failed to satisfy the expectations of the 
Ethiopian people. The law and its application failed to create among the people the 
‘’deference, sympathy, fear and reason’’ towards the law and made the job of the 
judiciary difficult to enforce compliance. The codes were not even physically seen 
by ‘’some judges and administrators’’ up to 10-13 years after promulgation and, as 
there was no promotion or attempts at engagement, and as such they were 
resisted by the people and decision makers (Beckstrom 1973: 701). They also lacked 
the internal wisdom to force the Government to act and the external wisdom to 
account when there was inaction. Rather lacking the ‘’internal morality’’ and the 
‘’quantum variance’’ (or the ‘inarticulate major premises’’ of Holmes) 62  in 
application, state laws closed the way to development and paved the way to 
material under development in the country. 
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 Doren 1994: 4, most provisions of it remained unapplied so far. 
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 The law of loans, the decree on concession, the law on companies, the law of bankruptcy, the law 
of nationality (all of which from 1924-1933), the law of Addis Ababa city promulgated in 1908 were 
closely modeled on French law (Abera 1998: introduction). The civil procedure code is influenced by 
the Indian (who in turn is influenced by England civil procedure). 
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 The idea is taken from Kales, Albert (1917), ‘’Due Process,’’ The Inarticulate Major Premises and 
the Adamson Act, Vol. xxvi, No.7, http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-
content. 
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Neither were they able to bring about social justice and development. As the 
country suffered from the ‘’transplant-effect’’ a mismatch between pre-existing 
conditions and institutions and the transplanted law the justice it meant to serve 
went clearly in contradictions to the justice the people imagined or for that matter 
the intended consequences of the rule makers themselves conceived. The 
customary conception of justice and practice prevailed despite the fact that the civil 
code bars the application of customary laws in matters covered by the civil code 
(Doran 1994: 8, Briesztk 1975: 58). Contrary to the formal institutions the ‘’social 
cohesion’’ among the people was created and maintained by tribal rules. Minas 
argued that save for Saudi Arabia and the Vatican, there was no ‘’oneness’’ in the 
world between the people and the countries ruling elite (Minas 2005: 2). It is easy 
to agree as far as the formal system and as far as the people were concerned that 
the ‘’oneness’’ in Ethiopia was visible in the inter-connection between the people 
and the non-formal ways of life. These problems were to persist during the Derg 
Regime. 
1.3.1.3.1.5. The Derg (lit. the council, the committee) 
The slow pace in the reforms of the Emperor Haile Silassie regime led to an 
attempted coup in 1960s and a popular revolt by the people that included the 
peasants, students and taxi drivers.63 This resulted in the usurpation of Emperor 
Haile Silassie in 1974 and brought about an end to the lineage of the oldest 
Christian theocracy in the world (Adejumobi 2007: 116). This revolution was not 
organised and left a vacuum which looked to be filled by young military officers, 
none above the rank of major (with those above this rank are believed to be 
associated with the old regime), drawn from the main unit of the army (Air Force, 
Navy, and the Police). The composition was like a ‘’military parliament’’ known as 
the Provisional Military Administrative Council, known simply as the Derg, forming a 
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 In 1973 draught was sever in central and Northern Ethiopia (particularly Wollo) which consumed 
the lives of 200,000 people and was one cause of dissatisfaction by the people against the Feudal 
Regime. 
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military-socialist republic that took advantage of the power vacuum (Bahiru 2002: 
242-244).  
In the same year Mengistu Haile Mariam was elected leader of the Derg and 
commenced 17 years military rule. This being so the people and the adversary 
speak in terms of a ‘’burst of revolution’’ and the Derg lacked ‘’a coherent 
ideological platform’’ but practically judged and appropriated the ‘’revolutionary 
ideas of the Ethiopian leftist intelligentsia’’ and declared a ‘commitment to Ethiopia 
socialism’ (Abejumobi2007: 119, Bahiru 2002: 237). According to Bahiru the 
revolution transformed the judicial and legal process and the dictatorship from 
1974 to 1991 is an era of destruction (Bahiru 2002: 238).  
During the Derg regime a Constitution and special laws were proclaimed. It adopted 
the 1987 Ethiopian Democratic Republican Constitution which was highly 
influenced by the Socialist Constitution. With a difference in the office and power of 
the President, the Constitution was similar to the Soviet Constitution. It was 
aspiration window dressing (Doran 1994: 10). A referendum, a unique occurrence in 
Ethiopian history, to adopt the Constitution was held. However the government 
was ousted from power before it was implemented. The Derg era also indicates the 
continuity in adopting laws from abroad to modernise the country. 
Other important laws of the regime included proclamation No. 1/1974 and 47/1975 
and other socialist oriented laws. Proclamation No. 1/1974 was promulgated the 
moment Derg seized power and suspended the 1955 Constitution. Proclamation 
No. 47/1975 was proclaimed to nationalise private property. The proclamation 
simply declared the government as an owner of land. The Derg nationalised and 
redistributed land without due process. The people were then permitted to the 
right to use the land. This measure was supposed to have ‘’created the legal and 
institutional conditions for accelerated rural development’’. 
In the eyes of most observers, the legal reform was a step in the right direction 
(Brunal 1974: 260). Although the Government succeeded in rectifying the injustices 
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in land ownership and the allocation of resources, agricultural output stagnated 
shortly after. The parceling of land led to inefficiencies in farming practices. The 
quota system also took a significant part of the output from the farmers to be put 
into national schemes. This was so because the law failed to be applied fairly and 
equitably. 
Another remarked law of the Derg regime was the Special Penal Law. The law was 
promulgated in 1974 and was to be applied by the Special Court-Martia. It amended 
the penal and procedural laws to increase the speed and certainty of convictions for 
‘’enemies of people’’.  with elements of vengeance, increased draconian penalties 
not requiring the prosecutor in many cases to prove ‘’state of mind’’, was used 
retroactively to punish all acts against Ethiopian Tikdem (literally Ethiopia first). 
Despite the laws most activities of the Derg were conducted on a campaign basis. 
The first of these was the 10 year (1985-1994) National Revolutionary Production 
Campaign. The campaign planned projects between 1985 and 1994 with the 
objectives of accelerated economic growth.  
1.3.1.3.1.6. Further Inconsistency 
The laws proclaimed during the Derg period embedded important socialist ideas of 
modernisation. The socialisation, or more precisely intensive sovietisation, 
demanded clear law making but persisted side by side with the application of the 
six previous Capitalist Codes. Though the Derg introduced Marxist ideology ‘’in the 
‘unprepared soil’ of Ethiopia’’ (Abera 1998) and enacted some laws to this effect, 
the commercial code, the law of property, contract and tort which had significant 
liberal developmental ideology remained largely intact. 
The co-existence of socialisation of firms with the capitalist oriented Commercial 
Code, privatization of the commercial Code with the Nationalization policy and 
laws, state ownership of land with freedom of contract and with the unequal 
distribution of land were being in conflict. This was one of many inconsistencies 
created by the co-existence of socialized and capitalist ideas. The Codes have 
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survived the Derg regime and still are applicable in the free-market economic 
system. With the growing civil and common, substantive and procedural tension, 
the adoption of the Derg socialist oriented laws intensified the already competing 
tensions.  
Other contradictions lay between modern and traditional laws. The ‘’jural 
postulate’’ of the country during the regime was ‘’Ethiopia tikdem.’’ (Brietzke 2006: 
1). Initially a slogan, then a motto, and later translated in to a vague philosophy64 
which not only suspended the entire legal system but also made law the weapon of 
choice for the military elite to strengthen state authority; with the undesired albeit 
foreseeable effect of increasing political repression. While the Derg resorted to 
using public law as a weapon of development, the vast majority of the people 
‘’subscribed to the values embedded in traditional law chief among which was the 
non-interference of Government in the daily lives of the population (Scholler 2005: 
121). The Derg in its urbanised, paternal, and factional approach was out of touch 
with the rural people with drove dissatisfaction amongst these communities. The 
traditional laws of the past which tried to harmonise society in an ever changing 
world survived the Derg ideological belief in eradicating class struggle. 
The lack of clarity with the Ethiopian Tikidem left inevitable contradictions in the 
judicial system. One of the proponents of the postulate, the then chairperson of the 
Derg, Lt.General Aman Andom, presented a recommendation for administrative 
and economic reforms. But his quest came to an end when he was ‘’silenced’’ by 
the Derg the same year on a fatal November evening (Bahiru 2002: 207). Thus it 
poses the question of what was Ethiopia First without progressive economic and 
institutional reform.  
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With the new laws, Ethiopia remained one of the least developed countries in the 
world. Notwithstanding the law and the campaigns yielding land rights, illiteracy 
reduction and popular participation in politics the Derg was challenged from many 
corners. The GDP (lowered by 0.8%) with its economic crisis, the 1985 famine, the 
widely hated villagisation programme, issues of ethnicity and national identity and 
attacks (from inside and outside) weakened the country and forced the leader to 
resign in 1991 (Bahiru 2008: 275-276). At the end of the era, agricultural 
productivity could not match population growth and land reform was condemned 
as being antithetical to modern motivations and method with the imposed 
communisation stifling the spirit of competitiveness and individual contribution 
(Scholler 2005: 129). The Derg land policy stifled individual and communal creativity 
and removed incentives for successful farmers. The social services that were 
promised in the plan simply failed to materialise.  
The lack of social justice caused resistance in all corners of the country, notably 
from the North, and resulted in uninterrupted war in the country.  Coupled with 
global movements the challenges forced the Derg to replace its militaristic-Socialist 
policy with the Mixed Economy System on March 6/1990. Despite that the 
resistance groups, led by TPLF (originally fighting for regional autonomy) formed the 
Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (hereafter known as the EPRDF) 
in the 1980s and defeated the Derg army in 1991 (Bahiru 2008: 276, 277).  
1.3.1.4. Post 1991 
The Derg was overthrown in May 1991 by the Tigrean People Liberation Front 
(TPLF) led coalition of the EPRDF. The TPLF group took the name ‘’Woyane’’ of the 
1935s peasant protest in the Tigray Region and organised itself under the Leninist 
banner of ‘’self-determination up to secession.’’ According to Bahiru (2002: 271) the 
group opportunistically used the slogan to get support from people in the 
periphery. 
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The EPRDF, led by Meles Zenawi, set up a provisional administration comprising of 
all opposition fighters, from which the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front soon withdrew and resorted to armed insurgency. Eritrea 
voted for independence in 1993 and had a bitter war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 
2000 over a common border.  
The EPRDF committed itself to multi-party democracy and economic reforms largely 
assisted by foreign assistance. Post 1991 is the time when sustainable development 
is topical and this concept is regarded as the ‘’jural postulate’’ of the country. The 
EPRDF adopted the Constitution of 1995 and pledged to commit to the respect of 
human and democratic rights and to uphold the rule of law. All customary laws 
were allowed to be applied within the framework of the Constitution.65 
Based on the shift and the commitments in the Constitution, policy documents 
were adopted and many reform programmes were launched. One such reform 
programme was the Comprehensive Justice System Reform Programme of which 
the Judicial Reform sub-programme is the main component.66 Many laws are 
promulgated to give effect to the Constitution and policy direction of the country. 
In particular the Penal Law, Tax Law, Land Law, Family Law, and Labor Laws have 
been amended or repealed. The laws are promulgated by Federal or Regional states 
under their jurisdiction. Together with the new laws, all the law of the earlier 
periods, including the civil, commercial and procedural law continues in operation. 
Thus, it is a period of reform, and of formal and non-formal legal pluralism. 
Legal reform has the directions of sustainable development and good governance. 
Despite a claim that the development in the country was erratic and lacked 
equitable distribution of the income generated (John Wings 2008: 2-4), the World 
Bank and IMF stated that the economy of the country is improving. It is the period 
when the relationship between legal reform and growth is positively correlated. 
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Since development could call for further action, it can also be argued that it is the 
period where the law is seen to possess the potential to help sustain development. 
This period has inherited many of the complex legal problems which have lasted for 
centuries. It is not clear whether and to what extent these problems are resolved. 
Having the promise of development in the economy one may suggest that the 
period has proved that home grown law, as a means to sustain development, could 
potentially develop the country. The social side of development remains to be seen. 
In this respect the author will continue to investigate in the next chapters whether 
the judicial and legal reform programmes are working in the right direction towards 
realising social justice.  
1.4. Ethiopian history of dispute settlement 
People everywhere have their own way of practicing, symbolising, giving meanings 
to events, judging right and wrong, good and bad and other ways of life.  Schwartz 
has identified basic values and many orientations in culture. The first one is an 
individual’s ‘’embeddedness’’ in society where members of that society are 
committed to maintaining the status quo, propriety and restraint of action that 
might disrupt group solidarity or traditional order. The second one is ‘’hierarchy’’ 
where role obligations within unequal distribution of power is obeyed. Accepting 
the social and physical world as it is, trying to comprehend and fit in rather than to 
change it (harmony) is also another orientation of culture (Schwartz 2002: 1-7). 
These characteristics, with variations in degree from country to country, are in 
contrast to what characterises developed countries -autonomy, egalitarianism, 
mastery and individualism.67 
As shall be explained in Chapter Six values (including collective ways of life, 
relationships with authority and respect for the elderly, preference to avoid 
uncertainty, affection to modest relationships, caring for the weak and 
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interpersonal harmony) were some of the characteristics of Ethiopian society that is 
in contrary to life in the West. This was true for the philosophy behind the 
traditional way of decision making in Ethiopia. The following sections discuss the 
institutions which have prevailed in the legal history of Ethiopia as to how they 
apply the law.  
Two initial thoughts worth consideration include the fact that there was no 
significant change in the institutions of dispute settlement for many years and it is 
important to note that the periods so far discussed do not match the period that is 
concerned in the following discussion. The discussion that follows focuses on three 
key periods: pre-1941 post 1941 and post 1974.  
A further reminder on the source of the discussion includes the fact that the 
discussion on ways of doing justice in Ethiopia relies to a large extent on foreign 
sources. Local sources of information are scarce. Chronicles, as source of legislation, 
are of limited use although one can find important decisions by contemporary 
Kings. Thus, it is necessary to rely on the travelers account to get an idea of the way 
in which cases were decided.  
1.4.1 Pre-Zara Yakob (1941) Period 
Generally speaking dispute settlement mechanisms before the 1955 modernisation 
wave can be categorised in three categories: the traditional dispute settlement 
mechanisms (with varied versions), Imperial courts (formal courts) and special 
courts. Let us have a brief look at them in turn.  
1.4.1.1. The pre-1941 Non-formal Institutions 
Before the establishment of formal courts in 1941 there was no separately 
structured judiciary to dispense justice and enforce decisions, reliance was instead 
on non-formal methods of dispute resolution. Abera discusses such non-formal 
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institutions found in Tigray, Amhara,68 Oromo, Kunama, Garage, Somali, Afar, 
Wolita, Kefecho and Annuak areas. With some changes in some values, norms and 
attitudes of the polity, this was the mechanism by which the people view as the 
proper and prevailing disputing resolution mechanism (Doren 1994: 5, Beckstrom 
1973: 704). This system was believed to yield better results than force and the 
formal system. It involved various modalities that included village elders, spiritual 
ways of settlement and a passer-by judge.  
1.4.1.1.1. Village Elders as Arbiters 
Dispute resolution mechanism using a committee of village Elders has been 
widespread throughout Ethiopia. The elders are trusted and selected for being firm, 
strong and knowledgeable of right and wrong. They serve on ad hoc basis and strive 
to arrive at the truth of the dispute even if their own initiatives and would consider 
guilty plea as ‘’conclusive’’ evidence.69  An elder’s main function was settling 
disputes in order to establish harmony (Doren 1994: 4-5). The harmony supposed to 
be established was among the people, the environment and the Creator God. As 
communal values had priority over modern laws, the main aim was reconstituting 
and re-integrating deviants in to communal life (Gidey 2004: 5). That is why the 
elders’ involved themselves in the settlement process at the earliest possible time 
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and tried to settle the problem as quickly as possible so as to reduce the damage 
done in the interim to the community.   
Depending on the type of a dispute, elders use different mechanisms of settlement. 
They negotiate most disputes particularly minor cases. Mediation and arbitration 
are employed to disputes pertaining to economic and other cases disturbing the 
communal peace. Thus the procedure are not predetermined and not fixed and 
resolution depends on the kind of dispute and the parties involved.   
1.4.1.1.2. Spirit Mediums and Religious Leaders 
While elders were dominant mediators or arbitrators other actors were also 
involved in dispute settlement. Supernatural forces were believed to be part of 
dispute settlement mechanism. Before the advent of Christianity spiritual means of 
settling disputes had been the predominant mode of settlement. Justice was done 
in accordance with such customary ways of dispute settlement which persisted in 
the pre-Aksumite period.70 As part of the custom, dispensing of justice was also 
dependent on ‘’traditional local and mystical beliefs (Abera 1998: introduction, 
Fisher 1971: 723-728). This included the use of tenkuay (sorcerers), the Coptic 
Church (sabate-masdefat) and other spiritual means of dispute resolution.  
As a matter of uninterrupted continuity, one account of such practice was 
witnessed by Portuguese explorers in the 16th Century AD. The Portuguese were 
shortly expelled from the country for their ‘’arrogance and insensitivity towards the 
rituals and traditions’’ of the country (Penrose et al 1987: 85). The same way of 
dispensing justice still prevails in some part of contemporary Ethiopia.71 
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Later Churches72 and religious leaders (of Christianity and Islam) were serving as 
one means of dispute resolution. For example Churches were used as an institution 
of sanctuary for those who committed serious offences. Taking sanctuary conveys 
the message that the offender is demanding the involvement of religious leaders to 
set a reconciliation process in motion. Violating legitimate sanctuary was a serious 
offence. Church authorities took active part in promoting the peace process (Fisher 
1971: 724-726).  
Some of these mechanisms became formalised. Formal recognition was given to 
some spirit mediums73 and Church and Sharia Courts. However, the jurisdiction of 
the Church Court was abolished by a decree in 1942. Despite this litigants continued 
to make use of the Church ‘’Court’’ for family divorce and inheritance cases. Even 
later Emperors like Emperor Haile Silassie were referring cases to such courts 
(Doran 1994: 6, Gidey 2004: 47-50). 
1.4.1.1.3. A Passer-by Judge 
As disputes were matter for everybody, societal pressure and communalism made 
every person an arbitrator in the case. This arbitrator could be a person who was a 
witness (in contractual cases), a selected arbitrator by the litigants, a relative to the 
parties (in family cases), a resident of a locality (hence the names yehagerlij, and 
yewonzelij) or a person who was just passing by when the dispute occurred. 
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 When it is thought that religious rules are breached, the king himself could prosecute a defendant 
at a bench where the aristocracy, the clergy men and the monks preside. In one case they passed a 
death penalty against whom accused by king Zera Yakob. However the prosecutor, the king did not 
agree with the decision and asked for an explanation by both sides. The king asked the accused if he 
understood why he came to face the trial and why he couldn’t cooperate with the monks. He and 
the monks explained on these points. The king then demanded their verdict which they still insisted 
that the accused shall deserve death penalty as he ‘’annul Sabbath, did not obey the kings order and 
did not bow down the king’’. The king however ordered 46 lashes of flowing which was effected 
immediately. The accused took the flogging as a martyr (Getachew 2010: 92-95). The same king also 
ordered another religious father not only to be to be flogged 40 times but also to be sent to a 
mountain (being tied with robes) being imprisoned for not bowing down to him. Three months later 
the king pardoned them and then asked them not to petty against him as he only intended to 
maintain what he inherited from his ancestors (Getachew 2010: 105). 
73
 For example Wofa Legesse, Supra note 62, has been given Certificate by Emperor Haile Silassie to 
give his service throughout Ethiopia. 
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A passer-by who is not close to the disputants could be stopped and asked by the 
disputants to settle their case in the name of an Emperor or some other royal 
personage. The passer-by could either escort or send the parties to the nearest 
magistrate although such a judge was expected to accept the duty as a civic 
obligation and would be offered a small fee for the service (Fisher 1971: 728). The 
person so approached had to convene a tribunal on the spot, typically under a tree 
and was supposed to be open, hence the name Open Air Court; the object being to 
hear the case and settle the case on the same day. If the passer-by cannot settle the 
case he had the power to arrest a suspected law breaker by ordering the latter to 
submit to custody in the name of the Emperor or some other royal personage 
(Fisher 1971: 726). If he refused he could be apprehended by force. The dispute 
could further be sent to the formal or non-formal body.  
This kind of settlement was described by foreigners visiting Ethiopia as ‘’road-side 
court’’ or a ‘’tough-man’’ system and the judges as a ‘’passer-by judge’’ (Abera 
1998: 19, Clapham 1969(87): 111, Fisher 1971: 721). Travelers also witnessed 
arbitration by ‘’road-side judge’’ at various times. Farago reported on the ‘’justice’’ 
that he personally witnessed in the late 19th Century. According to him litigation 
was oral and could take place in the streets at any time any place. In a case he came 
to witness a ‘’police man’’ in the street was immediately promoted to the rank of a 
judge and gave the decision (Farago 1935: 31). 
More or less the same fact is recorded by Monroe for the medieval period. 
According to him, justice was highly centralised. He quoted Alvareze as reporting 
justice as ‘’rough’’ and ‘’ready’’.74 In minor cases, decisions were final and when 
appeals were allowed, appeals to the Emperor would pass through a ‘’notary’’ 
(Monroe 1935: 69). The whole procedure was entirely oral. Customary law was 
applied as the Fetha Negest was ‘’unsuitable to Ethiopia as it was inaccessible, 
difficult for the local people to comprehend the content and the purpose it was 
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 See Getachew 2010: 82-111, for details as to how justice (for example by King Zera Yakob) was 
rough and ready. 
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drafted (Monroe 1935: 70). Flogging and awards were the usual remedies. Alvarez 
witnessed the flogging of judges at the spot ‘’for miscarriages of justice’’ although it 
was not clear who judged them (Monroe 1935: 70). This same practice continued 
during the 17th Century but with more brutality (Monroe 1935: 125). With an eye 
for an eye, the same practice continued during the reign of the last Emperor Haile 
Silassie (Monroe 1935: 170). 
The passer-by judge would arbitrate based on his own conscience and according to 
the dictates of natural law (Abera 1998: 31). Under customary law (particularly in 
Amhara) the involvement of this kind of person as an arbitrator was common and 
maintained the balance in the application of natural law and customary law in the 
system. As every man was a judge Brietzke criticized the passer-by judge as an 
evasion of the ‘’ legal profession’’ (Brietzke 1974: 30).  
1.4.1.1.4. General Remarks 
The traditional methods, spirit mediums and passer-by judges have qualities worth 
summarizing. Procedures in all cases were simple. There was no specific procedure 
except oral accusations and denials. Litigation was spontaneous and both civil and 
criminal remedies could be given in a day.  
Non-formality, free debate by parties, pleaders and bystanders, reliance on 
arbitrator knowledge of the facts as the basis of decisions, some supernatural mode 
of proof and consensus judgments were common place in Ethiopian justice. In 
addition, extensive use of personal sureties and apparently elaborate regulation of 
witness evidence was also common. The non-formal procedures were also much 
influenced by lay audiences who were free to ‘’interject their own questions, 
comments, and even wager on the outcome of a suit (Fisher 1971: 730-732-732). 
The institutional arrangement in the non-formal sector and the wider involvement 
of the community in dispute settlement mechanisms indicates the philosophy 
behind disputing. Disputes which are negative to harmony are believed to damage 
not only the parties in dispute but also the entire community and had to be 
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avoided. As disputes arise owing to conflicts over scarce resources, honor, dignity, 
fame, religion, or blood revenge which were believed to escalate unless effectively 
settled, mediators usually focus on problems over parties, and the future is 
maintained by maintaining the status quo. 
The benefit from harmony was established amongst men, the environment and the 
Creator. That is why mediators, elders, and spirit mediums frequently referred to 
societal norms (by way of proverbs), their ancestors, and their Creator when 
necessary or when they come across hard cases.  
1.4.1.2. The pre-1941 Formal courts 
There were no formally established courts until 1941. Before the establishment of 
formal Imperial courts in 1941 the administration wing of the government acted as 
the judiciary. Thus an administrator of a locality was the judge of the 
administration. The Chika-Shum (parish headman-literally judge appointed over the 
soil) was an administrator and a judge at the lower level of administration. Above 
him in the hierarchy was the Woreda-gaz (literally District Governor) to administer 
the area and heard appeals from the Chika-shum. The Provincial Governor, who sat 
with uncertain number of Wonbers (judges), heard appeals from the Woreda-gaz. A 
king appointed Ras (administrator and governor of the locality) was a judge. Finally, 
the Emperor could review cases from the Provincial Governor. Much latter the Afa-
Nigus75 was mandated to receive appeals on behalf of the Emperor.76 
Though formal, litigation was entirely oral. As a result when a party brought an 
appeal to the higher court in the hierarchy, his opponent and the judges who gave 
the decision were required to appear before the appellant court. In 1908, Menelik 
decreed that decisions of judges should be registered by the registrar of judgments. 
                                                          
75
 The Afe-Nigus (lit. mouth of the king) was the President of the Emperor Supreme Court (see for 
example proclamation No. 2/1942 article 3). Before 1908 Afe-Nigus was responsible to hear any 
complaint, except complaints on death penalty, and used to give final decisions. 
76
 Regulation issued on December 1/ 1934 gives the AfeNigus power to hear appeals from special 
court with power to preside over litigation between Ethiopians and Foreigners. See also Monroe 
1935: 69. 
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Later on a Decree on March 22/1922 abolished this system and introduced the 
court record system.  
In 1908, Afa-Nigus (literally translated as the ‘mouth of the king’) was appointed as 
head of all judges in the country and according to part II of a Decree in 1908 was 
empowered to check whether decisions were given according to the Fetha Negest.  
All the judges were under a duty to send all copies of their files (Gilibach) to the 
Afe-Nigus for purposes of inspection. When the backlog increased, Emperor 
Menelik established six special tribunals comprising of 12 judges (Wonber-rases 
literally principal judges) to be appointed by the Emperor to receive appeals on 
behalf of the Afe-Nigus. However appeals from the Wonber-rases still could go to 
the Afe-Nigus under part  IV of the Decree in 1908. However that arrangement the 
prerogative discretionary power of the Emperor to receive cases for revision was 
also preserved (Fisher 1971: 714).  
Prior to 1941, judges were performing multiple tasks. Judges were administrators 
and arbiters as well as investigators. 
1.4.1.2.1. The Judges as Investigators 
A judge at Awraja (administrative hierarchy above Woreda) level was mandated to 
investigate homicide cases under Decree No. 21/1937. In being an investigator, they 
were to be assisted by four assessors and the Governor General77 of the locality. 
The finding of the investigation would be sent to a criminal court for sentencing 
that could pass criminal sentences aside from the death sentence. Judges at lower 
level were also expected to investigate unknown offenders using the Afersata78 
procedure.  
                                                          
77
 Is a Governor higher in the hierarchy than Aweraja. 
78
 This was a government sponsored criminal inquiry into a crime. In conducting the Afersata all the 
local people gather to pick up the perpetrator of an alleged offence. One of the people inform the 
judge in private as to who committed the offence and the judges declared the end of the gathering 
as evidence is provided with by a ‘’wof’ (Litarally bird). 
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Some trace the origin of Afersata system to 1781 when it was instituted to help the 
King police-the Leba-adagn79 (thief hunter or seeker administered by a Chika-
shum). In Afersata all the local people would gather in the forum where the ‘’judge’’ 
sat with seven or eight Mirtoch (Literally translated as ‘selected‘) to investigate a 
crime where the offender was unknown. The investigation could take days. Being 
informed by a member of the gathering the judge would pick one of them as the 
perpetrator of the offence. The informant would remain anonymous and the judge 
would pick the offender as if informed by a ‘’Wof’’ (literally a bird). The accused in 
this system could appeal to the Governor on the testimony of the ‘’Wof’’. In the 
same way the Chika-shum would be involved in the investigation of a crime using 
the Leba-shai procedure. Both the Afersata and the Leba-shai80 were believed to 
identify an unknown offender. These practices had elements of the past where 
decision makers investigated and reached for the truth of the case with the help of 
supernatural forces. 
Non-formal systems had penetrated the formal system in other more formal ways 
as when laws allowed the direct application of non-formal systems. For example a 
proclamation on July 28/1932 mandated the courts to base their decision on the 
established custom (Ende-Sir’atu) of their locality. The proclamation empowered 
Emagnoch (literally assessors) from the non-formal sector to assist the formal 
system in the discharge of its duties.  The application of customary laws with the aid 
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 Literally it means a thief-seeker who serves to find a fruit of an offence. The process of searching is 
as follows. The person to serve as a leba-shai has to be a young boy aged from 14-18 and should not 
have commuted sexual intercourse. A victim of the offence would complain to the administrator of 
the locality. The person would receive the leba-shai and took him to his house where he would be 
served with local drinks and seep a smoke through a pipe. After he became unconscious a person 
delegated from the administration would tie his flank up with a girdle and give him a flog using a 
switch. The young boy then would wake up and run. The person delegated would hold the girdle and 
follow the leba-Shai, protecting him not to touch water and any person otherwise he would be 
antidote. The leba-Shai finally would get into the house of the offender or sleep under the bed of the 
offender. The owner of the house or the bed would thus be the offender (Kebede 2011: 72-78). 
80
 The civil codes did not recognize the system as a result the profession fallen in to disuse (Messing 
1955: 422).  Afersata and leba-shai are abolished during the reign of Haile Silasie not for adhering to 
the bottom up approach but the desire on the part of the ‘’ruler to be seen modernized by 
westerners’’ (Alexander 1994: 269). 
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of Emagnoch made customary laws more discernible (Fisher 1971: 712). The non-
formal system of settling disputes were penetrating the formal system and contrary 
to the formal courts, non-formal systems were omnipresent and omnipotent. 
Formal laws couldn’t ignore this fact. 
1.4.1.2.2. Zufan Chilot (Emperor Bench Jurisdiction) 
As part of both the formal and non-formal system the Emperor had exclusive 
Prerogative to preside over cases (Chilot) and was the apex of dispute settlement. 
Similar to the local administrators, Emperors who throughout history were taken as 
the ultimate source of justice were capable of trying cases they deemed important 
and exercised judicial function as one of the duties of Kingship. It formed part of the 
ancient institutions and was firmly established in the Ethiopian legal system and 
was one of the most fundamental parts of the legal institutions in Ethiopia (Sedler 
1964: 59, 76). Even during the time when political power of Emperors declined, 
Emperors were recognised as the ultimate source of justice (Sedler 1964: 59). 
According to Sedler Emperors81 of the country have been looked upon as the 
‘’ultimate source of justice and as part of this tradition, Emperors were empowered 
to exercise prerogative sovereign power to do justice in the country (Sedler 1964: 
60-61, 76). It is a long history and one of the reasons that sustained the monarchical 
system for such a long period. According to one source, it was more than 3000 
years old (Redden 1968: 146).  
The Emperor at the apex had original jurisdiction82 in the more serious cases. For 
example one can find in the chronicles the famous condemnation to the death of 
Zara Yacob’s sons and daughters by their father for idolatry (Vandelinden 1974: 
245-246). In the 16th Century Alvarez recorded that ‘’important cases’’ were 
entertained by the Nigus (King) and Abera lists commercial cases tried by Emperor 
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 As fountains of justice their power with respect to life, land, property of the people was unlimited 
and unquestionable. These were not recognized by a law. 
82
 The Emperor’s power to appoint, dismiss, arrest, release, kill and pardon was more of an exercise 
of original jurisdiction than administrative power (Zikre Neger 1946: 52, Fisher 1971: 71). 
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Iyassu (1730-1755), of cases of liquidated sums, homicide, theft, robbery and 
liability for animals irrespective of fault by Tewodros (1855-1868) (Sedler 1964: 60). 
A Decree on 23 Jan. 1883 by Menelik provided evidence of how he gave serious 
decisions on theft cases. According to Abera, Emperor Menelik also entertained 
cases of defamation (through incriminatory letters) and perjury (Abera 1998: 83-
89). 
Despite its significance, the old system of Emperor justice was a ‘’wandering’’ one. 
The Capital City was in a continuous state of motion. While Aksum and Lasta (for 
Zagwe Dynasty) were relatively permanent, the seat of the Ethiopian court moved 
from Aksum to Gonder, Lalibala, Tigray, Shoa and many other places in between. At 
times the shift was twice a week (Horvath 1969: 210). In order to initiate a change 
in the location of a capital city or camp, Emperors had only to mount their horse or 
mule and ride out of the settlement (Horvath 1969: 211). As Emperors were the 
final arbiters and the fountain of justice throughout ages, the judicial body and 
justice they served was also wandering. It was during the reign of Fasiledes (1632-
1667) that the quasi-nomadic mode of the Ethiopian monarchy was abandoned and 
the royal court came to rest at the city of Gondar (Adejumobi 2007: 24). 
In the exercise of zufan’s appellate jurisdiction the Monarch spent a good part of 
their time in personally dispensing justice to litigants who came from far and wide 
(Markakis and Asemelash 1967: 196). According to the system the tradition is that 
every Ethiopian had the theoretical right to appeal to the Emperor. In the past 
appellants did so by throwing themselves in the Emperor’s path and shouting 
‘’Abyet’’ literally ‘’hear me’’ or appearing before the Emperor palace and shout the 
same way (Messing 1955: 418).  
More recently a part VIII of Decree on Oct. 21/1928 and a proclamation on July 
28/1932 allowed aggrieved parties to speak (Mechoh, Abyet Malet) to Emperors 
when dissatisfied with lower court decisions. Emperor Haile Silassie exercised this 
power despite the fact that the 1931 Constitution did not formally recognise this 
48 
 
jurisdiction.83 The Emperor was believed to exercise their discretionary power to do 
justice and mitigate the rigors of law when courts failed to do so (Sedler 1964: 72).  
The Emperor’s Chilot jurisdiction was assisted by officials. During the earlier period 
the Afe-Nigus assisted the Emperor. In his travel report Monroe recorded an 
Emperor presiding over cases with two ‘’chief justices’’ (Monroe 1935: 69). Later on 
two important institutions named Fird-Mirmara and the Seber-Semi 84  were 
introduced to assist in making recommendations to the Emperor in the exercise of 
His Chilot jurisdiction. Fird Mirmera used to screen and refer cases that demanded 
the Zufan Chilot. It could also establish a commission to assist the office. On the 
other hand Seber-Semi was to give opinions on questions of law on those cases 
being entertained by the Emperor. These institutions could also recommend 
another court to hear the case (Sedler 1974: 73). 
Changes in form and extent, the underlying rationale for the Chilot jurisdiction 
remained the same for so long.85 
1.4.1.3. Pre-1941 Special Courts 
Special courts of various kinds were operating in Ethiopia before 1941 under 
treaties, decrees and traditions. The treaties in 1849 and 1908 established special 
courts for British and French citizens. According to Article 7 of the treaty of 1908 
the law of the defendant country was to be applied unless both subjects were 
foreigners. The Franco-Ethio treaty of 1922 also established the Special Court of 
Ethiopia to try cases arising between Ethiopians and foreigners. 86 The courts had 
jurisdiction concerning all conflicts (civil and criminal) where a foreigner was 
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 This was also so for the latter part of the legal history. Thus, art. 182 of the criminal procedure 
code allow Chilot Jurisdiction despite the 1955 Constitutions did not recognize it. 
84
This had been recognized by a proclamation dated on December, 6/1932.  
85
 Even Emperor Haile Silassie held that he used to preside over this Chilote on every of Wednesday 
and Friday as this had been the norm that has come from earlier days (Haile Silassie 1937: 46-47). 
See also Sedler 1974: 73, 67. 
86
 Later on the jurisdiction was extended to other foreigners not benefiting from similar agreements 
between their government and Ethiopia. This extension of jurisdiction was based on the principle of 
‘’equal treatment’’ to all foreigners in the empire (Vanderlinden 1974: 248). 
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involved. These Special Courts exercised jurisdiction when foreigners demanded in 
which case their consul sat as a member of the court and foreign laws applied. 87 
Save for appeals in homicide cases, the Decree of July 4/1930 improved the earlier 
treaties so that the Afe-Nigus was delegated to hear appeals on behalf of the 
Emperor. The decision of the Afe-Nigus was to be executed after the Emperor gave 
his consent. However principles developed by the court are not available (Abera 
1998: 82). 
During the 1930’s the special court was more actively sitting nearly permanently 
and made important decisions (Vanderlinden 1974: 249). The Court ceased to 
function with the Italian occupation of 1936 and was not revived after the 
restoration of Ethiopian independence in 1941, the original treaty having been 
abrogated as a result of French recognition of the Italian conquest (Peters 2000: 
56). 
Another special court which had jurisdiction on cases regarding the security of the 
country was also established by Decree No. 87/1939. The court had nine judges-
four of which were from the high court, three from the military with a rank above 
Liieutenant Colonel and two from the civil administration with a rank above Hager-
gezi.88 All the judges were appointed by the Emperor. Decisions were appealable to 
another special court having five judges: The Afe-Nigus, presidents of the houses, 
one official chosen by the Emperor from those who were advisors to the crown and 
one person from the military who as the most senior General were members of the 
special appellate court. 
There were also other special courts like the market courts which were functioning 
outside the formal court system. The market courts were supervised by the 
‘’market master’’ who could sit on cases along with a special judge (Fisher 
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 This special court had a foreign advisor. According to Emperor Haile Silassie the Swiss Musie 
Abierson was assigned as an advisor to the court (Haile Silassie 1937: 42-48). See also Monroe 1935: 
170.    
88
 According to the Afersata Regulation, dated August 4/1933, this is the governor of a locality who is 
also the judge of the locality (article 10
th
 of the regulation). 
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1964:716). In his account Farago recorded the existence of a court of appeal 
presided by the Minister of Justice and a Court of Justice presided by the Minister of 
Trade (Farago 1935: 30-32). As the ‘’market courts’’ were not recognised by formal 
laws, the appeal system was interconnecting the non-formal and the formal system. 
1.4.1.4. Attempts to Integrate the Formal and Non-formal Systems 
There were attempts to reform some of the dispute resolution mechanisms, such as 
Afersata, Atbia-dagna and leba-shai (Literally a local judge) during this period. 
Regulation dated July 26/1932 identified two reform areas in Afersata: the need to 
reduce the number of people gathering in the Afersata and the need to rectify the 
miscarriage of justice under the guise of ‘’wof’’. The regulation limited the size of 
the arrest and the days of collective confinement. Afersata was more formalized so 
that it could be held once in a month on either Saturday or Sunday (as prescribed 
by Article II), the investigating judge could sit at a place where the parties and 
witnesses did not need to travel for more than three hours and could investigate 
under oath, the administrators who were responsible for sending the parties to the 
judge for investigation, and the investigative judge would be appointed by the 
administrator upon recommendation by the Shaleka. The judge could arrest the 
guilty and send him to the judge next in the hierarchy (who according to Article X 
was the Governor of the locality). The undisclosed witnesses who were called wofas 
indicated above were required to be known and named as witnesses of the judge 
under Article XII of the Decree. 
Another institution that had been established to reform the traditional system was 
the Atbia-dagna. The Atbia-dagna was established by the Central Government as 
per proclamation No. 90/1947. Its establishment was an attempt to combine the 
local traditional with the new formalised traditional means of settling disputes 
(Singer 1971: 327). An Atbia-dagna was a local judge appointed as a judge in the 
rural areas. Each Atbia (locality) would have one Atbia-dagna. The dagnas (judges) 
entertained tinish-neger (small claims) and settled (erq) disputes on the basis of the 
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local tradition. If mediation was unsuccessful, they could arbitrate. Their decision 
was appealable to Mikitle-Woreda (sub-woreda) courts. If the Mikitil-Woreda courts 
varied the decision the woreda court could hear the appeal and its decision was 
non-appealable as specified in Article V. Two Emagnote also advised such courts 
under Article IV. These attempts to reform were resisted by the people who 
neglected the Atbia-dagna and ‘’often used customary law or equity’’ (Doren 1994: 
5). Other means of settling disputes were often more ‘’effective’’ than the Atbia-
dagna (Singer 1971: 327-328). 
An attempt during the Menelik era to limit the practice of leba-shai is another 
example of re-formation. An initial attempt to abolish it shifted to limit the exercise 
of the leba-shai as the leba-shai discovered a ring which Menelik had hidden in 
order to test the effectiveness of the system. 89  Leba-shai too was resisted 
(especially in the Southern part of Ethiopia) as a centrally imposed system.  
1.4.2. Post-1941 
1.4.2.1. Formal Courts 
For the first time in the legal history of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 2/194190 
established formal court systems constituting the Imperial Supreme Court, High 
                                                          
89
 For this and further discussions see Fisher, work cited at note 52. 
90
 It was after the Italian occupation when the country began everything a new. Though three 
important changes took place during this time (established the court, established the law school, 
and promulgated lasting codes), the judiciary especially at the lowest level hasn’t been significantly 
changed from what has been during the earlier times. The people still serve subpoena and is the 
police judge, use intercession, lodge complaints against the court before the administration, practice 
Awchachign (another name for Afersata). The main reasons were judges being alien to the new laws, 
the lack of independence and their organization, progress in the modern courts being evolutionary, 
the educated not joining the judiciary and lack of training centers for judges (this is based on the 
earlier belief that Ethiopian, acting as a passer-by judge, are specialized judges), the new laws 
proclaimed in a hurry (which do not have traditional laws ready to base upon) became  a burden to 
the already problems, lack of institutions (registry for example)  to fully implement them, lack of 
trust upon the modern courts even from the government side, all made the laws seem fiction than a 
law to be enforced (Assefa 1973: 19-29). 
 
It is only if the modern courts (treat parties equally, independently, competent) are trusted that 
there would be peace and security, healthy developed society, that the new laws would thus be 
customized by the people. Then after the police and court would only become nominal institutions. 
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court, Ye’awraga or Provincial Court and Woreda or Kebele Courts. The organisation 
of the courts followed the organisation of the administration. Accordingly all 
powers were merged at the top in the person of the Emperor, at the bottom the 
executive functions were combined with the judicial functions. Local governors 
were presidents of their respective courts.91 In the 1960s the civil and criminal 
procedural codes reorganised the courts but the four level hierarchies of courts92 
and the chilot jurisdictions were retained. 
Alongside the formal courts, the Chilot jurisdiction of Emperors still continued in 
this period. The Emperors were given formal power of appellate jurisdictions as per 
the Civil Procedure Code of 1968 and Article 168 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 
1961. Accordingly he could give decisions as justice and common sense dictated 
rather than the directive provided by the law. So the law could simply be put aside 
by the judiciary and the Emperor in the interest of ‘’justice’’ (Clapham 1969, 1987: 
111, Abera 1998: 5). The earlier institutions and techiwoch (literally translated as 
Assessors) continued to assist him either by screening the cases or by giving legal 
opinions. 
Despite the Constitutional guarantee that judicial power could only be exercised in 
accordance with the law and that judges were personally independent, as specified 
by Article 110 of the Constitution, 93 judges of all levels were to be appointed by the 
Emperor and were responsible to administer justice ‘’in accordance with the law 
and in the name of His Majesty Haile Silassie’’ as set out in Article 48 and Article 111 
of the Constitution of 1955. One of the then judges, Gebrehiwot, noted how 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Being the custom, the people like the earlier times would then respect the laws without them 
(Assefa 1973: 33). 
91
 See for example article 10 of a proclamation dated on August 4/1933 which states that the 
governor of a locality was also the judge of the locality. Kebele throughout the thesis represents the 
lowest form of government administration in Ethiopia.  
92
 The criminal procedure code, under article 223, even maintained the Atbia-Dagna courts to 
entertain cases including damage to property cases or cases of theft whose value worth less than 
Ethiopian Birr 5.  
93
 Thus the Ethiopian judiciary were capable of assuming a capital role in the development of the 
national legal system if the court respect article 110 of the Constitution which declares that ‘’in the 
administration of justice, they submit to no other authority than that of the law’’ (Scholler 2005: 17). 
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inaccessible and dependent the formal courts were. He remarked how busy he had 
been working as an administrator in the morning and as a judge in the judiciary in 
the afternoon (Gebrehiwote 1990: 34). 
Furthermore the institutional incapability of the formal system to implement the 
modern codes was visible at the conclusion of the period when there ‘’were no 
professional judges and institutional setups to comprehend the modern codes’’ 
(Abera 1998: 17). There was no finance and the majority of judges did not have 
formal, let alone legal, education. After 30 years of the Codes’ promulgation, 90% of 
the population was still illiterate (in 1994 it was 85%) and 5th grade was the 
maximum level of education for the judges (Beckstrom 1972: 701, Doran 1994: 5). 
These judges were expected to apply the most developed codes requiring expertise, 
for instance, in mathematics and accounting94 for tax, and other business law.  
The Imperial courts were supposed to administer other relevant Imperial orders as 
laws and later the Fetha Negest. The law, however, was not uniformly and 
consistently applied by the courts (Beckstrom 1973: 74). The Fetha Negest, for 
example, was an ‘’esoteric document hardly known or used outside of the highest 
court’’. By the 1950’s it was considered outdated and the Civil Code of 1960 under 
Arrticle 3347 repealed it (Doran 1994: 4). Thus formal courts lacked a jural 
postulate and the attainment of modernisation or development or civilisation or 
sustainable development was not thought of as a task for which the judicial body 
bore responsibility.  
1.4.2.2. Post 1941 Customary and Special Courts 
Customary courts of the earlier times were operating after 1941 in a number of 
ways. The incapability on the part of the formal courts was forcing the people to 
resort to its established forms of dispute resolution such as negotiation, arbitration, 
lodging complaints to the Emperor, and to self-help. A study in 1968 indicated that 
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 Though Beckstrom (1973: 703-708) held that the judges were serving ‘’visceral service’’ Paul 
Brietzke challenges this. He argues that the civil and commercial codes are ‘’neither for the most 
part oriented towards traditional laws nor do they promote development’’ (Brietzke 1974: 149-167).  
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customary dispute resolution mechanisms applied by local elders were very much 
alive despite the attempt under the Civil Code to curtail them (Doran 1994: 5). 
During the era of the modern codes the people rarely made use of Government 
courts (Doran 1994: 5).  
Moreover the non-formal system penetrated the formal system in a number of 
visible ways. At first the proclamation establishing formal courts for the first time 
allowed the traditional courts to hear and settle minor disputes ‘’until such time as 
regular courts can be established’’ to decide cases.95 It was to this effect that local 
judges (Atbia-Dagna) were established by proclamation No. 90/1947 until the 
procedural codes were promulgated.96 All the courts were permitted to have two 
Emagnoch (assessors) who could question witnesses or give opinions on judgments 
although the courts were not duty bound to follow the advice of Emagnoch.97 
As in the earlier days, the ordinary court judges used to refer matters to the village 
elders which again applied the customary court and kept its influence in the formal 
system (Doran 1994: 5, Gidey 2004: 47-50). This was so as judges were not well 
acquainted with the local custom despite their claimed selection based on factors 
such as sympathy for the poor, truthfulness and knowledge of custom. As judges 
were referring cases to the traditional system the ‘’modern’’ law lost the 
opportunity to be judicially applied and serve the modernisation they promised 
(Singer 327-328).  
A significant change in this period occurred when the feudal system was ousted 
from power by a military junta; known as the Derg. 
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 Article 23 of Proclamation No.2/1942.  
96
 The two procedural codes also changed the structure of the courts by establishing the Woreda 
(the lowest level in court structures), Awraja(above Woreda) and High courts while at the same time 
impliedly abolishing or limiting the power of Atbia Dagna, mikitil woreda (Communal court) and 
Teklay Guazat Court. Actually the Atbia Dagna was an elder to mediate, a police to enforce in a 
locality where there were no police force, an administrator, and a judge to decide (Assefa 1973: 19). 
97
 See for example article 19 of Proclamation No.2/1942 to this effect. 
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1.4.2.3. Formal Courts during the Derg (1974-1991) 
During the Derg era courts were mainly organised in accordance with the two 
procedural codes. The most significant change was the erosion of power of the 
formal courts. The regime proclaimed ‘Ethiopia First’ the moment it came to power 
and executed more than 60 former government ministers and senior officials 
without trial by the ordinary courts. Thus, the judiciary was effectively subject to a 
forced abduction of responsibility from the very beginning.  
During the Derg regime most of the powers of the judiciary were taken away from 
the court and given to either the executive or some other committee. Special courts 
were established at the highest level to entertain important economic and other 
‘’revolutionary’’ crimes (Proclamation No. 214/1974). Military courts were also 
established to entertain Constitutional issues. Kebele courts (at the lowest level of 
administration) and kenema98  courts were established to entertain the most 
important cases for the public like housing and immovable property (Proclamation 
No. 11/1980).  
Thus the ordinary courts were entertaining less significant cases.99 That was one of 
the reasons why the courts were not as visible as they should have been. The 
Courts were also organized under the Ministry of Justice (Proclamation No. 
11/1980). Later on the courts were able to secure their separate administration but 
remained within jurisdictions which were not considered important by the 
Government. Judicial appointment was based on loyalty to the then single party 
(Workers Party of Ethiopia). Judgeship was for a term equivalent to the term of a 
national council (Shengo).  
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 An administration in the cities set up above kebele ( the lowest level of administration). 
99
 District and General Special Martial Courts were more important that the ordinary courts. More 
minor cases were entertained by the ordinary courts and conflicts between the courts were resolved 
by a ruling from the special court (see Proclamation No. 9/7194, 7/1974, 7/1975, 323/1973, 
185/1961 get more information as to how the power of the ordinary courts were curbed). 
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The judiciary of this time was also seen as an integral part of an oppressive 
regime.100 When the Derg was ousted the judiciary was found to be inefficient, in-
accessible, biased, lacked systems of accountability and ineffective according to the 
Justice Reform Programme of Ethiopia in 2004. The cumulative result of the system 
was ‘’low per capital productivity, income, consumption and saving’’ (Briesztk 1975: 
40-49). 
1.4.2.4. The Era of EPRDF (Post 1991) 
The discussion on the judicial system of post-1991 is the subject of Chapter Six. 
Here follows only a brief introduction to the system. 
After the downfall of the Derg the age old central system of administration gave 
way to a nation nationality and peoples based on a policy of federal 
decentralization. The arrangement of the judicial system automatically followed 
from the federal arrangement. Accordingly, there are two tiers of court: the Federal 
Courts and the Regional Courts. The Federal and State Courts have their area of 
jurisdiction and have independent structures, administration and accountability 
system. The Supreme Courts have power to give final decisions only in areas of their 
jurisdiction.  
Proclamation No. 25/1996101 established the Federal courts. The courts are vested 
with power based on three principles: law, parties and place. Federal courts have 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws, international 
treaties and other parties and places identified in the proclamation. The Supreme 
and High Courts have appellate and original jurisdiction.  
The Federal Supreme Court includes a Cassation bench with the power to review 
and over turn decisions issued by all other courts (including cassation benches of 
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 World Bank, Legal and Judicial Assessment Report 2004: 15; also CIDA 2008: 101. 
101
 Central courts were established by Proclamation No. 40/1993. The courts were organized to 
administer justice. Under article 4(1), 4(2) the central courts were mandated to ‘’safeguard 
individual and democratic rights, freedoms, and interests guaranteed by the Constitution and ensure 
the maintenance of law and order and the prevalence of peace and justice’’. The courts were 
replaced by the Federal Courts (Proclamaton No.25/88) without comparable mandate. 
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regional courts) containing fundamental errors of law. The interpretation of law 
rendered by the cassation division of the Federal Supreme Court is binding on all 
other courts as provided under Article 2 of Proclamation No. 457/2005.  
Federal judges are appointed by the House of Representatives (HOR) after being 
selected by the Judicial Administration Council and submitted for appointment by 
the Prime Minister. Since there is no jury system in the country an appointed judge 
in every court is a judge on disputed social facts and law. The ordinary courts are 
declared to be independent, accountable to the House of Peoples Representatives 
(HOR) or to their respective regional councils and they are duty bound to adhere to 
the Constitution. The regional courts have jurisdiction on matters not under the 
federal court system’s jurisdiction. The ANRS102 courts also entertained Federal 
cases as per the Constitutional delegation.103 The ANRS104 has established its own 
cassation bench that does not establish precedence in the region. The regional 
judges will also be appointed by the regional council after being submitted by the 
judicial administrative council. 
These formal courts inherited all the judicial problems of the past. Despite 
remarkable improvements in access, efficiency and independence the judiciary still 
remain ineffective. There is overall acknowledgement of the need for certain 
reforms within the judicial system. According to the World Bank priorities of reform 
in the country included quality of justice, access to justice and commercial justice 
(World Bank: 2004). Legal and judicial reform constitutes one of the main pillars in 
the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) to promote economic 
growth and alleviate poverty. It requires among others improving institutions and 
their capacity and integrating efforts into the overall national strategy (World Bank: 
2004). 
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 The same holds true for Tigray and Oromoia National Regional States Courts.  
103
 See article 80 of the Constitution. 
104
 Other regional states including the Oromia, Tigray, Harrari and the SNNP region states also 
established regional cassation benches. 
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Owing to the lack of quality in decision making and the unresolved problems in 
efficiency, access, independence and accountability the Federal and the ANRS105 
reorganized the process of decision making into what is commonly known as 
Business Process Engineering (hereafter BPR). The USA was the origin of the BPR. 
After reorganizing the procedures the expected main focus would be effectiveness. 
How far was contemporary reform free from Westernisation? Would procedural 
reforms result in social justice? What was the reform programme meant for?  These 
and related questions would be entertained in Chapters five and Six. 
1.4.2.5. Other Decision Making Bodies 
Other formal and non-formal ways of doing justice are operating along with the 
formal systems (Getachew and Alula 2008). In this respect special court and 
customary courts are significantly in operation. The special courts of the previous 
era had not only continued but multiplied during this era. In addition to the 
Constitutional Court (House of Federation under Article 84 of the Constitution), 
other special courts of this time include social courts, administrative tribunals, 
military courts and religious courts. 
Proclamation No. 311/2005 Article 50 established social courts for Addis Ababa. The 
court is a two level court with first instance and appellate jurisdictions. There is no 
municipal supreme court although the cassation bench is included in the appellate 
court. Cassation review from the decision of this bench can be brought to the 
Federal Supreme Court (Article 41 the Charter). The proclamation also established 
two levels of kebele (social courts) to hear civil matters worth 5,000 ETB. Appeal 
and cassation revisions from social courts could be lodged to the municipal courts 
(under Article 50(1, 3and 4) of the Charter). Social courts are also established in 
Regional States106 to handle small claims and minor disputes (MoCB 2007: 89). 
Appeals from the decisions of such courts to the respective regional supreme 
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 Including Tigray, Oromia, South Nation Nationalities and Peoples Regional States.
 
106
 They are also established in Tigray, Oromia, Southern Nation Nationalities and People, Harrari 
Regional States
. 
In some states like Tigray they have significant jurisdiction on land and family 
matters.
 
59 
 
courts, then to the Federal Supreme Court, are allowed on grounds of fundamental 
error of law.  
Procedurally and substantively social courts were expected to look more ‘’social’’, 
flexible and non-formal than formal. Despite that the ANRS identified the following 
problems in the way the social courts discharged their responsibilities: contrary to 
their expectations they were found to follow too formal and rigorous procedures, 
applying substantive law rather than the traditional norms and rather than settling 
cases, they were authoritatively declaring decisions.  As a study in ANRS identified 
these problems, the courts are being restructured to settle cases using traditional 
means of dispute settlement.107 
The Constitution also recognizes religious courts under Article 34 and 78. However 
their jurisdiction as limited to personal and family matters.108 Today the Sharia 
Courts are the only religious courts established at the federal and regional level. 
They exercise jurisdiction on personal matters when parties consent to their 
jurisdiction. They apply Sharia Law and have an appeal system. However they are 
required to follow the civil procedural laws that formal courts apply (Proclamation 
No. 188/99). The Courts are accountable to the Federal Judicial Administrative 
Council. All states have given same recognition to sharia courts and arranged the 
courts in a more similar way. 
Further, the Constitution recognizes every national and nationality the right to 
develop their own culture. This presents the Government with the corollary duty 
not only to protect these cultures but also to recognize the customary ways of 
dispute resolution mechanisms as an integral part of the judicial system. Despite 
the Constitutional recognition of such customary courts under Article 78(5) in 
practice no customary courts is given such recognition and no customary courts are 
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 See Proclamation No. 151/2000 of the region which gives priority to the traditional system in the 
selection of judges, the procedural and substantive law they apply, the use of traditional ways of 
summoning witnesses. Though they are constituted formally they are expected to act non-formally. 
Their power is, however, limited to civil cases worth Ethiopian birr 1500 and to petty offence 
selectively indicated in the proclamation.  
108
 See art.34 of the Constitution and art 4 of Proclamation No.188/1999. 
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yet established. Nevertheless, these non-formal mechanisms are prevailing as they 
were in the earlier periods. They serve as primary decision making mechanisms. 
They are found throughout Ethiopia. According to the World Bank report they are 
the ‘’real judicial world’ for most Ethiopians (World Bank Legal and Judicial 
Assessment Ethiopia 2004). 
The current system also recognizes or establishes other forms of dispute 
settlement. Such systems include Conciliation and Compromise under Article 3318 
and 3307 of the Civil Code, Arbitration under Proclamation No. 377/2003 for labor 
disputes, amicable settlement by Ombudsman and Human Rights commission 
under Proclamation No. 211/2000 and Proclamation No. 210/2000. 
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Conclusion 
Amorphous but less influential legal system 
The Ethiopian legal system had been an amalgam of ‘’civil and common law’’ 
tradition, ‘’modern and secular’’ and ‘’traditional and religious’’ law. These 
produced an amorphous legal system. While ‘’the judeaeo-Christian and Greco-
Roman elements of Ethiopian civilisation preclude a consideration of its problems in 
a purely African customary context’’ her isolation for ages (and absence of 
colonisation) and the topography of the country contributed to the localisation of 
the judicial system (Krezecunovitz 1963: 173). Despite that the laws were globally 
produced and induced the judicial system was entirely localized. That being so the 
periodisation of law and decision making bodies could not fit. The attempt to 
impose law from the above resulted in inconsistencies, rejection and other ways of 
resistance on the part of the people. These created opposition as a source of 
conflict which in turn was balanced by the non-formal systems in operation in the 
formal arena. The result had been much of the continuity of the non-formal system 
hitherto. The resistance to an ever ending imposition of globally produced laws 
created and widened the sharp dichotomy between law and dispute settlement 
bodies. The dichotomy has to date not been fully harmonised.  Accordingly the laws 
to the benefit of Ethiopian growth couldn’t halt the country’s impoverishment.  
The judiciary (with the Emperor at the top and the people at the bottom) had been 
multiple tasked but could not influence Ethiopian growth. It didn’t rectify the 
failures-political, market, institutional or socio-cultural-in the system.  
Ethiopian modernisation efforts failed because all the efforts ignored the people’s 
ways of doing justice. Later efforts (for example the sovietisation effort of the Derg 
regime) also failed for they ignored the true wishes of the people. The Ethiopian 
experience is a typical example of what a centralized, modernising and social 
coordination of interactions yield nothing if laws did not mirror the society while 
engineering it. This created the dichotomy between the people and the executive. 
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The laws also served to consolidate power in the inside while to look modern to the 
outside. As the laws lack such ‘’compatibility’’ and are ‘bad-laws’, the costs, to use 
Buscaglia’s (1996: 566) phrase  of complying and enforcing the laws became higher 
and higher. The laws might have benefited either the ruling or the commercial elites 
high up in the hierarchy. As the people are pulled in many directions owing to the 
amorphous laws, the result had been as the old adage runs ‘the rich get richer and, 
the poor gets the children’.  Accordingly the decision making bodies could not serve 
either legal or social justice. 
Absent or fluid jural postulate  
In Ethiopian legal history contradictory or inconsistent norms (local vs. national, 
customary versus religious and the natural, the socialist versus the capitalist, the 
global versus the national) historically co-existed. This produced diversified decision 
making bodies both horizontally and vertically. One reason for such diversification is 
the lack of jural postulates for which decision making bodies should follow so that a 
common good for all should be realised. Accordingly the most appropriate role for 
the court was not clearly stipulated either as positive or negative duties. Until the 
establishment of the State Courts in 1941, there was no such minimal duty on the 
part of the judiciary to ‘’say what the law says’’. Judges applied their ‘’legal 
wisdom’’ and principles of justice without being tied by the letters of the law 
(Vanderlinden 1974: 256). It was not clear how the judiciary perceived and assessed 
its own responsibilities.  
As everyone could be a judge, the formal courts were not separated from the 
people. They were accordingly, able to give decisions based on individual values 
irrespective of the law. Public values were defined in such loose terms as ‘’justice’’, 
‘’good’’, ‘’right’’ and ‘’equity’’ which may be subject to abuse. As such individuals 
could base settlements on their ideological attitudes and values (under the guise of 
justice) and preferred their individual conception to reach at a settlement which 
Winter called ‘’result-oriented decisions’’ or they could be of ‘’attitudinal model’’ 
(Winter 2002: 694).  
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Despite the recognition of justice as a virtue, meanings of ‘’the good’’, ‘’the just’’, 
‘’the righteous’’ or justice were vague and fluid and unable to measure the quality 
of decisions so that they were susceptible to individual preferences of justice and 
wisdom.  
While the original Ethiopian idea of justice was one of equalising power and 
maintains harmony, with the emergence of the Emperor as a ‘fountain of justice’ 
the power is shifted. Justice was ‘atomized’ at top among the rulers and at the 
bottom among decision makers. It focused power at the top of the hierarchy 
amongst the ruling class and the courts did not and could not effectuate just 
development of the population.   
Most Dependent Court 
Until the promulgation of the Constitution in 1955, there was no conception of 
separation of powers in either words or practice. All administrators were also the 
judges in their respective jurisdictions. Thus the courts had all the power that the 
executive had which hindered checks on administrative abuse (misuse) of 
discretion, action and inaction. As politics and courts were not separated, the 
formal courts were susceptible to political pressures. Thus, the executive could use 
the court to legitimize and promote its administrative decisions.  With a long history 
of the country’s independence the court thus paradoxically remained dependent.  
As the people (as a passer-by could have been a judge) at the bottom and the 
executive (the King or the Emperor) at the top were the judges, the court could 
have influenced development through either broad based rule making at the apex 
or through its case-by-case ‘’gradualist and particularistic approach’’ (Peters 2000: 
1458) at the grassroots. The Emperor’s role of rulemaking was highly influenced by 
the effects of their judicial rule making process.109 The merger at both ends 
maximized power without the judiciary and made the judiciary not only what 
Hamilton described as the ‘’least dangerous branch of power’’ (horizontally) but 
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 See Meneike’s Decree matters of theft whose base are theft cases.  
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also the detrimental branch thorough its vertical arrangement against social  justice 
and development.  
The fact that the Emperors who-were considered the fountain of justice-did not 
perform justice eroded the people’s trust and confidence in all other decision 
making bodies. As justice had been ‘wandering’ together with the Emperor this had 
created lack of focus and direction. This shift in the geography of justice had 
important implications in the development of the law and the courts. The 
‘wandering’ made the legal environment unstable. It also burdened the executive 
with caseloads, resulting in lost opportunities for justice at the bottom. This created 
a unitary mentality towards justice and may have led to burden highest courts with 
increased caseloads. There cannot be legal development or development in the 
wider sense, when the legal environment is unstable.        
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The three core points indicated above exemplify that despite the theoretical regime 
changes in Ethiopia not much had changed in practice as far as realising justice was 
concerned. This was mostly visible in the ways disputes were settled by the various 
regimes. When the formal system was constituted it distanced the non-formal 
system despite being penetrated by the non-formal system in various ways. Later 
efforts had never given enough space to the non-formal ways of doing justice as a 
result of which the way the people institutionalized the non-formal justice system 
and the way the people conceptualized justice was accorded little space in the 
formal systems institutionalization and conceptualisation of justice. The mismatch 
between what the two systems understood by institutions and institutional role and 
justice disconnected the people from the very ability to contribute to development. 
Where in a system where pluralism is wide spread the ideology of choice that can 
be a basis for deliberative choice of justice and institutions to serve justice 
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determines the country’s development path. These had not been conceptualized in 
the legal history and the next chapter explains how these elements of development 
should be conceptualized.  
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2 
On Institutions and Justice 
The previous Chapter demonstrated that the modernisation efforts of Ethiopia at 
various times and forms did not bring about the economic growth it promised. 
Radical changes in the regime did not alter the actual practices within the justice 
system. One of the reasons for the failure of political reforms to establish free 
technocratic institutions was the tendency to impose reforms from a top-down 
approach and deny sufficient space for non-formal systems to prosper. This denied 
possible harmonisation between the formal and non-formal systems. The lack of 
comparable space given to dispute resolution mechanisms signified weakened 
institution building that had become a challenge to current institutions. The 
Chapter also demonstrated that the mismatch and disorientation of the two 
important institutions (law and dispute resolution organs) meant prevalence of 
injustice, under-development and poverty. Institutional mismatch had been 
characterized by disorientation in functions, impositions of modernisation efforts 
without pre-engagement and the lack of local innovative adaptability. In other 
words, the consecutive failures were related to the lack of theorisation involving 
institutions to effect modernisation, and the definition accorded to institutions, 
their nature, form and functions.  The chapter underlined the need to orient 
institutional action towards the cultural norms of the country. 
This chapter explains institutions and demonstrates the relationship between 
institutions and justice. Accordingly, it examines the relationship between judicial 
institutions and poverty which identifies that institutional strength is directly 
related to realizing social justice and alleviating poverty. The chapter identifies law 
(beyond the law of contract and property) and dispute settlement organs as 
institutions in so far as they bear influence on the behaviour of the people towards 
social justice. In this respect identifying the proper institution (serving social justice) 
is important as reforms of institutions cannot be durable, focused, legitimate and 
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feasible without such identification. Justice reform programmes arise from such 
need to orient the dispute settlement body towards social justice. This chapter thus 
connects the challenges identified in the legal history of Ethiopia with the remedy 
of the judicial reform programme of the country which is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
Accordingly the first part of chapter defines and explains the relationship between 
institutions, their forms and functions and explains global attempts made to reform 
the legal institutions. Though institutional discourses have long histories their study 
has been marginalized by major financial institutions. When institutional studies 
come to the center, their role has been narrowed as merely serving the Market and 
economic growth. This part argues that institutional role goes beyond the market 
towards impacting social justice. 
The second part briefly addresses the various meanings and aspects of justice in 
relation to institutions. The sections recognize that conceptions of justice and role 
of institutions is not confined to the mere administration of the written laws that 
does not impact real lives. It argues the need to see beyond mere formal 
arrangements. 110  The chapter explains that justice demands considering the 
positive or negative contributions of the non-formal sectors. This will be followed 
by brief conclusion.  
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 For example Ethiopia, while poor, registered an average double digit growth for a decade now. 
Even if some rapid growth is registered for the last consecutive years some claim that the growth is 
erratic and lacks equitable (re)distribution of the per capital income generated (John Weeks et al 
2008: 2-3). This economic achievement has to be seen in light of the contribution of decision making 
bodies vis-a-vis the realization of meaningful life in the context of Ethiopia. It has to be seen if 
political stability and social justice is secured and other spheres of public lives is impacted positively. 
In the context of Ethiopia, the economic achievement cannot be detangled from the various aspects 
of the human elements of growth. 
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2.1 Institutions: The What 
Institutional studies have been unable to establish a consensus as to what these 
institutions are, what their role is and how to build or form (reform) them.111 
Black’s law dictionary defines institutions as ‘’an elementary rule, principle, or 
practice or an established organization’’. Though this might be broad the current 
mainstream thinking, harmonized by economists studies in new institutional 
economics identify contract and property rights as institutions. Nevertheless this 
would not serve much unless the conception includes administrative institutions. 
Douglas North is dominant in this discourse and identified institutions as humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction 
(Douglass North 1991: 97). These are the rules of the game- ‘’a set of rules, 
compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to 
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing wealth or utility 
of principles’’-and consist of both non-formal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and code of conducts) and formal rules (Constitutions, laws, 
property rights) (Douglass North 1991: 97). In his analysis of institutions North 
raised important points which include non-formal constraints governing social 
behavior. The constraints (formal, non-formal) vary radically through time and 
across different economies and he acknowledged that changes in formal and non-
formal institutions are slow and largely incremental. 
Douglas North however narrowed institution as conception of contract and 
property rights constraining behaviors towards lowering economic transaction and 
productivity costs. The interest on lowering costs would arise especially when long 
distance trade raises issues of costs pertaining agency and contract negotiation and 
enforcement. Long distance trade expanded the market that necessitated more 
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 For example in the views of Plato institutions are thought of as an ‘’expressions of’’ man’s mind 
(thought and habit of mind) whose expression gets an ‘’outward and visible sign’’ through a written 
code and judicial branch (Baker 1959: 103). For Plato common property and the family are 
institutions (Baker 1959: 103). Van Arkadie points out that institutions are both the rules of the 
game’’ and the ‘’organization’’ (In Chang, notes 2).  
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specialized producers, lowering information costs, increasing mobility of capital, 
innovations to spreading risks, standardisation of trade, lowering information 
exchanges and provisions of incentives for contract fulfillment (Douglass North 
1991: 97).  
According to North under such conditions institutions of contract and property are 
devised to ‘’create order and reduce uncertainty’’ in exchanges and solve problems 
of human cooperation especially under conditions of games where plays are 
repeated, when there is lack of information on the other players and when there 
are large number of players (Douglass North 1991: 97). Effective institutions reduce 
transaction and production costs per exchange so that gains from transaction are 
realisable. Thus, institutions are defined and understood as concepts of contract 
and property rights incentivizing structure that shape economic change towards 
economic growth. 
Accordingly the central issue in defining institutions is ‘’creating an economic 
environment that lowers transaction costs and induces increasing productivity’’ 
(Douglass North 1991: 98). Societies in distance and repeated trade need effective, 
impersonal contract enforcement to the improvement of economic actor material 
status, in the absence of which ‘defection are great enough to forestall the 
development of complex exchange (Douglass North 1991: 100). Thus contract law, 
the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property rights constitute 
lowering these costs. 
In the eyes of North’s identification of institutions dispute settlement organs are 
some where away from being considered as institutions. They are in fact products 
of institutions as he held that ‘’the development of enforcement mechanisms that 
is developed by merchants themselves was more significant than a variety of ways 
courts handled commercial disputes (Douglass North 1991: 107). He further held 
that the presence of a state in its various forms is in fact to lower transaction costs 
and ‘’take over protection and enforcement of property rights as impersonal 
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exchange makes contract enforcement increasingly costly for voluntary 
organizations which lacked effective coercive power’’ (Douglass North 1991: 110).  
Identification of contract and property rights as institutions for economic growth is 
however problematic for a number of reasons. In the first place the discourse is 
some way away from identifying which institutions in which forms are necessary for 
economic development. With the exclusive focus on property rights, it does not 
answer what property right is in fact causal to economic growth. For example it 
does not answer why Ethiopia registered double digit economic growth for a 
decade now where land, unlike the western-style private right ownership, is owned 
by the government. In most cases dispute settlement organs entertain property 
cases of various kinds including land, family property, and intellectual property, 
crimes against property, company property, communal property, and common 
property. North’s identification of property excludes these groups and leaves the 
relationship between these rights, the dispute settlement organs and economic 
development untouched. 
Secondly the emphasis on private property right assumes individualized 
materialistic incentives towards economic growth. But real life experience may not 
always work in this manner. As Chang pointed out human motivations are multi-
faceted and there is just too much non-selfish human behavior for us to explain 
without admitting a range of non-selfish motivations and without assuming a 
complex interaction between different types of motivations, both selfish and non-
selfish (Chang 1991: 23). As the legal history of Ethiopia and the discussion in 
chapter six reveals Ethiopians were costing too much to secure fair justice so that 
the selfless meanings of life and their agency were given prevalence over self-
centered private materialist gains. Technical crafting in contract and property rights 
would not suffice without administrative institutions harmonising selfish and non-
selfish ways of life.  
Thirdly a strong protection of contract and property rights is not always true as a 
general proposition. As the growth-impact of protection of private property rights 
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may not be constant over time too strong protection of property rights is not good 
as too weak protection is not good (Chang 1991: 24). Too much protection may be 
to the disadvantage of the property owner or the environment. For example land 
had been privately owned in Ethiopia long before the nationalisation policy of the 
Derg regime. Too much protection of privatisation did not warrant economic 
development, nor did the Derg nationalization. It is after these policies of land that 
double digit economic growth is registered. 
North’s linear identification of contract and property with economic growth fits the 
one-size-fits-all approach to economic development. A lack of an independen 
mono-vissioned institution makes a ‘’one-size-fits-all’’ of institutional reform 
problematic. The enormous increase in the harmonisation of institutions has 
prompted debate on the suitability of the so-called ‘global-standard’ institutions for 
developing countries (Chang 1991: 2). Thus institutions have diversified tasks 
towards and beyond contract enforcement and guarantying property rights. In the 
context of Ethiopia different institutions were seen to perform different functions. 
Formal courts were meant to serve justice while non-formal ones were meant to 
establish harmony in the community. At the same time the same function can also 
be performed by different institutions. Harmony can be established by the criminal 
administration tasks of the formal courts as it can be established by the non-formal 
bodies. The prevalence of multi-tasked institutions makes linear relationship 
between institutions and economic growth difficult. 
Far from real life impossibility, this institutional mono-tasking has other intended 
and unintended consequences, particularly when adapted without proper scrutiny 
by other countries like Ethiopia. According to Chang mono-tasking institutions is 
favorable for particular interest groups to hijack certain institutions and make them 
work mainly to their advantage, increases the danger that countries import certain 
institutions for one function and do not carefully think about their ‘other’ functions 
and creates problems of incompatibility with the local ones (Chang 1991: 55-6). The 
adoption of Ethiopian Constitution of 1955, for example, was ‘hijacked’ to effect 
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power centralisation while the 1960 civil code did not give room for non-formal 
systems of doing justice in matters covered by the code, which should have been 
the other equal function of the code in the context of Ethiopia.  
These problems leave the how of building institutions (importing standards, 
cultivating context specific innovations or hybridizing) to effect economic growth as 
un-answered questions. If, for example, we decide to reform Ethiopian dispute 
settlement bodies so that contract enforcement is efficient, we need to sort out 
ideas like how much of the reform is to courts (including independence, 
accountability and access), how much is up to the litigant’s behaviour, how much is 
to learned experience from the non-formal sectors and abroad. Which kinds of 
social, economic and political contexts matter, what kinds of resistance may be 
encountered by debtors and how effective institutions of contract enforcement can 
be built? 
This would force a wider look at the institutions and identify institutions as basic 
structures of society rather than the narrower form and function they assume. In 
this regard Rawls considers institutions as ‘’a public system of rules which defines 
offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities and the 
like. Games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of property are 
examples of such an institution (Rawls 2005: 55). Rawls however meant institutions 
of ‘’decent people’’ and excludes the non-formal, the traditional, system of the 
poor countries in particular from being considered as an institution. Still a much 
more comprehensive understanding is needed. 
Formal contracts are in fact corollaries of well-specified and well-enforced property 
rights. This is a right that developing economies lack. The enforcement of these 
rights is ‘’only possible as a result, first, of the development of a third party 
(Government) to exchange, specify property rights and enforces contracts, and 
second of the existence of non-formal norms of behavior to constrain the parties. 
Thus more is needed than the clarification and enforcement of property rights 
towards rapid and frequent market transactions. Social justice demands more 
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optimal institutional role than securing expectations of contract and property 
rights. 
Thus as institutions have to be identified with a social purpose they commonly 
apply to a particular formal organisation of the Government and public services as 
well as the non-formal systems operating within societies.112 Accordingly, the law 
guarantying political rights and duties and dispute settlement organs were to be 
seen as shaping behaviour towards social justice and were identified as either basic 
(constitutions) or derivative (dispute resolution bodies) institutions.113 This goes 
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 They are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior and govern the behavior of a set of 
individuals within a given community (https://en.m.wikipedia.org>wiki>institutions), last visited on 
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 Basically constitutions people make are basic and are meant to express basic thoughts of the 
people. It would be the product of people’s ‘’mutual recognition, mutual consent’’ and ‘’mutual 
continuity’’ to mirror their basic thoughts based on concrete, reasoned (and emotion loaded) and 
aggregated debates. In such formulation the procedure the people follow to adopt basic institutions 
and the content of the debate matters if institutions are to matter. Constitutions are thus basic and 
primary institution people make as a rule of the game and to rule the game. It is meant to be time 
and place specific and stable ‘’often have in-built mechanism against change (Chang 2010: 490). The 
constraints and expansion of freedoms therein would thus be known ahead of time so as to shape 
behaviors of individuals and groups. It is the basic to other institutional way of thinking and acting. 
 
The basic institution does not have a life of its own unless secondary institutions are formed or given 
space. Secondary institutions are structurally constrained to think within the permits of the basic 
institution. To be just, secondary institutions should expand choice of freedoms and constrain 
behaviors against such a choice. All such expansions and contractions are derivative of the 
constitution and get their guidance from this basic Institution. Hence in the procedure they follow 
and the substantive laws they apply, secondary institutions are duty bound to give life to the dictate 
of the basic institution. 
 
Establishment of derivative judicial bodies and recognition of non-formal system are such 
expressions as secondary institutions. As non-formal system exists with or without the constitution, 
a Constitution could only be judged in accordance with the space it rendered to such institutions. 
Hence, they are secondary non-derivative institutions.  
 
As expressions of human mind secondary institutions too is time and place specific. They exist at a 
certain time and place when the actions specified by it are regularly carried out in accordance with a 
public understanding that the system of rules defining the institution is to be followed (Rawls 1999: 
55). Once radically formed or recognized to be in tune with the basic norms, reform of secondary 
institutions would be slow, predictable and non-erratic so that every imposed reform wave could not 
de-form them. Stable as such, institutional reform need to be designed when the interest to 
constrain powers curbing capabilities and relax those which enhance capabilities towards social 
justice arises.  
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beyond Douglas North’s concept and includes administrative institutions of both 
formal and non-formal institutions constraining and expanding behaviors. 
Institutions therefore constrain and expand the real freedoms that the people had 
towards the values they hold dear to them.  
As expressions of human thought, institutions are expressed not only to constrain 
(which otherwise would be top-down imposed) behaviour but also expand horizons 
of human freedoms. Institutions, thus, are expressions of human thought both to 
constrain measures restricting justice and encourage measures realising justice. The 
ability to constrain as well as expand human political, social or economic behaviors 
(capabilities) towards social justice qualifies them as institutions.  As structures or 
mechanisms of social order, they govern the behaviour of a set of individuals within 
a given community. As such they are different from organizations and are visible as 
courts or invisible as markets (contract and property rights) or semi-visible as non-
formal ways of decision making.  
When they shape recurring patterns of behaviour, they remain stable and their 
reform would be slow and staged. Institutions that at one point were beneficial can 
(with passage of time) become roadblocks of development. As Chang put it 
‘’institutional overdose’’, be it formal or non-formal, is nowhere great as in the 
mainstream discourse on private property right (Chang 1991: 12). Accordingly, the 
demand for social justice would leave us with some common principles among 
these institutions one of which is the point to start the process of institutional 
reform by introducing desired elements of social justice than by introducing the 
desired institutions. 
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2.2. Arrangements of Decision Making Bodies in the Administration of 
Justice 
According to Norrie, the administration of justice is applied differently in 
authoritarian and democratic systems. Whether a society is just or unjust depends 
on ‘’the organization and power structure of institutions’’. Of these institutions the 
judicial ones- as bastions of justice, are central to the understanding of how justice 
is administered (Norrie 1989: 395). As there cannot be a singularly definitive 
institution in terms of importance and therefore there cannot be a ‘’one-size fits-
all’’ solution,  the quality of the administration of justice in a specific country’s 
context determines whether the country is widely considered a success as against 
raging famine and poverty and determines where the world places the country 
within its own development cycle.   
As has been discussed in Section 2.1 the central point of the administration of 
justice demands mono-vissioned independent but multiple-tasked institutions. The 
discourse which resulted from the partially successful attempt to singularly task 
institutions, was caused by the design to effect forced integration between the 
different institutions. As there is no what I call automaticity of singularity of 
institutional functions, multiple-tasked institutions work in an environment where 
they interact vertically and horizontally with other institutions in a complex but 
dynamic way. Judicial bodies, for example, interact with the basic institution (the 
constitution), the subject (parties), and the object of litigation (such as the land) in 
such a way.  In an effort to make effective decisions, the same interaction applies to 
non-formal ways of settling disputes. Effectiveness, thus, demands prevalence of 
formalized multi-functional insitutions operating on principled based integrating 
approach.  
The interwoven interaction helps decision making bodies (for example in handling 
issues of wealth) to raise the level of trust between parties in dispute, fastens 
exchange between parties, raises the level of cooperation between parties in 
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economic exchange and lowers risks in such exchanges. If this is guided by the 
principle of justice, the inter-action promotes social justice in a more 
comprehensive and meaningful way. Decision making bodies could in more general 
terms establish social justice as they could redistribute resources as effectively as 
possible. That is why legal reform must work with institutional pluralism. In doing so 
each institution may look inward towards its procedural and substantive law and 
outward towards other mechanisms of doing justice. 
This leads naturally to a utopian identification of institutional arrangements as just 
or unjust and effective or ineffective irrelevant. Sen rightly pointed out that the 
‘’identification of fully just institutions is neither necessary nor sufficient, it rather is 
redundant’’’ (Sen 2009: 5). Institutions can be effective or not effective when justice 
is maximized. This would mean, for example, that if there was a demand to choose 
between different dispute settlement institutions to handle a case the one which 
applies the principle that enhances basic justice (and reduce injustice and sustain 
justice) prevails. 114  The realisation demands the institution to assess what 
constrains and expands the exercise of basic freedoms. An institution, not just by 
mere arrangement, but by realising social justice shall effectively be the proper 
institution for realising justice. 
As the inter-action and intra-action is a complex and dynamic, institutions often fail 
to live up to their expectations. As this could spread injustice against the demands 
of social justice this is the point where the demand to reform them arises. Thus 
there has to be a constant, periodic and regular check on the prioritisation of tasks 
assigned to them and the way they do justice and reduce injustice towards halting 
injustice which should be the primary triggering force for a judicial reform in poorer 
countries like Ethiopia. In this respect the demand with regard to formal institution 
is more acute than the non-formal ones. 
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Accordingly the central role of decision making bodies in enforcing the norms of 
society either through but not limited to retributive justice, sanctioning norm 
violations, corrective justice, distributive justice and/or restorative justice is a major 
concern to be maximised to realize social justice in basic institutions (Schere 1992: 
13). This can be done first by connecting the institution with the basic institution 
and with other institutions within the dynamics the relationship allows. 
This calls for a discussion on what justice is, how to serve it and measure it. As shall 
be discussed in the next section justice involves realising the capabilities of persons 
and groups. Persons by default include both artificial ones as no less than natural 
ones as far as justice with lives is concerned. Comprehensiveness demands the 
enhancement of capability of groups as real experience in poor countries involves 
group lives. The starting point for a discussion of institutional effectiveness is the 
capability of persons and groups. Other means of measurements like ‘’institutional 
quality, government effectiveness, measures of the limits of executive power’’ 
(Botero et al 2004: 275) are thus to be measured by the level of capability they 
realize.  
2.3. Justice and Functions of Institutions 
Lack of agreement on what institutions are meant by ends up in the lack of 
agreement on what their role (example advancing economic growth or serving 
social justice) should be and when and why to reform them. As has been indicated 
above an institution can serve more than one function while many institutions can 
serve similar function. Functions of institutions however need not be confused with 
their form. Functions of dispute resolution mechanisms (like realising social justice 
or enforcing contracts) are different from forms of dispute resolution mechanisms 
(like independence and accountability). The Ethiopian experience demonstrates 
that forms of institutions do not guarantee specified or certain outcomes. The 
guarantee to judicial independence did not necessarily realize social justice as other 
less or no independent or non-formal dispute resolution mechanism could 
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guarantee social justice without being independent. This means that the same 
function can be achieved by an independent court or by a dependent non-formal 
dispute resolution mechanism. This, however, does not mean that ‘’form’’ is 
irrelevant. The same function cannot be performed by making the court dependent. 
Thus one need not impose too much fixed institutional values of one institution 
upon another without proper scrutiny. The function and form of institutions 
however have to be seen in relation to the different conceptions of justice. 
Justice has played a role as ‘‘a fundamental and indispensable organizing principles 
for any kinds of human association’’ (Scherer 1992: 2). Ever since the beginning of 
human concern with a desirable form of organisation, justice has been one of the 
essential postulates for utopia, the ideal state (Scherer 1992: 3, 5). Aharon Barak 
(1992: 66-67), the ex-president of Israel Supreme Court, attaches the value of 
justice to almost everything. Justice is the basis of democracy: is the goal of law: is 
the standard for evaluating the law; indeed, it is one of the central values of a legal 
system. The general purpose of every statute is the realisation of justice. Justice is 
the appropriate value with which the judge should decide-justice for the parties, 
justice for society, and justice in law (Barak 1992: 66-67).  It plays a significantly a 
mobilizing role in restoring justice to the parties.  
As Charles Dickens, quoted in Sen says in Great Expectations ‘’there is nothing so 
finely perceived and finely felt, as injustice (Sen 2009: preface). If justice is 
‘’removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society must in a moment 
crumble into atoms’ (Mattis 2009: 94). Tyrants even justify their political action 
within the prevailing social context, provoking feelings of injustice. If justice is 
everywhere, where and what is needed is sensing it out of poverty.  
2.3.1 Justice in Ancient Times 
Aristotle had related capability to the idea of justice. He argued that truth is the end 
of theoretical knowledge while action is the beginning of practical knowledge. We 
do not know truth without its cause. It is impossible to know poverty, the highest 
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degree of severity as it is a cause to other impoverishments, and without the 
knowledge of its causes (Aristotle Rethoric: 14). If so, what is the cause of poverty? 
How would poverty form the requisite basis of knowledge in providing justice? Can 
we automatically say that there is no justice when poverty prevails? If, according to 
the social psychological definition, justice is a ‘’basic component of any human 
society’’, how do we sense or perceive its prevalence or absence? How shall we 
understand it? In this respect ancient thinkers attached the idea of justice with the 
realization of different interests. Plato and Aristotle are pertinent regarding this 
point. 
Plato considered the aim of a ruler as the welfare of its citizens. Citizens are 
committed to the care of the ‘’absolutely unselfish’’ ruler.115 So the theory goes that 
those who lived by obeying the wishes of justice of unselfish ruler will satisfy their 
justice interests and become just themselves. The just man is wiser (as he 
acknowledges the limits of his action to a definite guiding object imposed by 
reason), stronger and happier than the unjust (Barker 1959: 97). The just man will 
discharge his function (of living) well and ‘’live well’’ and be happy. Hence, 
happiness had been a mechanism used to sense and measure justice.  
The justice that Plato proposes exists in two forms. It exists on a larger scale, 
broadest, strongest, simplest, and clearest in a more visible fashion in any state. 
Given by a state, a state being a product of the human soul, justice has three 
elements; first an element of desire, second an element of reason, lastly an element 
of spirit. Besides the implied psychological basis, there is also an implied conception 
of the true nature of justice presenting from the first in Plato’s construction of the 
State; that each should be to their own cause (Barker 1959: 100, 104-105). In 
Plato’s understanding of justice an individual has two aspects to their own justice, 
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community is the will of the ruler who wills his own good. It follows that justice may really and in 
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and shows justice through either. In one aspect he is a member of a community and 
he shows justice by exhibiting the one virtue proper to the peculiar place which the 
one predominant element in his nature has assigned him to; the virtue (for 
instance) of courage. In another aspect he is an individual soul, and as such he 
shows justice, if he keeps each of all the elements of his soul in its right place, and 
there by exhibits all the virtues of wisdom, and courage, and self-control. In a state 
of nature men do and suffer injustice freely and without restraint. But the weaker, 
finding that they suffer more injustice than they can inflict, creates a contract with 
another to neither do injustice, nor to suffer it to be done: and, in pursuance of the 
contract, they lay down the law, the provisions of which are the standard of action 
and the code of justice.116 
Contrary to this Aristotle argued that there are different forms of justice in different 
associations. He considered justice as ‘’the true spirit of a political association’’. In 
discussing the issues of justice he specially emphasises the conception of man, 
state, constitution and movement. Man has his real meaning as a member of a 
State, he lives and has his being; without a State he has no meaning. Man is by 
nature a political being forming associations of various kinds. The State is described 
as an association of such other associations. Each of the subordinate and subsumed 
associations has their own justice and friendship. The inner unity of a State, like that 
of all associations, is to be found in the justice and friendship which unite its 
members. But the family, as an association or true institution, being included in the 
State, the justice of the family has become part of the justice of the State (Barker 
1959: 235, 225, 237). The sum of justices in each association constitutes the justice 
of the state. 
Beginning from ancient time’s justice had always been about distribution of 
rewards or punishments. The contest comes from what we want to divide and the 
grounds upon which this distribution will form. According to Aristotle virtue is to be 
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distributed. He argued that what made the State’s identity and constituency was 
not its divisional part but its form, that is to say its constitution, for the constitution 
is the form of the State. The constitution is essentially a determination or 
conception of the movement towards the end at which a political community aims. 
There is one true end, which, and which alone, the state as moral community can 
pursue: and that is a life of virtue. And it is this virtue which is to be distributed 
among subjects of justice. Every State that walks by this end is a normal and proper 
state. The constitution, where the government agrees in unselfishness, is thus good 
as compared to a bad constitution. Justice as a virtue is the ‘’political good’’: 
defined as a ‘’reciprocal rendering of equal opportunity,’’ it is termed the ‘’savior of 
the State and gives to each and all their own (Barker 1959: 218, 235, 305-308).  
The distribution of virtue makes justice higher than virtue; it is virtue in action, it is 
more than an internal spirit; it is the active fulfillment of an internal spirit in the 
conduct of a member of society towards another member. To be considerate is a 
virtue; to act accordingly towards another is justice. Justice (action in conformity 
with the law) is determinant of the quality of its members. There is ‘’complete 
justice’’ and the ‘’final good’’ when every moral obligation is enacted which means 
the fulfilling of the law (Baker 1959: 332, 337). To be just is to have all the virtues in 
one. 
Moreover, Aristotle gave due emphasis to what he called ‘particular justice’ and the 
capability of individuals towards the rule of equality. The just here is the equal, and 
he who is just is he who takes no more for himself than he allows his fellow to take 
for themselves. This is what Aristotle called ‘particular justice’. The state on which 
particular justice rests is that of an association of equals. Each individual has his 
due, and that he is so treated, and so treats others, as to preserve the proper 
proportion between the members of the association. The due of an individual is 
answered vis-à-vis distributive and corrective justice (Baker 1959: 339).  
Aristotle also gave capacity as an element of justice. Taking a citizen as a 
shareholder, not a tax-payer, he argued that that we need to exert our effort to get 
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the right man in the right place; ‘but the right man is the ablest rather than the 
worthiest’ (Baker 1969: 341). In the administration of justice Aristotle made 
capacity (to wealth, birth, friendship) as basis of justice. For example Aristotle 
preferred to award instruments to those who are best at the work for which these 
instruments are intended. In office he prefers ‘capacity for the function of office’ 
(Baker 1959: 347-348).  
According to Aristotle men aim at a certain end (happiness with its constituents) 
which determined what they choose and what they avoid. Institutions ought to do 
whatever increases happiness and avoid whatever destroys or hampers happiness. 
The activity of wealth, the use of property (such as money and territory) is the 
constituent part of happiness. Justice is the virtue through which everyone enjoys 
his possession in accordance with the law and is good as a cause of the good of the 
community (Aristotle Rhetoric: 17). Then it is a must to distinguish those particular 
institutions which tend to realize the ideal of this constitutional end (Aristotle 
Rhetoric: 17). 
2.3.2 Justice: Contemporary Times 
It is not only the naturalists who actually attach happiness to a sense of justice. 
More specifically, and more directly, the Utilitarian’s sense justice whenever an act 
or a rule or the consequences wherefrom produces pleasure/happiness over pain. 
Among contemporary writers Rawls’ justice as fairness, Nozick’s justice as 
entitlement, Nielsen’s justice as equality, Barry’s justice as impartiality and Sen’s 
and Nussbaum’s Capability approach broadely explain the current discourses on the 
issue of justice (Scherer 1992: 17). The following sections briefly treat Rawls’s and 
the capability approach. 
Rawls’s justice as fairness is a development to reconcile the tension in classical 
liberal philosophy between demands of equality and individual liberty. Justice as 
fairness is a systematic and practicable conception (not metaphysical or 
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epistemological) and offers an alternative to the dominant Utilitarianism (Rawls 
1985: 226, 1999: 20).  
According to Rawls justice, as a basic structure of society, determines the way in 
which institutions distribute rights and burdens. Efficient and well-arranged 
institutions should be reformed or abolished if they fail to be just (Rawls 1999: 47, 
Scherer 1992: 18). The primary subject and the first virtue of social institutions, of 
the basic structure of society is justice by which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights (primary goods) and duties and determine the 
division of advantages from social cooperation.117 
Rawls assumes membership in a society as involuntary associations. As society is 
characterized by irreducible value pluralism, the starting point for a discussion of 
theory of justice cannot be based on a comprehensive moral or religious doctrine 
(Rawls 1999: 82, peter 2009: 3, 4). If the basic structures of a society are just, the 
outcome generated by the social and economic process will be just. The most 
important ideas to reconcile this tension is the idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation and the idea of ‘’citizens as free and equal persons.’’118 The latter is 
based on the political conception of persons having two fundamental moral 
powers; capacity for conception of the good and the capacity for a sense of justice. 
For Rawls, the conceptions of the good are called reasonable if they are in accord 
with the requirement of the reasonable. However, he holds that reasonable citizens 
accept that their society will always contain a plurality of conceptions of the good. 
Reasonable persons are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its 
own sake a world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on 
terms all can accept reciprocally -an idea of fair cooperation. 
Taking people in the original positions as free and equals, everyone is symmetrically 
related to make decisions under a veil of ignorance (Locke’s ‘state of nature’) (Rawls 
1999: 11). Of other strategies in the original position (maximax or gambling) people 
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chose the maximini strategy where they go for safe options. In choosing the 
maximini strategy, the first principle of justice people chose is equality in certain 
kinds of liberties (procedural justice).119 According to Rawls this would be a basis to 
agree on fundamental principles of justice of decent people that burdened people 
should endorse. 
As far as the function of institutions is concerned Rawls (1999: 47) held that 
institutions (whose principles are different from principles for individuals) promote 
one common good. Imagining persons in the original position as maximising their 
individual preferences he (1985: 227) argued that realisation of values of liberty and 
equality is the common good. Institutions are established and ranked to the extent 
they effectively guarantee conditions necessarily for all and how efficiently they 
advance common end benefit of liberty to everyone (Rawls 1985: 97). Hence for the 
libertarian Rawls basic institutions in a modern democracy are guided by the two 
principles of the realization of the values of liberty and equality and are just or 
unjust to the extent of such realization (Rawls 1985: 227, 1999: 53). Thus just social 
realsations would only follow the arrangement of just institutions.  
Rawls makes some important points and his pragmatic approach is appreciable. His 
pragmatic approach (to metaphysical) is determinate enough for justice will always 
be about what people are due. Pragmatic approaches help to settle issues which 
cannot be settled entirely by conceptual analysis (Schmidtz 2006: 7). His idea of 
justice as determinate enough has procedural and substantive elements (Schmidtz 
2006: 12). Stum (1999: 160) holds that evidence of interrelationships exist between 
the outcomes of a particular interaction namely distributive justice and the 
procedure used to allocate resources in the decision making process. The fairer the 
procedure used to determine the outcome, the more psychologically acceptable the 
outcomes will be. These procedural elements are a must that one cannot avoid in 
the analysis of justice. 
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Notwithstanding his approach, Rawls’ theory did not tell us what the free and equal 
persons end up with. He didn’t yield clear answers as to where the destination of 
burdened societies is. As he gave primary importance to the arrangement of 
perfectly just society and just institutions than social realizations, he ignored the 
possible adverse effect that his theory might have on people beyond borders, he 
failed to provide systematic remedies to those affected by parochial values and 
failed to take the possibility of the presence of different justice principles in the 
original positions and gave no room to the possibility that some people may not 
behave reasonably (Sen 2009: 90). As pragmatic as it looks, it cannot help in 
pragmatic assessment of function of institution.  
Rawls common good is made clearer by the neo-liberal economists that consider 
economic growth as a common good. This interest to attach institutional functions 
with economic growth grew more and more as a result of World Banks desire to 
‘demonstrate the links between good legal systems and positive economic 
outcomes (Faundez 2011-12: 10). The Zedillo Report120  recommends that no 
country can expect to achieve equitable growth, or meet the International 
Development Goals, unless it focuses on building effective domestic institutions. 
Douglas North’s conception of contract and property rights goes in line with this as 
it considers institutional function to maximizing wealth or utility.121  
In this respect there is evidence which proves that institutions and economic 
growth have positive links. Risse, for instance, concludes that recent econometric 
work show institutional quality is crucially and truly causal to economic growth 
(Risse 2004: 87). Despite this mushrooming interest in connecting economic growth 
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2004: 98). See also Douglas North 1981: 2010-202. 
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and institutional strength, taking this linearity and causality discourse seriously is 
problematic for a number of reasons. 
The current mechanism of measurement (inclined to liberalisation and growth 
rather than human development) merges different kinds of institutions and uses a 
composite and unified concept to measure its quality. The indexes use incompatible 
and structurally biased variables that are influenced by the general nature of 
business, picture of how institutions may or may not promote growth and 
development (Chang 2010: 484). The mechanism claims institutional qualities but 
did not show us the true qualities of institutions except that institutions should be 
predictable, efficient, transparent, accessible and accountable. 
Secondly this approach suffers from being simplistic, linear and wrongly connects 
institutional strength with economic growth. The causality runs from institutions to 
economic development, ignoring the important possibility that economic 
development (the reality is more in this direction) changes the operation of 
institutions (Chang 2010: 476). It also took the relationship to be uniform across 
time and space (Chang 2010: 482).  
Thirdly the approach is hegemonic and could not yield in establishing basic 
institutions from the bottom. It particularly considers free market and property as 
institutions. According to Chang these supposedly better institutions are those 
institutions typically found in Anglo-American countries which are seen as 
maximizing market freedom and protecting private property rights most strongly 
(Chang 2010: 474). A legal system which does not have an ideal legal system like the 
advanced capitalist countries is considered as ‘’incomplete and imperfect’’ (Faundez 
2011: 11). As shall be discussed in the next chapter this is a renewed, revived 
interest in the law and development movement which assumes states as a new 
type of sates-a market-friendly state regarded by the Bretton Woods Institutions as 
destination for all states regardless of their level of economic or political 
development (Faundez 2010: 7, 8).  
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Despite the emphasis on the free market this trend does not provide us with an 
objective means to measure the degree of free market, the extent of regulation or 
the exact empirical relationship between free market and efficiency (Chang 2010: 
478). It is difficult to measure the quality of such institutions. As indicated at Section 
2.1 this discourse did not allow space to other form of property rights including 
communal property and agricultural cooperatives (Chang 2010: 479-480) Problems 
in measuring make the creation of a causal link between institutional quality and 
economic growth difficult. 
By exclusively focusing on economic growth, one ignores other important functions 
of these institutions such as the coordination administration, learning, innovation, 
income redistribution and social cohesion of the institutions. Factors such as 
geography, disease and natural endowments which are fundamental causes for 
differences between countries in economic terms are also not given enough weight 
(Chang 2010: 36). The linear nature of the approach also ignores the non-formal 
institutions long established and could contribute to economic growth if properly 
understood and employed. With an exclusive focus on econometrics, building the 
capability of human beings is excluded.  
As far as this is concerned Botero argued that it is important to note that human 
factors are decisive in the development agenda of poorer countries or are possible 
impediments to development. Evidence pointed out that it is the human capital 
which has a causal effect both on economic growth and democratization (Botero et 
al 20046: 196-197). Rather than political institutions it is the human and social 
capital that is primarily and causally connected with growth. Human and social 
capital, determine a set of institutional opportunities and shape institutional and 
productive capacities of society. Thus human capability is causal not only to 
economic growth but also to political development. Poorer countries should 
therefore accumulate human capital and, once they become richer, are increasingly 
likely to improve their institutions (Botero et al 2004: 297, 298).  
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The problem is how to build human capital and by whom this can be built. What 
mechanism can poorer countries employ to accumulate human capital if the 
accumulation of human capital is going to bring about improved institutions. How 
can human capital be built without institutions undergoing appropriate change in 
the way they think and act? Should not institutions assume the primary 
responsibility in building human capital-whatever it means? 
Thus, both Rawls and the neo-liberal economists show us only one view of the 
wider picture. To use Dworkin’s phrase, they are an intermediate conclusions within 
a deeper theory. Hence, it is important to complement these thoughts from other 
contemporary insights. The capability approach is one such insight. 
2.3.The Capability Approach 
Following Aristotle, Amartya Sen developed the capability approach and departed 
from preexisting hegemonic discussions of justice on important points.  
Sen took peoples’ suffering of injustices as the starting point for a discussion of 
justice. The most and the first important departures of Sen from the earlier 
discourses begin with the desire to eliminate clear remedial injustices around 
people (Sen 2009: vii). The central and a reasonable starting point (and Sen asks if 
this could also be a reasonable ending point) to the theory of justice is the 
identification and retreat of redressable injustices. The question is how to reduce 
injustice and advance justice rather than looking for perfect or just institutions. One 
of the reasons for this approach is a lack of agreement, under strict conditions of 
impartiality and open mindedness, of the nature of a just society and the 
unavailability of perfect institutions (Sen 2009: 8-9).  
His second departure layover his argument that ‘’justice cannot be indifferent to 
the lives that people can actually live’’ (Sen 2009: 18). The advancement of justice 
has to be a search for comparatively (rather than transcendentally) the actual 
realisations (rather than institutions and rules) in societies involved. The importance 
given to human lives, experiences and realisation cannot be supplanted by 
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information about institutions that exist and the rules that operate. The realised 
actually goes beyond the rules and the institutions. Thus the central concern of the 
capability approach is evaluating how well people’s lives are socially realised with 
reference to their capability to function, (rather than in terms of their utilities or 
happiness) that is their real opportunities to be and to do what they value being 
and doing (functioning).122  
Sen is interested not only in the kinds of lives people manage to lead, but also in the 
freedom that they actually have to choose between different styles and ways of 
living (Sen 2009: 227). We could choose to use our freedom to enhance many 
objectives that are not part of our own lives in a narrow sense. Capability is thus the 
opportunity to decide what people should do and the deontological responsibility 
for what they do (Sen 2009: 19, 231). According to Sen (2009: 228) this freedom is 
valuable at least for two different reasons: more freedom gives more opportunity 
to pursue our objectives (opportunity aspect) judged by whether people end up 
doing what they would respectively choose to do if unrestrained and we may also 
attach importance to the process itself (process aspect). Accordingly, an equal share 
of opportunities is more important than an equal share of the means to freedom 
(e.g. primary goods). This idea of justice is significant in the analysis of justice 
particularly in a plural society with multiple grounding or plurality of principles (Sen 
2009: 194FF).  
Instead of equalising resources or welfare, equality is defined and aimed at in terms 
of the capacity each individual has to pursue and to achieve well-being-a space for 
the assessment of individual well-being and the freedom to achieve it. Capability is 
a set of vectors of functionings reflecting a person’s freedom to lead one type of life 
or another. Capability amounts to the substantive freedoms a person has, or the 
real alternatives available to the person herself to achieve well-being. In that 
respect capacity is related to well-being both instrumentally, as a basis of judgment 
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on Disability and Special Needs, Continuum International Publishing Group. 
90 
 
about the relative advantage a person has and her place in society; and intrinsically 
since achieved well-being itself depends on the capacity to function and the 
exercise of choice has value of its own as part of a freedom to determine what he 
wants, what he values, and ultimately what he decides to choose. In contrast to the 
emphasis on economic growth this idea of realising social justice is an alternative 
dimension of function of institution. In line with this humanistic function of 
institutions Sen thus gives much emphasis to the realization of social justice. 
In this respect institutions are to allocate burdens and benefits towards building the 
capability of citizens. His conceptualisation of functions of institutions is linked to 
his understanding of development. He holds that many political thinkers (including 
Rawls) have gone wrong in considering justice as a matter of arranging just 
institutions.123 Accordingly, his realisation focused theory pays attention to the way 
institutions actually work to affect people’s lives rather than being merely arranged 
(Sen 2009: 20-22, 67-69). Sen does not see institutions as promoting a single 
common good.  He rather takes lives of people seriously and visualises institutions 
as promoting human development and justice, rather than treating them as 
manifestations of justice. According to him it is hard to think of good institutions as 
being basically good in them, rather than possibly being effective ways of realising 
acceptable or excellent social achievements which is more important than 
achievements in terms of economic growth (Sen 2000: 83).  
Sen brings in institutions only as ways and means of achieving development, 
characterised as expansion of different kinds of interlinked freedoms and the 
removal of different categories of interconnected ‘’unfreedoms’’ (Sen 2000: 23). 
The notion of development cannot be conceptually unlinked from legal and judicial 
arrangements. Development is not confined only to institutions and policies in that 
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 One approach concentrates in identifying perfectly just institutions social arrangement and took 
the characterization of institutions as the only identical task of justice; another is based on the idea 
of contract (imagining population as a party to the contract). Contracterian is dominant now lead by 
Rawls contemporary dominant political philosophy, based on social contract and concentrates on 
the search for ideal social institutions. 
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sphere. It has to be judged by what freedom people manage to have in that sphere 
and the overall effect of all these instrumental variables on the lives of human 
beings in that particular sphere. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine what social 
realisations are actually generated through such institutions (Sen 2000: 82). Legal 
development, not just about what the law is and what the judicial system formally 
accepts or asserts, takes note of the enhancement of capability-their freedom to 
exercise the rights and entitlements that are associated with legal progress (Sen 
2000: 10-11).  
According to this approach there is no direct causality and linearity between 
institutions and development. Institutions are held as capable of contributing 
directly to the lives that people are able to lead and as important in facilitating 
people’s ability to scrutinise the values and priorities that they can consider, 
especially through opportunities for public discussion. 124  Institutions, through 
‘government by discussion’ help to build capacity to enhance reasoned engagement 
through enhancing informational availability and interactive discussions. Building 
capability would pave the way to realizing and sustaining justice.125    
Sen makes several critically important points. His point is so important, namely that 
justice has to give meaning to actual lives. The need to hold practical public debate 
is as important a starting point as the how of justice. His conception of 
development beyond the mere accumulation of wealth is significantly 
comprehensive and true. The fundamental importance he attaches to freedom and 
the interconnection between economic, social, political and legal freedoms is also 
important.  
Despite its obvious strength, Sen’s idea of justice needs some reconstruction. 
According to Chimni Sen talks about social realisation but did not critically show 
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 Institutions are meant instrumentals in realizing social justice towards sustainable development. 
Sustainable development could not be attained without effective decisions being rendered by 
decision making bodies.  
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how this realisation is to be materialized. He also did not see the ‘’social process 
and structures that inhibit development’’ (Chimini 2008: 8). Those class structures 
that bear influence on the way capability is realized has not get due consideration 
by him. He does not explore the role of collective action in shaping social policies. 
His sole emphasis on individuals and ignoring groups in any society makes him 
suffers from both methodological nationalism (for his sole focus on local factors) 
and methodological individualism.126     
While Sen focuses on lives and visualises development more comprehensively, he 
neglects the subject of political economy that are compelling insights in to social 
process and structures central to the realization of the goals of development 
(Chimini 2008: 8). Sen convincingly demonstrated how personal heterogeneities, 
diversity in physical environment, variations in social climate and differences in 
relational perspectives can be contingencies in the conversion of incomes in to the 
kind of lives that people can lead but refrains from exploring the ways in which the 
concentration of economic power over the means of producing and diffusing 
culture might compromise my capability to decide what things I have reason to 
value (Sen 2000: 240, Chimini 2008: 9).  
Pogge (2004: 30-32, 37, 45) on his part argues that ‘’Sen’s approach is an important 
and helpful heuristic device, but does not provide a criterion of social justice that 
could in any way be considered a valid alternative to the resourcist perspective’’. 
The capability approach overstates its contribution to the egalitarian debate, and 
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 In reply to this Sen has points and considered attacks on him as ‘’methodological individualism’’ a 
mistake. He argues that the re-establishment of society as an abstraction vis-s-vis the individual has 
to be avoided. And he puts reasons why capability of groups is not the focus of his idea of justice. For 
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members of the group place on the proficiency of the group. In valuing a person’s ability to take part 
in the life of the group, there is an implicit valuation of the life of the society itself, and that is an 
important enough aspect of the capability perspective. On the other hand a person belongs to many 
different groups including gender, class, language, profession and religion. The increasing tendency 
towards seeing people in terms of one dominant identity is not only an imposition of an external and 
arbitrary priority, but also the denial of an important liberty of a person who can decide on their 
respective loyalties to different groups to all of which he or she belongs. Seeing a person as a 
member of one social group tends to be based on an inadequate understanding of this breadth and 
complexity of any society in the world (Sen 2009: 245-247). 
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cannot ultimately be justified. Pogge particularly criticises what he maintained as 
serious problems in dealing with natural inequalities. He claims the approach, 
including individual differences among the elements of moral concerns, ends up 
identifying disability as ‘vertical inequalities’ and hence in stigmatizing disabled 
people as overall worse endowed than other people. Things like eye or color are 
horizontal differences and as such do not constitute grounds for additional 
resources (Pogge 2004: 30-32, 37, 45). 
The other problem with Sen is his ultimate emphasis on national issues. Sen (like 
other developmental economists) overwhelmingly focused on relating the 
persistence of severe poverty to local causes-bad governance, sexist culture, 
geography while leaving unstudied the huge impact of the global economic order 
on the incidence of poverty worldwide (Pogge 2004: 30). Pogge, like Sen, supports 
the idea of freedom from severe poverty as a basic human right (Vizard 2005: 17). 
But Sen treats poverty as capability deprivation while Pogge treats it as an external 
imposition (Vizard 2005: 17, Sen 2009: 254). Pogge held that the more advantaged 
citizens of affluent countries in collaboration with many political elites in the 
developing world have acted responsibility towards most of the life-threatening 
poverty in the world (Pogge 2004: 31, 45).  
The high rate of mortality and morbidity (where women and children under the age 
of five are the most at risk) is most significantly determined by poverty (Pogge 
2005: 183). Accordingly, the rich are actively participating in the largest crime ever 
committed by shaping and enforcing the social conditions and social institutions 
that forcibly and avoidably cause to suffering and poverty. We cannot avoid poverty 
only because of the fantastic increase in inequality (Pogee 2004: 32, 37). In the 
existing world poverty manifests a violation of our negative duties, our duties not to 
harm, as well as duties to avoid causing harm that one’s past conduct may cause in 
the future to others, our intermediate duty (Pogge 2004: 34-36) Sharing this view of 
Pogge, Chimni also criticizes Sen for not sufficiently appreciating the effect of 
globalisation on the fundamental transformation of the international system, with 
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the result that Sen does not attach any particular salience to global economic and 
political structures (Chimini 2002: 10).  
Accordingly Sen’s approach to justice needs further revision in order to visualize the 
Ethiopian context.  
2.3.2.Nussbaum’s reconstruction of the Capability Approach 
Nussbaum has developed the capability approach further. She visualised structural 
defects in the dominant western theories that yield very imperfect results 
(Nussbaum 2004: 1). Accordingly the problem of global justice will only be solved by 
thinking of what all human beings require to live a rich human life through 
purposeful social cooperation that focuses on old fellowship as well as new self-
interest. Capability cannot be detached from a central part of our own good-to 
produce and live in a world in which all human beings have what they need to live a 
life with human dignity (Nussbaum 2004: 2).  
Thus Nussbaum endorsed the capability rather than resources approach as it, 
rather than resources, yields the most appropriate space for comparison between 
individuals. She however criticises Sen’s approach, stating that it does not show the 
‘’most central capabilities that are central to any human life’’ (Nussbaum 1997: 227, 
265). Accordingly she lists the basic capabilities (she terms entitlements) that are in 
a way similar to Rawls’ lists of primary goods.127 Human respect, human fellowship 
in a more expansive sense is the bargain for mutual advantage among rough equals 
and is the focus of her capability listing. Despite an overlapping consensus 
Nussbaum held that her capability list can more concretely be specified in 
accordance with local beliefs and circumstances (Nussbaum 1997: 286). The lists 
have separate and indispensable components that are related to one another in 
complex ways. Her current list of capabilities include capability for life, bodily 
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 Rawls list of Important liberties include political liberty and freedom of speech and assembly, 
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person, the right to hold personal 
property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law 
(Rawls 1999: 53). 
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health,  bodily integrity, sense, imagination and thought, emotion, practical reason, 
affiliation (friendship and respect), other species, play, control over one’s 
environment (political and  material) (Nussbaum 1997: 287-288).  
The duty to realise list of capabilities lies in individuals, fellow citizens and in 
institutions. Since each person cannot define this list individually, constitutionally 
structured institutions are created and delegated with the responsibility of meeting 
the minimum capability threshold.128 The establishment of institutions therefore 
provides this valuable service and human need and contributes towards living 
fulfilled life. The citizens are then charged with a collective obligation to fulfill this 
responsibility by being respectful to cultural difference and align cooperation 
(Nussbaum 1997: 200).  
2.4. Basics of Justice 
2.4.1 Common Good 
The discussion on justice recapitulated that justice is all about the interests in the 
lives of individuals and groups. Individuals and groups have their own specific needs 
that may be in conflict, parallel, overlap or intersect with one another. A political 
community must aim, above all, at making good the wants of individuals and groups 
and this is the realisation of their specific powers of thinking, feeling, and 
contributing as social beings.129 Striking a balance is the key driver.  
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capability approach complements Sen’s approach and suggests a set of basic human entitlements. 
Most important ideas of the list include:  
  
 Most nations, well and honestly run, can promote many or even most of the human 
capabilities up to some reasonable threshold level 
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 The family should be treated as a sphere that is precious but not ‘’private’’. 
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According to Barker individuals live as individuals according to their own good 
pleasure (Barker 1959: 36). People at the same time live as a group according to 
their common way of thinking, speaking and acting. In other words a person lives 
through two vises as individual and member of a community (Barker 1959: 106). 
Whilst individuals live in group they consciously surrender the free exercise of their 
own will in return for the common good namely the protection and preservation of 
common lives. The real freedom and sustained justice in a pluralised society 
requires individuals that are not socially isolated. 
There are therefore three goods for a society to attain: the reduction of individual 
disability, realisation of individual capability and the maximisation of group 
capability. The first involves satisfying the interest of another. The second involves 
self-sufficiency. The satisfaction of all the interests involves the creation of the 
common good which is the sum total of satisfaction of ‘’one-self’’ and ‘’another-
self’’. When a person seek for the common good, he becomes both selfish and 
‘’unselfish’’. He seeks to avoid injustice in protecting and preserving him-self: he at 
the same time seeks justice in maximizing ‘’another-self’’. 
Accordingly, though individuals can be described as unit and cannot act in two 
entirely opposite ways now he is expected to act entirely in many directions 
towards the common good (Barker 1959: 100). The duty that each has to do his 
own (Plato’s doctrine of specialisation) has an implied conception of the true nature 
of justice (Barker 1959: 105). In accordance with specialisation, life, demands 
diversification of tasks for the sake another’s good. According to Barker fullness of 
expression and true consciousness of pleasure are to be found in doing one’s duty 
in the station to which one is called (Barker 1959: 96). Healthy relationships among 
these interests naturally moves society forward, secures social justice and is a 
natural cause for development. This, building upon the capability approach, is the 
thematic area of this research. 
The common good which has got such a status would be the only One Common 
Good and the ‘’Final Good’’ –to use Aristotle’s phrase. However the ‘’common 
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good’’ has got various versions. Rawls for example more importantly affirms the 
plurality of conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good affirmed by 
citizens. However as public agreement on the requisite conception of the good 
cannot be obtained out of this plurality, liberal values of the decent people shall be 
imported by burdened people. For Rawls the principles that decent peoples 
endorse are common goods. These, according to Rawls, are nothing less than liberal 
principles of global justice.130  
In any society the common good is to be found in the basic institution. Adopted by 
the consensus of individuals and groups, this constitution, is State’s identity and 
constitutes its permanence (Barker 1959: 208). A clear knowledge of the common 
good orient knowledge and action towards the right end otherwise thought and 
action will be disoriented (O’Neil 2004: 13). The corollary demands the intervention 
of the State through its institutions so that the common good is understood, 
pursued and ultimately achieved; this is to maintain the tripartite relationship of 
the individual, the people and the State.  
In the tripartite relationship, as Plato noted, the just man will discharge his function 
satisfactorily. The whole issue focuses on the function of living well, and this is 
realised when the people live in order to be glad as neighbors: about getting on 
with our lives in a way that complements rather than hinders our neighbors’ efforts 
to get on their own (Barker 1959: 174). Decision making bodies serve the 
advancement of the common good by promoting the individual as well as society’s 
self-realisation. In the realisation of a list of capabilities these bodies need to 
understand society’s expectations for individual and the group through which they 
administer the right justice.   
2.4.2 Indispensability of Reason 
The enhancement of justice towards maximisation of citizen’s lives involves a 
reasoned engagement. Reason can be defined as an explanation or justification for 
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something, a motive for acting or thinking, and a power to think in a rational way.131 
It can be concerned with the right way of viewing and treating other people 
(culture, claim) by examining different grounds for respect and tolerance. Those 
who advocate reasoned thinking point out that reasoning is important for two 
reasons; for avoiding arbitrariness and accessing authority (O’Neil 2004: 11). 
According to O’Neil there are four conceptions of practical reason; reasoned action 
towards the objective Good, pursuit of subjective ends using instrumental 
reasoning, shared norms and action-based personal commitments and critical 
revisions of action-based norms and commitments (O’Neil 2004: 49).  
Practical reasoning is one of the constituents of the human soul which is 
indispensable to guide individuals along a single line. This line is a principle imposed 
by reason (Barker 1959: 97). Accordingly, the path of reason or the rule of the 
intellect has to be the basic determinant of good and just behavior as well as of an 
acceptable framework of legal duties and entitlements (Sen 2009: 38-39).  
Though this is contentious, there is no dispute over an alternative to practical 
reasoning.132 The purpose of coming to decision making bodies is for public 
discussion and reasoning, is not merely to decide the winner or loser of a game. For 
Aristotle, citizens of a polity do not come to court in order to promote their own 
selfish agenda-to injure an enemy or reward a friend-but to do what is just and 
beneficial for the whole society (Kraut 2002: 450). Hence, thinking of the familiar 
legal apparatus of assemblies and courts, Aristotle identified law as dispassionate 
reason and maintained that people should be allowed to share in the process of 
due deliberation and judgment (Kraut 2002: 405). Accordingly the great spiritual 
limitation up on man is reason (Barker 1959: 321).  
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 This raises problems for non-formal or traditional institutions as it is usually argued that they 
operate in an irrational manner and not a reasoned manner. Max Weber categorized Kadhi justice in 
this way suggesting that they decided cases according to the facts of the specific case rather than 
through reason based on norms. 
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Sen also advocated the indispensability of reasoned thought (Sen 2009: 39). Justice 
demands that we have a desire to understand the world and this understanding 
inescapably involves reasoning. Reasoning is central to a proper understanding of 
justice; concept which at its core involves considerable unreasoned thinking; indeed 
it may be particularly important in understanding such a world. Unreason, impulses 
and mental attitudes, relying on very defective primitive form of reasoning, which 
makes reason based actions and responses far less effective (Sen 2009: preface, 
xvii). Decision making bodies should give due emphasis to the indispensability of 
reason when screening illegitimate claims in their pursuit of social justice. 
Justice whilst being the common good of a society is built on some theoretical and 
practical conceptions of what reasoning is. Reasoning is a way of guarantying that 
the right things are done but also helps to ensure that the people affected can see 
that justice is being done. It helps to scrutinise unjust ideologies and blind beliefs. 
Public reasoning is important as a way of extending the reach and reliability of 
valuations and making them more robust. Reasoned engagement (not just goodwill 
towards others) helps to prevent catastrophes and injustice (Sen 2009: 5, 35, 46-48, 
241).  
2.4.3 Objectivity and Subjectivity 
If reason happens to be indispensable in the pursuit of justice, what special role 
does it play? Does it guarantee that it indispensably leads us to enhancing or 
securing justice and truth? In epistemology, where the matter is clear, a very 
dubious procedure could accidentally yield a more correct answer than extremely 
rigorous reasoning but a decision devoid of reason may have unintended 
consequences and the probability of enhancing capability may be low. In thinking 
about the issues of justice in the case reasoned scrutiny emerges as being an 
objective we can reasonably aspire to (Sen 2009: 40-41). Judges are accountable to 
be objective when they give reasoned decisions which justify acts of citizens which 
aspire to reflect the common citizen’s basic institutions. This belief should not be 
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that of the decision maker, but one formed objectively out of impartiality to the 
decision-makers own thoughts but in conjunction with that of their community; this 
is an unusual and exceptional quality in a decision-maker.  
In order to objectively assess the world, judges need to free themselves from the 
position they assume. Objectivity and exploring a theory based on public reasoning 
demands going beyond positional confinement towards an independent position, 
viewing the world from a delineated somewhere and broadening the comparative 
assessment and transposition by avoiding barriers to the comprehension of what is 
going on from the limited perspective of what to observe from ones perspective.133 
In this regard Rawls demands people to ignore their talents, education, social 
standing, economic resources and operate under a veil of ignorance and further 
demands of people to think devoid of political, religious, moral doctrines, and thus 
position themselves in an original position to deliberate their set of principles or 
justice to the common group (Rawls 1971: 19-20). This is comparable to Lock’s state 
of nature where there is no assumption of any principle, even Lock’s Natural Law, as 
the basis of any agreement.  
One lesson that could be taken from this theoretical thinking around justice is the 
nature of objectivity practically applied to the demands of public discussion, 
reasoning, impartiality and reflection. The role of unrestricted public reasoning is 
central to democratic politics and the pursuit of social justice (Sen 2009: 44).  
Be that as it may objectivity is an illusion if one thinks in terms of objective 
reasoning alone. Subjective reasoning cannot be avoided as decisions are made 
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largely based on emotions and personal values. These values are ultimately rooted 
in our sense of shared humanity; Dunson commented that emotions energize the 
ethical quest (Dunson 1999: 96). Even Sen spent most of his life seeking creative 
solutions to the colossal scourge of hunger and malnutrition for he cannot forget 
the look in the eyes of emaciated refugees during the Bengal famine of 1943, the 
foundation setting experience or the emotions felt which have subsequently never 
been far from his consciousness (Dunson 1999: 96). Moral attachments are one of 
the primary and essential purposes of a democratic society. 
At one side of the extreme we find the advice of Lord Mansfield to a colonial 
governor to consider only what the governor thinks of justice and require him to 
decide accordingly without giving consideration to reasoned thinking. The logic or 
the reason behind such advice was that judgments will probably be right but 
reasons will certainly be wrong’’. In situations like the raging famine, Sen (2009: 4) 
held that it seems natural to protest rather than to reason elaborately about justice 
or injustice. Thus in decision making subjectivity is as indispensable as its 
objectivity. 
According to Flex rationalist approaches to justice have proved inadequate.  Flex 
argues that some of the problems with concept of justice (such as those of Plato, 
Aristotle, and Rawls) arise from giving privilege to the rational aspects of human 
subjectivity and from positing abstract, impersonal, and disembodied concepts of 
reasoning (Flex 1993: 332). Relationships between people are defined by logic and 
intellect, which unaided by unrefined judgment cannot in isolation comprehend 
such connectivity as is between related persons. The rationalistic approaches are 
suggested to be doomed to fail and actually are counterproductive because they 
block the development of other capacities such as empathy and appreciation for 
otherness, which is required for the effective exercise of justice. Contrary to these 
views he held that justice is not a finite or permanently set as rules or principles. It 
is an ongoing process, through a set of interrelated practices, where our goals and 
purposes subsequently change. Some form of reason may inhibit or block its 
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development. Thus discourse about justice cannot do without the concept of 
subjectivity and society does not become completely different beings when 
entering the communal world (Flex 1993: 332). Justice is best understood as an 
ongoing process rather than a fixed set of procedures or a pre-prepared standard to 
which individuals must conform (Flex 1993: 341). Rawls also calls convictions and 
attachments part of a non-public identity without which we would be disoriented 
and unable to carry on.134 Thus it is both possible and necessary to develop a non-
rationalised conception of the self and justice. 
Understood as a process, justice is one of the ways individuals manage the strain of 
being simultaneously public and private, alone and in relation to others, desiring 
and interdependent. On a collective level, justice is one way which groups manage 
the strain of mediation between individual subjectivities and that which they are 
composed such objectivities limited by resources, past traditions, and the 
consequences of historical decisions to which individuals must now must respond 
(Flex 1993: 341). The management of such tensions necessarily involves the 
exercise of various forms of power. Justice, as a process, incorporates the least 
reconciliation,135 reciprocity,136 recognition,137 and judgment.138 This signifies the 
indispensability of subjectivity in pursuit of social justice. 
The reasons for making room for relevant emotions, plays complementary role to 
reason and reflection. As far as the reliability of impressions and feelings is 
concerned, it would not be plausible to see emotions, psychology, or instincts as an 
independent source of valuation (Sen 2009: xvii). Ideology and dogmatic belief can 
emerge from sources other than religion and custom and have frequently done so, 
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 See Rawls, A Theory of justice supra note 25, p. 241. See also Adam Smith who held that human 
affections, feelings and passion (what he calls ‘moral sentiments’) play a greater part than reason in 
socialization (Mathis 2009: 88). 
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 This requires new unity of differences, mutuality and incorporation rather than annihilation of 
opposites and distinctions. 
136
 This involves a continuous though imprecisely defined sharing of authority-not necessarily 
equality of power- and mutuality of decision. 
137
 This involves acknowledging the legitimacy of others. 
138
 This involves a process of balancing and proportion, of evidence and reflection, of looking 
forward and backward. 
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that does not deny the role of reason in assessing the rationale behind instinctive 
attitudes. The role of instinctive psychology and spontaneous responses cannot be 
underestimated; it is important to note that the sentiments, psychology and 
reasoning can be interwoven and supplement each other. The first perception 
shouldn’t be of right and wrong as that cannot be the object of reason, but of an 
immediate sense and feeling of reasoning in a subjective way involves a move from 
observation of the tragedy to the diagnosis of injustice’’ ( Sen 2009: 4, 49-50). 
Thus, like the transitional object, justice cannot bridge inner and external reality if it 
is conceptualised in purely objective or subjective terms (Flex 1993: 341). Realising 
social justice therefore demands giving due weight to objectivity and subjectivity in 
a way which necessitates giving due weigh to formal and non-formal systems. 
Moreover the realisation of social justice demands some constant elements of 
justice and some locally variable elements of justice. Nevertheless the 
conceptualisation of institutions and social justice had been dominated by a one-
size-fits-all mindset and has ignored this conceptualisation challenge of reasoning 
and institutions in envisaging equitable social justice.  
Conclusion 
This chapter indicated that understanding of institutions and their function has to a 
large extent been influenced by Douglass North’s conceptions of contract and 
property rights as institutions. Though discourses have changed in theory, this 
conceptualisation hadn’t substantially shifted. The notion of economic growth as 
development was supposed to follow just institutional arrangements that had to be 
endorsed by poorer countries.  
As the one-size-fits-all solution fails, the demands of exploring solutions 
incorporated the opportunity that locally grown non-formal systems provid for. This 
further demands an exploration development beyond economic growth, 
considering humanistic elements of development, expanding the real freedoms of 
the people in speculating and realising purposes of living and designing the ways 
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that make people capable of getting their wishes realised.  These demands a 
bottom up approach in designing the common good around the ends needs of the 
population and making balanced and proper use of objective and subjective reason 
based public engagement. The exercise calls for giving a balanced and particular 
attention to cases before decision-making institutions and hence the contextual 
listing of capabilities towards social justice. 
Besides contract law and economic growth reform efforts, this would yield results 
in developing countries if root ideas of institutions and justice are broad enough to 
encompass non-formal systems with the end of realising human capability as a 
concept of justice. This demands establishing connections between various decision 
making bodies and assessing their impacts on the different interests reflected by 
litigants towards or against social justice. This creates a proposition in response to 
the lingering question of the connection between human rights, human capabilities 
and justice. 
The previous chapter illustrated how the formal law and court system could not 
bring behavioral change on the part of the people. A reformed institution is needed 
so that the people secures a more resilience chance of attaining a reasonable level 
of social justice out of balancing issues of human rights, capabilities and justice.  The 
reform discussed in Chapter One failed to yield this effect and therefore it is 
important to see if the global attempt to reform institutions might properly 
concpetualise institutions and justice so that the reforms can base the realization of 
social justice on firmer foundations. As human life is central to institutions, 
meaningful endeavor to form or reform justice systems cannot ignore the value of 
human lives. An institution reformed in such a way must reflect societal justice and 
encourage the proper understanding and attainment of legal and social justice and 
reduce injustice. The next chapter explores if the reform pertaining to these 
institutions would result in realisation of social justice as identified in this chapter.  
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3 
Legal and Judicial Reform 
In the previous chapter the relationship between the ideas of justice, legal justice, 
social justice and the role of institutions was explained so that basic and derivative 
institutions serve justice when, through preventing injustice and enhancing justice, 
they make people capable of being and doing. It was suggested that conceptions 
relating to institutions and justice gave insufficient space to the social, cultural, 
political, economic and religious contexts of the countries they were supposed to 
serve.  It was also suggested that the need to reform institutions arose when they 
became roadblocks to the realization of development. 
This chapter is chiefly concerned with whether and to what extent can institutional 
reform programmes provide an effective response to the needs of legal and social 
justice. In this respect the chapter discusses the old and new law and development 
movements. The chapter enquires as to whether the old law and development 
movement has been influenced by this understanding and how far it was resorted 
to or departed from the earlier ideas of progress, institutions and justice. It 
indicates why it failed to realise its promises and exacerbated the inconsistencies 
that poorer countries had in their legal systems. Building on this the chapter also 
enquires as to how this failure forced the move from institution-free technocratic 
reform programmes of the Bretton Woods ethos139 to the ‘’institutions matter’’ 
slogans. It queries how once a marginal topic became the central agenda in the 
1980’s through the debate on economic development (Chang 2010: 473) and why 
judicial bodies were made the center of reform. This triggered the new law and 
development movement. Thus this chapter discusses the relationship between 
institutions and social justice and elaborates on whether and how the judicial 
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 See https://en.m.wikipedia.org>wiki>Bretton.design the financial system, last visited on 4 Aug. 
2016. The institutions are the International Financial Institutions mainly the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. After the conclusion of world war the second 730 delegates from 44 
allied nations gathered to regulate international monetary and financial order. The financial 
Institutions were hostile to the institutions and used to treat institutions as mere details.  
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reform programme impacts lives, principally through reducing injustice and 
enhancing legal and social justice.  
The chapter has two parts. The first part of the chapter deals with issues of the old 
law and development movement (what it is, why it failed and the reasons for its 
failures), a brief history of judicial reform, the relationship it had with the old law 
and development movement and what is meant by judicial reform. The second part 
carries on the discussion further and explores the various discourses of hegemonic, 
counter-hegemonic and capability approaches to development. As the judicial 
reform programme cannot ignore the way peoples’ do justice and the role of the 
State in effecting development, this has resulted in the discussion of the 
development of legal pluralism and the idea of developmental state to be followed 
by a short conclusion.  
3.1 The old law and development movement 
The old law and development discourse casually correlates law and progress. Its 
conceptualisation had been preceded by earlier notions of ‘missionisation’, 
progress, civilisation, growth and modernisation (Wallerstain 2005: 1262-1265) 
from which it did not significantly departed. The notion made a strong return to the 
18th Century with the most important product –‘can do’- attitude to progress and 
made development a euphemism for progress’’ (Marryman 1977: 462-463, 467). 
The earlier trends had been influenced by the work of German Sociologist Max 
Weber who had been the key figure in holding law as an important means of 
development. Weber explained that the rise of capitalism and industrial civilisation 
owed to a rationalized legal system of the West that was autonomous from other 
spheres of society, consciously designed, and universally and consistently applied to 
all similar cases.  A rational and predictable legal system thereby generates certain 
substantive provisions necessary to the operation of the industrial system 
(Marryman 1977: 5, 11).  
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The earlier colonization trends assumed that non-European countries were unable 
or unwilling to develop their resources which led to an exploitative and profit-
driven approach to the resources of the non-European world (Wallerstain 2005: 
1264). This civilizing mission was seen as moral and political duty of the Europeans. 
After 1945 the language of civilization was changed to development, the European 
and non-European to North and South dichotomy, and it was assumed that 
countries of the South could potentially develop themselves, as opposed to being 
developed by the North. The assumption then was that countries in the South 
would develop technologically if they adopted proper policies in government 
function areas. Accordingly, aid and advice were rendered and this was seen 
positively as a route to achieving the ends of development (Marryman 1977: 466). 
The new ideology was called Developmentalism or dependency by Latin 
Americans,140 Socialism by the Soviet Union and economic development by the USA 
(Wallerstain 2005: 1265).  
The language and tone of the mission had got a new flavour in the 1960s with the 
emergence of the idea of stage of growth the main proponent of which was 
Rostow. Rostow’s model of development, the modernisation model was based on 
the belief that every country in the world can develop. It explained why some 
countries are developed and why some had not and prescribed patterns of 
development. His prescription was a liberal economic theory having five stages of 
development: traditional society (characterized by subsistence agricultural 
economy), preconditions to take off (with surplus of wealth society begins to 
develop manufacturing), take off (industrialization and commercial agriculture 
begins), drive to maturity (national economy grows and intensifies) and age of high 
mass consumption (greater income than buying essentials, economy flourishes). 
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 This theory is Marxist-inspired and is developed in the Global South and argues that 
modernization theory is based on false premises, the challenges of development are external to the 
South and international relations are bad so development is possible with fewer relations. 
Elaborated primarily by Latin American scholars, it attributes the cause of underdevelopment to be 
found in the history and structure of the global capitalist system (Merryman 2004: 9-10). 
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According to Rostow every country need to pass through all these five stages. 
Rostow’s key notion was that development required a takeoff which could be 
achieved through the transfer of institutional lessons undertaken by Western 
countries to developing countries. For the law and development movement, this 
meant the transfer of the key principles of Western legal systems, also known as 
liberal legalism, to developing countries (Trubek and Galanter 1974: 1062). 
Influenced by the Western model of modernisation, this model assumed that the 
West had the best and had outgrown its developing neighbours. Development was 
suggested to be achieved when the South had similar institutions like the West. Part 
of being economically and politically free, it was assumed that if each country 
followed the same route to development the same result would follow.  
The now well established criticism of this proposition was that it gave no regard for 
each country’s specific geographic, historic and  the situation of the people.  
Accordingly modernisation theory simply ran out of steam in the early 1970s as 
political institutions disintegrated, authoritarian and military regimes proliferated 
and developing countries failed to progress economically as predicted (Tamanaha 
1995: 2, 3). Then it was followed in the 1970s by the decade of development (as 
declared by the United Nations) a decade in which development became an all-
embracing, elixir concept. Having its heyday in the United States in the 1970s it 
defined development as embodying principles of economic growth and poverty 
alleviation. With this the law and development movement emerged and tried to 
causally connect law with these objectives. 
Embraced by the basic tenets of modernisation theory (Tamanaha 1995: 3) the law 
and development movement followed the 1960s growth agenda as a new field of 
technical assistance and scholarship whose components included the idea of 
progress, the movement for law reform and the emergence of interest in law and 
society (Marryman 1977: 461). The theme was to speed up the social, economic 
and political convergence of the South and the North economically via the 
protection of property and contract rights; politically via the establishment of 
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liberal-democratic government and socially via a change in social behaviour for the 
South using Western law reform.141  
The movement assumed that law was the solution to the problem of development 
in developing countries (Trubek and Galanter 1974: 1096) and thus optimistically, 
invariably, positively and causally connected law with development. As the theory 
underlying the law and development movement was the underlying modernisation 
theory whose main proponent was Rostow’s stages of growth, for the law and 
development movement this meant transferring core conceptions of modern law, 
liberal legalism, to developing countries. Like the earlier makability tenets the law 
and development movement assumed the evolutionary power of ideas and 
institutions of the West on developing countries.142  The core conceptions of 
modern law were used to explain the cause of industrialisation in the West that 
included the social purpose of law: 
1. As designing to help and control the conduct of individuals 
2. As applied equally, and its enforcement designed to assure conformity with 
the law and  
3. Applied by courts, whose bases of decisions are authoritative rules and 
doctrines, as the primary institutions to apply and define the law. 
The paramount importance the movement gave to individuals, the principle of 
equality and the formal system is apparent from the start. Moreover formal laws, 
formal ways of enacting them, formal enforcement institutions and formal 
education were the central positive change agents in the process. The basic theory 
held modern law as a system of rules, a form of purposive human action and part of 
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 Barron 2002: 5, Trubek 1972: 3, 7-10, Nader 2007: 2, Barron 2005: 6). See also Frank 1972: 768. 
The main idea behind the conception is the existence of an organized modern nation state which 
rationally and purposively enacts laws for the realization of growth. For that purpose western laws 
were taken as possessing such ‘’purpose” and ‘’power” of change. This conviction forced the West to 
mobilize and transfer resources to the South-the most notable of which is the deliberate flow of laws 
and institutions of and from the West to the South. 
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 The idea is taken from Chimni (2008), The Sen Conception of Development and Contemporary 
International Law Discourse: Some Parallels, The Law and Development Review, Volume 1, Issue 1. 
See also Tamanaha 1995: 3-4. 
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the nation-state to effect social change enhancing the state to create the system of 
rules, courts and other institutions which make, apply and enforce the law. Being 
purposive, universal and rational modern law supplant local, particularistic and 
traditional forces and is the vehicle through which the assistance of State replaces 
communal and  traditional authority (Tamanaha 1995: 4-6) that organized decision-
making against common standards. 
Thus the purpose of law in the old law and development movement was the 
functional prerequisite of an industrial economy with different articulations. This 
includes in its importance the creation and maintenance of the market that 
emphasized predictability. Another articulation lays in its purposiveness and power 
of more effective norms to define and channel behaviour, with the more likely 
economic growth that will subsequently occur. Effectiveness was viewed as a 
mechanism to measure the capacity of a state to exert its power as main actor in 
transforming economic activity (Tamanaha 1995: 6-7).  
Professionally educating judges as social engineers about the role of law in 
development was assumed to narrow the gap between the law in books and the 
law in action. In this respect Galanter143 hopefully speculated that education could 
be the basis of development as it could overcome values installed by family, class, 
religion, and other social forces.  
This conception resulted in changing the laws and decision making bodies of the 
South. First laws on the books were ‘’perfected’’ if necessary by importing foreign 
codes-such as laws guarantying freedom of contract. And as tradition suppresses 
the application of rationally enacted modern law, impartiality in the application of 
laws must become a reality (Tamanaha 1995: 9).  
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 See Mark Galanter (1966), The Modernization of Law in Modernization, Myron Weiner. Mark 
Galanter was one of law and development movement writer. 
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3.1.1 The Reality 
The reality on the ground proved that economic, political and social merger of the 
West and the South had not been realized. Contrary to what the movement 
dictated the gap between the West and the South had been polarizing. According to 
Trebilcock (2001: 9) the average income gap between the richest and poorest 
countries has doubled within the last 40 years. With all sorts of declarations, 
commitments and conventions countries and peoples were not made equal. Within 
the West itself there were severe problems. In the US, where the laws, 
development policies and ideas of the movement originated, there is a widespread 
poverty and a wide gap between the economically rich and the poor (Nader 2007: 
5).  
Legal education too was not capable of bringing about the necessary changes. After 
lawyers and judges went through education (mostly modeled in the law and 
development movement) the way they practiced law proved that law schools and 
training centers did not manage to be bath house where entrenched societal values 
could easily be taken off. Legal education was inadequate in that it placed excessive 
emphasis on learning legal rules and doctrines, a method which, apart from dull, did 
not enable the student to properly understand the social and economic reality and 
hence social justice as an idea.144 Most political thinkers are aware that human 
beings are complex, multi-faceted beings made up of biological, physical, 
psychological, intellectual, social, and in many cases spiritual elements. 145  As 
Schmidtz (2006: 179-180) suggested some part of Justice may not be analytically 
built into a concept and is not immutable, therefore it would be hard to believe that 
education can exclude these. 
Unfortunately the law and development movement failed. Regardless of the 
situation in developing countries the same reason that accounted for the political 
development movement also accounted for its failure. The main proponents of the 
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movement at Yale, Trubek and Galanter, in their widely read article entitled 
Scholars in Self-Estrangement indicated how a lack of theory and empirical 
knowledge of the third world, a loss of faith in the Western conceptions as a picture 
of American society, doubts about the desirability or universality of the American 
experience and skepticism about the policy motives of America challenged the 
movement.146 
The movement in the first instance was based on a weak theoretical foundation of 
law and development. According to Tamanaha the crisis facing the movement was 
in part the wider crisis facing social science. As science could not have all the 
answers for all social problems, the ideas in the movement were also less than 
perfect thus the laws, the ideas and the conceptions were unable to solve the many 
social problems confronting developing countries (Tamanaha 1995: 21). For the lack 
of theoretical foundation the practitioners in the South were not able to prioritise 
reforms or to predict the effects of various measures; any analysis of the cause and 
effect relationship was difficult.   
The lack of theory forced the movement to be based on false comparisons that 
lacked compatibility with the environment that existed in third world countries. 
Besides the normative blindness, the inability (and in some cases unwillingness) on 
the part of Western countries to understand the social and cultural plurality of 
developing countries,147 many  problems related to power imbalance, level of 
professionalism, level of competence and corruption in the South were also factors 
(Nader 2007: 11). Third world countries were characterised by entrenched ethnic 
highly diversified communities with wide social strata that were simply overlooked 
by the movement (Chua 1998: 6). The one-size-fits-all solution just could not yield 
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enough resonance and specificity for such a highly heterogeneous societies. In such 
circumstances law was one player out of a team of players which needed to align 
their interests and ideas with the society in which they were playing a significant 
part.   
This false comparison and idealisation was followed by invalid comparisons and 
involuntary impositions of Western laws. The mission became unjustified 
interferences with third world legal affairs. According to Trubek and Galanter this 
naivety and ethnocentricity was the main reason for its failure. Merryman also held 
that the movement failed, as it was largely a parochial expression of the USA legal 
style, and because it was to the most part an attempt to impose US ideas and 
attitudes on the third world (Marryman 1977: 479, 483). The belief that liberal 
legalism could easily be transplanted to developing countries from the Western 
countries was perhaps naïve with hindsight.   
The reality of US society also indicated further contradictions. While the law and 
development movement encouraged formal systems, the 1970s also witnessed 
another significant Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement in the US the 
central theme of which is a desire to discourage litigation and to settle disputes out 
of courts.148 It was an equal and opposite movement to the law and development 
movement. The assumption in the ADR movement was the lack of trust in courts as 
the primary institutions to apply or define the law. What Roscoe Pound called 
popular dissatisfaction and judicial crisis almost a hundred years ago was the 
central idea triggering this ADR movement. Though such a movement cannot be 
labeled as anti-law it was right in pointing out that formal systems in the West could 
not be omnipotent or omnipresent. 
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The other problem inherent in the movement was the way development was 
understood.149 As progressive social change the law and development movement 
assumed a nation as developed when it adopted Western legal standards. This 
entailed economic growth that did not reflect the way development was conceived 
in the developing countries (Nader 2007: 10, 11) where US lawyers were not 
considered as social engineers (or as omnipotent problem solvers) (Marryman 
1977: 466). More generally the movement allowed too little participation of lawyers 
from the developing countries and the reform focused on the formal legal process 
to the exclusion of non-formal systems. These factors narrowed the much greater 
project of freedoms and capability enhancement in developing countries that 
resulted in the failure of the movement and forced the West to resort to the new 
‘’Institutions Matter’’ slogan.  
This failure coupled with the failure of governments in Africa, the collapse of 
dictatorships in Latin America, and the profound transformation in central and 
Eastern Europe thus necessitated a sound legal framework but also an independent 
and honest judiciary. The institution by having such improvements in quality didn’t 
cause the collapse of social and economic development (Santos 2002: 316). 
Accordingly, the judiciary as an institution became the central focus of the new law 
and development movement and has been reformed in all continents of the world. 
There after every government in transition and developing countries has been 
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involved in one or more internationally sponsored projects designed to strengthen 
their legal system and institutions (Faundez 2010: 567).  
3.2 A Brief History of the judicial reform programme  
The old law and development movement revived in the late 1980s when the global 
economy interlinked factors of globalisation, democratisation and international 
human rights (Faundez 2010: 3). In line with this the Bretton Woods Institutions 
(the World Bank and the IMF) called for a major shift in the theory and practice of 
development.150 Since then the World Bank has been the major player in promoting 
and implementing legal and judicial reform programms. The Bank is a vital source of 
financial and technical assistance to developing countries and works in ‘’partnership 
to reduce poverty and support development’’.151 
As a result the Bank advocated a number of substantive economic policies 
(structural adjustment policies) that required major legal and institutional reforms. 
These measures included trade liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, deregulation, tax reform, fiscal discipline and enhancing the security of 
property rights (Faundez 2011: 6-7). These measures, termed the Washington 
Consensus, expected government roles in recipient countries to be reduced and 
pressed for free-market based reforms. These structural adjustment policies that 
aimed at ‘’reducing the fiscal deficit of highly indebted countries did not yield the 
expected results and were resisted by governments and citizens of recipient 
countries (Faundez 2011: 6).  
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Subsequently, the Bretton Woods Institutions demonstrated further shifts in the 
theory of development. The new approach to development was made obvious in 
1992 through its Governance and Development publication that explained the legal 
implications of its new approach. The publication indicated that good governance is 
synonymous with sound development and further indicated that its programme 
and financial projects failed due to the qualities of government actions.152 This 
indicates that the Bank’s approach had not been static as it exerted serious effort to 
offer intellectual justification for its involvement in the legal reform (Faundez 2010: 
1). The dynamic nature of the Bank’s approach can further be recounted from the 
proposal of Ibrahim Shihata who had been its General Council from 1983-1998.  
In setting out the Bank’s involvement in the legal reform programme Ibrahim 
Shihata proposed that legal rules and institutions should be market-friendly so that 
the two key institutions of the market economy (private property and contract) can 
function unencumbered by arbitrary state actions or by undue influence of local 
elites.153 This proposal rejected the interventionist type of state and called a new 
type of State labeled the market friendly state. In this approach the legal system is 
expected to play critically important role. The proposal to this effect is positivist and 
formalistic which includes the law known in advance, properly enforced, amended 
by pre-established procedures, a legal system with general rules effectively 
enforced and authoritatively interpreted by an independent judiciary that was 
called upon to implement the prescription of the Washington Consensus (Faundez 
2011: 3, 7).  
As far as implementation of the proposal is concerned the Bank attached conditions, 
as it did not regularly survey its member states, requiring recipient countries to 
enact market-friendly legislations. Based on this policy-based lending, the 
establishment of a market-friendly legal system was taken as an immediate 
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destination of all states regardless of their level of economic or political 
development.154 The conditions to release funds were based upon commitments of 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation.155 These prescriptions are what came 
to define the Washington Consensus.156 This justified the Bank’s involvement in the 
reform as nonpolitical and uncontaminated from its original objective and helped to 
spread the Washington Consensus worldwide. 
Initially the evolution of the Bank’s reform process was overridingly influenced by 
the Washington Consensus,157 and was aimed at creating rules and institutions to 
further the process of economic liberalisation. Nevertheless weak institutions in 
developing countries were believed to hinder the success of market-based policies 
introduced under the aegis of the Washington Consensus (Faundez 2010: 10). 
Corruption and a lack of respect for the rule of law (in sub-Saharan Africa) and various 
other governance failures at the root of the ongoing dilemmas of development also 
gave another momentum (Faundez 2010: 6) to the agenda of institution matters. 
When the Bank recognised that this process would be unrealistic without taking 
into account such institutional frameworks within which the law is embedded the 
governance agenda became part of the reform process (Faundez 2010: 2).  
Thus new components of reform which included anti-corruption and the development 
of targeted policies on poverty reduction were added on to the Washington 
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advice being addressed by the Washington based institutions to Latin American countries as of 
1989’’. These policies were fiscal discipline, reduction of public expenditure, tax reform, interest rate 
liberalization, competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflow of foreign direct 
investment, privatization, deregulation and secure property right (Global Trade Negotiations) 
www.cid.harvard.edu>cidtrade>issues, last visited 2 Aug. 2016.(Rittich 2004: 5). 
157 Which include trade liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, deregulation, tax 
reform, fiscal discipline and enhancing the security of property rights (Williamson, 2000). 
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Consensus.158 This necessitated the reform of a wide range of institutions beyond the 
governance agenda.159  Efficient and independent judiciary, civil service reform, 
decentralisation and empowering the poor were among the measures and policies of 
this agenda. Within the governance framework the place assigned to law was largely 
restricted to restraining governments and facilitating commercial intercourse 
(Faundez 2010: 2, 11). The critical attention courts have got is a product of this new 
role attributed to courts as a key instrument of good governance and law-based 
development (Santos 2002: 317). This has expanded the scope of the reform 
agenda (which was circumscribed exclusively to the economic sphere) and left no 
area of law that could be excluded from the reform which paved the opportunity to 
re-conceptualise the nature of the reform process and to place it within a broader 
framework of development.  
Despite the advice of leading development experts to make country specific 
assessment (as the implementation touches many sectors and is complex) the Bank 
placed the governance agenda firmly within the framework of the Washington 
Consensus and defined improvement in governance as improvements in economic 
performance which include making and implementing economic policy, delivering 
social, legal and regulatory services and securing accountability (Faundez 2010: 11). 
This resulted in producing a long list of recommendations that placed an unbearable 
stress particularly on those countries whose institutional capacity was weak (Faundez 
2010: 11) which further necessitated the need to focus on core public institutions such 
as legal and judicial reform being key examples.  
Though the World Bank inspired ideas especially in the Rule of Law programmes have 
influenced general thinking on the need for judicial and legal reform, the Bank later 
recognised shortcomings including being technocratic, adhering to the one-size-fits-all 
assumption and lending without allowing enough time for project implementation. 
Being aware of the difficulties and criticisms in the expansion of the reform projects, 
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 See for example Roderick 2002 and Supra note 135. 
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 There were 45 items in 1997, 66 in 1999 and 116 in 2003 (Faundez 2010: 10). 
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its legal department began responding to the difficulties. The one-size-does-not-fit-
all philosophy become frequently used in the late 1990s (Post-Washington 
Consensus) and the Bank has brought about the social dimension of development 
into the mainstream economic development agenda (World Bank 2000). This shift is 
marked by the production of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) 
which pronounces greater attention to the social, structural and human side of 
economic growth (World Bank 1999). The Bank (1999) was more ambitious when it 
suggested that poverty cannot be eradicated and other social goals cannot be 
achieved without political action at the grassroots’’ (World Bank 2000). 
This recourse was in sharp contrast to the old law and development movement but 
also contradicts the economic rhetoric that necessitates the way to design the co-
existence between the two conceptions. The recourse emphasised country-specific, 
country-led ownership, participatory and more inclusive approach to intervention 
that strikes a closer chord to that of a proper development strategy. The widening 
of the scope and procedural changes is more than responding to the critiques of the 
old law and development movement. 
Based on the firmness of the Bank’s strategy, it organized a conference in the year 
2000 with a central question: what is the role of legal and judicial reform in the 
development process? The answer given by the keynote speaker of the conference, 
Amaryta Sen, in his widely quoted book Development as Freedom raised the issues 
of capability enhancement for citizens. This challenge was considered a costly 
diversion from the objectives of the Washington Consensus in which the tools of 
economic analysis couldn’t be easily employed to measure the results of 
development (Faundez 2010: 2). It highlighted the disadvantages provided by the 
intellectual dominance of economists within the Bank. The economists undermined 
Sen’s agenda in favour of the Washington Consensus so that institutional, legal and 
judicial reform was to serve the consensus. The Bank’s economists went about 
restoring the original link between legal reform and the Washington Consensus and 
120 
 
hence the ‘’Institutions Matter’’ and judicial reform programmes began to make 
their way into the Bank (Faundez 2010: 10).  
3.2.1. Judicial reform as an agenda of ‘’Institution Matter’’ and the New 
law and Development Movement. 
International assistance to the judicial reform programme can be divided in to two main 
periods: from 1960s to 1970s and from the 1990s to the present. The in between period 
of almost 20 years was a time when little judicial reform took place at all and when 
international donors were virtually absent from the scene.160  
The judicial reform programme was needed to tackle the issues of effectiveness. 
Accordingly judicial reform has been one component of the justice reform programmes 
that refer to the efforts of creating a viable judiciary, strengthening its democratic 
function and improving the functioning of a country’s legal system, both in terms of 
fairness and efficiency. It forms part of a broader category of the promotion of the rule 
of law and justice reform programmes  (Gloppen et al 2004: 1, 2) which is built on the 
cornerstone of an independent, efficient and effective judicial system. Theoretically this 
has meant making developing countries and countries in transition more market friendly 
which has included the strengthening of the judicial branch, speeding up of the 
processing of cases, increased access to ADR, reduce caseloads in the courts and 
professionalising the bench (Messick 2002: 117-118). Tackling these issues has been 
intended to make the courts effective. 
In the selection of judicial reform programmes three generalised approaches are 
noteable. According to Magalhaes (1999:145) the reform programmes can be 
viewed from either the cultural and political legacies of the past, the role of 
international actors and external models and the self-interest of political actors. 
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Accordingly the motivations to reform the judiciary, according to Glopenne et al (2004: 
4-5, 16), can be summarised as motivated by four objectives. The objectives include to: 
 Facilitate human rights and provide access to justice for all members 
of society;   
 Secure law and order; 
 Facilitate economic development 
 Secure democratic accountability, good govenance, and the integrity 
of the political process 
Most reforms have been influenced by external models and interests. For example, the 
1960s reform in Latin America assisted by the US was motivated by economic 
development while the 1990s effort by the World Bank was motivated by economic 
liberalisation in enhancing economic development, encouraging foreign investment 
and trade and political liberalistion. The reforms in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s were 
motivated by the desire to strengthen local capacity so as to operate the country’s legal 
system in accordance with each country’s colonial past. On the other hand the 1990s 
African legal reform was motivated by the ‘’wish to support democratisation and was 
less interested in economic liberalisation’’, by the desire to strengthening the rule of 
law and its institutional players as part of the broader good governance agenda 
(Gloppene 2004: 15, 16). 
The endeavors of the World Bank was also motivated by the desire to see a more 
efficient and transparent judiciary capable of speeding up the process of economic 
development.  Messik (2002: 1) states that the World Bank supports judicial reform 
only when it is relevant to the country’s economic development and to the success 
of the Bank’s lending strategy for the country. Legal reform, according to Ibrahim 
Shihata, was meant to serve the overriding objective of transforming state-centered 
development policies into market-based policies.161  
                                                          
161
 Shihata 1996: 1577, 1579: see also Faundez 2010: 3. 
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After the year 2000, the World Bank (2000: 1) redefined its role as promoting economic 
growth and reducing poverty in its member states by providing opportunity, 
empowerment, and security through laws and legal institutions. The desire to making 
the judiciary effective was due to reflect on this role in light of the needs of national 
governments and donors. In this regard key considerations of the work of the Bank was 
the embrace of judicial independence, the right to limit government power and protect 
the rights of individuals, judicial training to educate and train judges in law skills and 
attitude, court administration and case management such as how to clear backlogs, 
record keepings, infrastructures, online decisions, fighting corruption, appointment of 
politically insulated judges, discipline and the removing of judges, the improvement in 
criminal justice, the accountability of government the promotion of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms in order to decrease court congestion, time and in some cases 
promote healthy competition.162 
Based on these objectives the court reform programmes are directed towards 
improving the court’s efficiency, capacity, integrity and responsiveness (Glopenne 
et al 2004: 6, 7). The main problems that reform efforts have been trying to 
overcome are accessibility of courts such as resources, psychological and 
motivational barriers, the lack of responsiveness and capability, the lack of judicial 
independence, a shortage of resources and inefficient use of resources available, 
and lack of legitimacy. Moreover, the reform process concentrated mainly on 
improving efficiency by updating and modernising the infrastructure of courts by 
introducing modern systems of case management and court administration and 
providing training for judges and court personnel (Faundez 2010: 569).  
3.3 Common trends in the Old and the New Law and Development 
Movements 
The ‘’Institutions Matter’’ agenda assumed the prevalence of some fault in the old law 
and development movement which needed a remedy. As the old law and 
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development movement had made assumptions associated with the judiciary one can 
welcome the institutional reform if amended structural faults in the earlier 
assumptions and practices of the judiciary. As indicated above the change introduced 
by the ‘’Institutions Matter’’ agenda pertains to the policy shift that included an 
emphasis on institutions, human rights, policy-based (rather than project based) 
lending and the use of soft law in the involvement of new actors (including NGOs, 
religious institutions), the involvement of non-formal sectors and norms at the 
grassroots level and a desire to channel government power. These changes demanded 
complex interaction among the various actors that forced the Bank to retreat to its 
original position and made the changes, both dynamic and static, mere speculative 
than a firm reality.163 Thus despite the shift in the policy direction of the new law and 
development movement, important similarities can be seen in the practice of the Bank 
than the record the documents care to tell.   
Both movements shared similar roots that extend back to the 15th Century. Theoretical 
interest to attaching quality of institutions to country’s level of economic development 
flourished in the 15th Century. For example, in the 15th Century Sir John Fortescue 
stated that England’s prosperity was traceable to the quality of English legal 
institutions’’ (Messick 1999: 121). A restatement by comparison 300 years later of 
the importance of Adam Smith’s tolerable administration of justice to carry a state 
to the highest degree of opulence. In the 19th Century Max Weber correlated legal 
rationality with a Western kind of capitalism when he held that legal rationality was an 
instrumental factor in accounting for the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe. In 
the 20th Century Max Weber attributed the rationalized, well-functioning judiciary 
to the differences in development between West Europe and China’’ (Messick 2002: 
120-121) and Hobbes emphasised the importance of the fear of some coercive 
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 The failure of the law and development movement made the Bank pursue a different policy. When it 
was made clear that social behavior could not be affected by an immediate change in the law, the Bank 
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different way. Despite this shift in policy from doctrinal law development to institution development 
the protection of property rights and rights around the enforcement of contracts make up 
constituent parts of the rule of law (Barron 2005: 12).  
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power to respect wealth enhancing exchanges. More recently Douglass North’s low 
cost means of enforcing contracts as a means of lowering higher transaction costs 
explains the contribution of the World Banks involvement in the ‘’Institutions 
Matter’’ agenda. The ‘’Institutions Matter’’ slogan is thus a return to these original 
principles. 
Most recent pragmatic approaches to theoretical trends, such as the interests of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions also correlate institutional quality with economic 
development. Both movements significantly narrow the conception of development to 
the domain of economic growth164 and decouple it from social growth. Both aim at 
keeping the legal environment stable and predictable so that economic actors freely 
transact with minimal government interference (Barron 2005: 15). However, as the 
law and development approach did not prove a causal connection, the same is true for 
the new law and development movement.165 
The third similarity lies in the lack of contextualization on the part of the reform 
proposals. Both did not take note of the detailed analysis of the reform recipient’s 
national institutional framework or their social conditions (Faundez 2010: 5, 6). The 
new movement explicitly embraced the rule of law rhetoric as a goal of development 
policy promoting sustainable development and good governance. This rhetoric was 
implicit in the old law and development conception. The movement produced and 
reproduced hegemonic institutions which bracket the people. The similarity in the  
‘’conception of the legal field was that it was not suitable for reimagining institutions’’ 
(Santos 2002: 315).  
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 See Doing Business 2011, Ethiopia, Making a difference for entrepreneurs. Doing business is the 
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economic terms (starting a business, dealing with construction permit, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business). This 
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Business 2011, Ethiopia, Making a difference for entrepreneurs). 
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 Most studies only identified statistically significant correlation, not casual links, between 
institutions and economic growth (Faundez 2010: 12). Thus both (either in theory or in practice) 
exclusively emphasized on economic governance which is a return to its near and distant original 
emphasis on market-friendly institutions. 
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Despite the World Bank definition of its task in terms of poverty alleviation since 2000, 
the practice above demonstrates that both movements ignored social justice in its 
strictest sense. Practically they talk in a language of positive law, formal courts and 
authoritative application of such law by the courts. Both were devoid of practically 
promoting the non-market purpose of living in a world that avoided the view that the 
interconnection between law and other non-economic spheres of life should be 
carefully investigated. In this regard, the most significant non-formal institutions 
meaningfully impacted the lives of people in the South were not given enough space 
as part of the movement. Both rejected non-formal ways of people doing justice in 
poorer countries.166  Despite the change in theory the practice the procedural, 
substantive and a formalistic approach to law remains the same.  
Both movements, old and new, have little to do with law considered seriously. Martin 
(1983: 133) held that the old law and development movement has very little to do with 
development in terms of capability. Martin is partially right. It is correct to hold that 
the new law and development movement has very little to do with either institution 
defined by Douglass North,167 or with development defined in this thesis in terms of 
capability realisation. 
Thus reform movements have been challenged from various corners. The 
challenges didn’t target the need to have the reform but rather are focused on its 
questionable assumptions, unproven impact and insufficient attention to the legal 
needs of the disadvantaged (Golub 2003: 3). It lies in the programme being 
ambitious, unrealistic, delinked from national priorities and the lack of sustainability 
towards results. For example, if one considers the economic achievements of the 
various economic miracles,168 one can observe that the rule of law enterprise, as 
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 This has been indicated under section 2.1as including the non-formal constrains though latter 
reduced to contract and property rights.  
 
168
 Tigers and Dragons, which are Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan: they were notable 
for maintaining exceptionally high growth rates (in excess of 7 percent a year) and rapid 
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presently conceived and implemented, is not the only way to achieve either 
improved economic outcomes or improvements in the quality of governance 
(Faundez 2010: 572). The extent it is detached from the earlier law and 
development endeavors is a further challenge. 
If both movements have these similarities, it is important to investigate other 
discourses that may benefit countries like Ethiopia. Contemporary discourse and 
attaching judicial reform programmes and development can be discussed alongside five 
categories. The first is hegemonic to borrow the word from Santos and is to a large 
extent dominated by international organizations notably the Word Bank. The second is 
the Capability Approach and the influential work by Amaryta Sen. The third is a counter-
hegemonic discourse dominated by different contemporary writers including Santos. 
The final two are related to the role of governments and people in reform programmes 
chiefly related to developmental state and legal pluralism. Let us have a closer look at 
each of them. 
3.4 Hegemonic discourse 
This discourse assumes that judicial reform programmes constitute an essential 
element of successful governance and anti-corruption strategies. Accordingly the 
objectives of good governance and anti-corruption couldn’t be reached without 
overhauling the judicial system and recreating stable, impartial, independent, 
predictable and accessible institution. After the law and development movement 
such an institution is what a second generation reform demanded (Dakolias 1996: 1, 
11, 64). The roots of the reform programme lie in the orientations of this discourse. 
As per the discourse one of the means where such ROL project could be built or 
promoted is through the reform of institutions including court systems. As these 
reformed institutions are believed to significantly and positively affect the economic 
performance of a country, the reform programme has to achieve ‘’the goals of judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
industrialization between the early 1960s and 1990s 
(https://en.m.wikipedia.o>wiki>fourasianTigers), last visited 12 June 2016. 
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independence, access to justice, accountability and efficiency’’ (Barron 2002: 27). Its 
conceptualisation of reform is however intellectually nurtured almost exclusively by 
economists of a neo-liberal persuasion to the exclusion of the legal academics 
(Faundez 2010: 568). Thus the underpinning theory is the New Institutional Economics 
Theory (Barron 2002: 12) according to which long term economic growth (in contrast 
to the short term growth of the Asian Tigers) entails the development of the rule of 
law and civil and political rights (Barron 2002: 13). Named as a result as the Rule of 
Law enterprise, the very goals of reform programmes is contributing to a long term 
economic growth. Judicial effectiveness is associated with the presence or absence of 
one or more of these elements. 
International institutions have shown paramount interest in seeing the attainment of 
economic development through this enterprise. Among the international donors the 
Bank is a ‘’major player” in the promotion of the legal reform programme.169  
According to Ibrahim Shihata, the main thrust the Bank’s increased interest rests is 
based on the ground that court’s institutional reforms cannot be ignored in the process 
of economic development  (Santos 2002: 325). Such reform programmes assumed the 
responsibility of quenching the needs of economic reform and of an open market. 
Accordingly the attainment of development, measured in economic terms, is the role 
of an effective judicial reform.  
The Bank’s approach is in perspectives advanced by writers like Thomas Hobbes, 
Douglass North, John Fortescue, Adam Smith and Max Weber (Messick 1999: 121, 
123). These writers argue to justify the ‘’Institutions Matter’’ slogan from different 
angles. Risse, for example, relied on recent econometric work by Rodrick, 
Subberamanian and Trebbi to show that institutions are crucial causal constituents to 
economic development. Despite the fact that institutions, geography and integration 
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matter to economic growth, institutions trump everything else. As such assistance to 
the poor should focus on institutional buildings.170    
As the enterprise is connected to the ‘’Institutions Matter’’ agenda, it is challenged 
from different perspectives. For example, Dodson, Thome, Dakolias, and 
Hammergren question if the implementation of the discourse is on the right track. 
These individuals have witnessed what Latin America has experienced in an attempt 
to reform their judiciaries.  
According to Dodson the experience in Latin American countries where the Bank had 
its first reform experiences and conducted the majority of its work, revealed that the 
results of the reform attempt were disappointing (Dodson 2002: 34) and were neither 
obvious nor easily measured.171 The reform programme in the region is said to 
produce results which are substantial but not drastic.172 
The reality in the countries where the reform programme is imposed also revealed 
how the main sponsors in this discourse took lessons from the failure law and 
development movements. Ineffective legal systems, weak political will, negative 
political culture, assumptions based on technicalities rather than political motives, the 
distribution of power (such as in Guatemala), the lack of local support and resistance 
from within the  institution itself (such as in El Salvador), the lack of resources and 
poor reform programme from the start made the reform efforts in the region 
pessimistic and did not halt the Latin Americans life being subject to deficiencies in the 
rule of law (Dodson 2002: 34, Vargas 2006: 46).  
Hammergren also questions the effectiveness of the project. She noted that the reform 
programme in Latin America had not necessarily brought about the performances or 
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 Dodson 2002: 34, Vargas 2006: 46; Dakolias 1996: abstract and executive summary. 
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outputs that were promised. Though there are important improvements in the region, 
the reforms were not meant to see improvements in the quality of service the courts 
provide. As per the recommendation of the Bank, they did not allow a focus on more 
fundamental things that require change and, the trend in such highly demanded areas 
of improvement was disturbing (Hammergren 2005: 407). It has been questioned if the 
reforms were guiled ones, benefiting judges and attorneys not the public. One of the 
problems identified by Hammergren was the jump-start of the US state re-
democratisation process without taking account of local demand. Another problem 
was associated with the wrong assumptions about the process, performance, outcome, 
case load, delays, poverty in the courts, accessibility, commercial impediments to 
investment (which actually were criminal and administrative law), systems of 
registration and accountability in the courts (Hammergren 2005: 604, 608).  
This discourse does not resolve conceptual problems including conceptions of 
development, institutions and the ROL that remained unresolved in the earlier 
movements. For example, the ROL has as many definitions to the extent of accusing 
‘’academics of having robbed it its analytical content’’ (Barron 2002: 12). It is a plastic 
and ambiguous phrase and is defined in various ways to the disadvantage of the 
academic but to the advantage of political debate. By the same token the inside 
definition of ROL is also ambiguous. The World Bank’s definition of the ROL by Shihata 
including judicial independence is somehow different from the Tung-successor of 
Shihata which includes among others accessibility of justice, predictable and 
accountable government (Stephenson 2000: 7, Barron 2002: 12, 15). The former being 
more formal and the latter which is more substantive. With conceptual ambiguities 
one cannot be sure of what the real intent of international donors or the Bank173 
meant by while promoting the concepts. 
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 The lack of clarity lies in how this stance established the possible relationships between market, 
democracy and other social dimensions of life. The Banks’ main orientation on market and 
enhancement (and reinforcement) of democracy (Thome 2000: 4, Dakolias 1996: 3, 5, 70) are now in 
agreement, now overlapping, now in conflict. According to Dakolias there is a tension between 
economic reform and democracy and between economic reform and social policy (Dakolias 1996: 
10). The same conceptual problems prevail in the Banks understanding of development. This move 
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Thus the first discourse left the basic questions of social justice unanswered. 
Problems identified are similar to factors that contributed to the demise of the law 
and development movement and still remain an agenda for further exploration. The 
gaps in this discourse are somehow complemented by the conceptualisation of 
development by Amartya Sen. 
3.5 The Capability discourse 
The second discourse pertains to the capability approach as discussed in the previous 
chapter and follows a relatively holistic approach. Amaryta Sen argued that 
development has to do with a wide range of dimensions of human being that bear on 
the capabilities of individuals to live lives they have reason to value. His analysis is 
based on his conception of comprehensiveness, conceptual integrity and casual 
interconnectedness according to which Judicial reform could only be seen as 
contributing to the process of development in general rather than separately to 
economic or other kinds of development. Glorifying one part of such a complex reality 
would produce a restricted view of development. Judicial reform programmes would 
be a critical part of the development process even if they do not contribute one iota to 
economic development (Sen 2010: 10). 
According to this conception institutions are ways and means of achieving 
development as characterized by expanding the interlinked freedoms and removing 
the interconnectedness of restraints (Sen 2010: 23). Legal development will only be 
assessed when it takes note of the enhancement of people’s capabilities rather than 
what the judicial body normally asserts or accepts. Sen has taken swaths of political 
freedoms, economic facilities, transparency guarantees, protective securities and social 
opportunities as the five distinct kinds of freedoms which are interconnected to advance 
the capabilities of a person.174 Freedoms are the primary ends and principal means of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
literally took development to mean economic progress, other critical components of which (social, 
environmental) being ignored or not given enough space. 
 
174
 For the details of this and how their connections strengthen one another see Sen, Amartya 
Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press. Each of these rights and opportunities helps to 
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development that requires the removal of major sources of restraint. According to him 
development should enhance people’s capabilities. Such basic capabilities lies with 
the Government’s basic duties of respect, defend and support (Sen 2010: 225, 231). 
The goal of a reformed judiciary is thus not less than raising this capabilities of 
persons.  
As discussed in the previous chapter this discourse too is incomplete and requires 
use of an assisting discourse which can be provided by the Counter-hegemonic 
discourse.   
3.6 The Counter-Hegemonic discourse 
This discourse provides an alternative to the first discourse and is to measure the 
delivery of justice or the prevention of injustice from those who are at the bottom of 
the hierarchy. Being counter-hegemonic it aims at domesticating judicial reform 
programmes. The discourse benefits from the prominent discussion of writers 
including Santos, Pogge, Upendra Baxia nd Pratiksha Baxi who criticize the legitimacy 
of the Bank involvement in the first discourse, the methodology that the bank follows 
and the efficacy of the reform project.175 
According to Santos the world is evolving in the direction of global consensus based on 
four elements; neo-liberal economic (the Washington) consensus, the weak state 
consensus, the neo-liberal democratic consensus and the legal and judicial reform 
consensus (Santos 2005: 315). These consensuses constitute the ideological basis of 
hegemonic justice. The fourth one where the judiciary is vested with the responsibility 
of delivering equitable, expeditious and transparent judicial services to citizens and  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
advance the general capability of persons. They may also serve to complement each other. Political 
freedoms takes the form of free speech and elections, social opportunities takes the form of 
education and health facilities, economic facility takes the form of opportunities for participation in 
trade and production.  
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 There are obvious differences between the authors included in the counter-hegemonic 
framework. The main difference seems to be that scholars such as Tamanaha and to an extent 
Faundez are critical of the World Bank’s approach to law and development, but do not see their 
approach as intending to promote Western corporate globalization, whereas scholars such as 
Santos, Pogge, Upendra Baxi and Pratiksha Baxi are critical of the Western global corporate based 
globalization. 
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economic agents is the derivation of the other three and is the most complex and 
ambiguous one. Of other institutions in the liberal global consensus the judiciary is the 
quintessential national institution.176 This is the basis to seeing the connection between 
reform programmes and development under this discourse. 
According to the counter-hegemonic discourse it is doubtful if the hegemonic 
discourse could manage to avoid the problems which so frustrated and disappointed 
members of the law and development movement (Messick 1999: 126). In this regard 
Faundez effectively demonstrated how the hegemonic discourse pursued 
contradictory objectives. According to Faundez (2010: 2) the Bank re-conceptualised 
the nature of the reform process and placed it under a broader framework of 
development with the recognition of the need to take account of institutional 
framework in the realisation of legal reform. The Bank also ignored the intellectual 
backing by Amaryta Sen, at the expense of economics pertaining the link between 
institutions and economic growth. This had been a resort to the original link between 
reform and the Washington consensus as it was solely aimed at the furthering of 
economic liberalisation. Thus, seemingly dynamic but resorting to the original link that 
legal reform and the Washington Consensus had (Faundez 2010: 2) the Bank pursued 
contradictory objectives in the following ways:  
a) A promotion to take account of local context with a resort to one-size-fits-all 
reflected in the Banks’ well published edition: Doing Business 
b) The need to see the interconnection between law and other spheres of 
social life, the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), with the 
resort to seeing the relationship vis-à-vis economic growth and giving 
priority to market-friendly policies   
c) The move towards the ‘’Institutions Matter’’ slogan and the expansion of the 
intellectual horizon to pursue market friendliness with a possible contradiction 
with ILO Labor Standards 
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d) The tension between the definition of the Bank’s mission as technical with the 
involvement in the legal and judicial reform that are not merely technical.177 
The tensions and contradictions forced the Bank to ignore the role of development 
regarding the non-economic dimensions of life and viewed the role of development too 
narrowly (Faundez 2010: 568-573). The Bank’s approach does not only pursue 
contradictory objectives but is also a top down hegemonic imposition (Santos 2002: 
317). As a result of being imposed, Faundez (2010: 6) held that most projects of 
judicial reform included long lists of activities without indicating priorities and realistic 
timetable for the completion of the projects.  
These activities include building infrastructure for the courts, designing and 
implementing automated information systems, modernising the organizational and 
functional capabilities of courts, establishing career paths for judicial and 
administrative personnel, strengthening the transparency of the judicial bench, 
introducing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to improve access to justice, 
establishing programmes to promote awareness of the legal needs of disadvantaged 
groups, especially those aimed at women, the young and indigenous people, the 
implementation of mobile court programmes, the establishment of legal aid clinics, 
the strengthening of public defenders offices and the improvement in the efficiency of 
judicial services for small businesses. This long list (drawn from the World Bank project 
in Honduras) is found in most countries of judicial reform programmes (Faundez 2010: 
6). 
While discussing the judicial reform programme in India, Baxi explored how  
impositions affected alternative dispute resolution mechanisms which according to 
the Bank was supposed to enhance access to justice and how it created judicial delay. 
Baxi held that the reform programme resorted to the strengthening of the rule of law 
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 Santos 2005, p. 352. According to Santos question of judicial reform, though judicial, is a political 
question. Owing to the reform, courts happened to be ‘’an ideal instruments of a depoliticized 
conception of social transformation and are the main pillars of a democratic project”. Thus, the 
reform judicialises politics. 
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framework that focused on access to justice in the context of economic growth and 
good governance. She argued that the reform created court arrears, imposed harsh 
regimes of impoverishment on the poor most prominently and excluded the poor. Thus 
the procedures and outcomes of the judicial reform disempowered the already 
dispossessed and only concealed the perfidious expansion of the power of the State 
and consolidate corporate interests. With the cost of justice, the reform used to 
legitimize the actualisation of projects of good governance, economic growth and 
development through the rule of law which now need serious interrogation (Baxi 2007: 
2, 3, 17).  
The Latin American and African experience also illustrates the impacts of 
hegemonic reforms. In Latin American countries and countries like Mozambique 
and Cambodia the globalisation is still mainly driven by donors, at times against the 
resistance of the recipient countries. In Africa the ROL programmes are imposed 
with the host countries in no position to resist. According to Santos (2002: 351) the 
high-intensive globalization is demonstrated by the case of Colombia as an example 
of extreme and intensive globalization and the result being destitution and 
economic decline. The tragic result of the reform projects being modest with the 
judiciary remaining weak and inefficient. The intensive pressure contributed 
decisively to the failure of most reform.  
A top down imposition exclusively focused on the formal system at the cost of non-
formal system178. The Latin American reform experience left out multiplicities of  
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 Impositions against the will of the people had been resisted in a number of ways. Faundez discussed the 
tensions between different dispute resolution institutions from the indigenous peoples’ point of view. 
Though democratisation and globalisation about bringing some change, Faundez noted that indigenous 
people regarded judicial institutions in Latin America as unfavorable, slow, expensive and inefficient and 
principally‘’ a cause and symbol of their long standing economic and political oppression’’ (Faundez 2010b: 
1). Despite policy of assimilation, the discrimination and unity of legal system in its traditional form of 
governance led citizens to resolve their own dispute. While judges openly disregard indigenous practices 
and customs, indigenous people on their part perceived judges and the judicial system in a negative light.  
The case of Africa is complex. In Africa states were heterogeneous considered ‘’multiple microstates” 
operating in different sectors at different local, regional and national levels (Santos 2006: 45). The 
complex and dense interaction among the sectors at different levels made the boundaries between 
them more porous. Despite this these countries were taken as legal and judicial tabula rasa (Santos 
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unofficial legal orderings and the dispute resolution mechanism that has long existed 
within the official system. This has widened the gap between the law in books and 
actions (Santos 2006: 46). 
Imposition also creates conflicts between the language of the reform programme 
and the language of the people in recipient countries. Upendra Baxi held that in all 
the discourse of development, the language of justice which was an antedate to 
Human Rights for a variety of reasons almost disappeared (Baxi 2007: 4, 7). 
According to him justice assumed a wider meaning than simply justice in a legal 
sense. In discussing the Bhopal case he claimed that the language of justice, rather 
than of human rights, was always championed by the people. Naming and shaming 
the producers of social indifference was much more important than the dialogue in 
terms of human rights. For the national and global impoverished the language of 
law almost always turns out to be disempowering whilst the language of justice 
continued to be source of empowerment.179 
Prudent investigation of justice in poor countries demands harnessing with the poor 
and the disabled. Furthermore much more care is needed in heterogeneous 
societies where multiple justice systems operate to ensure systems are effective. In 
this respect Pogge’s idea is important as he opposed imposed programmes which 
exacerbated poverty. He, in his theory of global poverty, held that it is possible to 
establish poverty as a human rights violation under a minimalist normative position. 
The underlining assumption is that human rights exist not as a fundamental positive 
duty to assist and aid the poor, but rather a fundamental negative duty imposing a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2006: 70). As a result of which their diverse legal and judicial practices were ignored at the cost of 
imposed values. 
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 Baxi 2007: 7, Baxi 2000: 132, Twining 2007: World Bank 37-38. Baxi argued that talks of such 
human rights only promote ‘’market-friendly human rights”. Taking hegemonic approach seriously is, 
thus, taking human suffering seriously. Accordingly institutions impoverishing the people should be 
restricted. Baxi’s concern has been for those people he calls ‘’subaltern peoples”. His distinctions 
(politics of human rights and politics for human rights, human right movements, human rights 
markets and human and market friendly human rights are puzzling and considers taking human 
rights seriously is taking human suffering seriously. He opposes all forms of imperialism, colonialism, 
racism, and patriarchy and sees the international human rights scheme as fragile, contradictory, and 
riddled with myths, false histories and ambiguities.  
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constraint on the conduct that causes severe poverty. This has the associated imposition 
of restrictions on institutions that cause severe poverty (Pogge 2002: 52, 55, 133, 180).  
This position assumes justice involving specific minimal constraints on what harms 
persons may inflict upon others (Vizard 2005: 5-7). Accordingly the judiciary as an 
institution, either through the procedural law it follows or the substantive law it applies, 
will only be allowed to function as far as it doea not cause poverty. As imposition 
contradicts the natural way things mature or develop, the development of 
institutions must be primarily counter-hegemonic and should be ‘’based on the 
recipient countrys’ institutional framework and their social conditions so as to 
realize social justice’’ (Faundez 2010: 6). 
Generally speaking the third approach questions normatively and empirically the 
methodology, legitimacy and efficacy of the first approach. Contrary to the language of 
the ROL, the counter-hegemonic approach talks in terms of justice and reverses the 
first approach. According to this approach it is highly improbable that the ROL and 
courts will sustain democracy against capitalism (Santos 2005: 52).  
All the discourses outlined promote specific perspectives. This research suggests 
that the capabilities and counter-hegemonic discourses can make significant 
contributions to realising social justice and preventing injustice. Their contribution 
however has to be scrutinised in a pluralist society where the state claims to be 
developmental. I would like to suggest, that account has to be taken of further two 
dimensions in order to develop an effective judicial reform programme.  
3.7 The Developmental State 
Owing to the prevalence of rent-seeking and corruption, the 1980s structural 
adjustment policies assumed states to play minimal role in development. It was then 
assumed that as state grew in size, their range of functions, and the amount of 
resources they controlled, the proportion of economic activity that became 
incorporated into rental havens increased correspondingly and therefore economic 
efficiency was in decline. The prevailing thought was that the sphere of state action 
137 
 
needed to be reduced to the minimum to combat this. Bureaucratic control was to be 
replaced by economic subjects to the market whenever possible.180 With the lack of 
powerful drives from the national government to constrain individual behavior and 
the pursuit of collective aims, the state was unable to perform even in its most basic 
role as the enforcer of contracts between parties (Evans 1989: 564). Hence, there was 
a need for the state to play a role in a more proactive way than as national police force 
towards development. This necessitated the improvement in government 
mechanisms and demanded the good governance state. It also defined development 
in terms of capital accumulation, which exclusively focused on democratic institutions 
of the state. An exclusive focus on this may not serve countries like Ethiopia.  
The Asian tigers discussed under Section 3.2 tried to rectify some of these 
shortcomings and defined the role of the state as promoting economic development 
from within so that national businesses secure competitive advantages in the global 
market. In line with this the great industrial transformation of the modern era (after 
the 1980s) in the East Asian economies (Singapore, Taiwan and Korea) made the idea 
of the developmental state a key discussion all over the globe. Their economic success 
was ‘’increasingly interpreted as depending in important ways on the active 
involvement of the state. (Evans 1989: 571). Woo-Cummings (1999: 10-20) defined 
the developmental state by its objectives and institutions and its characteristics can 
be summarized as:  
a) Planning substantive social and economic goals rather than leaving it to 
the market (plan rational capitalist developmental State) conjoined with 
private ownership under close supervision from the state 
b) Setting economic development as top priority and design effective 
instruments to promote such a goal; including forging new institutions, 
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 The idea of taking state action to the minimum is taken from Haywood, Andrew (2000) Key 
Concepts in Politics, P110, Palgrave Macmillan, who argued that Utilitarianism allows each individual 
to make his/her own moral judgments as each alone is able to define what is pleasurable and what is 
painful, it upholds diversity and freedom and demands that we respect others as pleasure-seeking 
creature. It provides the major foundation for classical liberalism. 
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weaving of formal and non-formal networks, the utilisation of new 
opportunities for trade and profitable production 
c) Avoiding shortcomings in unregulated free market forces and over 
regulated state for intervention and control; use of meritocracy and 
autonomy, use of professionals detached from powerful rent-seeking 
groups 
d) Achieving bureaucratic coherence, by providing a well-coordinated and 
well-staffed set of skilled employees, who have broad public and political 
autonomy  
e) State competence to implement the policies of Government 
With a developmental state there is an obvious emphasis on socio-economic rights 
and the sectors involved in the provision of services. This state has meritocratic 
rather than coercive institutions so as to assist as well as discipline the big economic 
actors. Meritocratic institutions of the developmental state monitor these businesses 
towards the states strategic objectives.181 The state may increase incentives to ‘’engage 
in transformative investments and thereby lowering the risks involved by such 
investments.” The role a state may play may not immune to rent-seeking but on 
balance the consequence of their actions promote rather than impede 
transformation’’ (Evans 1989: 563).  
The following Section discusses the role of the developmental state in a pluralised 
society like Ethiopia.  
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 See Evans 1989: P. 574. The implementation of this needed for example in Japan a coherent 
bureaucracy as a result of the greatest concentration of brain power, hyperbole-powerful, talented, 
prestige-laden economic bureaucracy of Weber renouncements. But the Japanese goes beyond this 
(Evans 1989: 574). It emphasized the indispensability of non-formal networks (both internal and 
external networks) as crucial to the bureaucracy’s coherence. The internal-meritorious networking 
connected with the external networks made the state and the private corporate elites even more 
important. The centrality of external ties has led some to argue that the state’s effectiveness 
emerges ‘’not from its own inherent capacity but from the complexity and stability of its interaction 
with market players”. Its effectiveness depends on the ability to construct an apparently 
contradictory combination of Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense immersion in the 
surrounding social structure. 
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3.8 Legal pluralism 
The counter-hegemonic and capability discourses demonstrated that meaningful legal 
and justice reforms should take account of peoples’ freedom to define development to 
make their life better. As legal pluralism is a key feature of many developing countries 
such as Ethiopia, effective and home grown judicial reform programmes would 
necessarily have to take account of legal pluralism. Meaningful judicial reform 
programmes would give due account to peoples multiple ways of doing justice. 
Conscious of this the 1986 declaration on the Right to Development under Article 1(1) 
provides that everyone has the right to ‘’an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, and contribute to, all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which can then be fully realized”.  Accordingly 
all people have the right to participate, contribute and enjoy their economic, social, 
cultural and political development.182 The first element of this definition is participation 
but question is participation of what kind?  
Participation through sharing hegemonic values involuntarily through various 
mechanisms, like structural adjustment or using soft laws, has been a new form of 
imperialism and a contractual mode of domination (Markus 2014: 373). As this could 
distance and dislocate the people from their own itinerary of development, 
participation under the usual state-to-state international development structure has 
failed to meet the objectives set out in the right to development (Markus 2014: 389).  
Thus discourses have to be reconstructed or contested so that actors in the play of 
justice would be diversified in the interest of the objects of development namely its 
people. This empowers people towards capitalising their various modes of serving 
justice so that decision making would be democratised to the benefit of development 
as a whole, which is furthers defined by the people themselves. Democratising the 
process has the added benefit of diversifying actors in decision making so that 
development (as understood in this thesis as capability realisation) would not be 
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140 
 
 
reduced to a one-size-fits–all syndrome. Furthermore the grassroots or ‘’bottom-up’’ 
perspective is more valuable for seeking to challenge power distribution within 
international development (Markus 2014: 389). The full enjoyment of this right entails 
the full exercise of legal pluralism which is not only a major theme in the study of 
justice but also a way of claiming communal identity.183 
So what is legal pluralism? Any sort of pluralism necessarily implies the presence of 
more than one legal system in the legal sphere. This contests the idea that lesser 
normative orderings, such as the church and the family are hierarchically subordinate 
to the law and the institutions of state. The legal reality in the modern legal system is 
approximate to the claims made on behalf of the state and this fails to see the fact that 
the legal reality is rather an unsystematic collegiate of inconsistent and overlapping 
parts, lending itself to no easily discernable legal definition (Griffiths 1986: 3, 4). In fact, 
the law in our modern society is pluralised rather than monolithic, in that it is private as 
well as public in character and that the national legal system is often a secondary 
rather than a primary locus of regulation. This reality contradicts ‘’legal centralism’’ 
according to which law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, 
exclusive of all other law, justice produced and distributed by a state, administered by a 
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 See for example Markus (2014), What is the use of Human Rights to Development? Legal 
Pluralism, ‘’Participations’’ and Tentative Rehabilitation, Cardiff University Law School, In this article 
Markus has demonstrated how marginalized and indigenous groups used the right to development 
as a means to claim active participation in matters that concern their community. Legal Pluralism 
enables people to actively participate in matters of justice which gives more energizing power 
towards realizing the capability of litigants.  In the field of legal pluralism the identification of law 
from other norms of legal ordering has not been straight in different jurisdictions. As has been 
discussed in the previous chapter the line demarcating law and justice has been grey. Some part of 
the legal history of Ethiopia makes it clear that the true birth place of laws was not the formal laws 
enacted. It was in the non-formal systems and in the Emperors (seen as fountains of justice at times) 
who were mitigating the rigors of laws. The legal history of the country also shows the attempt on 
the part of the rulers to centralize legalism. This can be seen in the introduction of Fetha-Negest and 
the civil code attempt to disallow application of customary laws in civil matters. The bewildering fact 
is that the more is the push, the more is the infiltration of the non-formal system in to the formal 
system. Furthermore, as the question what is law in Ethiopia has not been answered so far and as 
the current Constitution declares to serving as a litmus paper for the play of the legal sphere, justice 
pluralism is more visible in the context of Ethiopia. 
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single set of institutions (Galanter 1981: 1, 3, 20) which is ‘’contrary to the reality, a 
myth, an ideal, and an illusion’’ (Vanderlinden 989: 49). Legal centralism thus has been 
the major obstacle to the development of a descriptive theory of law. 
Legal pluralism is an attribute of a specified social group, and not a name of a 
doctrine, a theory an ideology, or an attribute of law or a legal system. In real terms 
it implies the presence of multiple legal mechanisms rather than one entire legal 
system. Legal pluralism is therefore a state of affairs in which the presence of 
behaviour pursuant to more than one legal order occurs.184 It denotes the discovery 
of ‘’...allocation of decision-making authority that would maximise the coexistence of 
these normative orders”.185 This involves the law as something which is more than mere 
state law which necessitates a revision of the role of law, nature of law, function of law 
and the relationship it has with other norms of ordering society. This pushes us to 
review the legal reality and hierarchy of norms and the arrangement of forums in 
Ethiopia where the state claims to be democratic developmental whose main goal 
includes alleviating poverty.  
Conclusion 
This chapter explained that the global initiatives to improve the way the legal system 
works have been dynamic in theory but static in practice.  It made clear that the 
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 Griffiths 1986: 1, 3, 10, 39. This necessitates the revisiting of what law in real sense is. Accoridng 
to Durkeim ‘’law” is a social phenomenon which is to be defined by ‘’function and not by form” 
(Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws and Legal Practice: Theories, Critiques and Prexiological 
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dominant discourse in the legal and justice reform programme distanced local 
contexts, such as legal pluralism and the developmental state, where the reforms 
were to be implemented. In practice the different discourses to this effect marched 
a long history but to end up with defining development narrowly in terms of 
economic growth. The trend also defined institutions and their roles narrowly as 
conception and protection of contract and property rights but to dislocate decision 
making bodies from the real lives of people. 
The global endeavors to reform the judiciary has suffered from the same 
reconstruction. It had monopolised justice of the norms of the state and court 
systems as institutions to protect institutions of property and contract rights. This 
has excluded non-state norms and non-state actors in the play of justice and 
distanced decision making bodies from serving social justice.This is more 
impoverishing in poorer countries where legal pluralism is the rule and people make 
use of non-formal decision making bodies as the dominant mode of dispute 
settlement mechanisms at the level of extensive pluralism. Unless a legal system 
empowers people and recognises these forums as proper ones, particularly in a 
developmental state that recognised the right to development, decision making 
bodies and social justice would remain disconnected to disempower and 
decapacitate the people.  
The next chapter explores the theoretical concept of whether the judicial reform 
programme of Ethiopia suffered from the same mistake.  
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4 
Judicial reform in Ethiopia 
The previous chapter discussed the global endeavors to improve institutions 
(especially the judiciary) and it has been indicated that there are theoretically 
distinct approaches about how to improve institutions. The main problem in 
reforming the judicial system had been the imposition by IFIs of a list of norms 
which narrowed the conception of development as economic growth. This excluded 
the other important project of social justice in poorer countries. Judicial reform 
programmes embraced recommendations with the same list of activities to be 
implemented across jurisdictions and dislocated justice from the non-formal system 
so that justice was distanced from the lives of the people. The problems in 
identifying institutions of institutions, social justice and the failure of the reform 
programme necessitates search for a remedy in the context of Ethiopia. 
This chapter explores whether the judicial reform programme implemented in 
Ethiopia suffers from same mistakes as the global effort. It, accordingly, explains the 
judicial reform programme in Ethiopia as a solution to the legal problems discussed 
in Chapter One and investigates the history, nature and structure of the judicial 
reform programme in the context of Ethiopia. The chapter explores solutions 
proposed by the reform programme towards the realisation of social justice. 
The chapter is organized in two main parts. The first part examines issues of social 
justice from the perspectives of the Ethiopian Constitution and further examines 
whether and how policy documents and government plans deal with problems of 
social justice. After a brief introduction on constitutionally recognized ways of 
dispute resolution mechanisms, the second part deals with the history and content 
of the judicial reform programme and whether the programme can solve the 
existing judicial problems to the same extent so that dispute settlement systems 
render quality social justice which is inclusive, creative, sustainable, equitable, 
viable, targeted and proactive. . 
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4.1 The growth and transformation plan (GTP) 
Ethiopia targets the attainment of democratic rule, good governance and social 
justice based on the involvement and free will of the people, extracting itself from 
poverty, and with the intention to reach the level of a middle-income economy as 
of 2020-2023. On the basis of this vision the second Growth and Transformational 
Plan (hereafter the GTP2), is approved by the HOPR on December 25/2015, and is 
topical among Government bodies including policy makers, the executive, courts 
and media in Ethiopia.186 The eradication of poverty is the basic aim of the plan and 
all strategies, policies and plans are geared towards it (the GTP2: 1, 21).  
The GTP stipulates strengthening developmental state and democratic institutions, 
improving the effectiveness of the justice system and ensuring the independence, 
transparency and accountability of courts are emphasized for development. The 
strategy for the justice sector is to ensure its effectiveness towards contributing a 
stable democratic and developmental state. Whilst the implementation and 
interpretation of law is expected to be in conformity with the Constitution, customs 
and traditions of peaceful resolution of disputes will be given special emphasis and 
will be applied widely during the GTP (GTP2: 103).  
Like the reform documents the GTP also adheres to the world development as a 
solution to the societal problem without a consensus on its definition. Development 
concerns, as understood in this thesis, should exert efforts by the Government to 
commit itself not to deprive the people of their needs as it should equally broaden 
the opportunities (economic, social, environmental) people should have towards 
exploring how empowered or disempowered people are with the GTP objectives 
regarding justice. The Constitution and the GTP claim that Ethiopia is a democratic 
developmental state; hence a brief discussion of what development means is a 
logical progression.  
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 The plan is being implemented for the second time (hence GTP2 for the year 2015-2020). The 
GTP2 considers development as a solution to the country’s problems, especially poverty. 
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4.2. Ethiopia as a developmental State 
The FDRE claims to be democratic but also a developmental state. The expectations 
and elements of a developmental state are discussed in the previous chapter. In the 
context of Ethiopia here follows an explanation of what is expected of the Ethiopian 
judiciary as a responsible institution of the state.  
Generally speaking the Ethiopian judiciary is expected to fight rent-seeking, operate 
independently (especially from the influences of the affluent) and work in an 
atmosphere where developmental thinking is hegemonic. 187  As part of 
developmental state judicial bodies as institutions need to plan their overall activity 
in line with the dictates of a developmental state. The plan is expected to give much 
emphasis to socio-economic rights and justice. Accordingly reconstructing a new 
legal theory and practice is also a must in this respect. In the socio-economic sphere 
the judiciary is expected to protect property, enforce contracts efficiently, apply 
commercial laws effectively, be efficient in criminal, family, land law administration 
and give attention to social needs and poverty reduction. The judiciary is expected 
not only to work in cooperation with the Government but it is also expected to 
account or put a pressure on the Government towards alleviating poverty especially 
where rent-seeking dominates. In cooperating with the Government it does not 
work as a mere extension or instrument of the Government but works in its own  
specific interest and competence and to account the government when it fails to 
realize social justice. It should also form effective external ties with bodies including 
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 In this respect see the policy on Ethiopian Renaissance, FDRE (November2011), Ye’hidisie 
Mesimer Be’ityopia  Hidasi, pp. 39-57, 65-68. According to the policy the Ethiopian developmental 
state is modeled on Taiwan and South Korea models. There are two reasons why developmental 
state is necessary in Ethiopia: the first one is (probably the main one) the need to changing the 
hegemonic rent-seeking political economy and the second one is avoiding selectively and effectively 
developmental throttles that could be the causes of market failures. Ethiopian developmental state 
has three basic characteristics. These are considering development as question of survival and 
committed towards this, a politically and economically independent state from the affluent and 
creating hegemony of developmental state mentality. These elements consider poverty, lack of good 
governance and lack of democracy will lead Ethiopia to its collapse. It too considers ownership by 
the government of key economic sectors (resisting the neo-liberal campaign to privatize) and 
strengethening intimate relationship with the peasantry.  
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the non-formal decision making bodies as a prerequisite to effectuate 
developmental missions: broadening the room for the alleviation of poverty and 
narrowing the room for vulnerability to rent seeking. This demands the prevalence 
of meritorious, coherent and qualified judicial bodies engaging with non-formal 
systems of dispute resolution and monitoring the business and the state towards 
the state strategic plan. If Ethiopian judicial reform is not to suffer from the same 
mismatch effect, these local needs should be included in it. Reforming and building 
such judicial body remains of paramount importance. 
4.3 Contributions of the Constitution towards social justice. 
4.3.1. Making sense of legal pluralism  
In a country of justice pluralism, State courts are not the only organs to serve justice 
and prevent injustice. The 1995 Constitution under Article 39(2) and (3) grants 
every nation, nationality and people the right to ‘’administer itself, promote its 
culture, help it grow, flourish and preserve its historical heritage’’. The corollary 
duty of this right is boldly stipulated under Article 91(1) of the Constitution which 
declares that the State is responsible to promote the equal development of 
customs and culture in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
non-formal systems of dispute resolution mechanisms which operate outside the 
domain of the formal structure and formal recognition are included as beneficiary 
of such promotion.    
Further the State is responsible to make use of the rich heritage of culture and 
dispute resolution mechanisms in pursuance of its aim to preventing injustice and 
realizing social justice. The realisation of the right to justice under Article 37 of the 
Constitution would be meaningful when the horizon of the forum for justice is 
broadened to include such social and cultural heritage. Giving due recognition to 
legal pluralism broadens the freedom of choice of litigants to suit their needs 
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towards realising their choice of ends of lives.188 Despite their being located outside 
the sphere of the formal system, these systems however are expected not to drag 
or encumber the commitment towards sustainable development.  
If dispute resolution organs are duty bound to sustain development as a result of 
the Constitutional imperative, both systems need to be treated as two competing 
systems with the outcome of achieving social justice. Thus, despite the lack of space 
given to non-formal systems in the global judicial reform endeavors, the Ethiopian 
reform programme cannot ignore the non-formal system. The pertinent questions 
would therefore be whether the role of these institutions in an era of proactive 
judicialisation of social justice can be balanced against proactive non-formalization 
of social justice whilst considering the possible intertwining of formal and non-
formal systems.  
4.3.2. The right to development  
Abera holds that while a highly developed legal institution characterizes developed 
countries, underdeveloped countries are characterized by low standard of living 
and underdeveloped institutions (Abera 1998: 193). This might not hold true for 
Ethiopian Constitution.189 The preamble of the Constitution declares that the 
Constitution is an expression of a strong commitment of the people to advance  
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 The way these non-formal bodies handle cases impacts (less, equal, more importantly) the lives of 
the parties who seek their assistance and administration on the issues they are faced with. 
Depending on the degree of conflict, the subject or object of a conflict (e.g. land, property or 
contract) their outcome influences the way the capacity of parties is enhanced towards their 
‘’being’’ or ‘’doing’’. 
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 The Constitution is adopted on Dec 8th, 1994. The date which the Constitution is adopted is 
commemorated as the National Day of Nation, Nationalities and Peoples of the country. Despite her 
long constitutional history (dating back the days of Da’amat state-500B.C-100 A.D) the Constitution 
is ‘’peculiar” (Solomon 2008:3) and, of course, ‘’new” (Fassil, 1997: 15). Its peculiarity is 
characterized by many of the departures it had from the earlier constitutions. The language policy of 
the new Constitution, the utmost importance it gave to ethnicity and federalism, the coverage of 
human rights (particularly the right to self-determination up to secession) and the conception of 
social justice and sustainable development are amongst significant departures from the earlier 
Constitutional discourses. The issues surrounding their inclusion are vehemently debated but the 
most important thing here is rather seeing how  new and how peculiar the Constitution is by and for 
the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. 
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their social and economic development in an orderly and peaceful fashion. This is 
what either the Monarchial or Marxist oriented constitutions aspired to achieve but 
subsequently failed to deliver (Fassil 1997: 49). Thus it is important to ask how 
orderly and peacefully the social and economic development will be attained.190 
The Constitution also recognizes the long established relationships and interactions 
of Ethiopia’s people. The preamble of the Constitution stipulates that the people 
are convinced to live with their ‘’rich and proud cultural legacies’’ and to develop 
their ‘’common interest’’. The result of such interaction and conviction is the spring 
board to aspire their ‘’common destiny.’’ Hence there is a mutual recognition to 
continue a just past based on the mutual consent of Ethiopian people. 
The discussion on the legal history of Ethiopia illustrated how the non-formal 
systems of dispute resolution had much continuity with the past. The primary rule 
to break the continuity is when the tradition of the past collides with the dictates of 
the Constitution. The hierarchy of norm arrangements in the Constitution gives 
prevalence to Constitutional rules. This holds equally good for dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Traditional values are not given a subordinate position where they can 
simply be tolerated or discarded by formal institutions. As any decision of a 
government body (including judicial bodies) cannot contravene the Constitution, 
the same is true for non-formal bodies. Thus provided this ceiling is respected the 
non-formal decision making process and bodies are allowed to operate as the 
formal ones do. 
On the other hand the Constitution speaks in the language the Western world; that 
part of the Constitution is not unique to Ethiopia. The preamble once again 
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 It is not the conviction of the writer that in the way to development the ‘’social” should 
necessarily come after the ‘’economic” or vice versa. The attainment of the one makes the 
attainment of the other highly probable. It is only when all, not one, is well off/better off 
economically that society, most probably, will be better off socially-and hence a society of one 
economic order. The other way round, when there is a just society it is highly probable that the 
society will be well of economically. The peculiarity of the Constitution would be meaningless unless 
it bears to the people the fruits of such commitment and secure sustainable development. 
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forwards a desire to constitute a political community founded on a strong 
commitment to the ROL. Neither the Constitution nor enabling legislation clarifies 
the ROL. Moreover, one-third of the Constitution (primarily Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution) is devoted to issues of human rights.191 It uses the language of ‘rights’ 
more than 55 times, with one of them being when the right to development is 
recognised. It is wise and proper to be committed to such norms but also wise to 
explore how far Western language impacts the Constitution and the judicial reform 
programme. It is also important to draw parallels between the language of human 
rights and of justice. 
Thus another important contribution of the Constitution is its recognition of 
people’s right to sustainable development under Article 43. 192  This right is 
recognized as a universal and integral part of the fundamental human rights (Fasil 
1997: 171). It declares that the Ethiopian people as well as each Nation, Nationality 
and People have the right to improved living standards and sustainable 
development. The basic aim of development is to enhance the capacity of citizens 
for development and to meet their basic needs. The beneficiaries of this right in the 
Constitution are Nation, Nationalities and people who are vaguely defined under 
Article 39(5) of the Constitution. Thus the Constitution can be said to have hinted 
how issues of human rights and justice should be balanced in the context of 
Ethiopia. 
The Constitution lays two main duties on the State concerning the implementation 
of the right to development. One is the duty to respect the right of the people at 
the grassroots to participate and be consulted in matters affecting their community. 
                                                          
191
 On the other hand it uses the language of ‘’justice” three times-twice when dealing with rights of 
persons arrested and accused and once when dealing with ‘’access to justice”. 
192
 The State is also duty bound to protect and ensure the country’s right to sustainable development 
when entering in to global relations. Ethiopia is a signatory to many international conventions, 
including the convention to effect development. The constitution declares that conventions of such 
kind shall ensure and protect Ethiopia’s right to sustainable development. The language the 
Constitution uses towards non-formal systems is essential to begin with doing or undoing justice. 
When policy documents and secondary institutions fail to effectively give life to the dictates of such 
basic institution, the need to reform secondary institution arises.  
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The other is a duty to enhance the capacity of citizens to sustain development. This 
includes realsing the objectives of Sen’s positive and Pogge’s negative duties as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
4.3.3. Judicial objectives and Constitutional imperatives  
Though the judicial bodies of Ethiopia are expected to respect, protect and realize 
the Constitutional imperative of development, the core expectations of the 
Constitution are not found in the law establishing the courts. However, from the 
dictates of the Constitution, the GTP and the policies of the country one can see 
that the courts are duty bound: 
1. Not to contravene the Constitution (Article 9(1)) which includes the right to 
development 
2. To exercise judicial tasks independently and to be directed solely by the law 
(Article 79 of the Constitution)  
3. To see the right of development respected and enforced (Article 13(1) of 
the Constitution which in turn means that the courts are duty bound to: 
 3.1. Improve the living standards of the people 
 3.2. Enhance the capacity of citizens for development  
 3.3. Meet citizens’ basic needs  
4. To interpret the right to development in a manner conforming to the 
international conventions ratified by Ethiopia (Article 13(2). Among the 
conventions ratified by Ethiopia is found the 1981 African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Article 22 of the ACHPR recognizes the 
right of all people to their economic, social and cultural development. This 
is more than identifying development with economic growth. Freedom and 
justice are identified as essential objectives for the realisation of the right 
(see the Preamble of the ACHPR). The ACHPR implies that the right to 
development is a human right and is a right to a particular process of 
development in which fundamental freedoms are realized. Each of the 
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rights has to be exercised with freedom, and the rights unequivocally 
confer obligations on duty-holders (as per Article 25 and 22FF of the 
ACHPR). Thus the right to development is a claim to freedom and justice 
towards a wider understanding of development and a duty on the part of 
the decision  making body towards this objective. 
Hence the documents assume that law (especially the Constitution) is a basis of 
development and institutions, both formal and non-formal, are equally important 
to effect development positively as understood by the Constitution. Accordingly, 
Ethiopian courts have tasks beyond the mere disposal of cases that requires a 
balancing of different interests in disposing of cases. The balancing exercise 
compels an effective decision maker effectively balancing social, economic and 
environmental issues.  
Based on this the following section discusses what is to be expected of an effective 
decision making body towards contributing to attaining and sustaining 
development.  
4.3.3.1 Effective decision making: basic needs, living standards and 
enhancing capabilities for development.  
As has been discussed in Chapter One the desire to civilize, modernize and progress 
Ethiopia from the reign of Emperor Tewodros through to the Derg regime had not 
led to the country’s aspiration being achieved. Contrary to this, the results coupled 
with other causes have been disappointing and accounted for the down fall of the 
States.  
Post 1995 developmental concerns remained principally concerned with the 
alleviation of poverty. This concern persists alongside controlled privatization, 
structural adjustment and judicial institutional restructuring from International 
Financial Institutions. Post 1995 contribution of decision making bodies were 
measured to the extent that it balanced competing interests and alleviated poverty, 
152 
 
which remains the primary yardstick in measuring the effectiveness of decision 
making bodies. 
In terms of the GTP and the Constitution poverty alleviation, this would require one 
of the following three things: raising the capability of individuals for development 
(social, economic, environmental), meeting basic needs of citizens (including 
housing, education, food, water, social security and quality service), and improving 
the living standards of citizens. Both individuals and groups would be expected to 
develop; individuals through their enhancing capacity and groups towards an 
improved living standard. These remain the objectives of development under the 
Constitution which decision making bodies too are expected to realise. 
4.3.3.2. Standards of living and basic needs  
4.3.3.2.1. Positive duty of decision making bodies 
The conception of standards of living is a difficult but central, question in studying 
poverty (Sen 1985: 17). Sen held that it is ‘’hard to think of an idea more immediate 
than that of the living standard” and associates this conception with ‘’quality of 
living’’. The standard of living has to be seen in terms of the objective minimum 
where the minimums including commodities, house accommodations, medical care, 
food, are ‘’fair enough’’ as a direction to go but not places to stop (Sen 1985: 15). 
Issues around living standards need to be seen in connection with a discussion 
around basic needs. The original formulation of basic needs takes into account 
certain minimum amounts of essential commodities such as food, clothing and 
shelter” which makes the literature imprisoned in commodity fetishism’ (Sen 1989: 
45). If the concern is with the kind of lives people lead or could lead, living 
standards and basic needs should be formulated in line with functionings and 
capabilities (Sen 1985: 25). The issues are instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, 
important and must be converted to ends and in converting them to ends individual 
differences are significant. With a difference in the ‘conversion factor’ for 
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commodities living conditions may vary greatly in accordance with physiological, 
social, cultural factors.   
Living standards and basic needs can be illustrated in the Ethiopian context. We can 
think of two cases where two different people possessing different commodities 
have different life styles (conversion factor) and litigating before a decision making 
body. A disabled person in case ‘A’193 could win 100,000 ETB which an able person 
‘B’ might also win in another case.  Both opulent to the same amount but it could 
not be said to have the same standard of living. In this case ‘’B’ (where 
physiological, medical, climate and social factors citrus peribus bear less of their 
influence on him) could be said to have a higher standard of living than ‘A’. The 
disability ‘A’ has restricts the freedom of choice he/she may have. The focus has to 
be on what the winners in both cases can or cannot do can or can’t be and whether 
the winners have the ability to achieve/be what they can with the 100,000 ETB. 
What they need in their life and how each one of them can convert their money 
into is what matters rather than pure possession of the Birr (Sen 1985: 25) as the 
value of living stardard lays in such conversion. The standard of living is such 
‘’functioning’’ and ‘’capabilities’’ (Sen 1985: 16). The winner in this case will be 
capacitated when he secured the ability to win the case to the extent of 100,000 
ETB, (his achievement, his doing, or his functionings), able to collect the Birr (his 
doing), and able to covert the Birr into what the winners reasonably want to live (of 
being). As functionings is the constituents of the person’s being, this can vary from 
the money to being healthy, having a good job, and being safe, to more complex 
states, such as being happy, having self-respect, and being calm. This functionings is  
 
 
                                                          
193
 See Pogge (2007) Could Globalization Be Good for World Health? PP. 1-3. As a disadvantaged 
party in a litigation we can also think of women (suffering severe ill health than men), children under 
the age of 5 (accounting for 60 % of death toll), the poor and the poorer inhabitants (suffering from 
avoidable mortality and morbidity rate).  
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crucial to an adequate understanding of the capability approach; capability is 
conceptualized as a reflection of the freedom needed value from functionings.194  
Functionings and capabilities are also related to aspect of freedom (Sen 1985: 36).  
Meeting basic needs involves avoiding commodity achieving illegitimate obstacles. 
This neecessitates enhancing individual freedoms whilst eliminating or reducing 
unfreedoms. In the scenario of ‘A’ and ‘B’ above both could win their case with or 
without the non-formal systems. If the non-formal system were not available or 
were inaccessible, the freedom ‘A’ and ‘B’ would be reduced to that extent which is 
in turn a reduction in capability. Accordingly it wouldn’t be absurd to argue that 
there is some loss in the winner’s living standard. The presence of alternatives 
increase the probability of winning. There is this ‘’simultaneous and two-way 
relationship between functionings and capabilities’’ (Sen 1985: 36, 37).  
In a highly traditional, communal and litigious society for the most part of its legal 
history, basic needs and living standards encompass a minimum which can be 
counted objectively (such as the 100,000 ETB) but also that which may not be 
feasible to count but which is impossible to ignore such as the justice provided by 
the State. The mentality of litigation throughout the nation will demonstrated the 
need to consider the quality of decision making as basic a need as the 100,000 ETB. 
Furthermore questions of basic needs and living standards as aspects and essences 
of quality pertains to opportunities decision making bodies can create for the 
parties so that they can fulfill their functioning of living therefrom. Thus the judicial 
service can not be below the minimum standard expected of the people. 
This discussion urges us to critically consider the current trend of the Ethiopian 
judiciary in which cases are disposed of where, as shall be discussed in the next 
chapters, the consequences of the disposal either enhancing or undermining human 
functionings and capabilities are not given due space. There is thus a strong need to  
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 Sen, Amartya (1992). Inequality re-examined. New York Oxford New York: Russell Sage Foundation 
Clarendon Press Oxford Univ. Press. ISBN 9780198289289. 
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consider ends of life in the procedure decision making bodies follow or the 
decisions they arrive. Gains from the progress for decision making bodies should 
move in the direction of assisting in the realisation of these functionings and 
capabilities.195 The expectation of these duties from the courts appears of a Senian 
nature but can only be completed by a discussion on the negative duties of courts.   
4.3.3.2.2. Negative duty of decision making bodies 
According to Pogge, the Senian capability thesis ‘’gives rise to open ended 
questions’’, is ‘’over extended’’ and ‘’implausible’’ (Vizard 2005: 2). Pogge’s 
conceptualization of poverty as a violation of  human rights on the basis of the 
assumption that human rights imposes a fundamental positive duty to assist and 
aid the poor but rather a fundamental negative duty to reprimand conduct that 
causes harm or the institutions that cause sever poverty (Pogge 2004: 34, Vizard 
2006: 6).  
Thus realisattion of social justice demands the decision making bodies to act to 
alleviate poverty and restrain from impoverishing the poor. Acts impoverishing the 
poor would narrow the real opportunity towards the realisation of social justice. 
This negative duty is equally important in the context of Ethiopian decision making 
bodies and can be breached in a number of ways resulting in harm to the poor. 
Such harm can be inflicted when judicial reform programme launched by these 
bodies doesn’t reflect the true notion of Ethiopian justice. Harm can also be 
inflicted through the substantive decision the courts make to the confines of 
procedural restrictions in place. If decision making bodies become insensitive to the 
social, economic and environmental harm of their decisions on the parties and 
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 To recapitulate it can be said that the judicial functions are deemed to be effective when they 
have fulfilled the objectives enshrined in the Ethiopian Constitution. More specifically they will only 
be effective when they promote sustainable development as per article 43; when they contribute to 
raising the living standards of the parties before them; when they shape behaviors of the citizens 
beyond the parties in dispute towards meeting basic needs and living standards.. 
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beyond and do not expand the real opportunities of litigants in legitimately shaping 
the outcomes of their case, this harm prompt much needed reform.   
This has to be the starting point in any major reform or design of judicial 
responsibility. Though it is not impossible to think that the realisation of a perfect 
justice in a polity, it would be good to start from what Sen called the removal of 
‘’clear injustices and the identification of redressable injustices’’ (Sen 2009: 
preface). Social justice demands this respect for the negative duty for Ethiopian 
decision making bodies, to be conscious of their wider responsibility and the 
implications they are responsible for. The duty to respect, defend and support 
capability enhancement lies in respecting these negative and positive duties of 
decision making bodies. 
4.4. The Ethiopian judicial reform programme  
Cognizant of the problems of social and economic justice196 the Constitution 
recognizes the right to development with a desire for this to be realized to its fullest 
extent in a successful sustainable way. Considering the country's level of 
development its institutions including its ineffective judiciary need to exert their 
maximum focus to achieve its aim. The way Ethiopia uses and reforms its 
institutions is key to the attainment of this goal.  
In the Ethiopian context the march from feudalism to socialism and then to 
developmental state has been a long journey in terms of time and content. As 
explained in Chapter One and this law reform programmes have this journey, but 
decision making bodies have been lagging behind this journey. The formal judicial 
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 It has been agreed that Ethiopia is materially underdeveloped and is one of the poorest countries 
in the world. The illiteracy rate is high, Gross Domestic Product and Per Capital Income is low, 85% of 
the people (more than 80 million) depend on agriculture with underdeveloped subsistence economy 
and social service provision. As a result, Ethiopia crafted a vision and adopted poverty reduction 
strategies. The central element in the vision is the alleviation of poverty, ensuring sustainable 
development to become a middle income country in less than twenty years. If this level of 
development could not be reached, poverty will lead to the collapse of the country.  Global factors 
being cetrus paribus, the lack of peace, stability, conflict, strife and other evils will all pave the way 
to disintegration. Contrary to this the preamble of the 1995 Constitution reminds the aspiration 
towards one political and economic order.  
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bodies were established over 50 years ago but were deformed during the era of 
Emperor Haile Silassie, then formed but paralyzed during the Derg regime and now 
are expected to be re-formed and trans-formed. Despite this there is a mismatch 
between the current idea of justice and the practice in realising justice.   
The competing and explicit interests represented by the law and the anti-law 
movements have been particularly importance to countries like Ethiopia where 
formal courts have operated with non-formal mechanisms of dispute resolution. A 
study provided evidence that 85% of the population of Ethiopia rely on traditional 
mechanisms of dispute resolution (Getachew and Alula 2008: 1-9) in order to 
achieve social justice. The most important question which arises out of this 
competition is how the reform shoulder the Constitutional responsibility between 
the formal and non-formal dispute resolution mechanisms. Balancing this involves 
synchronization of tensions or resistance and conflicts between competing bodies. 
As a natural consequence of the balance of power it has led to shifts in superiority 
from the one to another and it is now expected that the reform will anchor the two 
positions in a state of synchronization. 
4.4.1. Pre-judicial reform programme change initiatives. 
The Ethiopian judicial reform programme took place in FDRE after the Derg was 
ousted from power in 1991 by armed coalition forces known as EPRDF. The force 
suspended the Derg Constitution and convenes a conference on 4th July 1991 and 
promulgated a transitional Charter on 22nd July 1991.197 As a remedy to the social 
injustices the people suffered during the Derg regime, the Charter ‘’dismantled the 
institutions of the Derg as detailed in the Preamble of the Charter. 198  This 
subsequently required a complete overhaul of the justice system. The Charter also 
endorsed the UDHR ‘’fully and without any limitation whatsoever’’ and laid the 
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 See FDRE (June 2014), Ye’hiopian Hiziboch Tigilina Agerawi Hidasiyachin, p.24.This is a policy 
document about the struggle of the Ethiopian people and its renaissance. 
198
 Paragraph 5 of the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia reads ‘’all institutions of repression 
installed by the previous regimes shall be dismantled’’. Article 18 of the Charter states that the 
Charter is the supreme law of the Land (Negarit Gazeta, No.1, 22
nd
 July 1991). 
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foundation for Federal Government and began the process of democratization and 
decentralization.  
As the Derg Constitution of 1987 stipulated under Article 101(2) that the term of 
justices and judges shall be the same as the term of the Shengo199 that elected him, 
no judge is expected to serve when the institution of Shengo was dismantled. This 
left a concerning vacuum in the judiciary. Further, the judiciary was decentralized 
which made the shortage of judges critical to impact the way dispute resolution 
mechanisms function. The acute shortage of judges in the courts triggered the need 
to recruit new judges. About 3000 judges and prosecutors were recruited all over 
the country and were given short term training (3 months) to fill the vacancies 
(Mandafrot 2002: 38). In collaboration with universities which included the 
Ethiopian Civil Service College and Bahir Dar University, these judges later upgraded 
their skills and knowledge during court recess time. The Federal Supreme Court 
collaborated with USAID to offer on the job training.200 
As part of reform measures, the Court Administration Reform Program (CARP 1) 
began to be implemented in 2002, starting at the Federal Supreme Court followed 
by the lower federal courts (CARP 2). The programmes were meant to improve the 
administration of the courts. These programmes were fully supported by the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The reform efforts were 
expanded to the ANRS under the National Expansion programme (hereafter NEP) 
which was fully funded by PSCAP through the Ethiopian Government. As shall be 
discussed later, in 2005 the NEP was incorporated under the FDRE Strategy and 
programme for Capacity Building (hereafter the SPCBP). This encompassed the 
judicial reform sub programme for the civil service reform programme. . 
                                                          
199
Shengo was the supreme state organ of the state during the Derg (the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia according to the constitution) the members of which were to be elected for a 
term of 5 years upon universal, equal, direct and by secret ballots (articles  62, 65 and 68 of the 1987 
Constitution). 
200
 This effort later developed to establish the Justice Professionals Training Center (Proclamation 
No. 364/2003, A Proclamation to provide for the Establishment of Justice Organs Professionals 
Training Center. 
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The allegoric success of the project was the reason behind the expansion and 
replication of the Federal Supreme Court project to 126 courts and then a further 
726 courts (Haile 2007: 15). These projects induced court reform thinking and 
activity in the federal and the ANRS courts. The programmes changed the 
traditional and archaic ways of court management and in particular, they changed 
the values and day-to-day efficiency of the courts whilst narrowing the opportunity 
that petty corruption may have proliferated due to any residual inefficiency. The 
introduction of color-coded filing system (the first in the reform activity) was one 
simple example of modernizing the old numbering system of files. Modern 
technology were introduced to record and transcribe the testimonies of witnesses 
and other important court proceedings. This to a large extent ended the hand 
recording of proceedings and made the operation of courts fast and reliable. It 
significantly reduced the time judges entertained cases from the bench and helped 
them take on more cases than ever before and further promoted accountability and 
transparency of the operation of courts (Haile 2007: 58).  
The design and implementation of a court cases database was another significant 
contribution towards efficiency of the courts. The first version of this was a Court 
Recording System (CRS) later upgraded to Court Case Management System (CMS 
and CCMS) and provides information to the client of the court but helps the court 
staff to plan, monitor and evaluate court performance. 
The introduction of a case flow management system, the quick production of client 
services, information desks, the quick production of court documents, 
computerization, use of photocopy machines, scanners, printers and templates also 
led to increased efficiency. The introduction of photocopy machines resulted in 
quick production of documents which could previously take months to find a file 
(Haile 2007: 59). The use of information technology also improved access to justice 
in the ANRS (Haile 2007: 17).  
These have been introduced in all the federal courts and 72 courts of the ANRS. 
Other successes which were reported included a backlog free courts owing to the 
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fast disposal rate of the courts and the expansion of mobile courts, establishments 
of waiting terminals (with TV, radio entertainment), information desks,201 sign 
posts, suggestion boxes, suggestion books and court buildings (including a building 
for the ANRS Supreme Court). Training in all these areas including training given to 
the court leadership team was also a significant achievement of the project. 
Accordingly reform awareness training for 3635 court staff members, service 
delivery and client handling for 4177 staffs, basic computer training for 449 staffs, 
leadership course for 134 staffs, database for 50, and court recording and 
transcribing for 154 staffs were conducted. Professional training was given to 
judges (Haile 2007: 15-16). Owing to the training on strategic thinking given to court 
leaders in 2004, and again in 2005, court performance began to be planned and 
courts began to evaluate their performance based on the plan. Before the training, 
the courts’ performance was believed to be unplannable as a result of which a 
judge was only expected to give decisions to cases that appeared before him. 
These efforts increased the efficiency of courts which will be discussed more fully in 
the next chapter. As can be seen from the achievements of the projects this 
promoted access to justice through elimination of case backlogs and the 
modernization system (Haile 2007: 61). However, capacity, transparency, service 
delivery, accountability, federal/regional collaboration, and effectiveness were still 
cross-cutting issues. Furthermore, no significant achievement was registered on a 
well-studied and harmonized non-formal system of dispute resolution and legal aid 
services. The achievements were ‘’fragmented and piecemeal’’ and didn’t consider 
the justice system as a coherent whole (Mandafrot 2002: 41, Haile 2007: 61). Thus a 
much more comprehensive justice reform was needed.  
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 Some however misapplied the introduction of the information desk. During a visit to a Woreda 
Court by the researcher as a president of the ANRS court, one of the courts placed the information 
desk at the back of the courts in order to be secretly informed by the public of the way the courts 
function. The information desk however was meant to be placed at the entrance of court houses so 
as to provide one stop service to court clients.  
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4.4.2. Brief history of the comprehensive justice reform programme 
In 1991 a shift in the political economy of the country meant the withdrawal of the 
Derg from politics, the commitment to human rights meant allowing citizens to 
realize their basic rights to development and prosecution of perpetrators of human 
right violations during the past regime, the radical shift in the structure and 
substantive content of the new regime meant constitutional reform. Following the 
declaration of the 1995 Constitution further action was carried on which included 
the adoption of policies such as the FDRE Strategy and programme for Capacity 
Building Programme (SPCBP) and Democratic System Building Policy (DSBP) that 
were both adopted in 2004. These policy documents indicated the need to reform 
and the direction of the judicial reform programme.  
The SPCBP was comprised of three parts: Part One dealt with general matters, Part 
Two dealt with matters of education, and Part Three dealt with the civil service 
reform programme. Judicial Reform was a sub programme within the Civil Service 
Reform Programme. According to the programme the main aim of the judicial 
reform was to enable the courts to execute and interpret laws designed to promote 
the development and democratization of the country. This required giving special 
training to judges, improving the way the courts function and the way they are 
organised (SPCBP 2004: 281, 289). Other goals include making case processing by 
courts speedier and modern, ensuring independence and accountability of the 
courts (SPCBP 2004: 287, 289). The Justice System Reform Programme was charged 
with designing a comprehensive reform plan to attain these objectives. 
In the same year the Government also adopted the FDRE Democratic System 
Building Policy (DSBP). This policy emphasized effective service before and above all 
else as the foremost role of the Government’s developmental role. The document 
underlined the only option left after the fall of the Derg regime was to build a 
democratic system in which good governance was secured (DSBP 2004: 4). The 
judiciary was assumed to play a key role in the democratization and development 
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process of the country (DSBP 2004: 8). According to the policy document 
Democracy and Good Governance are important in alleviating the circle of poverty 
and ensuring peace in the country. The objectives of good governance were 
articulated as fighting corruption and ensuring fair, transparent, accountable and 
speedy Government services to the public (DSBP 2004: 8, 82, 86). Owing to the 
reform that has been done in enacting the new law and establishing institutions,202 
as parts of the people-centered development measures, these were not sufficient 
to realize justice to a level which met expectation of the people. The question that 
remained was what actions with regard to the judiciary was expected to alleviating 
poverty and realise justice for the people. Underlying the role of the judiciary in the 
democratization process the document (2004: 88) stated that the judicial body has 
the task of ensuring the rule of law in an efficient and fair way. It accordingly 
emphasized the need to ensure accountability for those who act contrary to the law 
and regulations that were aimed at facilitating the free-market through the exercise 
of freedom of contract. Judicial transparency, independence and accountability 
were assumed to be instrumental in ensuring these objectives (DSBP 2004: 84, 88-
95). The judicial system had to be reconstructed on ‘’a new and strong bases with a 
sense of urgency’’ (DSBP 2004: 96).  
In 2002 the then Ministry of Capacity Building (hereafter the MoCB) conducted a 
workshop where four papers were presented.203 One of the objectives of the 
workshop was to: 
identify the general framework for the development of a comprehensive 
justice system reform programme that is appropriate for the establishment 
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 The enactment of the new penal code, family code, proclamations to amend and complement the 
commercial code, the labor law, the establishment of the Ethiopian Human Right Commission, Office 
of the Ombudsman, Anti-corruption Commission are among the reform measures. 
203
 See MoCB (2002), Proceeding of the workshop, p. 3, 23, 205. One of the papers was presented  by 
an Ethiopian from Ministry of Capacity Building and the three by experts from Canada, France and 
UNDP. The CIDA and UNDP funded the workshop. 166 people from different Federal and Regional 
government sectors, NGOs (APAP, Forum for Social Studies, Evangelical Church), Embassies 
(America, Italian, china, Canada, Norway, Nigeria, Finland, Austria), academia, USAID and UNDP 
participated in the workshop. 
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of a constitutional democracy wherein the rule of law and human rights are 
fully respected (MoCB 2002: 1).  
Following the workshop, the Office for the Justice Reform Program (JSRPO) under 
the MoCB prepared and tendered terms of reference for international consultancy. 
The Center for International Legal Cooperation (hereafter the CILC) 204 responded 
by conducting a technical and analytical assessment of the justice system. CILC is an 
independent Dutch non-profit organization founded in 1985. It provided expertise 
to developing countries and countries in transition engaged in legal and judicial 
reform. Its beliefs are ‘’a functioning, reliable legal system is a critical precondition 
for the political, economic and social well-being of a country’s population. Its 
mission is promoting ‘’the rule of law by initiating and implementing international 
legal cooperation projects’’ for a variety of challenges within developing legal 
systems. It was an academic and independent partner of the World Bank yielding 
independent and substantive contribution to the legal systems of developing 
countries and countries in transition.205 It was one of the ‘’law and justice technical 
assistance providers’’ of the World Bank.206 Regarding justice and legal reforms CILC 
shares the ethos of the World Bank discussed in the previous chapter.207 
As a result of the CILC response, a contract was signed between Ethiopian MoCB 
and CILC on 27th May 2003. The contract mandated CILC to review the overall 
Ethiopian justice system and develop a baseline needs assessment of the justice  
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 See CILC 2005, p.52.  CILC acted as an adviser and catalyst in the project. It is composed of 
international and local experts. While international experts were recruited by CILC in the 
Netherlands, France and Sweden, the local experts were recruited by the JSRPO.  
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See Inside CILC, why and where it all began-stories from the founding fathers (1-3), 
‘’http:|\/\/www.cilc.nl\cms\/wp and also See http://www.cilc.nl/inside-cilc-why-and-where-it-all-
began-stories-from-the-founding-fathers-2/, last visited 26 Mar.2016. 
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 See also the World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/5JCB612CAO, last visited 24 Mar. 2016. 
207
CILC involvement in Indonesia was not uncomplicated. While there was strong critics of the 
human rights practices and politics of the Indonesian government under the Suharto regime, the 
World Bank and others supported its involvement on the believe that ‘’to invest in and engage with 
the legal structures of the country would benefit the corporate sector’’ and that in order to be ‘’part 
of the world economy, national economies and legal systems needed to be modernized to create 
jobs, growth and prosperity’’. This indicates shared ethos between the World Bank and CICL. For 
details seehttp://www.cilc.nl/inside-cilc-why-and-where-it-all-began-stories-from-the-founding-
fathers-2/ last visited 26 Mar. 2016. 
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system with a view to identifying shortcomings and suggesting remedies. The JSRPO 
was a counterpart of the study while UNDP was part of the discussion and covered 
the funding for the research (CILC 2005: 11, 51).  
4.4.3. The comprehensive justice system reform programme. 
As the previous discussions made it clear the judicial and legal sector of Ethiopia 
presents various complicated challenges. Moreover, the sectors institutions were 
affected by the long and complicated history of the country (World Bank 2004: v11). 
The Justice System Reform Programme (hereafter the JSRP) too identified the 
complex legal history as hindrances to the Ethiopian administration of justice.208  
Thus it was important to determine the specific and contextual reform demands of 
Ethiopia. The reform, had to contextualize the answer to key questions such as:  
a) The specific nature  of the judicial reform  
b) The direction and priorities of the judicial reform 
c) The unique elements in the country’s judicial reform programme  
d) The historical context under which the judicial system is working 
e) The symmetric or asymmetric power arrangements of formal and non-
formal decision making bodies  
f) The best ways in which disputes are resolved to serve legal and social 
justice.  
As shall be explained more clearly later it has only been through the JSRP that the 
country has attempted to transform the legal system in a more comprehensive way. 
The most important question in this study is therefore how effective is the judicial 
reform in the context of Ethiopia.    
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 As is discussed in Chapter One the legal history of the country has been suffering from a mix of 
civil and common law countries, embraced secular and modern law together with religious and 
traditional law which was identified one of the problems. This mix co-exist as well as conflict with 
each other and at times replace one another. 
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When the justice sector reform programme was crafted in 2002, the workshop 
organized by MoCB, in cooperation with United Nations Development Programme 
(hereafter the UNDP) and Canadian International Development Agency (hereafter 
the CIDA), invited different people to make remarks in opening the workshop 
underlyining the objectives of the judicial reform. According to John Sheram, a 
Canadian Ambassador to Ethiopia, whist addressing the workshop establishing a 
modern and efficient justice system was emphasized as the objective of the reform. 
A representative of UNDP, Mr. Samuel Niambe, shared this thought but further 
noted that the reform should go beyond organizing the justice sector and help the 
judiciary discharge its main objective which was to protect human rights, settle 
social conflicts in an impartial and effective way as a partner in human development 
(MoCB 2002: 24).  
On the other hand the then Minister of MoCB identified the main objectives of the 
justice sector reform programme which included:  
1. Overhauling the justice system in order to achieve a maximum level of 
justice as desired by the people and the Government 
2. Enabling justice organs as learning institutions to act proactively and 
sensitively to the needs of the public and empower them in contributing 
fully to achieve good governance and justice in the true  sense (Mandafrot 
2002: 30, 36, 41, 42).209 
To realize the objectives, the base line study undertaken by the CILC identified 
many problems in the judiciary of Ethiopia. Three main problems of the Ethiopian 
justice system were identified as: inaccessibility and unresponsiveness to the 
desires of the people, prevalence of corruption and abuse of power through 
political interference in the administration of justice and inadequate funding of the 
institution aggravating the deficiencies in the administration of justice (CILC 2005: 
14, 170- 190). The more specific problems regarding the judiciary (CILC 2005: 15, 
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 MoCB 2002, pp. 16-17. This in particular was addressed by the then Minister of Ministry of 
Capacity Building, Tefera Waliwa. See also Mandafrot 2002: 30, 36, 41, 42. 
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159-179) include a lack of responsiveness to the poor, trust, confidence, basic 
information, independence, transparency, training, accountability, court 
administration, case management, backlogs, speedy trial, poor working 
atmosphere, and poor archive system. The lack of sufficient study in ADRMs and the 
lack of research in the use of these rich ADRMs in the formal system were also 
identified as another problem.210 
As the list of the problems makes it clear problems identified look similar to the list 
of problems identified for other countries discussed in Chapter Three section 3.1. 
For example, the Honduras reform programme identified issues of gender, the 
youth, indigenous people and small business as judicial branch challenges, whilst 
the rest of challenges identified in Ethiopia were similar or identical with what has 
been identified in Honduras. 
4.4.4. Reform recommendations and goals  
The baseline study for the judicial reform programme has a list of recommendations 
as solutions to the problems identified and the reform programme relied on these 
subsequent reform recommendations. The study boldly expressed that the 
                                                          
210 The CILC 2005: 15, pp. 159-179 has also identified other propblems. The problems identified 
included the unresponsiveness and inaccessible of the courts to the poor who are forced to seek 
alternative justice, lack of basic information on the part of the courts (courts lack automatice access  
to the official Negarit Gazeta, their libraries were poorly equipped or non-existent and most court 
decisions were not published and reported) and low perception of the independence of the 
judiciary. Other problems include:  
 selection and promotion of judges is insufficiently transparent, the criterion being too 
general and lacks imputes from other legal professionals, civil society and citizens,   
 lack of training and accountability of judges,  
 Weak court administration and case management,  
 Delay of cases and high congestion rate, unnecessarily costly, complex and 
Unpredictable justice system,  
 Protracted criminal justice system in violation of speedy trial, 
 Inability to tackling corruption, biasedness and political interference,  
 Poor working atmosphere, poor salary scale of judges compared to international 
standards,  
 Low level of competence among support staff 
 Absence of initial and continuous training for the staff, poor filing system and poor 
court administration 
 Poor court administration and archive system, excessive but unproductive support 
staff. 
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recommendations were forwarded bearing in mind the ‘’international rule of law 
principles’’ (CILC 2005: 214). According to CILC the principles have at least elements 
of an independent judicial system, demanding for courts interpreting and applying 
the law and regulations in an impartial, predictable, efficient and transparent way, 
consistent enforcement of decisions of courts and access to justice for all.211 It 
emphasized the desire to secure judicial independence so that the power of 
Government would be limited to protecting the rights of individuals (CILC 2005: 
213FF).  
Bearing in mind the global ROL conception, the document further enumerates some 
26 recommendations including for the establishment of a Human Rights 
Commission, Office of the Ombudsman, encouraging Civil Society and Piloting the 
projects. The recommendations emphasized that enhancing judicial independence 
and its professional capacity had to be a high political priority. Other 
recommendations included limiting the power of the Supreme Court presidents and 
transferring their power to Judicial Administration Commissions, establishing 
transparent recruitment and promotion system for judges on the basis of objective 
competence and transparent criterion, establishing judges associations, improving 
judicial education and training, developing judicial career paths, strengthening 
transparency of courts and judicial accountability, developing period performance 
evaluation of judicial performance based on transparent and relevant quantitative 
and qualitative criterion and integrated into training programmes, improving initial 
and continuous training for judges and other staffs, government financing for the 
training of judges in a stable and sustainable way, deploying court managers for 
administrative tasks of the court and giving the administrative staff professional 
training, computerizing the court system, giving priority to reducing backlogs, 
strengthening legal clinics, establishing execution department, creating accessible 
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 CILC 2005, 213-214. The baseline study recommended that this includes professional capacity and 
should be given a high political priority so that the judiciary will be free from the influence of the 
executive. Thus the judiciary needs to administer its budget and its administrative staff (2005: 213), 
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copies of court decisions to lawyers and the public, improving the working 
atmosphere of courts, making the Bar responsible for licensing, training on all 
matters related to the functioning of a lawyer, accessing copies of court decisions to 
the lawyers and the public at large, commenting on court decisions by academics 
and making the comments available to judges, lawyers and prosecutors offices, 
printing selected decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, improving working 
conditions of the courts, seeing the possible use of ADRMs to address the backlog 
of criminal cases, training of corps of specialists of ADRMs, and study the nature of 
social courts (CILC 2005: 21, 25, 214-227).  
These lists of recommendation, summerised in ten goals including one for 
monitoring and evaluation, have been endorsed as the Comprehensive Justice 
Reform Programme.212 So far these goals have been in place as of 2004.  
4.4.5. Implementation 
The then MoCB was the responsible body to implement the programme. A high 
level committee, National Justice Reform Steering Committee (NJRSC), chaired by 
the Minister of the then MoCB whose members were drawn from the various 
justice sectors (and the three levels of Government) of the federal and regional 
states (including courts, prosecution and parliament) coordinated the 
implementation of the programme (Mandafrot 2002: 44). The NJSRC oversaw the 
programme and sat policy intended to guide implementation of the programme. 
While the MoCB bore the responsibility of implementing the reform programme, 
the JSRPO, staffed by a director and three experts within the ministry, acted as 
secretary to the NJSRC and facilitated and co-ordinated the implementation of the 
programme. It monitored, evaluated and produced reports of the technical 
implementation of the programme (Mandafrot 2002: 44-45). The actual 
implementation of the programme was the responsibility of the various 
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 The goals have 38 activities as subsets. The ANRS also contextualized, approved and implemented 
this programme as of from 2002.  
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implementing agencies having a project manager/focal person.213 There were also 
offices organized in each sector to facilitate the implementation. For example, a 
National Court Reform Project Office at the Federal Supreme Court coordinated, 
monitored and evaluated judicial reform performances of all courts.214 
The implementation recorded many success stories. According to reports it helped 
the introduction of change environment in the courts, introduced the use of 
modern technologies in processing cases, introduced color coded filing system, 
recording and transcribing system, case management system (data base-versions 
CRS, then CMS now CCMS), improved client service (case flow management system, 
information desk systems, sign posts, waiting terminals, service counters, quick 
production of court documents (templates or forms, photocopiers), provided court 
leadership trainings, use of ICT in courts, (including computerization, e-litigation at 
the federal supreme court level and tele-conferencing), increased in disposal rate, 
expanded mobile courts and increased legal aid. These were registered as successes 
of the reform programme both in the Federal and ANRS courts.  
4.4.6. Some contradictions in the programme 
The success of the reform programme had to been in line with its realisation that 
pertained to the constitutional expectation of the courts. In this respect there were 
some contradictions which related to the local demand for reform and how and to 
what extent it was contextualized. The attempt to identify local problems but to 
propose solutions on the basis of the international conception of the ROL is one 
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 CILC 2005, 292-93. These agencies at the Federal level include the Ministry of Justice, the Federal 
Police Commission, Penitentiary Commission, Ministry of Education, Various Law Schools, and the 
Federal Supreme Court (CILC 2005: 292). 
214
 According to Zewdineh (2007: 4) much of the blame for slowing down the reform process during 
PSCAP should go to the MCB/BRCB and the World Bank who are empowered to be the clearing 
houses for consolidating reform plans and implementing procurement requests. With a slight 
difference (example the chairperson of the steering committee being the president of Regions) 
similar structure/arrangement is replicated at the regional level. Regional structures include 
Regional Steering Committee, programme co-coordinating Office and local implementing agencies. 
The Office also facilitates the purchase of modern equipment (initially including the color coded 
files) by the MoCB and distributes to the various regions. Besides equipping courts the projects also 
helped to further identify problems in the courts and thus paved the way for the comprehensive 
reform orgramme (Zewdineh 2007: 34).   
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indication of the problem. Furthermore, some kind of alignment with the ROL was 
visible when an independent judiciary (applying laws impartially, efficiently, and 
predictably in a transparent way) is recommended mainly to ‘’limit the power of the 
Government and protect individual rights’’ (CILC 2005: 214). The global conception 
of the ROL leans towards the neo-liberal conception of reform which, expecting a 
much less role of the government, had been initially resisted by the Ethiopian 
developmental State.215    
Furthermore it was noted that the unique problems in the Ethiopian judiciary was 
what triggered the reform programme. The lists of Ethiopian justice problems 
identified were however similar to the list of problems in other countries where the 
World Bank had its initial involvement in judicial reform projects. The list of 
recommendations for ‘’equitable justice’’ in the Honduras project matches sixteen 
or more of the recommendations for Ethiopian reform. Stressing the unique and 
complex legal problem of the country, this cannot simply be a mere coincidence; it 
is at least more than coincidence or at most deliberate.  
The recommendations also have other contradictions. For example, while the 
problems envisage a possible study and use of ADRMs, the recommendation 
reduced this to a study to see if ADRMs could reduce the backlog in the criminal 
justice. ADRMs application was further curtailed when the programme emphasized 
that numerous and grave failures of the court system should be thoroughly 
resolved before considering the involvement of ADRMs. According to CILC the 
utmost should be done to address first of all other issues of the courts before 
tackling the complex issues of entrenched religious and customary law (CILC 2005: 
213). This does not only seem contradictory but disconnects the formal system 
from the non-formal system, reducing its capability of being a learning institution, 
and was against the targets of Ethiopian developmental state as underlined in the 
GTP2.  
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It is also important to see if the list of activities reflected the desires of justice in the 
eyes of the people in ‘’its true sense’’.  In this respect the language of the reform 
programme demonestrates how homegrown the programme is. Pragmatism over 
the issue of human rights, governance and economic development seemed to be 
the normative backdrop of the reform programme. The reform sought to make 
public institutions responsive and efficient, empower citizen participation and 
promote good governance and accountability. Accordingly, a modern and efficient 
system is emphasized by all the papers and the programme is expected to protect 
human rights, good governance and the rule of law. The judiciary is one of the 
justice sector reform programme components and effective delivery of justice by 
judicial organs is expected as one output. A reformed judiciary attracts foreign 
capital and encourages investment (MoCB 2002: 20-21). Despite all the problems 
and research, the underlying emphasis is a substantial contribution to the 
Government’s market-driven growth strategy (Mandafrot 2002: 45) as opposed to 
the wider notions of social justice.216 
Thus despite the call for justice in its true sense the protection of private and 
property rights and the enforcement of contracts are still central pillars of the 
reform programme. A predictable, sound, strong, independent and accountable 
judiciary is what is expected of the reformed judiciary. Effectiveness is seldom 
mentioned and when it is mentioned it is either incomplete or lacks the necessary 
connection with social justice. It seems that the on-going reform programme is part 
of a post-colonial global reform project spearheaded by international financial and 
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 It is also important to see how the recommendations were well taken note of. Contradictions are 
noticeable in the goals of the reform: see how efficiency (Mandafrot 2002: 36-39) and effectiveness 
(Mandafrot 2002: 43) are conceptualized in the document. It’s conception of human rights does not 
fit the conception of justice and the right to development in the Constitution. The means to realizing 
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power given to the Federal Supreme Court to give binding interpretation of laws on all courts of the 
country is against the advice given in the reform document to establishing system of stare decisis in 
Ethiopia (See the CILC 2005: 172). Proclamation number 457/2005 was promulgated the same year 
against this recommendation.  
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major Western donors whose objective is to promote ‘’participation, accountability 
and good governance’’ (Faundez 2010).  
Despite that the lack of clarity on concepts imported from outside was another 
complicating factor. For example, the reform programme lacks clarity on how the 
judiciary is connected to development. The programme has also made use of 
conception of the ROL that has not been made clear so far. Problem also lies in the 
lack of consensus on what judicial reform is meant towards alleviating poverty in 
Ethiopia and how the reform gets (positively or negatively, causally or otherwise) 
connected to the country’s development. The lack of clarity on the point makes the 
objective, direction and Constititional achievments of the reform programme 
unclear.  
Mandafrot (2002: 36) stressed that the reform programme improved the courts 
organization, administration and way they functioned. This was good as a starting 
point but not a point to which to end, for the people and the Government desire 
justice in ‘’its truest sense’’ towards development Constitutional understood as 
realizing functioninigs and capabilities. 
Conclusion 
Ethiopia has declared a democratic developmental State. This is unique as it 
encompasses elements of developing its policy targeted towards poverty 
eradication and growth from within, whilst creating an accountable state towards 
tackling rent-seeking and corruption. Being a democratic state also emphasized 
making use of the traditional system of dispute resolution. In reality, the Ethiopian 
justice system relies heavily on the traditional system of dispute resolution. 
However despite the desire, the reality and the GTP expectations, these systems 
remain underdeveloped. The CILC well noted the impact of the decentralization and 
the lack of study into a consideration of constitutionally tested ADR methods (CILC 
2005: 56) but to date relied heavily on the formal system. Non-formal systems 
matter in realising social justice and reform should include this peoples’ experience 
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from merely studying the formal legal actors (including law maker, courts, police, 
public prosecution) alone. This should have included study on the identification of 
non-formal systems. The JSRP’s baseline study was devoid of such a study. It has 
lacked qualitative interviews with the people including local justice actors which 
need to ask why and who make use of them and how and what made them 
effective. As the baseline study did not incorporate their perspectives on these 
important wide range issues of social justice it excluded village experts versed with 
non-formal justice, local problems of social justice and issues of the non-formal 
justice. The chapter has indicated that the Ethiopian reform programme hasn’t 
identified these problems and created determined solutions to combat and rectify 
them.   
Like other programmes it focused on the court budget, legal aid, staff, lawyers, the 
users of courts, information, technology, modern equipment, treatment of cases, 
backlogs and length of proceedings, and enforcement of their decisions. Values like 
judicial independence, accountability, control, efficiency, access to justice, legal 
certainty, impartiality, and predictability, and ROL have also a focus. But it lacks 
focus on issues of legal pluralism and the realisation of social justice as a result the 
Ethiopian programme does not necessarily follow the Ethiopian context, but is very 
similar to other programmes. The underlying approach being to giving priority to 
improving that part of the formal judicial system related to the market.  
Moreover, the global conception of the ROL is the base of the reform 
recommendations that Ethiopia has adopted. This international agenda of formal 
justice had been promoted from the reform programme in Honduras to the 
Ethiopian project ignoring the much needed local good governance and ROL 
agendas as key to the attainment of social justice. As Paliwala and Kamchedzera 
indicated ‘’justice indicators are generally formulated by, or on behalf of, agencies 
involved in promotion of good governance, the rule of law and justice at a global 
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level’’ in an attempt to achieve ‘’their own top-down objectives’’ (Paliwala and 
Kamchedzera 2014: 4).217 
The reform follows the hegemonic discourse that makes the relationship between 
alleviating poverty and serving justice and halting impoverishment as indicated in 
the GTP and the Constitution problematic. In the Ethiopian context the fulfillment 
of basic needs and living standards of the people are indicators of measuring social 
justice but the reform programme does not mention them. A reform programme 
that contributes to the overall quality of the life of the people at this level should 
have incorporated these elements so as to build the appropriate and effective 
Ethiopian justice system. 
When the reform programme speaks in terms of global demands for good 
governance, the ROL and legal justice, this formalized liberal conceptions and 
bracketed the issues that the citizen’s prefer most namely social justice, the forum 
for serving it, the outcome namely preventing injustice and serving social justice 
from these forums. As reform programme would then become hegemonic top-
down impositions of identified justice problems and recommended justice 
solutions, justice would then not capture the human dimensions of living, and the 
actual experience of the people on the ground. 
An alternative approach to this hegemonic approach would have been designing a 
counter-hegemonic people-centered institutional reform programme that gave 
priority to justice issues and forums identified and chosen by the people. This would 
give priority to: 
1. Halting impoverishment, alleviating poverty; considering rules and activities 
to the extent of reduction of injustice and serving justice 
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 Paliwala and Kamchedzera :4. Thus the agencies involved include agencies of the UN such as the 
UNDP, UNHCHR, international financial institutions such as the World Bank, organizations of the rich 
nations such as the OECD; and developing country aid donors such as USAID, DFID (UK), CIDA 
(Sweden), SPFG (Spain). 
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2. Enhancing people capability to meeting their very choice of justice and 
forums of serving justice; studying success, failures, capacity and complexity 
of the forums, and designing ways these forums could cohabit while keeping 
their autonomy, 
3. The nature and application of basic and derivative institutions, the way they 
produce injustice or justice individually, and the way justice is being served 
or injustice halted in Ethiopian plural society. 
As indicated in Chapter Three Section 3.1 the World Bank began designing pro-
poor policies. This shift towards greater responsiveness and consultation is most 
welcome as it gives the chance to explore issues of social justice from the 
contributions of decision making bodies towards the improvements of the 
qualities of peoples’ experience and lives. It would be of paramount importance 
to the people that this approach would be bottom-up to emancipate the people 
and fulfill their ambitions. It would give the people a chance to fight any further 
progression towards injustice.  
This desire to consult and be responsive to people’s needs has been reflected in 
the Constitution and the GTP of Ethiopia where it was declared that every 
endeavor in every institution is designed towards allieviating poverty and 
enhancing people’s capability. Pious as this might look it is not reflected in the 
Comprehensive Justice Reform programme that should have been focused on 
the choice of the people at the bottom of the hierarchy. Further the choice 
would have got bigger chance of being realized had the non-formal systems of 
doing justice been given enough space in the reform programme.  
The next chapter explores in more detail the success of the Ethiopian reform 
programme and examines how significant these successes were in progressing 
the agenda of legal and social justice.   
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5 
The Success and challenges of the Ethiopian judicial reform 
programme 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the Ethiopian judiciary operates with 
several key issues which call for its structural reform. Some of those challenges 
have been discussed in Chapters One and Four. With a political willingness to 
reform, the judiciary operates within the opportunities of formation and 
reformation of the justice system. It operates within the global system where 
judicial reform programmes are the spearheaded agenda of Ethiopian international 
partners. The chapter also explored that despite the desire to serve justice in its 
truest sense, namely in a way which the people and the government want, the 
executive direction selected distanced the people from real experiences and their 
everyday lives. One of the key programme directions was to focus on the judiciary 
as learning institution. This was firstly to see if, and how, the courts could learn 
from the non-formal systems towards achieving legal and social justice, and how 
they could expand the delivery of these practices in the long term.  
This chapter examines the profile of cases in the Federal and ANRS courts (to be 
explained in Section 5.1), the challenges in the courts and how this impacts the 
current pursuit of justice. It empirically shows how and to what extent the Ethiopian 
judicial reform was tailored to the Ethiopian context in solving its unique legal 
challenges in the administration of justice. The discussion of this Chapter is based 
on information obtained from the court database, the files examined in the courts, 
information obtained using questionnaires, interviews, observations and focus 
group discussions. As shall be fully indicated in the introduction of the next chapter 
a total of 84 questionnaires, 53 files, 34 informants and 4 focus group discussions 
were administered to get relevant information for this study in nine courts. On 
177 
 
these bases the chapter discusses the achievements and challenges of the Federal 
and ANRS courts while implementing the reform programme. 
It has two main parts and two clusters. Cluster One deals with the performance of 
ANRS courts while Cluster Two deals with the performance of Federal Courts. 
Following a discussion of the demographic and a brief introduction to the judicial 
bodies of the Federal and ANRS Courts, the first part highlights the litigation profile 
of the country.  The litigation profile of the courts is supported by data from the 
court database and helps to explore the performance of the courts and how this 
performance is connected/disconnected to the issues of legal and social justice. The 
performance of the courts creates incentives and disincentives for litigants which 
shall be discussed in this part of the chapter.  
The second part discusses the challenges and opportunities of courts in serving 
legal and social justice. The challenges that the formal courts are facing 
demonstrate that formal courts still have unresolved problems that remain an 
agenda for the future. Finally the chapter discusses the future agenda of courts to 
be followed by a brief conclusion. 
5.1. The Ethiopian Judicial System 
The judiciary of Ethiopia is one of the three branches of Government. As is 
discussed in Chapter One the EFDR Constitution, following the Federal 
arrangement, established a dual formal court structure: Federal and State courts. 
These courts have three tiers: First Instance Courts at the lowest level, High Courts 
in the middle and Supreme Court at the apex of the hierarchy. The Supreme Courts 
have first instance, appellate and cassation jurisdictions in their respective 
jurisdictions. 
Judicial power is vested upon these courts that have ordinary jurisdictions (general 
competence) over civil, criminal and labor matters. The Federal courts apply federal 
laws while regional laws apply both the regional (and federal laws in handling 
federal cases). In a largely civil law country, both of the procedural laws have 
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common law orientations. The courts are subject to no authority but the law.218  
Security of tenure of judges is for 60 years with no possibility of extension.219 
The Constitution does not clearly demarcate matters that fall within the jurisdiction 
of either the Federal or Regional judicial bodies. The jurisdiction of the courts is 
defined by statutes and thus the law establishing the Federal Courts, instead, does 
this demarcation. The Constitution, however, delegates the ANRS Supreme and 
High Courts with Federal High and First Instance Courts powers regarding Federal 
Matters that arise in the Region.220 All other judicial matters are under the 
jurisdiction of the regional court.  
In both the Federal and State courts ordinary jurisdiction is administered by 
professional judges. Judicial posts are assumed by appointment by the respective 
law making bodies (Councils or Parliament). According to Article 11 of Proclamation 
No. 684/ 2010, eligibility for a Federal judicial post requires the judge to be an 
Ethiopian, volunteer to serve as a judge, being 25 years of age or above, commit 
loyalty to the Constitution, have a first degree in law from a recognised university 
with good results, successful result through interviews and examination, have a 
good reputation, diligence, successful completion of a pre-candidacy training course 
and have clear criminal record.221 For the High Court or Supreme Court, a judge 
must have completed 6 and 10 years of service as a judge or in a related practice. 
The Judicial Administration Council recruits candidates and submits the list via the 
Prime Minister to Parliament for appointment.222 
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 Articles 78 and 79 of the 1995 Constitution. 
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 This is unless ajudge resigns of office upon his consent or removed by the parliament from office 
on grounds of breach of discipline or gross incompetency (article 79(4) of the Constitution). 
220
 Article 78(2) of the Constitution. 
221
 See Proclamation No. 223/2015, Zikre Hig, for the ANRS. This is more or less the same in the 
ANRS Courts except that there is no age limitation in the Region. 
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 See Proclamation No. 684/2010 according to which members of the council include the 
presidents of the three courts, vice president of the Supreme Court, three members from the 
parliament, the Minister of Ministry of justice, a judge selected by all the judges, a lawyer appointed 
by the council, a law academic and distinguished citizen appointed by the council (articles 5 and 6 of 
Proclamation No. 684/2010). As per Proclamation No. 209/2014 of the ANRS the ANRS Judicial 
Council is constituted of the President and vice presidents of the Supreme Court, two members from 
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All the First Instance Courts have a single presiding judge whilst all the Supreme 
Courts presided over by at least three judges with greater numbers for cases like 
cassation. The High Courts of the ANRS Courts are presided over by three judges. 
While the civil benches of the Federal High Court are presided over by a single judge 
Criminal benches in cases with the possibility of imprisonment of more than 15 
years are usually presided by three judges.223 While giving recognition to customary 
practices that do not contravene the Constitution, the Constitution also recognizes 
religious and customary courts with jurisdiction on personal matters. These non-
formal courts lack criminal jurisdiction. Below the First Instance Courts (Woreda 
Courts) are also found Social Courts but having no Constitutional recognition.224 
Alongside the formal courts, there are also two tiers of Municipal Courts in Addis 
Ababa that hear appeals from the Social Courts. 
Jurisdiction on matters of the Constitution and Constitutional interpretation is 
under the jurisdiction of the politically constituted House of Federation.225 The 
formal courts lack judicial review power over proclamations passed by the 
legislative body of the state. As far as other laws (including laws by the excutive, 
customary laws, government decisions)are concerned courts power to judicial 
review is further curtailed by Article 3(1) of Proclamation 798/2013 which declares 
that ‘’the unconstitutionality of any law or customary practice or decision of 
government or decision of government official’’ shall only be interpreted by the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry or the House of Federation. 226 While Article 84(2) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Regional Council, one judge from the Supreme Court, two judges from the High Courts, three 
judges from the Woreda Courts, Head of Justice Bureau, one distinguished citizen selected by the 
Council, one lawyer and one member from Women Association (Civic Society). 
223
 This is alleged to compromise justice in the court and a draft proclamation is submitted to the 
parliament to make the Federal High Court an appellate court with a sitting of three judges. 
224
 The ANRS established social courts as per proclamation No. 151/2007. The Social Court judges are 
to be selected in a traditional way, are expected to proceed, summon witnesses and give decision 
based on the tradition of their locality. Thus, it can be said these courts are more of customary than 
formal. 
225
 See article 62 (1), 83(1) and 84 of the 1995 of the Constitution.  
226
 The researcher as president of the FHC and ANRS Supreme Court observed this as a claim by 
judges not to directly apply and give reality to the constitutionaly recognized rights including the 
right to development.  
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of the Amharic version of the Constitution limits the power of the HOF or the 
Inquiry to interpret ‘’law’’ proclaimed by the legislative branch of the government, 
the proclamation (and the earlier proclamation No. 251/2001under article 3(2))  
broadens the scope to include regulations, directives, customs and decisions given 
by the Executive and other branches of the government. Thus the proclamation can 
be said to have limited the courts from interpreting the unconstitutionality of such a 
wide range of laws directly impacting the peoples’ life with a potential to distancing 
them from giving due regard to the right to development as recognized by the 
Constitution. This too however may require Constitutional Interpretation by the 
House of Federation. 
5.2. Relationship between formal and non-formal systems of dispute 
Resolution 
The formal and non-formal systems of dispute resolution mechanisms in Ethiopia 
are connected in various ways. The structure of the courts is discussed in Chapter 1 
but the following discussions indicate the level of connections the courts have at 
different levels.  
After the 1960 Civil Code failed to abolish the non-formal ways of dispute resolution 
mechanisms, different kinds/level of relationships exist between the formal and 
non-formal systems in Ethiopia. For example, while the social courts in Addis Ababa 
are strongly connected to the formal courts in Addis Ababa, the social courts in 
ANRS are loosely connected to the formal courts. The social courts in Addis are fully 
incorporated into the Addis Ababa Municipality Courts. The municipal courts not 
only train and supervise them but also review their decisions. Social Courts in Addis 
Ababa apply traditional mediation mechanisms but are within the Government’s 
lowest administrative (kebele) structure with a right to appeal and lodge cassation 
complaints to Supreme Court. The judges are selected by the local people but 
appointed and disciplined by the government structure.  
The social courts in ANRS are within the lowest level of the Government structure 
but are loosely connected to the formal courts. This makes them more non-formal 
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than formal. Article 9 of Proclamation No. 151/2007 (of ANRS) requires that any 
person assumed competent to be a judge by the people and who volunteers to 
serve the society shall be elected as Social Court Judge. The courts have the 
objectives of realising the rights protected under the Constitution.227 They are 
expected to apply the customary procedural and substantive laws in both civil and 
petty offence cases they handle. The remedy they can award is limited by the 
proclamation.228 The Sharia courts in the Federal and ANRS courts are arranged in a 
more or less similar way. In both the Federal and Regional states they use Islamic 
law for adjudication and civil procedure code for conducting proceedings.229 They 
are recruited by the Islamic Affairs Council, but appointed, promoted, disciplined, 
financed and remunerated by the Judicial Administration Council. Thus these courts 
are incorporated into the formal system to a great extent. 
Other kinds of non-formal dispute resolution mechanisms are connected to the 
formal system on an ad hoc bases. For example, Ye’betezemed Shimigilina (Family 
Council) is connected to first instance (Woreda) courts in handling family cases. The 
courts are expected to send family cases to the council before rendering a decision 
on the merits of the case. The chairperson of the council is selected by both parties 
in common and appointed by the court while the remaining members are 
appointed by the court after being nominated by each party. 
There are also other kinds of non-formal courts that are not legally connected to 
the courts but several courts are connected to them by offering parties with the 
opportunity to use non-formal systems. Parties in litigation will also resort to non-
formal systems when doing so would be cost-effective. The Civil Procedure Code 
(and the Civil Code) under Article 315 and following articles allows arbitration 
                                                          
227
 See article 4 of the Proclamation. Other objectives include creating conditions for solving 
problems of Good Governance, enhance the culture of peaceful neighboring relation of the people 
by settling conflicts through arbitration, mediation and negotiation. 
228
 According to article 12 of the proclamation the power is up to Birr 1500 for any dispute involving 
pecuniary claims of movable property. The Courts have power over petty offences and may order 
apology, compensation to the victim based on local custom and impose fine up to Birr 300 or 
compulsory labor for a period of seven days to a month (see article 15 of the proclamation). 
229
 For example see proclamation No. 188/1999 for the Federal Sharia court. 
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within or without formal courts. In other instances, as shall be explored in the next 
chapter, non-formal systems do operate without being connected to and 
recognised by the formal system. 
 
Chart 1: The structure of Ethiopian Courts and other Decision Making Bodies. 
 
5.3. Selection of research areas 
The research, constrained by time and other resource limitation, tried to select 
areas as representative as possible.230 The study covers the three Federal Courts 
(Lideta FFIC, FHC and Federal Supreme Court), three First instance (hereafter the 
Woreda Courts), two High courts and the Supreme Court of ANRS. These areas are 
selected based on the severity of poverty in the areas and hence the need to do 
social justice, availability of rich sources of information, prior information of sources 
                                                          
230
 More on the method nd methodology is given in Chapter Six. 
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of the areas and availability of judicial training centers and academic institutions. 231  
In these areas the majority and most important players232 of justice in the formal 
and non-formal systems, which handle a huge number of cases, are located. And 
the implementation of the reform programme began there. The areas are also 
convenient for the researcher which provides limitations on time and financial 
while burdened with administrative duties.  
5.4. Litigation profile, type of cases, litigants and performance 
measurement 
5.4.1. Cluster One: The ANRS Courts 
After the implementation of the judicial reform programme the number of cases 
brought to ANRS courts has dramatically increased and is gently on the rise for the 
last five years. With the increase in the number of cases the disposal rate of courts 
also increased. The following table illustrates this fact. 
 
Table 1: Cases lodged and disposed in ANRS Court.233 
Period 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
No. of cases 
Lodged  
494,906 530,939 539,124 571,552 588,504 2,613,275 
Cases Disposed 473,431 507,461 510,139 531,740 553,621 2,578,392 
 
                                                          
231
 See the works of Fassil (2005), Enough with Famine in Ethiopia, A clarion call, Commercial Printing 
enterprise, and the ANRS Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (2015), 2013/14 Budget 
Year Annual Statistics Bulletin. A study by Netsanet Telehymanot (2009), Dynamics of poverty in 
Addis Ababa, FSS Research Report No.3 also indicated that Lideta sub-city of Addis Ababa is the most 
deprived one, p.3.  
232
 The attempt to get key relevant informants (as can be seen in the next chapter) who are rich with 
information from all sides helped a lot in the areas where the size of informants is not large enough.  
233
 Source: ANRS Supreme Court report, 2011-2-15. 
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Figure 1: Table 1 in graphical format. 
 
The table makes it clear that the number of cases brought to the ANRS courts 
reached its peak at the end of 2015. The number of cases brought to the courts of 
the region increased from 494,906 in 2011 to 588,504 in 2015 the difference being 
93,598 cases. 
 
With the demography of the region we can observe that significant number of the 
ANRS population was litigating in each year. The following tables show this 
comparison.  
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Table 2: Demography of ANRS, 2015.234 
Place Population City Rural Area Male Female 
Students 
(Grade 1-8) 
Students 
(Grade9-10). 
        
ANRS 20,018,999 3,126,997 16,892,002 10,011,204 10,007,204 2,066,419 484,733 
NS 2,074,012 324,813 1,749,199 1,067,726 1,006,286 225,638 52,438 
WG 2,474,254 312,221 2,162,033 1,220,477 1,253,774 272,580 59,558 
 
The table shows 84.3% of the ANRS people live in a rural area. The proportion of 
male and female citizens is almost equal, and a significant number of children are in 
elementary schools. If we assume there to be two people involved in a single case, 
as plaintiff and defendant (excluding third party litigants, witnesses in a case, 
families affected by a case), 6% of the population was involved directly with 
litigation in 2015. 
The NS High Court report for the year June 2011 to June 2015 shows that 44,135 
people were involved in 14,022 court cases that are settled through mediation. This 
implies that three people on average were involved in any single case. If we simply 
project this figure for the region at the risk of oversimplification, 1,765,512 (9% of 
the) people were having their days in the courts in 2015. This number totals 
8,175,075 for the year 2011-2015. This implies that 41% of the people were having 
a day in courts within the last five years.235 The court could potentially and 
meaningfully constrain or expand behavior of litigants and the people towards 
social justice in the region. 
The number of cases brought to the court has to be seen in relation to the 
performance of the courts. The following table shows the performance of the ANRS 
courts for the last five years. 
                                                          
234
 Source of date: Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS: (WG stands for West 
Gojjam Administrative Zone, NS stands for North Shewa Administrative Zone). 
235
 The number shows almost half of the population having a day in a court. This is excluding other 
people including extended family members, third parties and witnesses that could directly or 
indirectly be involved and affected in a case. 
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Table 3: Performance of ANRS Supreme, WGHC and NSHC.236 
 
Court 
No. of 
Cases 
No. of 
Disposed 
Cases 
Less than 
6 months 
(%) 
Clearance 
Rate 
Congestion 
Rate 
Total No. of 
Judges 
Case per 
Judge 
Supreme N/A N/A 56.6 N/A N/A 146 N/A 
WG High 43,673 43,071 91.2 98.8 1.06 
728 504 
WG Woreda 323,663 321,154 96.4 99.9 1.01 
NS High 26,405 25,870 95.8 100.3 1.02 
973 314 
NS 
Woreda 
279,650 278,312 99.9 99.7 1.01 
  
The table makes it clear that courts measure their performance based on time and speed 
of performance. In this regard courts are performing well in terms of efficiency. 
Accordingly, 56.6% of the cases in the Supreme Court, 95.8% of the cases in North Shewa 
High Court and 91.2% of the cases in West Gojjam High Courts are disposed in less than 6 
months. For the Woreda Courts the figure is even higher 99.9% for North Shewa and 96.4% 
for West Gojjam. 
The five year reports of the respective courts indicate that for the last five years the 
clearance rate237 for the Woreda Courts range from 99.4% to 102.8%, their performance 
ranges from 96% to 97.7% and the congestion rate ranges from 1.02% to 1.04%. The lowest 
                                                          
236
 Source: Report of ANRS Supreme Court (2011-2015). 
237
 According to the Evaluation Report of ANRS Supreme Court (2015), p.15 the plan was 99.5%, 
95.55% and 92.5% for the Woreda, High and Supreme Courts respectively while the performance on 
average was 100%, 196.9% and 102% respectively.
 
The report for 2015 is for the nine months 
performance of the courts.The evaluation report indicates that the plan was 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 for the 
Woreda, High and Supreme Courts while the performance on average was 1.04, 1.14 and 1.38 
respectively. 
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rate is with the Supreme Court with performance rate of 72.7%, clearance rate of 89.6% 
and the highest congestion rate of 1.40. According to the five-year plan of the courts while 
the expected performance of the Woreda, High and Supreme Courts was 98%, 95% and 
85%, the average achievement was 96%, 87.4% and 72.7% respectively.238 While this is for 
the entire Region, the performance for the three courts is given through the following table 
and figure.  
Table 4: Performance of ANRS Supreme, WGHC and NSHC.239 
 
Year 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
No. of Cases 152,942 168,758 176,290 184,546 128,751 
No of Cases 
Disposed 
144,582 160,228 164,856 166,796 116,128 
Files reopened 17,092 21,640 25,640 27,998 16,658 
No. of Judges 367 416 424 370 267 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
238
 The Evaluation Report, Supra note 18, p.12. 
239
 Source of Date: the ANRS Supreme Court database. 
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Figure 2: Table 4 in graphical format. 
 
The figure makes it clear that the number of cases brought to courts, the disposal rate, the 
number of files re-opened and the number of judges increased dramatically at the 
beginning of the GTP and thenafter it was on the gentle rise. The efficiency is 
commendable despite the decrease in the number of judges in the ANRS Supreme Court, 
WG and NS High courts from 424 to 373 and then to 267.  
This mechanism however does not indicate the quality of court performance. The court 
measures Quality mainly using the amendment or reversal rate by a court higher in the 
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hierarchies.240 The following table shows amendment and reversal rates for 2015. The less 
is the reversal and amendment rate, the higher is the quality.241 
 
Table 5:  Reversal and Amendment Rate of ANRS Courts242 
Court 
Affirmed  
(%) 
 
Reversed 
(%) 
Amended  
(%) 
No. of mobile 
benches 
Cases seen 
By Mobile Benches  
Supreme Court 54.98 20.6 18.7 7 18,867 
NSHC 60.52 17.04 13.28 118 20,110 
WGHC 51.7 17.26 12.04 30 29,718 
Total N/A N/A N/A 155 68,695 
 
The table makes it clear that the higher in the hierarchy the higher the reversal and 
amendment rate. At the beginning of the GTP (2011) the reversal rate of High Courts was 
18.3% and the amendment rate was 9.3%.  After five years the figure is raised to 20.4% and 
11.7% respectively. This indicates a decline in the quality of Woreda Courts performance 
which implies that while the courts perform well in terms of efficiency, their performance 
in terms of quality is low. On the other hand, the Supreme Court reversal and amendment 
rates of 22% and 21.5% in June 2011 have declined to 14.8% and 13.2% in June 2015.243 
This indicates improvement in the quality performance of High Courts.  
The table also indicates that accessibility to the court in terms of the expanding mobile 
benches is appreciable.244 In the region there are a total of 465 mobile benches. The mobile 
                                                          
240
 The evaluation report, Supra note 18, p. 27. 
241
  Ibid.  
242
 Source: ANRS Supreme Court Performance Report for 2015 
243
 As the evaluation report indicated the plan was to keep the rate on average 6% at the end of June 
2015. Compared to this plan the ANRS Courts still need to do more on assuring quality in their 
performance.  
244
  For the last five years (excluding 2007) a total of 215,013 cases were decided by mobile benches.   
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135   
benches operate in a fixed area. This means that one mobile bench covers an area of 
143,152.5sq.m. This accessibility however has to be seen with the geography of the region. 
The statistics of the Bureau shows that major mountains, lakes and rivers of Ethiopia are 
found in this region (and in WG and NS Zones). Both WG and NS are located 1500 meters 
above sea level. WG (covering 13,295.8 sq.m) has 407 kebeles and NS (covering 15,954.9 
sq.m) has 439 kebeles. This geo-geography of the region necessitates the inevitability of 
arranging mobile benches. Thus more effort in democratizing decision making bodies, in 
the content and process of the formal system, more accessibility to the courts, the use of 
tele-conferencing and deployment of the increased use of the non-formal systems of 
dispute resolution was expected. 
5.4.2. Cluster Two: Federal Courts 
Table 6: Federal Courts performance the data for the First Instance Court is only for Lideta 
Branch.245 
 
Court 
Number of cases 
Performance measured using mechanisms 
developed by the reform programme. 
Transferred 
From 
previous yr. 
New Reopened Total 
Clearance 
rate  
Congestion 
rate  
Backlog  
Transferred to 
n/year 
Supreme 2558 57,587 302 60,447 99 1.09 0.09 4606 
FHC 4793 57,180 5472 67,445 94.4 1.14 0.14 8274 
FFIC:Lideta 4039 56,780 20113 80,938 97 1.08 0.08 6095 
 
As the table makes it apparent the clearance rate, congestion rate and backlog of the three 
courts are satisfactorily within acceptable range. Over the last five years filing in the 
Federal courts increased 246 most cases being criminal. Most (28% at FFIC) civil cases are 
disputes between individuals for declaratory judgments. With the increase in the court 
                                                          
245
 Source: Federal Supreme Court, High and First Instance Court (July 2011-July 2015). 
246
 The FSC database for the years 2011-2015. 
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loads, productivity has to increase otherwise backlogs will increase.247 The table makes it 
clear that a large number of files were closed which were re-opened later. Files reopened 
later were the files that were closed without being finished. As identified from the 
database the reasons for reopening a case included demand for recovery of cost of 
litigation, finding of evidence or defendant, appearing at another time, finding of new 
evidence or legal argument. 248 
Table 7: Top Five Civil Federal Cases (2011-2015).249  
Period Court 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
 
 
2011-15 
Supreme Agricultural 
Land 
Property 
(house, land) 
Inheritance Monitory 
Claims 
Enforcement 
of 
Decision FHC Family and 
inheritance 
Labor Monitory 
claims 
Contract Property
 
FFIC Monitory Enforcement 
of decision 
Family Property Inheritance 
 
As the table makes it apparent, agricultural land cases (accounting for 28.5% of all 
the cases) were top in the hierarchy of the Federal Supreme Court. This may be due 
to the huge number of cases coming from the Regional courts in the cassation  
 
                                                          
247
 See also The World Bank (2009), Uses and Users of Courts, Ethiopia. This gives more meaning 
when seen in relation to the number of federal judges. The number of Federal judges for the years 
2012, 2013 and 2014 and 2015 was 180,160 and 228 respectively. The number of cases disposed per 
judge is 587.5, 530 which indicates the decrease in the overall productivity of judges. While the 
number of diploma holders decreased from 3 to 2, the number of judges holding LLB and LLM 
increased. In the 2005 plan every judge was expected to give decision for 66 files per month. The 
2006 and 2007 plans amended this and a judge was expected to give decisions for a number of cases 
depending on the level of courts he/she is in and the type of benches he is presiding over. This 
ranges from 6 to 70 files in a month.  
248
 See that the total number of files reopened for the years 2011-2015 for the Federal Supreme 
Court, FHC and FFIC Lideta Branch was 25,887 which is 12.4% of the cases brought to these courts: 
The Courts database last accessed on August 2/2015. 
249
 Source of date: Federal Courts data base. 
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division of the court. This is followed by property litigations. Monetary claims were 
top in the First Instance Lideta branch while contract and monetary claims were top 
in the Federal High and First Instance Courts. Enforcement of decision is among the 
top cases, being the six in the Federal High Court. 
Some claim that most of these cases have chain effects. Family cases trigger 
company cases while company cases trigger labor cases. For example, money and 
contract cases in the High Court were entertained by the 6th, 7th and 8th civil 
benches of the court. The money cases in the benches pertain to commercial and 
non-contractual liability cases. Out of the decisions given in 2015 by these three 
benches 83 (of 231), 113 (of 368) and 88 (of 301) were brought by private limited 
companies or public company cases.250 Thus private limited and share company 
cases amounted to 31.5% of the disposed cases. An informant in this research told 
me that most company cases pertain to family cases where the desire to divide 
shares arose after divorce is granted in the Federal First Instance Court.251 
The database misses such information. The files also do not tell of this story but the 
researcher has observed these effects from many files whilst working as president 
of the ANRS Supreme Court and FHC. It is thus easy to see that multiple effects of 
divorce cases have not only had on the social fabric but also on the economic 
performance of the country. 
5.5. Challenges of the Formal Courts 
As the tables have made clear, the post reform efficiency for the Federal and ANRS 
Courts has significantly increased acceptably and satisfactorily but this performance 
has to be seen in terms of whether the courts actually served legal or social justice. 
The real experience of litigants on this ground is problematic. When cases are 
                                                          
250
 Source Federal High Court data base, last accessed 12 Aug. 2015. 
251
 Interview with Academic ‘D’ (PhD), University Lecturer and Practicing Lawyer (Former Judge at 
the Federal Courts), 22/9/2015. 
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investigated on a one-to-one base, this performance of the courts may not be as 
satisfactory as the efficiency drivers have indicated in the above tables.  
The database of the courts gives the information indicated above but misses details 
of a case that are found in the file. As most of these details are not accessible to the 
general public, they give individual attention to the details of a case known to them 
and shape their behavior accordingly. In this respect the disposal rate of courts gets 
problematic when cases are seen on such an individual bases. From a one-to-one 
attention to cases, the following table shows how the outcome of a disposed case 
selected randomly is reached in different courts. The tables indicate different 
challenges that the courts face in rendering legal or social justice some of which are 
related to getting decisions, enforcing decisions and high attrition rate of courts. 
These challenges shall be explored below. 
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Table 8: Getting and enforcing decisions: Debre Birhan Woreda Court.252 
File No. 
Amount claimed and 
About(in Birr) 
Cost Incurred 
(in Birr) 
Duration 
Number of 
Adjornments 
Bases of 
Resolution 
(010)10515 
40,000 
(Loan) 
1490.50 8 days 3 N/A 
(010)10433 
3785 
(Equb Money) 
162.50 7 days 2 
Court Decision 
based on 
Admission 
(010)10423 
2856 (Property 
Damage) 
125.50 13 days 5 Mediation 
(010)9863 26,000 (Loan) 
986.50 and 
lawyers fee 
15 days 5 Court Decision 
(010)10424 Family 25 plus 10.50 25 days 8 Mediation 
(010)10384 
70,000 (Family and 
property) 
25 plus 10.50. 54 days 12 Court Decision 
(010)10068 
60,000 (Family and 
Property) 
25 50 days 10 Court Decision 
(010)9396 
Family, 60,000 and 
land 
25 
9 months 
and 
10 days 
25 
Court Decision and 
executed 
(010)9213 Family 25 
6 months 
16 days 
13 Court Decision 
(010) 10781 
Family and  land 
 
25 
5 months 
and 
7 days 
4 Court Decision 
(010) 10668 Family (Liaka case253) 25 
1 month 
and 1 day 
7 Mediation 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
252
 Source files from  courts visited on 22/7/2015 and 18/8/2015. 
253
 This case shall be dealt with in more details at the end of chapter six. 
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It is clear from the table that for the Woreda Court, the minimal amount of judicial 
fee (less than a dollar in family cases) incentivizes the parties to litigate. The table 
makes it apparent that a greater number of cases are completed through 
mediation. The number and duration of adjournment was shorter in cases where 
parties either admit a case or when mediation is involved. With an in increase in the 
kinds of disputed items, though the case is the same, litigation is protracted and 
delayed. Thus, keeping other factors constant, non-reform factors can be seen to 
contributing to the success. 
More or less the same incentives and dis-incentives are observed on the files at 
Bahir Dar Woreda Court. Of the Bahir Dar files randomly and selected and examined 
6 of 14 files were mediated and closed.254  Two of them were closed for non-
appearance. The others three were closed after the liquidator is appointed, divorce 
granted and the money claimed was awarded. 
One of these cases (File number 37093) was a case where a guardian of an insane255 
young man (with severe mental health problems) who had claimed to sell his house 
so that he could get hospitalised and treated. In this case, the witnesses testified 
that the guardian didn’t have enough money to take care of the young man. Based 
on this the court gave the decision in a very short period of time with only 3 
adjournments. This can be said to be efficient. I got the chance to talk to the lawyer 
of the guardian eight months after the file was closed. He did not know if the young 
man had been hospitalized  but told me that the young man was always on the 
streets of Bahir Dar, as he did before the guardian brought the court action. Thus, it 
was difficult to claim that social justice was served in this case. So far he has not 
                                                          
254
 The files are 37903, 38694, 38684, 38681, 36322, 36843, 36821, 36535, 37908, 37904, 38689, 
38690, 36362 and 38691. Six of these files pertain to family cases. One of them pertains to case of 
inheritance, one monetary case and others are property cases. 
255
 Under article 339 of the Ethiopian Civil Code a person in insane when as a consequence of his 
being insufficiently developed or as a consequence of a mental disease or of his senility, is not 
capable to understand the important of his action. 
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been hospitalized and his requests for treatment, his capability of being, have gone 
unanswered.  
Enforcement of decisions too is challenged from several perspectives. Court 
decisions may be enforced either voluntarily or with the help of decision making 
bodies. It is true that many institutions serve to secure property and enforce 
contracts. Some of them entirely non-formal (not relying on Government) and some 
of them are governmental. Economic theory does not tell us which of these 
mechanisms of securing property and enforcing contracts is the best, and in reality 
they are all far from perfect. As private enforcement may degenerate into violence, 
enforcement by the government may be ‘captured and corrupt’. Economists have 
been generally most optimistic about courts as institutions of security and have 
devoted little attention to analysing their limitations (Shleifer et al 2003: 453). The 
following discussions indicate the involvement of their limitations with respect to 
enforcement of decisions. 
As indicated above enforcement of decisions is one of the most frequently 
entertained cases in the courts. After a case been disposed the Ethiopian Civil 
Procedure Code requires a second separate litigation action to enforce decisions. 
Further the Ethiopian reform discussed in Chapter Four requires the establishment 
of a separate department to the enforcement of decisions. This has been 
established in the federal courts. The ANRS courts have none.256 One of the reasons 
parties prefer courts to non-formal ways of doing justice has been due to the better 
enforcement of decisions. Despite that the files in the table indicated that 
enforcement of decisions is not as efficient as giving decisions is. In most of the 
cases judgment creditors did not move to enforce the decisions and the status of 
enforcement is unknown.257 In some cases it was difficult and inefficient without 
                                                          
256
  In the Federal Courts the court that gave the decision receives application for the execution of 
the decision and gives an order to execution department to complete the execution. In the ANRS 
courts the same court that gave the decision complete the execution. This is in accordance with 
article 371 of the civil procedure code. 
257
 File No. (010)10515, (010)10424, (010)10424, (010)10068 and (010)10781. 
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the involvement of non-formal systems. Appellate Courts have also suspended 
enforcement of decisions which decision they finally affirm.258 There has also been 
the possibility of closing a file without execution being finished.259 In one of the 
cases two sheep, whereupon injunction order was given, were dead pending 
enforcement of the decision.260 These facts are problematic as they put a court 
decision in to jeopardy thereby increasing the risk involved in contract. Getting and 
enforcing decisions becomes more problematic as the amount in dispute gets 
higher. The following tables from the ANRS Supreme Court and Federal High Court 
data indicate how enforcement gets tougher when the amount involved gets 
higher.  
                                                          
258
 File No. 9863 and 10384. Interview with Academic ‘B’, University Lecture and Practicing lawyer, 
Former Judge at the ANRS Supreme Court, 19/8/2015 also revealed that appellate courts finally 
affirm the lower courts decision. This makes the suspension meaningless.  
259
 File No.10423, 9213 and (010)10668. 
260
 File No.9396. 
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Tablw 9: Getting decisions: ANRS Supreme Court.261 
 
File No. Claim Amount Duration 
No. of 
Adjournments 
Bases of Resolution 
308884 
1,374,014.85 ETH for 
Boodily injury) 
74,014.85 ETB 
(general damages) 
 
2 years and 
10 months 
14 
Shimigilina 
(settled 
for 50,000 ETB
262
 
Shimigilina 
32706 Land possession dispute 
3 months 
and 22 days 
4 Shimigilina 
Left to Land 
Administration 
Authority 
30789 
1,706,494.91 ETB  
(Contract of Sale) 
4 years 54 
Mediated for 
1,074,631.09 ETB 
Mediated after 
cassation 
31799 
783,332.70 ETB for 
bodily innjury) 
2 years and 
10 months 
19 
Shimigilina for  
55,000 ETB. 
Excuted 
immeditaly. 
35101 
1,055,500.00 ETB for 
Damage claim for 
negligencet homicide) 
N/A 15 Mediation 
Shimigilina and 
settled for 
35,000 Birr 
35081 Inheritance dispute N/A N/A N/A Shimigilina 
34795 Paternity dispute N/A N/A N/A Shimigilina 
34588 
Land 
 
2 months  and 
15 days 
N/A N/A 
Shimigilina 
 
39811 inheritance 11 mths and   Sent back for 
  15 days   retrial. 
 
The table makes it clear that efficiency is problematic at the ANRS Supreme Court. It 
is also clear that the involvement of non-formal ways of settlement is visible in a 
number of cases at the apex of courts. In most of the cases parties, after prolonged 
adjournments, resort to non-formal ways of dispute resolution and mediate for a 
lesser amount.    
The table also makes it clear that some of the cases are closed but unfinished. For 
example, File Number 39811 is sent back for a retrial while file number 32706 gave 
judicial power to land authorities which may be against the very purpose of 
litigation. This may leave parties at the mercy of the land authority that litigants 
might be fighting against. 
                                                          
261
 Source: Files visited on 17/8/2015-19/8/2015 
262
 This is one kind of informal system of dispute resolution. Chapter six shall discuss the details 
about it. 
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5.5.1. Getting and Enforcing Decisions: The Federal High Court 
As per Proclamation No. 25/1996 dictates the most important national cases are 
tried by the Federal High Court.263 Owing to the large amount of money involved 
and the complexity of the cases, both getting and enforcing decisions are 
problematic in the court. As indicated above the Civil Procedure Code requires 
Judgment creditor to reopen the ‘’dead’’ file for the enforcement of the decision. In 
this respect the practice is in tune with this procedural dictates. As Table 7 indicated 
the enforcement of decisions ranked as one of the top five cases in the Federal 
courts but it was the most problematic as a result a significant amount remain 
unenforced. The database does not show the exact figure in this respect and there 
is no mechanism to visualise post decision status of the parties, and hence 
realisation of social justice. The following table shows the prevalence of the 
challenge.  
                                                          
263
 These include crimes against the state, the constitution, foreign states, the tax system, forgery, 
the security of states, diplomatic cases, substance abuse, and crimes between religious or ethnic 
groups. Civil cases include Federal cases worth Birr 500,000 and above, nationality issues, cases of 
foreigners, negotiable instruments, banking and insurance cases, habeas corpus cases and 
Intellectual property cases. For the details see proclamation Nos. 25/1996, 321/2003, 138/1999, 
254/2001 and 454/2005. 
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Table 10: Table 7 Getting and Enforcing Decisions in tabular format.264  
File No.  Amount Claimed and for. Duration 
No. of 
Adjournments 
Bases of 
Resolution  
130542 
3,493,577.93 ETB  
(Contract of Sale) 
2 years and 4 Months  22  
Award  
1,846,000 ETB  
138582 
793,792.95 ETB(Contract of 
Sale) 
3 Months and 21 Days 6 Claim Granted 
138542 
3,009,257.75 ETB  
(Guarantee) 
5 months and 5 Days  7 
Case lifted and 
closed. 
138490 
13,252,236.51ETB 
Construction Case) 
6 Months and 12 Days  6 
Award 
6,419,526.01 ETB  
116843 
1,190,838 ETB  
(Construction Case) 
2 Years and 36 Days  
 
27 
Award 
1,259,754.15 ETB  
138127 
655,162.40 ETB  
(Property Damage) 
1 Year an 11 Months  21 Claim Granted 
138244 
2,245,520.95 ETB 
(Property Damage) 
6 Months  5 Claim Granted 
111397 
1,640,743ETB  
(Loan) 
3 Years and 9 Months 
(including Cassation)] 
 
N/A 
Mediated after 
Cassation 
117028 
886,832 ETB  
(Carriage) 
2 Years and 4 Months  N/A Mediated 
 
As can be seen from the table both efficiency and enforcement of decisions, hence 
legal and social justice, is problematic.265 The table makes it apparent that the 
higher the litigation rate the more difficult getting decision. The files did not show if 
parties moved to enforce the decree as a result of which the status of the 
enforcement is not known at the time the files were visited.266 Contrary to getting 
                                                          
264
 Source: files of FHC visited 22 Sep. 2015 015. 
265
 This holds true for the other files that are consulted but not indicated in the table. These files 
111479, 111343, 108085, 111397, 117028, 111474, 116905, 128174, 125370, 138706, 134543, 
138468,111501, 125454, 138843, 134547 and 116905 also witness the same challenges as those in 
the table went through. 
266
 The files were visited from 22 Sep. 2015-26 Sep. 2016, Addis Ababa.  
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the award and realising the capability of doing,267 judgment creditors incurred 
additional costs (impoverished to that extent) after ended up as winners. For 
example, the winner in file No. 138582 claimed 66,353.51 ETB as a cost incurred in 
the process of litigation and was awarded 39,689.51 ETB.268 
Both the Regional and Federal files indicated that when the enforcement of 
decisions begins the real battle too begins. Judges informed me that there are many 
challenges in the enforcement of decisions and in the process courts face many 
obstacles. Accordingly, judgment debtors deploy various techniques to paralyze the 
execution. Debtors hide property, refuse to pay, protest against the value of asset, 
try (and at times commit) bribery, cause third party interference in the process as 
right bearers, conspire during auction, avoid asset (seizing, valuing, sale), use other 
dilatory techniques (including appeal, interest, calculation of debt, other creditors 
(government or custom authority), claim insolvency or refute the validity of the 
decision during execution.269 The winner could not control all these and would be 
forced to litigate vigorously. Thus enforcement in most cases requires more time 
and effort than obtaining the initial judgment. 
                                                          
267
 In this respect the researcher has a shocking experience when he visited one of the prison houses 
in Addis Ababa having more than 10,000 prisoners. At the conclusion of the visit the researcher 
chaired a meeting with the representatives of the justice organs where the prisoners unanimously 
and bitterly stated that the government thinks that they were being rehabilitated when they actually 
were released after being sardined. If so enforcement in criminal cases is not realizing the capability 
of the state and the prisoners. 
268
 Compensation to an amount of 345,857 ETB was also claimed in File No. 111397. The winners 
were awarded 135, 372 ETB on File No. 138490, 57,486 ETB on File No. 116843, 229,602.80 ETB on 
File No. 138127 and 352,337 ETB on File No. 138244 as costs incurred in the process of litigation. 
These costs are huge for a poor country. None were enforced at the time of the visit. The costs are a 
double blow to the winners who happened to be technically winners but losers in real terms. 
269
 Interview with Judges R (A judge at the civil bench of the Federal High Court, served as a judge for 
more than 10 years) and Judge S (judge at the civil bench of the Federal First Instance Court, served 
as a judge for 6 years). A judge at the Federal Cassation Bench, judge Q who served as a judge for 
more than 23 years also shared these views. Other factor like lack of clarity in writing judgments was 
also noted as a challenge by the execution department when the 2014 budget year court 
performance was evaluated by all Federal Judges. 
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Enforcement was one of the top five cases270 in the courts but the files, at the time 
of being consulted, did not show the completion of the enforcement. That may be 
one reason why enforcement of cases ranked one of the top five cases in the 
Federal Supreme Court too. The more enforcement of decisions is appealed, the 
higher the rate of inefficiency in courts performance making neither the entry nor 
the exit to litigation easy. 
5.5.2. Attrition rate of Courts 
Though the disposal rate of court is significantly large, this does not necessarily 
mean legal justice (and social justice) is served to the litigants. In both the Federal 
and ANRS Courts a significant number of cases are closed without being decided or 
judged. For example, in 2011 the ANRS Justice Bureau report indicated that  of the 
33,894 and 8632 cases prosecuted at Woreda and High Courts 1249 (5.2%) and 827 
(13.13%) respectively are prematurely closed for either the witnesses or defendants 
did not appear before the courts. There are many reasons for their non-appearance 
but reasons identified by the ANRS Justice Bureau (Dessie 2004: 167-172) include:  
1. Delays in court including the adjournments of cases without hearing 
witnesses  
2. Lack of interest in testifying (unless for a close relative): due to lack of trust 
on courts and lack of trust on prisons as places of rehabilitation 
3. Choice by victims of non-formal forums to settle their cases 
4. lack of a witness protection scheme 
5. Fear of forced seclussion from social ties (edir, senbetie, debo)271 
6. Presence of individuals escaping justice without being held accountable  
7. Unpredictability on the part of the justice system 
                                                          
270
 The same is true for the ANRS courts. The Gera Keya Woreda Court report for the year 2010-2015 
indicates this fact. 
271
According to Woldemichael, Haile (1973), Social and Economic impediments in Ethiopia (PHD 
dissertation), UTAH, these are traditional, social and economic institutions and cooperatives in 
Ethiopia. Haile examined the different kinds of social, customs and economic practices that impede 
social and economic development in Ethiopia. 
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8. Migration in search of jobs 
9. Low level of allowance for witnesses (almost 1 USD a day)  
An effective judicial reform has to increase the probability apprehension, 
deterrence rate, highest marginal productivity and confidence in business. Despite 
that the list of problems identified by the Bureau indicates that defendants and 
witnesses weigh the pros and cons of the formal systems. They calculate the 
expected cost of committing a crime multiplying the probability of being 
apprehended by one or more of the variables in the list. This makes victims (and the 
government) incapable of realising their capability of getting decisions (of doing) 
towards the fulfillment of one of their basic needs-justice. Furthermore the Federal 
Court report demonstrates that a huge number of cases were closed without 
getting a final decision. To the extent that significant number of cases are closed 
without being finished (prevalence of high attrition rate), legal and social justice 
would remain un-realised by the formal system.272 
5.5.3. Challenges of the Litigation Process 
Countries inherited formalized or strict procedures from countries like UK or France 
either by conquest or colonization.273 In the Ethiopian case chapter one indicated 
                                                          
272
 This compromises party’s right to access justice as granted under article 37 of the 1995 
Constitution. 
273
 See Shleifer et al (2003) Courts, Supra note, 51, P. 51.
 
See Shleifer et al (2003) Courts, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.118, No.2, p. 507. According to Ahleifer Montesquieu held that 
‘’judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, 
incapable of moderating either its force or rigor” As it is held that ‘’form is the sworn enemy of 
arbitrary rule, the twin sister of liberty”, non-formalism is associated with vulnerability to subversion 
by the powerful. Thus the desire to control court outcomes, and lack of trust on courts, forces law 
makers to design heavy-going procedures that the courts should follow. That is why the French 
revolution and Napoleon did not trust judges and codified procedural laws to control judicial 
discretion, all inclusive, as a guarantee of freedom. It can thus be argued that greater formalism in 
some countries can reduce error, advance benign political goals, and protect the judicial process 
from subversion by powerful interests. In such cases greater formalism is an efficient adaptation to a 
weaker law and order environment (Shliefer et al 2003: 460). 
 
Research also revealed that countries that have inherited legal systems with heavily formalised 
dispute resolution end up with lower quality of legal systems, at least for simple disputes. It can thus 
be argued that extreme legal or practical formalism brings extreme cost and delays, unwillingness by 
potential participants to use courts, discourages litigation and forces litigants to resort to other 
primarily ignored forums. Extreme formalism could thus reduce litigant material benefit and be a 
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that Ethiopian inherited procedural laws. Litigation is mainly channeled by the Civil 
and Criminal Procedure Codes. In both cases oral litigation is the mainstream 
litigation.274 The general rule in the codes is that litigations pass through ordinary 
procedures leaving expedited procedures as exceptions.275 
As procedure is a means to an end it should, as far as possible, be as simple as 
possible. In this respect ordinary procedures in civil litigation include exchange of 
pleadings, first hearing (to frame issues), second hearing and a judgment. With the 
exception of some preparatory works (for example, exchange of statement of 
defense that can be done by administrative staff (registrar of a court), all are done 
by the sitting judge. In criminal trials the litigation is simpler as the code envisages 
continuous and preliminary oral events that include preparatory matters, trial and 
judgment.  
The litigation diagram for civil and criminal litigation: 
Figure 3: Civil litigation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
potential source of injustice. On the other hand, the judges in the UK were assumed to be on the 
right truck as a result of which the political process accommodated great and more judicial 
independence. Thus the common law was accommodated which placed less emphasise on 
formalism. 
274
 Exceptions include statements of claim and criminal charges that need to be submitted in a 
written form. 
275
 Exceptional procedures include summary and accelerated in civil litigations and special 
procedures for offences like petty offences and the real time dispatch practice currently adopted in 
criminal litigations.  
Exchange of 
Pleadings 1
st Hearing 2
nd Hearing Judgment 
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Figure 4: Criminal litigation. 
 
 
 
The figures show the three phases in litigation: the procedure till the case is ripe for 
a decision, the time to render decisions and rendering decision. The enforcement of 
decisions also passes through the same three steps. This generally does not 
discourage litigation. However, the practice in courts deviates from these 
procedural imperatives and fall short of the codes expectation.  
Adhering to laws is one of the reasons motivating reforms discussed in the previous 
chapter. The files examined in the field research reveal that the litigation processes 
largely rely on written submissions, fragmented, detracted by interlocutory 
submissions and less continuous. This is so if litigation in practice is mostly led by 
the party’s in litigation rather than being led by the judges. The files examined show 
a cumbersome procedure (though not necessarily complex) employed in the courts. 
Judicial reform programme can relieve this source of injustice by taking lessons 
from other systems with a reduced and less cumbersome formalism. Other reforms 
redesigning workflows or processes could redesign and ease the process. 
In addition to the files that I have seen in the courts my observation in the courts 
demonstrate that in significant number of civil cases first and second hearings are 
lumped together. At the hearing stage parties in some cases simply read their 
statement of claim and defense. 276 By the same token the most important part in 
the criminal process at the trial stage happened to be dry, recording machines 
simply recording or registered what a witness narrates. 
                                                          
276
 These are two separate stages where the court hears to frame issues and hear or receive 
evidence based on the issues (See articles 241, 249 and 257 and following articles of the civil 
procedure code). Under the criminal procedure code trial is continuous (articles 123-149 of the Code 
indicate this fact). 
Preparator
y Matters 
Trial Judgmen
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5.5.4. Challenges regarding the free movement of property. 
A free market economy cannot exist without free flow of property, finance and 
labor. In this respect the way courts handle assets freezing or unfreezing bear an 
impact on realising social justice. Courts have power to give a temporary 
injunction277 order as per Article 154 of the Civil Procedure Code if property is 
damaged in various forms with an effect to impoverishing a litigant. Developmental 
as the article may be or construed to be, the practice is not always so. My informant 
told me that frivolous litigations (let alone genuine ones) are freezing assets worth 
millions and all procedural designs to protect this are practically made shaky at a 
frustrating rate.278 The procedural codes demand proves by way of affidavit to show 
the damage. Despite that the courts in most cases give injunction soon they receive 
statements of claim. My informant279 stated that the moment litigation starts 
plaintiffs bring affidavits to freeze assets of defendants and courts grant the order 
automatically. Most benches have developed templates to facilitate this. The files 
examined demonstrate injunction orders given on houses, machineries and other 
immoveable properties. 280  The injunction orders were not set aside at the 
                                                          
277
 According to article 154 of the Civil Procedure Code this is an order given to restrain a party from 
doing a particular act or requiring him to do such an act. This will be given where action taken with 
respect to property will prejudice the other party or where in a suit to restrain the breach of contract 
or the commission of an act the defendant is threatening to breach the contract or do the act 
pending litigation. As per the article the court has to be convinced that the applicant has prima facie 
case that protection is necessary so that the applicant will not suffer irreparable injury.  
278
 Interview with ex-Judge ‘A’, ex-head of Federal Courts, 4/10/2015.  
279
 Interview with Retired Judge ‘A’, Supra note 8. The researcher as ex-president of the ANRS and 
FHC also observed same practice. 
280
 When the non-formal system tries not to disconnect parties from the market and the social circle 
he is in, the formal system does not always operate so. In criminal cases public prosecutors argues 
against bail rights of defendants which in principle and in practice freezes people (Interview with 
retired judge ‘A’, Supra note 57). If Injunction is not administered as per the civil procedure code it 
negatively impacts the economy of the country. In one case court made an injunction order on 
money in all accounts of the defendant in Banks which collapsed the construction of Ashegoda Wind 
Farm-now generating 120 MW the largest of its kind in Africa. The injunction was latter set aside 
when the judge found that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case. In another case the 
Construction of stadium in A.A capable of holding 60,000 persons was suspended as a result of an 
injunction. In this case too the court was found to lack jurisdiction at the end of the day. In another 
case an injunction order was given on the money and assets of a judgment debtor (monetary claims 
and has nothing to do with the dam) which oosed a great treat to the construction of the Great 
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conclusion of the case and some have even lasted until the cases were disposed at 
the cassation bench of the Federal Supreme Court. For instance the case in File No. 
111397 has ended on erq at the Federal Cassation bench on 28 July 2015 and the 
suspension was lifted only on 29 July 2015.281 Neither of the properties so frozen 
was sold at auction to effectuate enforcement of decision. 
Problems of this kind arise as a result of inefficiency in courts which according to 
one judge interviewed as part of this research one source of possible delay in courts 
is the process by which defendants or third parties began to lodge complaints in 
order to get the injunction order set aside. 282  This diverts efforts in getting the 
main issues resolved towards interlocutory matters and de-capacitates people and 
assets which is a big damage to a poor country like ours.283  
5.5.5. Challenges in measuring quality. 
The performance measurement mechanisms of the court did not show whether 
legal justice or social justice was being served. The mechanisms mostly measure the 
efficiency of the courts and give us the general picture of the courts’ judcial 
performance. The database generates numerical reports including number of cases, 
the date it is opened, the date of closure, number of adjournments, period of 
disposition and the bench handling the case, clearance rate and similar items. Most 
measurements are general and numeric and did not show the individual attention 
the court gave to each case. Numbers tell much but not all. The emphasis on basic 
needs and standards of living demands measurement beyond numeracy. From 
these perspectives the reports or the data bases of the courts are of little help. 
Government organs entrusted with the administration of the courts have not 
developed ways to assess whether social justice has been served by the courts or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam-currently under construction on Blue Nile River and expected to 
generate 6,450 MW upon completion. 
281
  It lasted nearly for four years without purpose. 
282
 Interview with Judge ‘B’, a senior judge at the ANRS Supreme Court, Preside over the Cassation 
Bench, 19/10/2015. 
283
 Interview with Retired judge A, Supra note 57.  
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not. The Judicial Administration Council and the plenum of the Supreme Courts that 
monitors the overall performance of the courts nor the Parliament to whom the 
courts are accountable assure the prevalence of social justice on a one-to-one 
base.284 No other organ assures the quality of their performance. The very laws 
establishing the court did not entrust them with the power to set such standards.285  
Accordingly, the courts themselves are in charge of both developing and testing 
quality of court performances. In addition to measuring mechanisms discussed 
above currently the FSC endorsed indicators to assess the quality of federal courts 
performance. This mechanism measures volume of work, efficiency, cost and 
quality of service. Quality indicators pertain to impartiality, equality, independence, 
professionalism, case flow management, reversal rate, consistency, rule of law, 
trust and confidence (FSC 2015:1). Despite that the five year evaluation report 
stated that these indicators were not implemented.286 
5.5.6. Seeing opportunity as challenge 
As indicated above the courts have opportunities that may be utilised to serve 
social justice. Among these opportunities the increase in litigation and trainings 
given will be discussed in brief. In Chapter One it was indicated that no one could or 
                                                          
284
 Other ad hoc organs including the National Steering Committee (earlier chaired by the president 
of the court), the Cluster (Replacing the former National Steering Committee of Reform programme) 
and composed of same members but chaired by the Minster of Ministry of civil service too did not 
follow the very day to day operations of the courts. 
285
 The ANRS Courts Re-Establishing proclamation No. 169/2002 and 223/2015 (except stating that 
the regional courts shall be efficient, effective and accessible based on rule of law, transparency and 
accountability) also has the same arrangement but the plenum had none of its meetings. Members 
of the Plenum are President of the Supreme and High Courts and Judges of the Regional Supreme 
Court (For further details see article 28, 29, 30 of Proclamation No. 223/2015 of the Region). Federal 
heads of courts (not willing their names be mentioned) are not sure if the plenum had more than 
one of its meetings (and do not remember the agenda) so far. As per article 32 of Proclamation No. 
25/1996 members of the plenum of the Federal Supreme Court include President and vice-President 
of the Supreme Court and judges of the Supreme Court, Presidents of the FHC and FFIC and the 
Regional Supreme Courts. Under article 33 the plenum is entrusted with: the power to deliberating 
on problems in the administration of justice, the power to approving directives that help to improve 
the judicial practice of the federal courts and the power to performing other functions that help the 
judiciary to be efficient and strong. 
286
 Five years evaluation report of Federal Courts, 2015: So far the courts largely depend on the 
reversal and amendment rate to sense quality of justice. This may be helpful in indicating the level of 
internal coherence between courts, but remain short of assuring quality in the Ethiopian context. 
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would be indifferent as far as question of justice was concerned or the more 
important question of injustice. Furthermore, people increasingly present their 
cases to the courts in the hope of getting their social, political, and economic 
problems resolved. Despite the courts gradualist and individualist approach to 
realise justice, an increase in litigation is a great opportunity to shape so many lives 
beyond the litigants. Most of the cases are disposed of in less than six months. This 
is another opportunity for the courts to reduce further disputing and have fewer 
cases at their disposal and gear efforts towards quality. Most cases are similar and 
repetitive so that it will be an added advantage to fair and equal dispensing of 
justice and shape the behavior of the potential parties to similar litigation. 
However, judges and lawyers view the increase in litigation as a hindrance to the 
speedy resolution of disputes. Moreover, the increase in litigation is viewed as 
increasing the possibility of corruption as a means to get speedier arrangements or 
decisions. Owing to this, professionals and the people talk about the prevalence of 
delay, corruption,287 and nepotism on the part of the courts. Be this real or simply 
something perceived the perception cannot out rightly be rejected. If this 
evaluative judgment persists when courts are congested but dispose cases within a 
short period of time, then the courts need to address the root cause of the problem 
and be more accountable, accessible and transparent in their achievements. 
The increase in the volume is also a challenge to courts where there is shortage of 
judges, where the most experienced judges leave the courts and join the bar. As 
Table 4 demonstrated the number of judges in the ANRS Supreme Court, WG and 
NS High courts decreased from 424 to 373 and then to 267 within the last three 
years. This will be challenging when the appointment process to replace judges 
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 In 2014 two judges from the FHC and FFIC are sentenced to 8 years rigorous imprisonment for 
committing corruption. On the other hand the ANRS evaluation report indicates that 16 judges are 
dismissed and 51 judges are penalized with money up to 4 months of their salary (The report, 2015 
Supra note 18, p.26, 36). Besides that the corruption perception of the people is more damaging 
than the reality in the courts (CIDA, (2008), Independence, Transparency and Accountability in the 
Judiciary of Ethiopia. 2008). 
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takes not less than a year.288 The experienced judges could have ended up in being 
good lawyers in serving justice in its true sense had the atmosphere of the bar 
would have been comfortable to this positive connection.289 These two facts are not 
in tune with the dictates of a developmental state.290 
5.5.7 Challenges in the competitiveness of non-formal decision making 
bodies  
The judicial performance of the courts discussed above indicates that the sector 
operates in the midst of many challenges and opportunities: the non-formal sector 
being one of them. As explained above most litigants in Ethiopia utilize the non-
formal system of dispute resolution under the impression that it is efficient and 
benefits both litigants so that no party lose out at the end of the litigation. 
Beginning from ancient time’s courts used to refer court cases to non-formal 
systems for better outcomes. This is a good opportunity as well as a challenge to 
courts who can, as ‘’learning institutions’’, take good lessons from the non-formal 
sector. 
Currently courts in Ethiopia are implementing the Business Process Reengineering 
(hereafter BPR). One of the reasons why the BPR is introduced in the court is that 
courts are functioning in an atmosphere of fierce competition.291 The competition 
                                                          
288
 The Regional Council meets twice in a year and so far appoints judges once in a year. Federal 
Judges are also appointed once in a year for years now.  
289
 Interview with Academic ‘A’, University Law Lecturer, Former Judge at the ANRS Supreme Court, 
Bahir Dar, 21/10/2015.  
290
 Other challenge also pertains to training given. The reports of both courts indicated many training 
(some of them sudden) given to judges. The opportunity that this training gives to make judges able 
ones towards enhancing the capability of parties has not always been positively accepted by the 
judges. These training to a large extent are quality and service oriented so that they pave the way 
towards securing social justice. Contrary to this judges have the impression that most training, 
though good, are unplanned and interrupt the usual judicial business and create court arrears on its 
part.
290
 When opportunities are viewed as mere challenges realisation of justice would be distanced. 
 
291
 See Ministry of Capacity Building, Business Process Reengineering (2014: 5) which states that 
other reasons include change and customer need of courts. As far as courts are concerned these 
same issues were the overall objective of the BPR. The reengineering is believed to change the way 
courts process cases so that every change to this effect is introduced. Thus the reengineering tacitly 
replaced the reforming. 
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between different forums amounts to alluding the existence of different forums 
claimed to render quality judicial service at the right time and in the right way. In 
this respect a competent decision maker expands the real freedoms of the people 
by meeting basic needs and standards of living and meets parties and constitutional 
expectations more effectively than other decision makers. 
Competitiveness in the decision making can be measured using quality of service, 
productivity of courts (such as services produced per unit of courts human, capital 
and other resources) cost of delivery of service and time of rendering service. 
Competitiveness can be measured using factors of case disposal, the demand for 
the services of decision making bodies, and the conditions in the nation governing 
the creation, organisation and management of formal and non-formal systems and 
the nature of domestic rivalry and the extent to which these bodies are available 
locally. Certainty and predictability to win a case, Government factors and a culture 
of litigation do also determine the fitness in the bodies. 
Informants to this research have stated that the non-formal system has competitive 
advantages with respect to low cost service, quality service, trust, respect, lasting 
solutions and in rectifying the wrongs of the formal system.292  Despite competitive 
advantages over reform achievements the formal system lacks competitiveness on 
these points. While the people demand justice in its true sense the legal history of 
Ethiopia and researches reveal that the courts were not well reputed in this respect 
(CIDA 2008).293 This is one of the reasons for choosing the non-formal system for 
resolution. As will be discussed in the next chapter, a significant number of judges 
and professionals also prefer non-formal systems. 
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 Interview with academic A, University Lecturer and Practicing lawyer, 21/10/2015; Academic B, 
University Law Lecturer and Practicing Lawyer, 19/8/2015 and judge B, a senior judge at the ANRS 
Cassation Bench, 19/10/2015.  
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 This is a study by the National Judicial Institute for the Canadian International Development 
Agency (2008) on the Independence, Transparency and Accountability in the Judiciary of Ethiopia.  
CIDA agreed to conduct an assessment and prepare action plan on these areas. It was commissioned 
by the FSC who in turn was commissioned by the National Justice Steering Committee to commission 
the study. This research indicated that Ethiopian courts are negatively perceived, P.195. 
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5.5.8. Establishment of other formal institutions 
As the legal history and the earlier discussions made it clear the competition 
between the formal and non-formal system is fierce. So the formal system needs so 
much flexibility in its process, so much productivity in its outcome and so much 
innovation in its process and ends. Much effort in improving the courts is expected 
from the Government.  
Despite that the Government’s current move in establishing other bodies with 
judicial power poses a significant threat to the very purpose of courts existence. 
Besides parties desire to resorting to non-formal sectors the legislative effects or 
Governments resort to establishing other decision making bodies (for example the 
recent establishment of patent courts, unfair trade practice tribunals-taking almost 
all tort cases from the formal courts)294 are not to the benefit of the court’s 
competitiveness. This may diminish the trust and power of the courts in the future 
and disputants might be pulled in many directions in search for justice. The locus of 
justice will be in the multiple justice sectors (local, private and government regimes) 
and this further complicates the existing legal problems.295 
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 A research by Yosef (2014), Bethiopia Yeseber Sir’eat Ymecheresha Wusani, The Cassation 
Question in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa University School of Law. Yosef identified 16 (later 17) decision 
making channels from which the FSC Cassation bench receives cassation complaints. See also 
proclamation No. 410/2004 (as amended in 2014) and establishing Proclamation No. establishing 
through which See proclamations No. 685/2010.  
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 This is apparent marginalization on the legal profession and another impediment to realizing legal 
and social justice.    
Other competitive advantages of the formal system include the following.  1/ Supply side of 
Litigation: In terms of what courts employ and pay (professionals and skilled man power), high 
technology to monitor performances and resources (infrastructure, administrative, information 
infrastructure, scientific and technological infrastructure) courts excel informal system. Imputes of 
courts like the number of cases brought to the courts (demand for justice), the numbers disposed by 
the courts, the number of judges and other staffs, the educational level of the judges, the number of 
training given to the judges and the budget of the courts excel the informal system. This potentially 
could make courts competitive and excel in performance. The increase in imputes, however, is not 
equally matched by an increase in the productivity of the courts. 2/ Related and Supporting Sector of 
Justice: The external connection that courts have with other bodies also influences the choice of 
forums. The more courts are connected to the external sectors (the public included), the more the 
opportunity to render quality justice. This is so in so far as the external tie does not compromise the 
independence of the judiciary. In this respect the courts effort to celebrate ‘’justice week” for the 
last five years and the joined up committees at various levels (reform steering committees), are 
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5.5.9. Challenges posed by change instruments 
As explained above the Federal Courts and ANRS have introduced various change 
instruments within a decade to this effect. The instruments multiplied and 
intensified efforts to reform the system from various angles. In addition to those 
discussed above the emerging change instruments include quick wins, the BPR (as 
of 2006), the team Charter (as of 2012), Citizens Charter (as of 2012) and the 
Balanced Score Card (BSC) (as of 2011).296  
Ethiopian judiciaries function under severe restraints on. The judiciary suffers from 
dismal conditions of service, staff shortages, a lack of adequate training, debilitating 
infrastructure and logistical problems (Wordl Bank 2004: 10). This has been so after 
the 2015 evaluation.297 Accordingly, the World Bank (2004: 10) recommended that 
‘’capacity building and reform should be staged or sequenced to reduce the 
potential for overburdening the sector’s institution”. 
However later efforts to reorganise the work flow of the courts became 
complicated and fragmented due to the extensive reforms so far exerted. The 
effects of the recently introduced change instruments neutralise the success of the 
reforms. For example, the introduction of BPR in 2013 diluted and took over the 
judicial reform programme.298 BPR meant changing the status quo, starting over 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
good beginnings towards benefiting from the external connections. This is a good opportunity for 
the courts but unless properly utilized is a challenge as well. 
296
 These change Instruments include: Court Administration Reform programme (CARP 1997-1999)-
study and piloted by the Federal Supreme Court; Court Administration Reform Programme (1999-
2004)-replicating CARP 1 in ANRS and Benishangul Gumuz Regions and all Federal Courts, and the 
Judicial Reform Programme and the Civil Service Reform Programme (as of 2005) that overlapped 
CARP 2. In addition to the success of the reform programme discussed under chapter 4 other fringe 
benefits of the reform programme are mentioned during the field research of this study. One of the 
informants said that the judicial reform programme is still being implemented while other ‘’change 
instruments” feed it. My informant said that the command post for Good Governance is one such 
instrument. It is also mentioned that the programme brought justice sectors closer so that the 
judiciary has got the chance to present the challenges of the court to the administration. It also 
benefitted the court so that courts may defend unfounded allegations of the administration against 
them (Interview with Judge ‘E’, a senior judge and head of a court, 7/8/2015. 
297
 See the ANRS evaluation report, 2015 and the FSC BSC, 2011. 
298
 The BPR reintegrated Police, prosecution, courts and prison administration in the criminal justice 
administration. The BPR for the civil justice system is done independently. Singapore and Asian 
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with a ‘’fresh start’’ and blank sheet (MoCB 2014: 11). Hammer and Champy 
defined BPR as: 
‘’…the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to 
achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance, such as cost, quality, service and speed.”299 
This definition pertains to the efficiency and effectiveness of courts and is fully 
endorsed in reorganising the Ethiopian courts. The dissatisfaction on the part of 
litigants was the main reason to launch the BPR. The main problems that the BPR 
tries to address include the inability on the implementation of the JSRP to satisfy 
the people and the ineffectiveness (high cost and delay) of the justice system.300 
Accordingly, the BPR is meant to change work process radically, dramatically and 
fundamentally. It requires beginning everything from a clean sheet. Initiated by the 
Federal State, the implementation began in Oromiya and Southern Nations 
Nationalities and People Regional States301 followed by ANRS and Tigrian Regions. 
The Federal Justice System joined this effort latter in 2008.  Despite that judges 
have lingering questions relating to change instruments introduced after the reform 
programmes. They doubt if the BPR, originally developed for private business 
improvement, could be implemented in the public sector particularly with in the 
judiciary. Judge ‘E’ told me that one of the judges in judges’ meeting raised his 
doubt if a ‘’client in a court could be treated like a king” just like he might be 
treated in a private business dealings for which BPR was initially designed.302 
According to Academic ‘B’ the independence of the judiciary is compromised under 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
countries are bench marked in the design of the BPRs thus adding countries in the list of the legal 
history of the country. 
299
 See Hammer and Champy 1993: 32). This book is the main, or rather the only reference to design 
and implement the BPR in Ethiopia. 
300
 As per the decision of the National Justice Steering Committee, minute no 110 of National Justice 
Steering Committee, February 16/2008, other reason include the inability to integrate the criminal 
justice system (from investigation to prison administration) end-to-end. The reform began from the 
Federal Courts and then expanded to the ANRS then other Regions. 
301
 Note that these regions were late comers in the implementation of the judicial reform 
programme. 
302
 Interview with judge E, senior judge and a president of ANRS High Court, (served for more than 
15 years), 7/8/2015. 
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the guise of these later initiatives. He further remarked that the lack of confidence 
on the part of judges arose from these arrangements and that is why the conviction 
rate of courts increased and the meritorious judges left the courts.303 He further 
added that practically public prosecutors at times happened to be decision 
makers.304 If that is the case the effect of the BPR would be against the demand of 
the reform programme to give judicial independence a top political priority. 
BPR was overlapped by BSC in 2011 the introduction of which underscored the 
dissatisfaction on the part of the people owing to the limited achievements of the 
reform efforts of the past, despite the BPRs’ desire to radically transform.305 In this 
respect too judges question whether BSC is a science or a tool to implement the 
BPR.306 As their predecessors did, these later efforts totally ignored the non-formal  
systems of justice.  
5.6 Agendas for the future 
5.6.1. Unresolved challenge of the Courts 
When launching the implementation of the five year judicial plan in 2011 the ANRS 
Supreme Court had identified two thematic areas as main objectives of the court. 
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 As table 4 indicated more judges have been leaving the courts and joining the bar. With the 
experienced flying off, spread wing judges could join the bench. This may not result in losing the 
more experienced lawyers, capable of understanding current legal developments and implementing 
policies and handling challenges and problems from within and without. On the other hand the 
courts may lack able judges to handle seemingly simple but complicated cases with the growth 
trajectory-of business litigation, of horticulture litigation, of labor disputes, of complex issues of 
land, etc. If the courts could establish healthy relationship with the flying off judges joining the bar 
and the lawyers do at the same level of commitment, courts could do more with mediation. This is 
not always so as the lawyers consider this as treat against their income (Interview with Judge ‘P’, 
senior Woreda court judge, 21/10/2015). Academic A, assistance professor and a practicing lawyer, 
(Supra note 72) agree on this point and added that too much mediation would be ‘’contaminated” 
when lawyers were involved. He mentioned a case (ANRS Supreme Court file No. 20012) where 
mediation was practically difficult to arrange in a dispute in which 9 brothers were involved. They 
were not only litigated among each other but also consumed their economy and brotherhood. 
Though the lawyers made the mediation difficult, the winner of the case at the apex of the court 
finally mediated and settled the case realizing that his brothers are more important than winning the 
case. After the settlement all are doing well.  
304
 Interview with Academic B, Supra note 72. 
305
 Federal Supreme Court, BSC, 2011: 15. 
306
 Interview with judge E, Supra note 82. 
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These were making judiciary service accessible and ensuring adherence to judicial 
ethics and accountability.307 These thematic areas had different goals including: 
1. Ensuring efficiency in the courts 
2. Increasing the disposal and clearance rate of courts 
3. Increasing tele-conferencing and number of mobile benches 
4. Increasing institutional competence 
5. Reducing reversal rate of court decisions (to assure quality) 
6. Increase judicial inspection, support and follow up 
7. Increase the capacity of court leaders and other staffs. 
During the implementation of the plan training (covering wide areas including land 
laws, management of cases, labor cases, service delivery, change management, 
policies and strategies and implementation of reform programmes) were given to 
realise these objectives (ANRS 2015: -7). After five years, the completion of the 
plan, in 2015 the court evaluated its performance. 
Despite the many pre-service, in service, and long term training as well as education 
given to judges to realize the objectives of the court the evaluation report of the 
court states that lack of quality, fairness in decisions and adherence to traditional 
ways of disposing cases in the majority of the cases were the main complaints 
against the courts. These have compromised the quality of court decisions (ANRS 
2015: 3-5). According to the report the quality of court decisions is understood in 
terms of giving decisions based on the truth of the case. Training were given to this 
effect and judges discharging their duty based on patronage and corruption are 
made accountable (16 dismissed, 51 judges given decision ranging from warning to 
a penalty up to 4 months’ salary (ANRS 2015: 36).  
External factors also account for the lack of quality in the performance of the 
courts. Perjury and production of forged documents by some government bodies 
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were among such factors. To dispense with these problems and arrive at the truth 
of the case the ANRS Supreme Court tried to work in collaboration with land 
authorities and municipalities so that these bodies shall provide legal evidence 
based on proper scrutiny. Despite all the efforts a wide range of complaints are still 
heard of in the way land cases are handled. This had compromised the quality of 
court decisions and much more effort is expected to be exerted to tackle these 
problems.308 
The same held true for the Federal courts. As indicated above the Federal courts 
receive cases of national interest from all corners of the country. As an organ of a 
developmental state the courts were expected to perform their tasks based on the 
plan309 they adopted in line with the GTP and the five year strategic plan of the 
justice sector. The yearly plans for the year’s 2012-2015, with a slight difference in 
figures, are more or less similar. While the 2014 plan introduced the drafting of a 
Citizens Charter, evaluation of the judicial sector and the reorganisation of office of 
the Judicial Reform Programme, the 2015 plan on its part added the preparation of 
ADR project and endorsed the plan to implement the Human Rights and Good 
Governance plan of the government. Building institutional capacity, serving 
efficient, effective, accessible, predictable justice and expedited execution of 
decisions and contributing to the building of the rule of law and good governance 
were the strategic tactics towards implementing the plans. 
At the conclusion of the 2015 budget year, the Federal Courts also evaluated their 
performance and found that, like the ANRS Courts, the courts still carry on 
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 The quality problems are identified as problems related with procedural fairness, ethics and 
problems related to evidence served by land authorities. And the solutions include increasing 
penalties in criminal administration of justice, curbing perjury, capacity building (the Evaluation 
Report: Supra note p. 26-27). 
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 The plan, including the ANRS Courts plan, did not reflect the achievement of justice from the 
socio-economic angle as was expected of an organ in a developmental democratic system. 
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repeating the same problems they had some years before. The problem with 
respect to measuring quality of court performance is paramount.310 
Thus the Federal and ANRS courts are still far away from serving quality justice. At 
the end of 2015 the attainment of legal justice is still a problem and the attainment 
of social justice was found a far-fetched exercise. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that the Ethiopian Judicial Reform Programme has made 
significant achievements in the administration of justice. Despite the courts being 
engulfed with an ever increasing demand for justice, especially achievements in 
areas of efficiency, use of technology in courts, training, planning and measuring 
court performances are significant. When the achievements are seen vis-à-vis the 
realisation of people’s demand of justice in its true sense so that the basic needs 
and standards of living of the litigants towards the realisation of social justice is 
explored the chapter identified various challenges.   
Accordingly the investigation of cases on a one-to-one bases revealed that the 
formal system is still some where away from serving social justice. The increase in 
the rate of litigation is found to be not healthy. Had the courts effectively resolved 
the cases there wouldn’t have been a dramatic increase in cases. On the other 
hand, though courts resolve the cases speedily, a significant number of them are 
resolved without being finished. A large number of those finished remain 
unenforced.  
With the lack of properly designed external connections to the ADRMs, the court 
has also missed many opportunities that could have enabled them to become 
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 Other challenges identified include lack of techniques to measure the court performance based 
on Balanced Score Card, lack of adequate knowledge, skill, and attitude and impute to measure the 
court performance based on the BSC, non-participatoriness-particularly in the preparation of their 
plans-continuation of business as usual in the operation of the courts, lack of ownership and 
commitment in managing changes, the low level (below expectation) of attitude to serve and the 
inability to measure impacts that training have yielded to judges  (FSC: BSC 2015: 253). 
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‘’learning institutions.’’ Among many factors the mismatch between law and 
practice and lack of reform in engagement with non-formal system remain major 
issues.  It can also be said that the court mechanism of measuring quality is 
problematic. These were major problems of the pre-reform era and remain agendas 
for the coming years. 
Realising these challenges the courts have introduced other change instruments 
(basically the BPR) as a panacea. The very assumption of the BPR (starting from the 
clean sheet) is problematic seen vis-à-vis reform achievements. Unless the BPR 
deliberately targeted the realization of basic needs and living standards of the 
litigants as an outcome of reforms, unless it gives enough space to the non-formal 
systems so that both forums operate in an atmosphere of cooperation (rather than 
competition) it will repeat the mistakes of the reform programme. Whatever the 
name a reform that does not base issues selected by the people might be doing a 
job which is important but distanced from realising both legal and social justice. 
It is therefore important to question why the realisation of social justice is far-off 
the formal courts. In searching for solutions the next chapter is based on case 
studies and further investigates the roots of the problems in this regard. 
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6 
Lessons for formal decision making bodies processing and deciding the 
outcome of cases 
The previous chapter has explained that litigation in Ethiopia has significantly 
increased after the implementation of the reform programme and is continuously 
on the rise. The mechanisms developed by the reform programme to measure 
court performance indicated promises in the efficiency of the courts but a closer 
look at cases revealed contradictions and challenges in the system. Specific cases 
demonstrated how reforms distanced issues of the people and could impoverish 
disputants. The challenges indicated that efficiency does not necessarily guarantee 
legal and social justice. It highlighted the need to undergo a paradigm shift in the 
conception, design, implementation and evaluation of reforms. It also suggested a 
need to have a shift that includes designing reforms from a bottom-up approach 
and working with the non-formal system. This cannot be fully comprehended 
without appropriate knowledge of the reasons behind the challenges. 
On the bases of field research, this chapter investigates the challenges from the 
perspectives of different office holders so as to explore the reasons why the formal 
system did not serve social justice, finds out how the non-formal system works in 
this respect and investigates the relationship between the formal and the non-
formal system towards the attainment of social justice. 
Furthermore the chapter explores whether the formal system can take lessons from 
the wisdom of non-formal systems of settlements. As indicated in Chapter One, 
Ethiopia is known for its wisdom in non-formal systems and one of the places where 
such a forum is widely practiced is the ANRS.311 The case study hence investigates 
the existence and strength of the practice in securing social justice through 
                                                          
 
311
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enhancing the capability of litigants. It also tries to indicate how the forums expand 
the real freedom people have in accessing justice for the purpose of capability 
enhancement and tries to highlight the root causes of the challenges of the formal 
systems. 
The chapter is organised into two main parts. The first part pertains to the formal 
system and the second part is devoted to the non-formal system. After introducing 
the method and methodology of case studies, Section 6.4 and the following 
sections deal with issues of social justice and discuss the how, what, and  why of 
social justice in the formal system and the practice in realising it. Following this the 
second part discusses the same issues from the perspective of the non-formal 
systems. Finally, a brief conclusion wraps up the chapter’s discussion. 
6.1. Methodology of the case study 
In 2005 and 2012/13 the researcher participated in study to identify the grassroots 
justice in Ethiopia.312 Based on the study the researcher wrote articles on these 
mechanisms but also, as the president of the ANRS Supreme Court, was able to 
conduct open public consultative meetings every six months with the general 
public. The study enabled the researcher to become more familiar with the 
traditional systems in Ethiopia and helped make the selection for this research of 
the council of elders (Shimigilina in Amharic) as the most representative non-formal 
system of the region a little easier. The participants of the consultative meetings, 
from all sectors of the people, were profoundly enthusiastic to indicate the strength 
and drawbacks of the formal system against the non-formal traditional system of 
doing justice. These benefited the researcher a lot. Later on, while doing this 
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The studies were published in two different versions. For the details of the studies see  
 Gebre Yintiso, FekadeAzeze and Assefa Fisha (ed.) Woubishet Shiferaw (2011), Customary 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Amhara National Regional State: the Case of Wofa 
Legesse, Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Ethiopia, Vol. 1, 
 Assefa, Getachew  and Pankhurst Alula (ed), Woubishet Shiferaw and Melaku Abate (2008), 
Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Amhara Region: the case of Wofalegesse in 
North Shoa, Grass-roots Justice in Ethiopia, Center francasisd’EtudesEthiopiennes. 
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research, the researcher learnt that the public meetings helped to develop 
confidence and trust between the researcher and the informants in this research. 
This is a socio-legal research, in which analysis of the legal system is combined with 
empirical research on how people in a particular context use that system in 
practice. The approach incorporates research on the substance and procedures of 
formal/non formal systems and investigates problems fundamental to social 
injustice. It examines people’s own ways for seeking remedy and connects poverty, 
markets, institutions and governance. 
The research tries to investigate the formal/non-formal capacity to address and 
resolve problems of social justice. The purpose is to diagnose the reasons and gaps 
in the deficiencies towards realising legal justice and social service as core thematic 
area of this study. The case study concentrates mostly on land and family cases 
because they present best practices in which the people demand realisation of 
social justice.  
The field study is informed by the conceptualisation of justice examined in Chapter 
Two, on available literature sources in the subject matter and the legal history of 
Ethiopia. It also benefited from the various reform documents stating various 
success stories and factors in the judicial performance, various challenges and risks 
of the court. The field study tries to re-connect the various conceptualisations with 
what actually is going on in the real life of the courts and the people. 
The field study also benefited from secondary data collected from different 
institutions, particularly from the most recent reports for the 2011 to 2015 
performance of the courts: the end of the first five year reform performance (and 
end of the five year strategic plan) and the beginning of the GTP2 (and the 
beginning of the following five year strategic plan) for all the courts under study. 
Office holders allowed unlimited access to the data and archive workers were  
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cooperative but heads of the court at the apex could not get sufficient time to go 
through all the thematic areas of the research. Thus, a brief discussion was 
arranged with them. 
With this background the researcher visited North Shewa and West Gojjam in 2015 
Administrations twice each. The researcher triangulated methods of data collection. 
The multiple methods helped not only to get more data but also increased the 
validity and reliability of the findings. The field study thus was accompanied by 
observations followed by document survey, examining files (totaling 53 files), 
administering questionnaires and interviews. It also benefited from the observation 
of the researcher in his capacity as ex-president of the ANRS Supreme Court and 
FHC. 
This helped to get a direct knowledge on the challenges of securing social justice. 
Questionnaires were administered to get a general overview and broader empirical 
understanding of the problems in the process and outcomes lying behind the 
challenges of legal and social justice from a relatively large group of participants. 
The high level of confidence and anonymity on the part of the respondents, the 
trust established between data collectors (research assistants) helped a high rate of 
response. Accordingly, questionnaires were distributed to over 84 judges, academic 
lawyers and other office holders. The researcher was able to get responses from 78 
respondents. Four public prosecutors in North Shewa did not return the 
questionnaire. Three indicated they were busy while one gave no reason. The 
responses helped to structure the much more concrete interviews with key 
informants. 
The rationale of an in-depth interview is to have plain-spoken knowledge and 
understanding about the real opportunities and challenges of decision makers, the 
decision making process of dispute resolution mechanisms, the understanding of 
responsibilities on these plays of justice, impact of decision making on the real 
economic and social lives of litigants and the people and the potential impact that 
the process and the outcome of decisions have on the environment. This is 
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conducted with a belief to getting targeted deeper information from a targeted 
selection of informants, to get a high response rate. This is particularly important in 
Ethiopia where dialogues make challenges clearer.  
Interviews were conducted with key informants involved with social justice. The 
selection was facilitated by court leaders and elders in the research area using 
snowballing techniques. Clients who went through both formal and non-formal 
dispute settlement mechanisms were interviewed to see how a single case could 
end up with different outcomes impacting the capability of litigants at significantly 
different scales. Overall, the researcher managed to have in-depth interviews with 
34 informants (presidents of courts, reform experts, elders, clients of decision 
making bodies, religious leaders, professionals and academic lawyers) from all these 
areas who are well-reputed with long walks of life or long walks of professional 
experience.313 The interviews were managed in four regional rounds, whereas the 
interviews in Addis Ababa were conducted at the most convenient time for the 
informants.  
The discussion was meant to be open and free so that there was no particular 
reference to a specific court or other decision making body during the interview. In 
conducting interviews the researcher understood the ethical considerations, 
especially the safety of the informants, despite their openness. Accordingly, the 
method of data collection kept the anonymity of informants with a clear 
understanding of the possible risks in mentioning their names in the research. Thus, 
codes representing participants is used in this research.314 They were informed of 
their privilege not to participate in the research, and were enabled to control their 
level of participation. Thus, various techniques (including use of research 
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 This includes those involved in focus group discussion. 
314
 Participants in the interview are given codes as for example Judge A, B for Judges; Academic A, B 
for Academic lawyers and Elder A, B for Elders.  
225 
 
assistants315 and recording) were used to get as much and free information as 
possible from the informants. 
The interviews were conducted under a setting which enabled exchange of 
information with trust. Informants fully participated in sharing their views, 
experience and observations. As the exchange of information was open and free, 
informants were free to tell me that they were not serving justice in its fullest 
sense. I was told that the report presidents of courts submit to the legislative 
bodies were only what the law makers want, not what the profession or the people 
want. Dissatisfaction on the judicial performance was obvious in the interviews with 
the lawyers consulted.  
In addition to the interviews, focus group discussion and observations were also 
conducted. A total of four focus group discussion were conducted with judges and 
elders.316 The selection was facilitated by the previous interviews, head of courts 
and leaders of elders and was made on voluntary bases. The group discussions were 
important to interrogate the responsibilities of dispute resolution bodies towards 
realising social justice. Observation of the selected sites by the researcher both as a 
researcher and head of FHC helped a lot in filling the gaps and complementing the 
discussions.  
The researcher encountered some challenges in conducting this research. The first 
pertains to the schedule of the informants which did not coincide with the schedule 
of the researcher who run chronic shortage of time for holding different 
assignments in the judiciary besides the research. The lack of organised data 
(especially from the non-formal system side) was also a challenge. The researcher 
was also persuaded to explain the new developments in the field of justice 
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 Melaku Adnew (practicing lawyer at DebreBirhan), Andualem Adenagir (Judge at Gera Keya 
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Woreda court and Elders in Bahir Dar city. And three judges at the Federal court constituting of 
judges from the three tiers of courts stand for the fourth group. 
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(especially conceptions of social justice) to make the respondents being informed 
about the new developments and the research. This is so as neither relevant 
literature nor court jurisprudence in this respect is developed in Ethiopia. Though 
comprehensiveness is not claimed the researcher was forced to examine many files 
as possible in order to get enough information pertaining social justice. 
Despite these difficulties, the field work generated important information into the 
challenges in securing legal and social justice, problems and prospects in the march 
towards social justice and the possible harmonisation of the formal and non-formal 
systems. The field work and the theoretical analysis mainly conclude the findings of 
the study. 
6.2. Tools of questionnaires and interview 
Information from interviews and questionnaires were gathered using tools 
prepared ahead so that full and free information could be gathered. Structured and 
semi-structured interview tools containing predetermined questions were 
prepared. There were common issues in the tools used to collect data but some 
room of flexibility was maintained to adapt the tools to the speciality of the 
informants. For example, the questionnaires and interviews from the universities 
gave more of an emphasis to the theoretical aspects of the research while the ones 
for the courts and the non-formal system focused on the reality on the ground. 
The questions used the same language and open questions to the range of 
informants so that rooms were left for follow-up interrogations and open 
discussions on areas the informants have much of their expertise. The questions 
were arranged logically, including a hypothetical case, and were given to the 
informants ahead of time so that the quality and reliability of the response is 
increased. Specific questions were arranged with in the questionnaires so that 
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respondents might exclusively focus on these specific questions.317 Sample tools 
developed and used in the research are annexed. 
6.3. Doing the field work 
Officers in the formal sector who are believed to give much information on issues of 
social justice were interviewed selectively while the rest were given questionnaires 
to fill. The questionnaires contained open ended questions which they could 
answer at the depth they deem proper. Those on the non-formal side were 
interviewed not only for their wisdom in interrogation but also for being less 
literate. Almost all the interviews were conducted by hand-note taking face-to-face 
interaction with the exceptions of two informants who were interviewed by a 
research assistant using a recording device. 
Interviews were conducted at several stages. After control questions were 
developed, they were given to the respondents to see and reflect upon them 
including passing decisions either to participate or abandon the involvement in the 
research. All, except two Supreme Court judges in Addis Ababa and three in Bahir 
Dar, fully participated in the research at the time and place they chose convenient. 
The two judges in Addis had ran short of schedules, the ones in Bahir Dar had field 
work some more than 300 kms away from Bahir Dar.  
In conducting the interviews, the researcher explained his capacity as a student 
fully (my professional capacity was also explained although this is known to most of 
them) as well as the purpose of the research. Most of them were happy to 
participate as the area was of great interest to them.  They were given consent 
forms to express their level of participation and level of consent. In some cases 
questionnaires were administered by research assistants who could more freely 
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approached by the respondents. This raised the level of participation and response 
rates.  
After the conclusion of the interviews the researcher exchanged addresses with the 
informants in case a need to follow up the interrogation arose on the part of the 
researcher or to receive calls if there arose any inquiries about the participation in 
the research. The researcher received no calls of the latter sort. 
6.4. The Formal System 
The discussion in Chapters 1 and 4 demonstrated that attempts to reform the legal 
system of Ethiopia suffered from the transplant effect. The judicial system of 
Ethiopia also suffered from this lack of contextualisation. These facts coupled with 
the following factors disorientedg the search for social justice. In the discussions 
that follow the research explores the how and why of challenges of the formal 
courts in addressing social justice. These how’s and whys include the perception of 
disputes by professionals, the reaction to it, the way justice is understood by them 
and the societal conception of justice, how judges and society match justice and 
administration of law and truth. The following sections explore these points.  
6.4.1. Disputing and Perception. 
According to the informants disputing in Ethiopia is increasing. Many explanations 
are offered for this. According to my informants the increase in litigation is owing to 
one or more of the following factors:318 
1. Increase in population with the possible increase in demand for justice, 
marriage and divorce 
2. Chance (example, there was so much inheritance litigation when the HIV 
epidemic was at the peak, issues of health was crippling the justice 
system) 
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 Interview with retired judge ‘A’, senior judge and ex-head of Federal Courts, 4/10/2015.  
229 
 
3. Economic growth (increase in litigation over labor and construction 
issues)319 
4. The increase in the awareness of society 
5. The prevalence of rent seeking and the lack of good governance in the 
system 
In addition to these causes of disputing, poverty and scarcity of resources 
(especially land), mentality of corruption and embezzlement,320 failures on the part 
of the executive branch of the Government are mentioned as possible causes.While 
Judge A sees family cases having these roots, Judge B said that  it is a result of 
problems in the executive that 90% of the cases in the regional courts are land or 
land related cases and so much litigation is brought against government enterprises 
like EELPA and ethio-telecom these days.321 
In relation to what has been said, it is interesting to see that the number of cases 
brought against the Government ranks next to the number of cases brought against 
individuals. In 2011 and 2015 a total of 2,395 and 1,624 cases respectively were 
brought against the government in the Federal High Court alone. In 2011 and 2015 
a total of 23 cases were brought by government bodies against another 
Government bodies. As the government cannot be a defendant in criminal cases, 
this is huge number for the government in civil litigation. 
Courts are also possible causes of disputes. According to Judge D the failure on the 
part of the courts to address the root cause of a dispute is mentioned as a possible 
cause. This problem is a cause to repeated applications to be lodged at the 
cassation bench of the Supreme Court despite the Court’s binding ruling on same 
issues. The same informant also noted the presence of decisions given in violation 
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 Labor cases are one of the top five cases in the Federal Court (See table 6). When the implication 
of construction cases on the economy of the country and work force of litigants became complex, in 
2014 the Federal High Court opened a special bench for litigation over construction matters. 
320
Interview with judge B, senior judge at the ANRS Supreme Court, preside over the cassation 
bench, 19/10/2015 and Academic B: academic lawyer, ex-judge at the ANRS Supreme Court, 
9/8/2015. 
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 Interview with Judge B, Supra note 10. 
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of clear laws, for example in the violation of the Federal Sentencing Guideline. Since 
judges are not held accountable despite such violations, the problem is 
proliferated.322 
In some cases ethical issues in the society and archaic laws generate litigation. 
Judge D mentioned that shifts in societal values makes a father to abjure his son, a 
brother being greedy against his brother with a result in increasing litigation. On the 
legislative side the legislature’s inability to issue clear laws on areas including 
inheritance, period of limitation323 is also noted as a cause. 
Most informants connected dispute to the very nature of human beings (as social 
animals) who have divers conflicting interests and consider dispute as inherently 
natural, inevitable, unavoidable and destructive. The most important thing is 
making use of this potential for constructive goals. If one cannot make constructive 
use of disputes, disputes escalate into conflict and consume lives in millions. Judge 
B added on this and argued that business transactions and the level of 
understanding in heterogeneous society like ours makes dispute unavoidable. As 
destructive as it is it normally abolishes trust, peace and security that negatively 
affect the smooth and free flow of goods, which in turn increase collateral 
transactions and reductions in investment. If it is unavoidable it is better to learn 
the most effective way of managing it.324 
On the other hand others325 argue that what makes disputes constructive or 
destructive is the way decision making bodies handle the dispute. It is constructive  
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 Interview with Judge D, a senior judge at the Federal Supreme Court, served as a judge for more 
than 15 years and preside over the Cassation Bench,11/11/2015.  
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 For example FSC Cassation division interpretations of period of limitation on cases like labor and 
inheritance. 
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 Interview with Judge B and Judhe A, Supra note 10. 
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 Judge E, senior judge and a president of the ANRS High Court, (served for more than 15 years), 
7/8/2015. 
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if we can reach at the truth of the dispute.326 It too is constructive if it is the result 
of a demanding society and the decision making bodies strive to arrive at the truth 
of the case. If decision is given on the bases of forged documents it disturbs peace 
and will be destructive.327 
Thus, institutional inability on the part of the formal courts to make constructive 
use of disputes escalated disputing in Ethiopia.  This failure accounts for distancing 
social justice from the people so that litigants learn legal and social justice from 
what courts do to them rather than shaping their behavior towards social justice in 
accordance with what courts do to other litigants on similar grounds. 
6.4.2. What constitutes the good 
In serving social justice what the practitioners consider as the common good of the 
society is important as this can be reflected in the realisation of basic needs and 
standards of living. They were asked what they prefer in their life. As members of 
their society their preference reflects their society’s reflections of its hierarchy of 
needs and has aspects of social justice within.328 Accordingly, many of the lawyers 
and professionals (43.3%) preferred health as good in their life. A total 53.3 % of the 
judges also preferred health. A total of 13.3 % of the lawyers prefer education, 3.3% 
preferred participation in a society and 6.6% preferred serving their society. A total 
of 10% of them chose all of these things as  good in their life. Next to health, 21.9 % 
of judges surveyed preferred education while 2.4 % preferred having a positive 
relationship with society, 9.7 % valued participation in the community, and 7.3 % 
named serving the society as their driver. A total of 12.1 % preferred all of these 
things as their good.  
As far as the common good in the locality is concerned Judge E stated that peace 
and the fulfillment basic needs is what the people place first in its hierarchy. In line 
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 Academic A, University law lecturer, ex-ANRS Supreme Court Judge, 21/10/2015. 
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 Interview with Judge D, Supra note 14. 
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 The respondents earn above Birr 600 a month and live above poverty line.  
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with this Elder I329 noted that progress and the utilisation of fruits of progress is 
what the people need most. Academic B on the other hand stated that since the 
people live in a very mountainous area which made access to electricity and 
transportation difficult, fulfilling infrastructures is what people needed the most. 
Accordingly, judges preferred the common good they envisaged for society as 
within the domains of basic needs (health and infrastructure) as discussed in 
Chapter 3. It provides a lesson on what constitutes common good and has to be 
individualized and locally tailored by citizen and judges alike. If justice is to carry 
meaning, it accordingly has to be tailored to local needs and context. For example 
as indicated above the geography of the ANRS makes the reach of justice to the 
people difficult. As a result, the difficulty on the part of the people to reach the 
judicial system cannot be underestimated. Disputants would be forced to travel 
several days, mostly on foot or using local means of transportation, to reach and 
appear before the hearing court while unrepresented. This coulde erode the 
significance of courts and social justice to the very rural people. 
If courts cannot make the Government capable of constructing roads, they have to 
devise ways of making the people capable through, for example, making justice 
geographically accessible. These could be the starting point to do justice for the 
people where physical distance and associated costs create barriers to the formal 
courts’ legal and social justice. Then it is natural to ask what really motivates office 
holders to act towards what they think is the common good. 
6.4.3. What motivates action 
The real standard of action motivating judges to reduce injustice and enhance 
justice in the community matters if we are to realize social justice. This is 
particularly true in poorer countries like Ethiopia where poverty makes the absence 
of justice more vivid. The late PM of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi is quoted in Gill as 
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 Interview with Elder I, Served as an elder for more than 30 years, on 6/8/2015. 
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saying ‘’...most powerful motivation to work daily for economic development is the 
humiliation of poverty” (Gill 2010: 4). 
Respondents were asked what motivates to achieve the goals of their office. Most 
of the lawyers and university lecturers (60 %) and 63.4 % of the judges chose ROL as 
their real indicator of justice. This choice is followed by security and safety, quality 
life and quality of justice system-all of them on equal footing (6.6 %). Quality of 
justice (24.3 %) stands second for judges’ while security and safety (9.7 %) and 
quality of life (4.8 %) stands third and fourth. 7.3% them chose all of them. On the 
other hand, the primary choice of the lawyers is followed by security and safety, 
quality life and quality justice system- each of them chosen by 6.6% of them. 
Thus, Rol is what motivates most professionals to act in the play of justice. As the 
recommendations of the judicial reform program was based on the global ROL 
initiatives, it is important to see if this conception of the officers is either motivated 
by these conception or if it is a home conception of ROL. On the other hand, it is 
also important to see how the ROL or quality of justice motivation is related to what 
they consider as the common good. These can be seen from what they understood 
and work towards justice. 
6.4.4. How justice is understood 
As justice is justified by a particular principle of justice and justification have direct 
relationship. Some of the conceptions of justice are justified based on entitlements, 
deserts, equality, or needs. The principles must find a minimum consensus in 
society by accrediting their existence and rectifying any situation of injustice 
(Scherer 1992: 4).  
To the question how Ethiopian lawyers understood justice, radically different 
conceptions of justice are observed among the informants. Judges and lawyers have 
different answers to what the role of a judge should be in an environment where, 
for example, political cases are made judicial issues. As members of a society the 
difference would naturally be as wide as the difference in the public opinion unless 
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judicial jurisprudence, reform or policy narrows their conception of justice. For the 
lack of these guidelines in the context of Ethiopia the justification for justice by the 
lawyers and academicians is diversified. They claim that justice is a matter of being 
rational, correct and truthful (not serving oneself) towards an equal distribution of 
wealth, benefits and burdens in the society. It is also claimed that justice is a matter 
of giving solutions to victims in a society, an instrument in the enforcement of rights 
and benefits. According to some this is done by the application of law that takes the 
moral and other values in society into account. One of the respondants replied that 
when justice is to be served, human political, economic and social conditions would 
be in a position better than they were before the decision was made. Justice is a 
bases for peace, growth and equality of humans.330 
Equally important, judges’ conception of justice is as diversified as that of the 
lawyers. That is why one of the judges stated that as justice is relative, two different 
decisions could be given by two different judges presiding over the same case. 
Justice depends on the judge who handles the case.331 Another judge stated that as 
justice is not a commodity special care should be taken in rendering justice but did 
not specify what kind of care and to which result this care should be taken. Though 
the judges emphasized values like equality and ROL in their respons, the indicators 
of justice as stated by the judges were very diversified and include: 
1. Enforcement of rights impartially, as per the law and procedures and make 
people use their rights 
2. Human beings capacity to make use of resources which they acquire on 
equal bases 
3. Giving remedy to victims based on law and evidence 
4. Mere application of laws 
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 Interview with Judge F, A senior judge at Bahir Dar Woreda court, now a presiding judge of a 
Woreda court, 21/10/2015. 
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5. Serving the people impartially, equally, without being corrupt and without 
due consideration of ethnicity, allowing equal opportunity, being 
accountable and respect people’s right to be heard 
6. Searching for truth 
7. Giving correct decisions 
8. Is a bases for peace of the nation, growth, love and security in the nation 
9. A means to produce and use wealth 
10. End result of economic or social grievance 
11. Rectifying infringed or lost rights 
12. Serving equally with the least (reasonable) cost and time 
13. Distributing benefits and burdens in accordance with substantive and 
procedural law 
14. Identifying winners and losers based on evidence and reason 
15. Not inflicting harm, rewarding the productive and punishing the guilty 
16. Right to be heard, express one’s opinions freely 
The informants also have diverse conceptions of justice. Judge E, for example, 
understands justice to mean recovering lost rights, leading a secure and peaceful 
life where basic things are fulfilled.332 He understands justice from a practical point 
of view. On the other hand he conceives of the justice system conceiving of justice 
as an instrument to fulfill good governance and so that the forums may not handle 
people roughly. 
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 Interview with Judge E, Supra note 17. Judge E chose to learn law and become a judge in 1999 
because it is a ‘’respected profession and can be used to make real rights and justice”. 
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This list makes it discernible that radically different conceptions of what constitutes 
justice are held by the judges. The list makes consensus hardly possible. It is difficult 
to see which principle of justice is the best way to realise the developmental state 
demands of social justice. Some look into consequences of action or inaction 
(deontologists) from a moral right/wrong obligation perspective while others look 
utilitarian-with a widely varying version under both categories. Others share the 
idea that justice has to do with entitling persons according to which theory ‘’a 
person has the right to one’s possession (holding) and rectification when such is 
violated’’ (Scherer 1992: 20). It is clear and simple that the difference in principles 
of justice for individual judges is also different from principles of justice for 
institutions. 
The inconsistency in the conception of justice implies difficulties in realising the 
acquisition of opulence as a means to capability enhancement based on a coherent 
principle. Accordingly what determines the outcome is the choice of acts, or 
strategies, or conceptions of justice by the lawyers, judges and litigants that results 
in unpredictability that makes guaranting any outcome difficult. In such instances 
there would only be a right to the choice of action by the parties and ‘chance’ at 
this level matters to determine the outcome of a case. As the dissection in the 
conception of justice continues today, the search for justice arise from the specific 
combination of the legal culture and of these widely differing legal convictions, 
principles, concepts and underlying postulates. 
The inconsistency further creates problems in searching for the truth of a case 
despite some informants conviction that searching the truth of the case is what 
constituted of justice. Some informants believed that the search for truth has to be 
the standard of action and bases for sensing justice. Judge D believed that justice 
has to make use of the law in the search for truth. Justice is the search for truth in 
the demands of the plaintiff and the defendant using the procedural and 
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substantive laws. According to Judge J333 justice is a dynamic concept which serves: 
to deter bad behaviors and create stability in the community and reveal truth. 
Judges, however, decide cases against (at times knowing) the truth of the cases.334 
They assume their responsibility as mere application of the law despite the truth. 
However, if judges cannot interpret laws against crystal clear false cases, they may 
be administering the laws but are not serving justice. In line with this Academic B 
stated that far above this court render decisions in contrary to laws and evidence-
which are the minimums in the administration of justice.335 As the formal system 
did not search the truth of the case, it gives decision on shallow bases and only 
treats the symptoms of litigation and manifestations of the dispute rather than its 
root cause. Mere application of laws compels judges to speak in the language of the 
law jargons the play of which disconnects unrepresented litigants from their history 
and their case. The great majority of sitting judges are doing their business on the 
belief that mere application of the law is administration of justice.336 What comes 
as an extreme case is considering courts disposal rate as equivalent of serving 
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 Judges have important stories regarding the implication of the mismatch between the truth and 
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demands. Thus, the mechanisms to measure courts performance should focus on quality, fairness, 
impartiality and the extent they reduce corruption. 
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the end of the days judges would not even resolve a dispute. Judge P (interview with judge P, a 
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to be interpreted to the benefit of one of the parties but in fact sharing the land could benefit both 
and serve justice in the eyes of the parties . Thus, the search for truth makes parties more pragmatic 
than judges. Judge L concluded that it is our backwardness and poverty that did not allow the proper 
implementation of the best laws we have in this pragmatic way. 
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justice. According to Judge B and Judge C, some of the sitting judges believe that 
disposing a case is dispensing justice.337 Judge B further noted and attached the 
problem to the entire justice system. He boldly expressed that the justice system in 
general recognizes justice as effectuating the interest of the government at the cost 
of the society and rule of law: and the judicial system recognises it by the number 
of files killed by hook or crook.338 Thus, the mechanisms to measure courts 
performance should focus on quality, fairness, impartiality and the extent they 
reduce corruption.  
The diversification in the conception of justice and the mismatch between justice 
and truth create gaps between litigant expectations of courts and the normative 
justice principle the courts follow. Lack of agreement on the fundamental moral 
principles, which Locke assumes under his state of nature, and the presence of the 
veil of ignorance in the core principles to which judges should adhere (is central in 
Rawls original position), should have been the core area where reforms rectify and 
create consensus. 
6.4.5. What influences conceptualization of justice 
In Chapter Two it has been indicated that the idea of justice is influenced by many 
factors (like society, educations, emotions) and would ultimately be either goal or 
consequence oriented. This has been tested empirically in the context of Ethiopia 
and is found true to some extent. Judges inner (professional) socialization and their 
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loose attachment either to the other branches of the government or the general 
public creates the impression that their conception of justice will be influenced by 
the special position they assume in the profession. Thus the influence that the 
outer circle bears upon them has largely been ignored. But the fact is that the 
understanding of justice of judges is mainly influenced by their interactions in the 
society.  
In this respect respondents were asked what influenced their conception of justice 
and it was found that the lawyers’, public prosecutors’, police officers’ and 
university lecturers’ conceptualisation of justice was influenced by many factors. A 
total of 20 %, of them are law diploma holders while 40.5% and 12.1 % of them are 
respectively L.LB and L.LM holders from recognised Universities. One of them is a 
Ph.D. candidate. However education had only influenced 16.6% of the lawyers’ 
conception of justice. Their conceptions of justice were mainly influenced by a 
myriad of other factors. The society bore its influence on 16.6 % of them. While 3.3 
% of them are influenced by work place 10% were peer influenced. The rest are 
influenced by tradition (10 %), instinct (3.3 %), and global factors (10 %) and by a 
combination of two or more of these factors (16.6 %).  
Moreover most judges and have got their L.LB (43.9%) and L.LM (41%) from 
recognised universities. One of them holds law diploma. As can be seen from the 
previous discussion they have gone through many and repetitive legal training. But 
the majority of their conception of justice (21.9%) is shaped by the community in 
which they are living. Education (12.1 %) and work place (12.1 %) have equally 
shaped their conception. While 4.8% of the judges stated stated international 
influences, 30% chose more than one of all these. 2.4% of them had tradition as 
their bases of conception of justice while 9.7 % found something difficult to express 
(including instinct) as shaping their understanding. This is true as Schmidtz (2006: 
179-180) puts it ‘’some part of Justice may not be analytically built into concept, 
and may not be immutable, but it will be hard to believe a theory that excludes  
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them.” The responses prove the need to preserve a room for subjective reasoning 
in realizing social justice as there are situations where neither education nor society 
bears their influence on some areas of conceptualisations of justice.  
Thus, the most important factor in the judges’ understanding (and other players of 
justice) of justice is society followed by the formal education they have been 
through. This contradicts the role assigned to education in the old law and 
development movement discussed in Section 2.8.1.  
If society significantly influenced judges’ understanding of justice, it would be wise 
to see how they work towards this understanding. In this respect most judges look 
to procedural thinking to attain the pursuit of justice.339 In fact 26.2 % of them 
preferred procedural justice. On the other hand 9 % and 5% of the lawyers and 
academic lawyers have chosen procedural justice as the primary and secondary 
bases of justice. The remaining ones, 6.6% each, chose acceptance in the 
community, reducing poverty and leading a life style one choses, equal distribution 
of benefits and burdens, equality in general, being entitled to something, avoiding 
clear injustice. None of them chose effectuating others’ good as the bases of 
justice. On the other hand none of them have chosen equal distribution of wealth, 
capable of being and doing, effectuating the good of the strong, equal distribution 
of benefits, improving standard of living as their primary choice. 
The same number of judges (26.2%) preferred equality. Equality will be most 
contested when trying to understand what to divide, how to divide and why. 
Distributive justice (and decision making theory) first require choosing which goals 
are to be met. It involves treating either all involved equally or equitably. The 
equality rule focuses on everyone receiving the same outcome, de-emphasising 
differences among receipts, and it is more frequently applied in intimate 
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relationships, while the contribution rule requires allocation based on contribution 
and requires being measurable (Stum 1999: 160). In this respect 21.9 % of the 
judges chose total equality, 4.8 % equality in sharing burdens, 2.4 % equality in 
sharing benefits and wealth. While none of them chose serving others’ good, 
serving the powerful and being entitled to something as their choice, 14.6 % chose 
avoiding clear injustice, 9.7 % capable of being and doing, 4.8 % reducing poverty, 
2.4 % chose serving self-good, 2.4 % improving standard of living. Some chose more 
than one while 9.7% chose getting recognition in the community. 
As is not uncommon as professionals, but not common as influenced by society, the 
majority of lawyers are procedure advocates with a preference for procedural 
justice.340 Econometric, distributive, and sociological understanding of justice in 
terms of achievements, power in society, entitlements, were also significantly 
observed. Being influenced by the society in the understanding of justice, it is 
puzzling not to see capability of being and doing enhancement, poverty alleviation 
and the avoidance of clear injustice not coming to the front. It is thus important to 
see how the judges and other professionals perceive of their society’s 
understanding of justice. 
6.4.6. Judges perception of how the People understand Justice 
Justice has to take account of the peoples’ context as ‘’justice is about giving people 
their due’’ (Schmidtz 2006: 13). It will be problematic if the perception on the part 
of judges and the reality in the society mismatch.  
Most informants believed that people’s understanding of justice is connected with 
the search for truth. In a focus group discussion, some participants had the  
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conviction that people conceive of justice in a wider perspective than mere 
application of laws by the courts.341 They stated that the people find justice in the 
search for truth and expect justice organs to search for truth and arrive at it in 
making decisions. Values like respect for equality, ROL, impartiality and importance 
of reasonable time in arriving at decision, have meanings in so far as the truth is 
reached at. Furthermore, the people understand prevalence of injustice 
comprehensively when the Government falls short of its expectations, be it in 
providing electricity, justice or food.342 Thus, the inability on the part of formal 
courts to reach at the truth of a dispute is understood as prevalence of injustice.343 
The informants contended that the people consider justice as being lost on the 
judiciary as it is not serving justice in this sense. Corruption is mentioned as of the 
causes for prevalence of injustice.344 This has got its various implications. Justice 
may be twisted to serve the wealthy, an instrument to punish the unwanted and 
the poor by the powerful and the stronger. As one of the judges stated this is one of 
the reasons not only for the increase in litigation but also the production of false 
cases and fabricated evidence before the courts. This accounts for an artificial rise 
in the number of cases in the courts.345 Another informant claimed a need for 
research but stated that courts send people to jail based on false evidence, give 
decisions taking evidence which is not genuine, from municipalities, land authorities 
and transport bureaus as conclusive.346 In a focus group discussion judges stated 
that people come to courts bearing non-proportional costs to search for a truth of 
                                                          
341 In a focus group discussion with the ANRS Supreme Court Judges,judge B and Judge C, the Supreme Court judges of the 
supreme court, 19/10/2015. 
342Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Bearing this in mind an informant told me that some have changed the adage ‘’one is presumed innocent until proven 
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Woreda Court Judge at Bahir Dar, .20/10/2015). 
345 Interview with Judge A, Supranote 8.  
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their case which they lost in one of these administrative organs but the same 
evidence from the administrative bodies would serve as a bases of court decisions. 
That is one of the reasons litigants try to exert every effort to win a case in 
unacceptable way.347 
6.4.7. Lawyers’ perceptions of how the people understand justice. 
The academic and practicing lawyers consider that the society understands justice 
in its thin form. They stated that the people did measure formal justice on 
individual bases rather than seeing the overall impact that formal decisions might 
have on the political, economic and social life of the people. Based on this 
conviction the people speak in terms of getting correct, rational and predictable 
decision. One of the academic lawyers stated that the people still adhere to the 
adage ‘’a chicken lost without justice is more cause for concern than a mule gone 
fairly judged.’’ 
Bearing this in mind academic lawyers consider the people as thinking the formal 
system not serving justice. Courts are perceived as forums where people get what is 
not their due. They consider courts as weapons and forums where the powerful 
revenge the poor and the innocent, and the selfish get unfair shares. To this feeling 
of prevalence of injustice in the formal system the people respond by either taking 
justice in their own hands, or resort to non-formal ways of doing justice (like a 
recent increase in litigation at Zebr-Gebreal)348 or resort to the production of false 
documents or practice of perjury.349 Hence the peoples’ perception of formal justice 
was resulting in the production of perjury and other false documents, and is 
paradoxically widening the injustice gap. 
Thus it is possible to see the paradoxes in the theory and practices. While judges 
and other lawyers perceive society as demanding the truth of a case in giving 
                                                          
 
 
349 Interview with Academic A, (Supra note 18), Academic B (Supra note 10) and Interview with Academic ‘C’ (Supra note 22).   
 
244 
 
meanings to justice, their understanding of justice and motivation to action is not 
geared towards searching for the truth of the case.  
6.4.8. A hypothetical case about a flute 
The real standard of action for justice and bases of sense of justice was tested using 
a hypothetical case whose idea is taken from Aristotelian and Sen’s conception of 
justice. The judges and lawyers (informants and respondents) were instructed to 
assume an ‘’original position” and detach themselves from their legal education and 
position and give a verdict on a hypothetical case. The case pertains to four children 
having an uncompromising interest to inherit a flute from their deceased father. 
The first child ‘A’ is a musician and in love with music, the second one ‘B’ is very 
poor and intends to sell the flute as a means of survival, the third one ‘C’ is not poor 
but intends to share the proceeds of the sale via auction with his brothers while the 
fourth one ‘D’ intends to keep the flute as a tribute to his father. 
While 7% of the lawyers and academicians preffered ‘C’, none of the judges 
preferred ‘C’ as sole heir (heiress) of the musical instrument. The majority of 
lawyers and academicians (43.3 %) chose ‘A’ while 23.3 % and 10 % of them chose 
‘D’ and ‘B’ respectively. The majority of judges (60.9 %) also chose ‘A’, while 34.1 %, 
2.4 % of them chose ‘D’ and ‘B’ respectively. 2.4 % chose more than one. As has 
been discussed in chapter two ‘A’, which is preferred by the majority of the judges 
and the lawyers, would have been preferred by Aristotle. 
Those who chose ‘A’ have given various reasons for their choice. Some of the 
reasons include that ‘A’ could: 
 Improve the instrument, be more beneficiary, develop himself 
professionally 
 Serve him, his father, his country and history well 
 Get meaning from the instrument 
 Help him in his quest to be a musician 
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 Benefit from the adage the right thing to the right person 
On top of these reasons the judges added that ‘A’ could make proper and correct 
use of the instrument to benefit himself and beyond himself, could efficiently 
generate income and satisfaction, could develop his profession further and 
becomes creative, could help others from the income generated, is the better 
choice than the other choices, the instrument is intrinsically more important than 
economically. 
Those lawyers and lecturers who chose ‘D’ mentioned that identity lies in history 
which should be preserved and that ‘D’ cannot sell or transfer the instrument in 
whatever way. Judges who chose ‘D’ also agreed on this point. They also added that 
the most important thing in living is keeping history, identity, culture and legacy. 
Humans by their very nature would demand respect for dignity, which would have 
been the selection by the late father. 
Lawyers who chose ‘C’ have mentioned that as all the heirs have equal rights 
distributing the share of the sell, as the right to an equal share of proceeds, would 
be fairer and correct than other choices. Judges who chose ‘B’ stated that helping 
the poor would be a source of happiness. 
My informants (and judges working in the same bench) also had radically different 
bases and conclusions. Judge E would prefer A as A would more effectively make 
use of the flute despite the fact that he thinks distributing the share of the sell 
would be fair. Judge B350 also preferred A to others as this choice makes A more 
creative. It is this kind of thinking which could lead society to strive for excellence. 
Academic B, conceiving of justice as (practical) fairness, preferred A which would be 
fairer than any other decision. 
Judge I argued that justice has to be measured from the result it bears and prefers 
A.351 Academic A on the other hand prefers D so that the legacy of the father may 
                                                          
350 Interview with Judge ‘B’ Supra note 10. 
351 Interview with Judge A, Supra note 8. 
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continue.352 Judge D argues that the law allows A to benefit but had he been not a 
judge he would have preferred D.353 Judge J prefers D and if he should act based on 
the civil code prefers C.354 Judge K also prefers A and he has same reason as other 
judges. The choice of the majority of judges can be construed to the benefit of A’s 
capability of being a musician. This may contradict other choices and other 
principles.  
Despite that most justifications given are utilitarian as the endeavor in choosing A is 
the utility that A gets out of the fluting. Even though that may be the choice, some 
elements of history, economics, hedonism, fairness in equal distribution of benefits, 
correctness are seen enmeshing choice of other judges. Some of the judges were 
egalitarians (equality is the correct distributive principle-as Terzi ( 2010: 125) 
defined it), some are resouricsts (claiming equality of primary goods), some were 
welfarist (focusing on the overall success, happiness and achievements of the heirs). 
In handling this single case the principles of equality (treating equal people equally), 
principles of just desert (people ought to get what they deserve), of reciprocity 
(focusing on character of relationship) and need (meeting class of needs) (as are 
explained by Schmidtz (2006: 14)) are mentioned as justifications. This indicates 
that justification and justice (legal, social) may not necessarily match. 
Whichever personal choice they may have, the majority of them (46.6 % and 43.3 % 
respectively) believed that both the formal courts and the non-formal systems 
could effectively serve their preferences. They explained that the courts can do so if 
they interpret inheritance laws (for example Article 1087(2) of the 1952 Civil 
Code)355 in line with the values in the society. Of course judges, under the present 
Civil Code, judges have no option but to sell the flute via auction and share the 
proceeds: and that is what they do (Academic B). 
                                                          
352 Interview with Academic ‘A’, Supra note 18. 
353 Interview with Judge D, Supra note 14. 
354 Interview with Judge J, Supra note 26. 
355 Article 1087 (2) of the civil code reads as ‘’The utmost care shall be taken to give to each of the heirs the things which are 
most useful to him’’. 
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On the other hand 48.7 % of the judges agreed that non-formal systems could serve 
their choice of justice effectively as it investigates each case on its own merit and 
give preference to the societal values to the laws. 2.4 % said they could not while 
2.4 % claimed that the non-formal system can serve but to a limited extent. 
By the same token 23.3 % and 20 % of the lawyers and academic lawyers said that 
the courts and the non-formal systems respectively can’t serve. Those who stated 
that courts can’t do mentioned that the law did not allow them, they cannot serve 
social justice short of written laws and courts have to adhere to the principles of 
transparency and accountability. Those who stated that the non-formal systems 
can’t do mentioned that non-formal systems are not developed in the country and 
doesn’t take account of the overall political, economic and social condition of the 
country unless trained. 
The difference in the application of the law in this case is due to the lack of a 
principle leading towards common good.356 Though it is possible that different 
principles could apply to different cases (family, environment), the application of 
different principles to the same case does not establish a coherent system. The 
principles too may not necessarily be developmental in the sense Ethiopia expects 
of the justice system. 
6.4.9. Perception of quality and fairness 
Judges and other professionals were asked whether the courts were serving quality 
justice fairly. It is only 6.6% of the lawyers and academicians who claimed that the 
justice being served by the formal system in their respective locality has the 
required quality. 13.3 % of them claimed lack of quality while the 23.3 % claimed a 
very limited quality. A significant number of them (13.3 %) stated that it is difficult 
to say if the justice has quality or not. Furthermore 30 % of the lawyers and 
                                                          
356 Be it egalitarian, utilitarian, the libertarian Sen accepts the possibility of plurality of competing principles and the 
importance of ‘’possibility of plurality of sustainable reasons” and use of ‘’plural grounding” not to rule any argument out as 
irrelevant or unimportant. There is no need to reduce multiple and potentially conflicting principles to one solitary survivor, 
guillotining all the other (Sen 2009: 12, 183). 
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academic lawyers stated that the non-formal system has quality; a total of 6.6 % of 
them stated that it has no quality and 6.6 % stated that they lack the information to 
respond while 20% stated that it has quality to a limited extent. 
Judges’ opinions were not significantly different. Most of them (36.5 %) claimed 
that the decisions that courts give are only fair to a limited extent. 14.6 % of them 
stated that court decisions are fair while 4.8 % stated that the decisions are very 
fair. In terms of quality 29.2 % stated that the decisions lack the quality, 14.6% 
stated that the quality is compromised, 4.6 % stated that it has the required quality. 
31.7 % stated that it is limited but is being improved while 4.6 % stated that it is 
difficult to judge. Regarding the non-formal system 26.8 % of the judges claimed 
that the settlement by the non-formal systems has the necessary quality, 12.1 % 
stated the quality is compromised, 12.1 % stated that it has no quality. 7.3 % have 
no information to judge, 7.3 % claimed that their quality is significantly better that 
the quality served by the judges. 2.4 % said that it is difficult to judge. Given the 
paradoxes, mismatches and the dominance of chance explained above it would not 
be surprising to see the majority claiming lack of quality and unfairness in the 
decisions of courts. 
6.4.10. The legal system conception of justice 
However litigants perceive of justice, decision making bodies should adhere to their 
basic principles (particularly in hard cases) in resolving disputes. Basic principles 
attach responsibility for the consequences of actions. As can be seen from the 
above illustrations, judges might chose A and arrive at the same conclusion with 
widely differing or contradictory underlining bases. A quick conclusion from this, to 
use Schmidtz (2011: 11) would be ‘’embracing a principle which resolves a certain 
conflict is not enough to show that the principle is a principle of justice”. 
The primary task would be searching for how the entire legal system conceives of 
justice. In this respect informants stated that it is difficult to express what justice is 
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for the justice system of the country.357 Academics A and B also have the same 
conviction.358 The effect of lack of clear direction can be seen in the mismatch 
between the laws, social justice and the practice in the administration of justice. 
This effect can be seen in criminal administration and search for justice and a brief 
explanation of it follows. 
Criminal trials, in addition to searching for truth, serve to express society’s deepest 
shared notions of institutional justice and fair play. They remind of the procedural 
and substantive values that the people hold dear. Criminal trials represent public, 
highly visible, morality plays, through which order and balance are restored to a 
community that has suffered an often grievous loss.  True restoration can occur 
only through criminal trials that are perceived to be just and fair (Hoffmann et al 
1996: 1272) by the people.359 
Be that as it may, the current practice in the courts did not exactly show the judges’ 
reflections of societal values in their day to day activities. Judge stated that if one 
asks three judges about the policy behind our criminal justice system, one could get 
three answers (due process, crime control or rights based).360 In the routine 
exercises one could be inquisitorial, another adversarial with a controversial fact, 
another in between. According to Academic B, since what justifies justice is not 
giving decision but giving the right decisions, neither the interest of litigants nor the 
country, nor is social justice taken account of in rendering decisions.361  
                                                          
357 Interview with Judge ‘D’, Supra note 14 andJudge J (Supra note 26). 
358 Interview with Academic ‘’B’’ and ‘’A’’, Supra notes 10 and 18 respectively. After serving for a long time as judges of the 
ANRS High and Supreme Courts, both have been  serving as university law lecturers for the last  6 and 14 Years respectively. 
359See Hoffmann, et al 1996: 1272. As Barbara is quoted in Hoffmann criminal trials affirms, simultaneously, the need of both 
our collective and separate selves. The trials allow us to define who we are as a people, help to educate all of us about that 
definition and provide us with an opportunity to foster our self-confidence in the fundamental morality of our society 
(Hoffmann et al 1996: 1272). 
360Interview with Judge J ,  Supra note 26. 
361Interview with Academic ‘’B’’, Supra note 10.Interview with Academic ‘’B’’, Supra note 10. Judge J added on this point and 
held that  though Ethiopia did not follow inquisitorial system, it is better if the courts search for the truth of the case. 
According to Judge J the law making process, the law schools, and the litigation process do not bear their influence in 
narrowing this difference: the problem lies not only in understanding what justice is but also in the how to serve of justice. 
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6.4.11. Truth, procedural guarantee and Orality 
In the search for truth, process matters. Talking and acting in terms of truth finding, 
the public at large gives importance to the process of litigation as equally as its 
ends.362 As far as capability enhancement is concerned the end does not necessarily 
justify the means. The most important values in this respect are the right to express 
oneself in court and the right to be heard in the same court. These rights have been 
given due regard among the public.363 In line with this Judge B conceives of justice 
as getting equal opportunity in being meaningfully heard which is not always so in 
practice. This can be seen both in the process and the end of litigation. As Judge B 
noted, judges should clutch the objectives of procedural laws buried under the 
dead letters of the laws. They have to apply procedural laws as simply and flexibly 
as possible so that the litigants could fully and meaningfully participate in the 
litigation process. These procedural guarantees (which the people give more weight 
to than the final decision) would result in an equal outcome. Justice is a matter of  
creating a fair and accountable world based on such outcome equality.364The 
respect of this right is important not only to the parties but also to decision making 
bodies as parties could show facts which a judge may not have investigated 
especially in land cases where both parties come up with documentary evidence of 
equal weight.365 Despite this procedural importance some of the judges breach 
procedural laws at the expense of substantive laws. Judge D stated that most 
applications at the cassation bench are about infringement of the right to be heard. 
In countries like Ethiopia, judicial process is largely determined by the legislature. 
This does not preclude judges from tailoring justice so that the outcome may fit the 
litigants. Judge D agrees on this and points that women and men may not give 
equal importance to damage to teeth. Theft and mudslinging may not convey the 
                                                          
362Interview withAcademic B, Supra note 10. 
363Ibid. 
364Interview with Judge ‘B’, Supra note 10. 
365Interview with JudgeD, Supranote14. 
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same meaning to people living in different areas. It is only when people are 
meaningfully heard that procedural guarantees tailor justice to the extent of gender 
or ethnic diversification.366 When exchanges of written submissions dominate 
orality in litigation, the probability of tailoring justice to local contexts will narrow. 
6.4.12. Some of the most common cases 
As explained in Table 6 land and family cases are most common type Ethiopian 
court case. The challenges in handling land cases affect the agricultural-led 
economy of the country while the challenges on the family cases affect the social 
fabric of the society. Both affect the relationship with the environment and social 
justice. The cases illustrate the importance the people gave to social justice as a 
basic need and how realising legal and social justice became problematic.367 Thus 
the following sections discuss the general challenges courts face in handling their 
most common cases. More specific cases will be dealt with at the end of the 
chapter. 
6.4.12.1. Land cases 
Beginning from the era of Derg (Proclamation No. 47/1975) land in Ethiopia was 
owned by the State. So land litigations in court involved rights other than ownership 
rights. This may have included the right to use and till the land, boundary disputes, 
disputes relating to possession and use of land, displacement, ownership rights over 
houses and other buildings. In a country where the majority of the people depend 
on subsistence farming, security in land holding has a direct bearing on capability 
realisation. Access to land, land use and land tenure have important linkages to 
food security and hence social justice. Thus, coordinating government efforts on 
                                                          
366Interview with Judge ‘D’, Supra note 14. Judge D mentioned people living in Dire Dawa and Gojjam giving different 
meanings to different mudslinging.  
367 as the long lived saying goes-A chicken lost without justice is more cause for concern than a mule gone fairly judged-is a 
common adage today (Judge B, Supra note 10). He added that the cases in the courts not only show the level of poverty in the 
people but also the commitment (dignity and social status in the society) of the people towards justice as a father litigating at 
the Supreme Court for a verdict against him worth  Birr 70 replied ‘’how come my son win a case against me”.  Judge A (Supra 
note 8) also stated that disputes mirror society. 
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land reforms and court endeavors in the anti-poverty initiatives are important not     
to impoverish the most vulnerable. Decision making has to take account of fair 
access to information and analysis of relevant information through multi-track 
communications and information exchange. Shared responsibility has to be 
enhanced. As inequitable land holding system exacerbates poverty policies and 
actions that are susceptible to tenure insecurity and fragmentation would lower the 
living standards and the well-being of smallholder farmers ( Costantinos 2013: 47). 
As the economics of scale tell us the advantages of land possession was  obtained 
due to the size of their land and the cost per unit of land generally decreased with 
the increasing scale of the land and this needed be tackled. 
The increase in land disputes exacerbates the increase in court workloads, which in 
turn exacerbated the problem of relating to land disputes. The growth in population 
unparalleled by equal growth in land access is further worsening the problems. The 
ANRS Government was trying to ameliorate the problem in various ways. Efforts 
have been exerted since 1997 to redistribute land in the region and do away with 
the long overdue problems. The ANRS government has used mechanisms of dilidil, 
yemere-tkotera and ticheta so as to redistribute land and give certificates of land 
holding.  Dilidil was basically employed after the downfall of the Derg regime in 
1997. It involved the redistribution of land and awarding certificates of land holding 
to land users. As the execution of Dilidil was not uniform, it was followed by 
Yemeret-Kotera in 2006.368 Yemeret-kotera involved measuring the lands at the 
disposal of farmers and registering in rural land registration book by ANRS 
Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use Authority. The person 
                                                          
368See The ANRS Manual for Registration and Updating Information pertaining to Rural land, 2012 for the details of the 
process, P.v11.Recognizing the economics of scale the proclamation No. 133/1998 of the Region under article 7(1) and 9(4) 
indicate the minimum amount of land to be possessed by land users while the regulation to this effect (Regulation 
No.51/1999) declares that it shall not be less than 0.25 hectares where it is a plot of land cultivated by rain and 0.11 hectares 
where it is cultivated by irrigation (article 5(1) of the regulation. 
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granted rural land would be given land holding certificate.369 This again couldn’t 
resolve the problems so that it was succeeded by Tichita (literally translated as 
public comment or opinion) in 2012. This later effort also carried on the same goal 
but involved a wider public participation. The land measured by the Authority 
would be registered when the Kebele people gathered and certify the correctness 
of the measurement-hence the name tichita.370 All these have been done to give 
certificate of holding to the land users and guarantee their right to hold and use 
rural land. 
However, the more such efforts are exerted, the more cases are coming to courts. 
The efforts have created irreversible chaos in the courts371 without solving the 
problems. 372  The focus group discussion and interview 373  revealed many 
challenges374 to social justice in the courts’ administration of land disputes. The 
challenges identified in the interviews and focus group discussions with judges 
included: 
1. These land reform efforts were backed by legislative reform.375 Some of the 
judges considered the law as setting aside prior court decisions while others 
                                                          
369See articles 1(2), 22-24 of ANRS Proclamation No.133/2006, The Revised ANRS Rural Land Administration and Use 
Proclamation. When land is measured neighboring land holders and users shall be called to attend therein and decide upon 
their boundary in agreement. 
370See the Manual, Supra note 59, P.v11. 
371Interview with judges A and B, Supra notes 8 and 10 respectively. 
372Interview with Judge N,  senior judge at Bahir Dar  Woreda Court,21/10/2015. 
373Woreda Courts have trial jurisdiction regarding disputes over possession of land and Cassation  jurisdictions from social 
courts regarding matters of jurisdiction and fundamental rights (article 22 of Proclamation No 151/2007, ZikreHig. 
374The challenge has far reaching implication than remaining on land issues alone. Land disputes are among the five top 
cases in the ANRS courts. Some other cases (for example most crime, family, inheritance) have issues of land as their ultimate 
causes. For example, in one criminal case the defendant killed his younger brother to be the sole heir of the land. In another 
case children are evicted by their uncle and are found in an orphanage (Interview with Judge L, Presiding judge of a Woreda 
court, 21/10/2015). In another case Judge ‘’N’’ (Supra note 65) stated that  person who lost a case owing to fabricated 
evidence from the administration killed (using axe) his younger brother and family who made use of the forged evidence. 
Judge A (Supra note 8) also stated that most litigation (including criminal ones) are either litigations over a resource or 
enforcement of contracts. It, homicide cases in regions center land disputes and every case has one of these reasons.  
375SeeANRS  legislations No. 89/198 and 133/1998 and regulation No. 51/2007  and the Manual Supra note 62. 
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maintained that prior court decisions prevail over the legislations. These 
have created unpredictability in the courts. 
2. The lack of documentation in the administration forced the use of Tichita. 
In some localities this mechanism is used as a weapon to evacuate the one 
which the residents do not want to live with. In this respect the poor, the 
destitute and women were victims of the process and the outcome.  
3. Furthermore, the weak, women and the very young were forced to take 
less fertile or hydroponics while the strong and the corrupt took the fertile. 
The process would be completed by granting certificate of holding that 
courts consider as conclusive evidence in land litigations leaving little to no 
possibility of other remedies. The weak and the women particularly face 
further problems in the whole process. They face problems pertaining to 
evidence in the litigation process. Administrative solutions wait for court 
decisions. Courts give decisions based on written evidence from the 
administration. Despite the Federal Cassation interpretation of the laws 
that oral evidence is admissible, courts give less weight to oral evidence. 
Women face various difficulties in getting the evidence from the 
administration. Even a farmer who tills the woman’s land on a contractual 
bases would use the Tichita process to hold certificates of use in case 
disputes arise and could simply evict the woman unlawfully. The women 
are afraid to serve summons to the men thus reducing the opportunity for 
litigation. There is no de facto equality between them. A farmer holding 
land for more than 15 years (Civil Code Article 1168)376 could simply be 
evicted by a farmer holding the certificate in this way. While some judges 
uphold the former as per Article 1186 of the civil code, this raises further 
issues of unpredictability. 
                                                          
376Article 1168 (1) of the civil code declares that a possessor who has paid for fifteen consecutive years the taxes relating to 
the ownership of an immoveable shall become the owner of such an immoveable. 
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4. Besides other requrments to inhereit a land, courts check the minimum or 
maximum amount of land that a farmer should possess, rather than seeing 
who could make more efficient and effective use of the land.377 A woman 
who won a case and gets land is heard to complain of losing the land owing 
to the damage to the land by a nearby river.378  Another informants 
questioned if women really won in this situation at the end of the day.379 
Since the judges do not appreciate the enhancement of capability of 
litigants, women who were winners in a land case were losers in the real 
sense. In addition to these trees are being cut in the litigation and 
environment is being degraded and antagonism between parties is 
widening. 380 
Hence, the court inability to shape the behavior of the executive branch of the 
government not only escalates land litigation but also created unpredictability and 
lack of coherence in the judicial system. This does not only make courts  
untrustworthy but also impoverishes the disadvantaged and is unable to prevent 
land degrading. The party’s capability wouldn’t be enhanced as basic needs and 
living standards not fulfilled and improved. The distance between legal and social 
justice can vividly be seen increasing. 
6.4.12.2. Family  cases 
In Chapter Five it was indicated that family (including inheritance) cases are one of 
the top litigated cases of the Federal and ANRS courts.381 Family cases have issues 
                                                          
377Proclamation No. 133/1998 allows land inheritance. Amending the 1997 A child could simply inherit by mere fact of being 
the child of the deceased. The limit is only the amount of land he is permitted to hold as per the law. This would split the land 
unnecessarily and creates economy of scale. The 1989 has got its hierarchy different from the civil code. The documentation 
problems made some to get compensation twice or trice. 
378 Interview with Academic ‘’A’’, Supra note 18. 
379Interview with retired judge ‘’A’’, Supra note 8. 
380Interview with Academic ‘’A’, Supra note 18. 
381Focus Group Discussion with Bahir Dar Woreda Court Judges, 21/10/2015. in the focus group discussion the judges agreed 
that most cases they entertain pertain to family cases. In fact they are engulfed with them. 
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of divorce, property and child maintenance. During the focus group discussions382 
judges who tried family cases revealed that the rate of divorce cases has increased 
overtime.383 The increase in the divorce rate of couples has one or more of the 
following causes: age difference between the couples, health problems, poverty, 
interference by relatives of the couples, criminal conviction and imprisonment of 
one of the couples, mismatches (especially in behavior), betrayal in property, 
inability to consummate and the absence of legal requirement to demand divorce. 
Desite that some of these cases the cases do not represent the couple’s genuine 
interest. Judge L and others guess that 70% of the family cases in the court they 
preside are fabricated divorce cases. This figure may be exaggerated but has an 
important message to convey. Focus group discussion reaveled that some litigants 
come to the court only to get a certificate of divorce so that they can get land (or be 
members in two separate house associations) from the respective municipalities on 
individual bases. That is why many couples, whom the judges know personally, 
continue living together after securing divorce decree by the courts. 384  This 
indicates how the courts’ inability to address the root causes of cases, at times 
known by the judges, incentive rent-seeking behaviors contrary to the dictates of 
Ethiopian developmental state.385 
Furthermore, family cases have chain effects on the capability of women, on 
environment and companies. Most plaintiffs in family cases are women.386  It is 
because the men control the resources that women in most cases happen to be 
                                                          
382Focus Group discussion, ANRS Woreda Court Judges, 21/102015. 
383The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution under article 34 provides that: Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses and that family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the state. Customary ways of dispute resolution and courts (as organs of state) are entitled to protect marriage 
and family. 
384Focus group discussion,Supra note 74. 
385As to how the Ethiopian system defines rent-seeking as a mechanism whereby profits the use of government power and 
creating connections with the affluent  so as to get profits which cannot be secured with the free market (FDRE 2007 Building 
Democratic System and Revolutionary Democracy, p.2). 
386Focus Group Discussion, Supra note 74. 
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plaintiffs in family cases.387 For example out of the files consulted in Chapter Five 
accounts for 76% of the total files. The pecuniary value of the litigation indicates 
how poor the litigants were. All the cases lodged in the courts ended in granting 
divorce despite the involvement of family council as per the family code.388As is 
true for land cases women in family cases also face similar complicated problems 
both in the process and enforcement of decisions. For example, following a divorce 
decision, contrary to the law and justice all properties would be liquidated equally 
between the husband and the woman despite the fact that the woman is the sole 
owner of the property.389 Judges L and others also stated that when the most 
important property for both, land, is divided between the two spouses women get 
the part of the land which is relatively less fertile than the share of the husband. 
Accordingly judge A asks if the woman wins at the end of the day in the real sense. 
Women lose so much property in this respect, and hence, justice should be more 
than keeping hierarchy and order.390 Thus, both the process and the outcome of 
family litigation are not only decapacitating the women but also escalating injustice 
and impoverishing women. 
In all other cases judges decide to divide the property in litigation between the two 
spouses. The land they hold and the forest or trees thereon will be divided equally. 
This fragments landholdings and impacts the economics of scale. Academic D also 
added that most company cases in the federal courts are preceded by the split in 
the family.391 As shareholders are members of the family, a split in the family 
                                                          
387Interview with retired judge ‘’A’’, Supra note 8. 
388This isrequired of the family code. 
389Interview with Judge ‘’D’’, Supra note 14.Under article 63 of the Federal Family Law of Ethiopia (Proclamation No.1/2000), 
all property is presumed to be common property of husband and wife unlessone of them prove that he/she is the sole owner. 
Proving this for a woman is difficult. Under the law, common property is a property that belongs both to a husband and a 
wife. 
390Interview with judge J, Supra note 26. 
391Interview with Academic ‘’D’’, University Law Lecturer and practicing lawyer, former Federal Courts Judge, , 23/11/2015. 
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breakup companies. This again splits the business environment, splits capital, 
increases unit costs and arises economics of scale.392 
6.4.13. Choice of forum 
As is discussed in chapter two the presence of different forums expands the real 
freedoms people have towards social justice. As members of the people this too 
expands the real freedom of judges and the lawyers. In a response to the 
questionnaires that asked what forum would the professionals prefer in case they 
come across with a case demanding third party intervention for resolution, the 
majority of judges in the formal courts, and other respondents prefer non-formal 
ways of doing justice.  In this regard 60.9% of the judges and 53.3% of other 
professionals prefer non-formal ways of doing justice. Only 18% of the judges and  
23.3% of the lawyers preferred the formal courts. 19% of judges and 10% of other 
professionals would make their choice depending on the type of the case they came 
across. 19.5 % of the professionals did not answer the question. A host of pros and 
cons lay behind the choices. 
In their response judges have mentioned the pros of non-formal systems which 
have been the bases of their choice that includes: 
1. Non-formal systems are less expensive and non-time consuming, and 
are confidential, result being win-win leaving the parties with good 
relationship, lasting peace and love among them 
2. The non-formal system gives freedom to choose arbitrators 
3. There is corruption in the formal system 
                                                          
392Ibid.  The researcher , as ex-president of the ANRS and FHC also observed the split in family splitting business and labor 
forces in many cases. Economics of scale is explained in section 6.4.12.1 and see Supra note 62 to this effect(The idea of 
economics of scale is taken from www.economicshelp.org>costseconomics, last accessed 2 Aug. 2016). 
. 
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4. Formal systems are not considerate; they lack the necessary 
capacity, the required accountability, predictability, trustworthiness 
and impartiality 
5. Could be resorted to any time, could arrive at the truth of the case 
While these have been mentioned on the questionnaires as benefits of the non-
formal system, the cons of the formal system are also mentioned. The first pertains 
to the power of the parties to bargain, to control the process and the outcome of 
their case. Once in the court parties could not control (may not understand) the 
process and the outcome of the case which in turn means that parties could not 
control the cost, time, the importance of the outcome and the volume of the 
outcome. The reputation of the decision making bodies, their friendliness, 
accessibility (like geography, cost or psychological), and quality level of their 
decision as understood by the parties, the relationship that the courts have with the 
parties, are also mentioned as the disadvantages of the courts. These factors erode 
courts’ competitiveness. 
Those who preferred courts, on the other hand, underlined the presence of a more 
or less educated and skilled manpower in the courts. The existence of pre-set 
procedural law known to the parties before the start of the litigation, the 
prevalence of clearly set mechanisms of decision enforcement which enforce their 
decisions however long time the enforcement may take are mentioned as reasons 
for the choice. In this respect courts surpass non-formal systems. Other reasons to 
prefer formal courts include: 
1. Non-formal systems are not strong enough as courts are, are different from 
place to place, are not under an institution monitoring them, have no system of 
accountability 
2. Low cost in the enforcement of decisions 
3. Ability to get correct decision based on the law, evidence, and the ability to 
appeal in the case of grievances. 
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6.5. The non-formal ways of doing justice 
6.5.1. A Representative Institution. 
The Ethiopian legal system is known for accommodating plural systems of dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Keeping the formal/non-formal dichotomy intact, the non-
formal system of dispute settlement has its own internal plurality. There are many 
kinds, forms and structures of non-formal system. They range from the nearby 
neighbor to the larger community. The focus of this research however is on those 
that have established systems as long, repeated traditions of the people. These are 
many.393 What is common of all is that they employ the mechanisms of Shimigilina. 
The most notable and widely used system is yeshimigilina erq ser’eat (system of 
elders’ council). Some of the research areas are well known for deploying these 
mechanisms for all kinds of disputes. The expression menz giligilu ena beligu (Menz 
for its traditional justice and its harvest394 indicates how the system is dominant in 
some areas. Thus, Shimigilina is widespread, common and representative of the 
non-formal systems in the ANRS.395 
The following discussions are about Shimigilina including its values, its jurisdiction, 
selection of the elders (Shimagilie), its workload and purpose. Finally, the section 
discusses a case that went through both the formal and the non-formal system.  
6.5.2. Shimigilina (literally translated as the Elders Council or council of 
wise men) 
In principle Shimigilina is an amicable ad hoc dispute resolution mechanism where 
elders in a community arbitrate and settle disputes. The local people under study 
                                                          
393In FekadeAzeze et al (2011) Annotated Bibliography of Studies on Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Ethiopia 
at least 125 kinds of customary dispute resolution mechanisms found throw-out Ethiopia are summarized. And it can clearly 
be seen that the use of elders in resolving disputes is common in Ethiopia. The same effect can be observed in the works of 
Getachew and Alula.ed. (2008) Grassroot justice in Ethiopia-the Contribution of customary Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 
Addis Ababa Ethiopia, United printers. 
394A locality including Gera Keya Woreda in North Shewa Administrative Zone. 
395See for example Getahew and Alula, Supra note 379. 
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call the whole process of Shimigilina and the outcome erq (literally translated as 
reconciliation).396 The system operates outside the formal government structure 
and is common among the people.397 According to Elder A Shimigilina has a long 
history dating back the time of Muse. Even Jesus Christ, sitting with the clergy men, 
used the mechanism to settle disputes.398 
The institution of shimaglina is run solely be shimaglewoch (literally translated as 
elders of the community). According to Elder B399 any person, whether he is young 
or old, male or female, domiciled in the community could potentially serve as a 
shimaglie, although the elderly and the male are preferred in the normal course of 
its operation. In hard cases priests and god father could constitute the 
Shimigilina.400 
The criterion for serving as a shimagle include reputation for making people come 
to agreement through his speech, wisdom, familiarity and faithfulness to the 
community norms and service, ability to convince litigants, good faith, God fearing, 
impartiality and life experience. Shimaglewoch are persons respected in the 
community (and by the parties) owing to these qualities.401 The people call them 
Chewa which literally means well-behaved.402 In all his qualities a Shimaglie is a 
person better than the litigants before him.403 Some believe that the responsibility 
of shimeglewoch in settling disputes is heavier than the damage inflicted on the 
parties. For this effect the popular saying reminds the elders of the heavy  
                                                          
396Elder C, served as a shimaglie and religious leader as of the DergRegim, Gera Keya Woreda, interviwed using research 
assistance, on 
397Interview with Elder A, served as  shimaglie and religious leader for more than 30 years, 25/10/2015. 
398Elder A, Supra note 90, cited Old Testament the hu chap. 11 No. 16-24 as an authority to his assertions. 
399 Interview with elder ‘B’, Served as Shimaglie for more than 20 years, 6/8/2015 DebreBirhan. He told me that he served as 
a shimagle with a female shimagle in which they settled disputes effectively. The women, he added, is effective as she put 
herself in the shoe of those in pain, shares their pains and burdens. He expressed that he prefers to serve with this woman in 
more, important or higher cases. 
400Ibid. 
401Interview with Judge E, Supra note 17,  Elder A (Supra note 90) and Elder C, (Supra note89). 
402Interview with ’’D’’ (served as Shimaglie for more than 10 years), Elder ‘’C’’ (Supra note 86). 
403Ibid. 
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responsibility they shoulder. The saw running Bereh gedel geba bilut yeshimaglie 
eda ale which literally means a person whose ox fell off a cliff said what an adversity 
to elders 404 implies that the responsibility of the elders is more demanding than the 
lost ox. 
The system operates based on unwritten laws. They try to reach at equitable 
decisions that awards kassa (compensation) in addition to encouraging forgiveness 
and giving directions as to future relationships between the parties. They are 
chosen by the full consent of the parties. If a party alleges to have a zenig literally 
meaning axis with an elder, the elder would not participate in the process. Usually 
the number of shimaglewoch is three and the forum could exceptionally constitute 
more to nine elders. The more serious the case is (for example homicide cases) the 
higher the number. The importance of the three men panel is as important as three 
trivets to cook food or the three priests to proceed prayers.  
Hence the proverb: 
Behulet gulicha aytadim 
Behulet dagna ayferedim 
Behulet qe’is aykedesim405 
literarily translated as; 
No baking with two trivets 
No sanctify with two priests 
No judgment with two judges (elders).  
                                                          
404Interview with Elder I, Supra note 21. 
405Interview with Elder F, a Shimaglie,  served as Shimaglie for more than 20 years but not occasionally, 18/10/2015. The 
translation is mine. 
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conveys two important messages. First it implies that it is impossible to hold 
Shimigilina without this minimum number. And secondly it implies that Shimigilina 
would bear fruits when conducted in three.  
The efficiency and effectiveness in their service depends on the social dynamics. 
They settle cases based on compromise, reconciliation and adjudication and 
enforce the settlement based on the consent and approval of the people. Since a 
party does not want to be outcaste from the community, he will tell the truth 
before the shimaglewoch but uses whatever mechanism possible to hide it before 
the courts.406 Parties give more of their ears to shimaglewoch than they give to 
judges.407 Parties express their secrets to the shimaglewoch rather than to the 
judges as a result of which the courts could have done nothing had shimaglewoch 
not existed.408 
Shimaglewoch, and the communal people for that matter, consider Shimigilina as 
civic duty demanded of serving both their community and the Creator. Elder E has 
been working as elder as of the Derg regime. He settled all the cases he had 
peacefully. He is aged 81 and thinks that his task as Shimagle gave him a long life. 
He told me that no case at the hands of shimaglie would remain unsettled as the 
saying-yemenekusie lolie yekiremit amolie yelem (literally translated as there is no 
unmelted bar of salt during winter (ironically meant cases before elders) as there is 
no servant of monk).409 
6.5.3. Values in Shimigilina 
According to Abera (1998:introduction) even though the Ethiopian conception of 
justice maintained its particularity, the philosophical bases was more or less similar 
                                                          
406Interview withAcademic B, Supra note 10. 
407Interview with judge L, Supra note 79. 
408Interview with Judge N, Supra note 65. 
409Interview with Judge P, Supra note 27. Judge P also has been working as astarakidagna (this was introduced by the BPR 
where an assigned judge to this effect tries to mediate a case before trial). He also worked as astarakidagna who settled 8 out 
of 10 cases and stated that he lived long due to this good performance. According to him the cases that remained unsettled 
are demon possessed. 
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to those of the Romano-Germanic system. Some of the similarities between the 
Ethiopian and the West philosophy of justice indicated that most important values 
of justice have their roots inside too. This research has identified similarities in 
some values, but also identified distinct advantages of the non-formal system in 
emphasizing forms of resolution which produce community harmony towards social 
justice.  
As has been discussed in Chapter One Ethiopians’ sense of justice is expressed 
through quene and idiomatic expressions. Quene and idiomatic expressions have 
various functional roles in everyday life of the ANRS. They exhibit important justice 
principles that still prevail in the non-formal system. My informants410 stated that 
the non-formal system of dispute settlement maintained long lived expressions in 
the long legal history of the country. Some of these expressions being deployed in 
the non-formal system, uttered in the working language of Ethiopia (Amharic), are 
the following. 
Derash Wuha Enquan Behig Siteyeq Yirgal (yiqomal)  
(Dashing water ceases to flow when so demanded in the name of the law). 
This adage indicates the degree of conviction that every human beings relation 
needs to be ruled by law. This is similar to the international conception of ROL. But 
the law here has the purpose of maintaining the status quo in communal life as 
ironically indicated in the dashing water ceasing flowing when demanded in the 
name of the law towards establishing harmony.  
Befird kehedech bekloyie, yelefird yehedech doroyie tikochegnalechi 
(A chicken lost without justice is more cause for concern than a mule gone 
fairly judged) 
This adage indicates that law is ultimately related to justice which gives priority to 
non-economic values of living.  This demands justice embodied with reason to 
                                                          
410Interview with Elders ‘A’ ‘C’, and ‘F’ (Supra note 90, 89 and 98. Elders E and G (Elder and social court judge in Bahir Dar, 
served for more than 15 and 30 years as Shimagliewoch, Focus group discussion, on 20/11/2015. 
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justify grounds for ceasing higher economic interests towards sustainable peace 
and hence communal harmony. This is different from the conception of justice in 
economic terms discussed in Chapter 2. 
Hig Yedihanina Yehabitaminn Cheriq Yaqoragnal 
(The law ties together the shabby garment of the poor with the finest outfit 
of the rich). 
This adage indicates how justice horizontally equalises the rich and the poor. This is 
important as far as sharing the burdens of litigation equally among the litigants, 
however their economic status, is concerned and helps to fight corruption and rent-
seeking in the realization of social justice. These idiomatic expressions show the 
important role the people assign to the law and the institutions enforcing the 
law. 411As the people did not measure justice in pure economic terms, the 
expressions signify important non-economic values of justice, law and rule of law as 
are understood in the non-formal system. 
The following expressions too indicate how truth finding is important in handling a 
case. They indicate the importance of written evidence and the fate of a liar as a 
loser and as ardent criminal. 
Ha Sayilu tifet, wul sayizu mugit 
(No writing without Knowing the letter ‘ሀ’412, no litigation without contract) 
This conception is important as far as consistency and predictability in the system is 
concerned. If this understanding is properly utilized, it can encourage market and 
investment that require predictability. 
Hametegna yafiral, hasetegna Yiretal 
 (Ashamed is the Gossiper, loser is the liar) 
Hasetegna birtu wenijelegna 
 (A liar is a notorious criminal) 
                                                          
411The law here  is to mean traditional law. 
412This is the first letter of Amharic, the equivalent of the English letter ‘A’. 
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When these expressions are seen together with the above ones they convey the 
message that justice and rule of law are ultimately related to searching for the truth 
of a case.  
On the other hand the following expressions underscore the importance and 
qualities of dagna (Literally translated as a judge.)413 These expressions point out 
the need to thoroughly investigate a case from hair to nail, the importance of a 
higher judge to rectify mistakes of a partial judge, importance of speaking in when a 
judge (who listens) is present, importance of truth finding, the need to secure 
tailor-made justice, accountability of judges and the impact wealth has on the 
balance of litigation. The expressions include: 
Dagna simeremir keras yizo eske-egir 
(A judge tries from head to to nail) 
Dagna siadela bedagna, ahiya siadela bemechagna 
(A higher judge for a biased judge, as a thong to correct a donkey who 
misses its balance) 
Dagna sigegn tenager, wuha sitera teshagaer 
(Speak your mind in front of a judge, pass over the river when you find clear 
water) 
Dagnoch kemeremeru, yigegnal negeru 
(If a judge canvases, the right will be revealed) 
Fird leliji, terabit ledeji  
(Judgment is to a child, a Masson is to a door-this is to indicate a person who 
prepares wood to make a door) 
Fird gemiday, ewinet aguday 
(A judge that slice off judgment will bury the truth) 
                                                          
413It is to mean traditional judge, a shimaglie.  
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Fird ena fitfit, beyefit  
(Let judgment and scrambled Injera (bread) be exclusive/private). 
Fird ayawik dagna, tegen ayawik eregna  
(A judge that does not know judgment, a shepherd that does not have a 
shelter) 
Dihana habitam temuagito, dingayina kil tematito  
(An argument between the poor and the rich is like a collision between the 
stone and the gourd)414 
These expressions reveal that the operation of non-formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms is endowed with important values including justice, honesty, role of 
authority and power in shaping relationships, evidence, truth, impartiality, 
availability of alternative (or hierarchical forums) forums, and process guarantee in 
dispute resolution mechanisms. They indicate that truth and justice are connected 
and are to be revealed from individual cases. The conceptions are considered as the 
common good of the people and are consistently applied by decision makers. The 
expression like Fird ena fitfit, beyefit (Let judgment and scrambled Injera (bread) be 
privatized indicates that justice has to be contextualised according to the needs of 
individual litigants. It is a basic need as bread is to litigants. According to the 
expressions it is the judge who should canvass so as to realize this right. Litigation is 
judge led and the role of a judge is significant in realising social justice or else it is 
difficult to pass over the river without facing fatal risk. This has been defined as the 
concept of social justice under Chapter Two. This conception of Ethiopian social 
justice could could have been utilized to benefit the judicial reform program 
discussed in Chapter Four. They serve from the very beginning of disputing to its 
commencement. If properly utilised, it could make people capable of realising their 
potential.  
                                                          
414
 This adage does not draw parallels between the poor and stone, the rich and the gourd but only 
implies that power imbalance can affect the outcome of litigation. 
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Furthermore, the expressions have important messages to convey. They cover 
every aspects of the non-formal system of dispute settlement and essentially glorify 
the importance of both process and outcome in dispute resolution. I learnt from the 
informants that all the expressions arose from established facts in disputing. They 
are articulated for defined objectives as for example warning judges to be 
accountable to their duties and to remind judges of their indispensable duty to 
search for truth. The wisdom of elders is expressed through them and the people 
get satisfaction and gratitude in holding them as a sign that their decision making 
process guarantees the search for truth or that there always is a judge against a 
biased local judge. Law is defined in the broadest sense making no strident 
distinction among positive laws, morals, culture, religious edicts the adherence to 
which is left to individual consciences with the approval of the people. ANRS values 
are against coercion and violence (mostly used to norm respecting if need arose 
with spiritual sanction). Values are believed to be inherited from the ancestors and 
constantly and continuously checked by God. According to my informants this has 
been the law in Ethiopia since the time of Moses.415 
Besides the values, Shimigilina in Ethiopia is usually utilised (along the formal one) 
when things got though as a result of an escalation of disputes into large scale 
conflicts.416 Apart from demands of this pragmatism the political system of the 
present Government cannot disregard the values. A bottom up approach to 
development takes account of the very bases of development (Including security, 
peace in a community) which could be effectively harnessed via non-formal ways. 
The Ethiopian Government, being developmental and democratic, cannot ignore to 
enhance full, meaningful and true respect (defend and promote) for this system. 
                                                          
415Interviewwith Elders A, Supra note 90. 
416For example the Ethiopian government is trying to settle the widely spread conflicts in ANRS (in Wolkite and Kimant areas 
and throughout Oromia regional State) using the Shimigilina system. The recent report by the Ethiopian Human right 
Commission presented to the HOPR (not yet released) indicated that the ANRS police force used excessive power to silence 
the conflict. One reason being the use of force before the conclusion of the Shimigilina system. 
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Commitment to a democratic developmental state gives enough room for such 
systems.417 
6.5.4. Jurisdictions (areas of operation) 
Potentially the institution of Shimigilina entertains every dispute in their respective 
locality. Judge E holds that all cases could potentially be settled by the non-formal 
sectors.418In this respect Elders H and E entertained cases ranging from battery and 
cases of bodily injury to homicide cases. 419 A saying Semay tekedede bilu 
beshimaglie yisefal alu (literally translated as If the sky is torn apart, shimaglie 
would sew it 420 connotes that Shimigilinanot only gives solutions to all societal 
problems but also restores community harmony which is identified in Section 6.4.2 
as a basic need of the community. Accordingly, the burdens 421 that courts currently 
carry can be relieved if cases with significant implication on social ties including, 
petty offence, family, land, boundary, cases arising from minor misunderstandings 
be referred to the non-formal system for an effective resolution.422 But this needs 
tying into a legal framework.423 
                                                          
417As has been discussed the mainstream thinking during the former systems was against non-formal systems and a talk of 
justice in this respect was not possible. As life and business cannot avoid considering these systems, for good or bad, we need 
to see how they are operating in the system. Especially it is important to see what, if any, opportunity they may create to a 
market and how far they may create opportunity to social cohesion and hence to social justice. The formal laws should give 
rooms to respect the cultural ways in which mutual trust could be developed. Contrary to this some laws do not give rooms 
for the application of traditional ways of doing business. For example, article 2142 of the civil code makes it mandatory that a 
loan worth birr 500 and above shall only be proved with the production of written evidence. The interpretation of article 1723 
of the civil code by the cassation division of the Federal Supreme Court (as requiring mandatory registration of contracts 
dealing with immovable properties) only created a mess  as it mismatched with the way the people understand and deal with 
business (Interview WithAcademic B, Supra note 10). Recent works indicated that this decision is being changed many times 
by the same bench and aproclamation is promulgated to control the effect of this decision. 
418unless the settlement is illegal and immoral 
419Elders E and G, Supra note 103. 
420Elder F, Supra note 98. 
421 Interview with Academic B, Supra note 10. 
422.Interview with Academic B Supra note 10, and Interview with Judge E, Supra note 17.  
423Interview with Judge E, Supra note 17and Academic B, Supra note 10.. 
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According to Elder C the service of Shimigilina is open to all people from any corner 
that volunteer to get the service. Women and some Government officers have also 
made use of the forum. He told me that people outside from his locality 
(Zanamba)424 and people from areas as far as Debre Birhan and Addis Ababa425 
have settled their cases in Zanamba. 
Shimigilina has also settled a case pending or entertained by the formal courts. 
Practically the courts (even at the regional cassation level) would push parties to 
reconcile when the outcome of the case is difficult to predict and when small claims  
are litigated.426 Most cases settled via erq would get rarely reversed by the courts 
and I found none in the cases consulted. Elder D427 told me that they have settled a 
case that is disposed of by the Federal Cassation Bench. 
In this respect Judge B informed me that in a marital property dispute a case at the 
cassation level, technically or legally, had to be sent back to the lower courts for a 
retrial. This would benefit the wife but the judges over the case thought that this 
process would further impoverish the woman. The husband expected another 
outcome. When the judges informed the parties the possible outcomes of the case 
they demanded time so that erq may be arranged. They were given time to see 
Shimagilie. The Shimaglina settled the case to the benefit of both parties. The judge 
remarked that judges should decide in the formal courts also in such a fair way 
(which the procedural codes allow) than being technical.428 
Relationships between the courts and the non-formal system is not always as 
smooth as these cases indicate. For example the Shimigilina in Zanamba entertains 
                                                          
424A locality in ANRS, Noth Shewa administrative zone, gerakeyaworedakebele.  
425This is more than 180kms and 300 kms away from ZanaAmba. 
426Interview with Judge B, Supra note 10. 
427Interview with Elder D, Supra note 14. 
428In another case parties’, on their own initiatives, come up with erq on the day judgments was to be given. Judge ‘B’ 
demanded the case to be closed bases on their erq. Other judges presiding over the case in the cassation bench did not agree 
on this move as decision was ready to be read. He told me that the result of the forward looking erq would have been much 
more preferable for the parties than the judgment. He added that judges should be more than the ‘’dead letters” of the laws. 
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only cases of betrayal as the nearby court prohibited them from entertaining family, 
land and other cases.429 
6.5.5. Workload 
All the proceedings being oral and the forum ad hoc, it is difficult to get reliable 
data that show the workload of the Shimigilina. But evidence here and there 
indicated that the system is busy and the case rate is increasing overtime.430 Elder C 
said that they used to entertain 20 or more cases in a day but this number is 
reduced these days due to a similar service established recently by churches in a 
neighboring Woreda including Chara-Yohanis, Gey-Sillasie, Cherer-Mewicha-Sillasie. 
Elder G told me that 1,500-2000 cases would be entertained in a year by a single 
Shimigilina forum in a Woreda which, if so, would entertain more cases than a 
Woreda court entertains.431 Another source indicated that when the Bahir Dar 
Woreda court entertained 14,205 cases in 2015, more than 30,000 cases were 
settled through the erq process for the same year.432 
The Ethiopian Arbitration And Reconciliation Center (hereinafter EACC) Bahir Dar 
Branch had 14 cases referred to it from the Bahir Dar Woreda court in June and July 
2012, of which 12 were settled effectively. The only cost incurred for all the cases 
was Ethiopian Birr 1,660. It reported that within 9 months of 2012 it had effectively 
settled 5,211 civil cases referred to it from Bahir Dar Woreda Court.433 The Branch 
effectively settled 1,642 civil cases in five months (from 2012-2013).434 Of these 
                                                          
429Interview with Elder C, Supra note 89. 
430 A study Supra note 2 indicated that a single forum with a combination of various ADRMs entertain more cases than the 
nearby Woreda Court. 
431The average number of cases a Woreda receives for the last five years does not exceed this number. 
432Judge I, on the focus group discussion and all group participants shared his argument. 
433The Branch used Shimigilina to effect the settlement. The cases were constituted of 1083 family, 783 paternity, 817 
neighboring dispute, 70 cooperatives, 305 commercial, 522 commercial organizations, 1005 other family issues and153 other 
cases. 
434which include 446 husband-wife and family cases, 157 paternity cases, 304 neighboring disputes, 35 boundary disputes, 
47 cooperatives cases, 178 commercial organizations cases, 183 other family cases and 344 other cases. The WG High Court 
also sent cases to the Branch which settled 121 (family 13 of 24, labor 28 of 52, other civil cases 20 of 27, land disputes 1 out 
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cases 14,022 were settled effectively and file closed.435 These figures make it clear 
that huge (and diversified) number of cases is being entertained by the Shimigilina 
system. Bearing the work load of the system in his locality Elder G concluded that 
had these bodies been strengthened, the people would have no desire for the 
police.436 
6.5.6. Purpose of Shimigilina 
Shimigilina has the purpose of maintaining peace and communal harmony in the 
present and for the future.437 This is reflected in every step of the procedure and 
the outcome of Shimigilina. For this purpose Shimigilina looks backward in 
searching for the truth but always looks forward for solutions. Judge B stated that 
while the formal system focuses solely on the past relationships between the 
parties, the non-formal system mainly looks forward to establishing harmony and 
restoring the lost balance.438 
Shimigilina also has the purpose of reducing damages from being inflicted on those 
near and around the perpetrator of the alleged wrong. Elder B stated that the 
purpose of the non-formal system is halting further damage not only to the parties 
but also to their cattle, children and women as a result of circles of revenge. Judge E 
stated that if a case in the formal system is between A and B for the non-formal 
system this involves people beyond A and B (is between groups in a community). 
This is very important as the most common litigation in the ANRS are litigations 
between relatives and close neighbors as a result of which social cohesion between 
relatives (and between man and environment) is being eroded.439 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of 1, civil and 9 of 13 crimes upon complaint, 1 of 2 crimes on property) peacefully. A total of 72 files of the 121 were settled 
peacefully. 
435The NS High Court yearly performance report, 2015. 
436Interview with Elder  G, Supra note 103. 
437Interview with Elders E, C, D and F, Supra notes 100, 86, 120 and 98. 
438Interview with Judge B, Supra note 10. 
439Interview with Academic A, Supra note 18. Thus reducing cycle of disputes necessitates settling misunderstandings and 
tightening social ties to be the very conception of justice in the no-formal system. 
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In addition to serving the communal peace at a minimal cost Shimigilina also serve 
to complement litigants in the formal system that have the truth but no evidence to 
prove it. According to informants the outcome of erq will be reduced to writing so 
that the litigants could make use of the document in formal courts in case the 
opponent defects.440 Moreover, the system is also used to rectify injustices in the 
formal courts. Informants mentioned cases where litigants in the formal court lost 
their cases due to forged evidence. In their respective localities informants441 came 
across with cases where, based on the consent of the parties, they went through it 
gain and rectified the miscarriage of justice in courts. 
The system also serves to prevent further litigations or escalation of vendetta. In 
serious cases (like cases of homicide442) Shimagilewoch would intervene on their 
own initiative at the earliest possible time to stop the circle of revenge.443 In other 
cases where the elders deem that the rate of disputing in the community escalates 
so that God will chastise the community they would initiative the process and 
convene a forum to reconcile or create the opportunity to reconcile possible 
litigants. For example Elder I 444 told me that: 
…when the Kebele had no rain (and was to face drought), elders and priests 
gathered the local people and told them that the widespread undisclosed 
dispute in the community was the cause to this fact. They taught the people 
that feuds would upset God who punishes the vindictive in this way. If they 
make peace, then God pardons and all would live in an ungrudging 
atmosphere. They did this for three consecutive days and made around 400 
people of the community reconcile. The people then resorted to work and 
when so engaged the community would face no more hardship. 
                                                          
440Interview with Elders DandC, Supra notes 120 and  89. 
441Interview with Elders D, C and E, Supra notes 120, 89 and 103. 
442Interview with judge E, Supra note 17. 
443Interview with Elder D, Supra note 120. 
444Interview with Elder I, Supra note 21. 
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He further told me that that the rain came after such settlement and he believes 
that there is no further ungrudging in his locality.445 Thus the system is making 
people resort to work and enhancing their capability of doing. 
6.5.7. Procedure 
Though the search for truth determines the procedure, Shimigilina uses unwritten 
laws and flexible procedure applied across civil, criminal or other claims.  The 
flexibility helps the elders to get more powerful information about the case so that 
litigants can come to a settlement. In most cases the aggrieved party triggers the 
motion of Shimigilina. Receiving oral allegations, the Shimaglewoch gather and 
deliberate on the issue and call on the alleged perpetrator of the damage. Some 
Shimigilina serve written subpoena.446 A person who did not appear or who abused 
the system is believed to suffer and cost his life.447 
The entire proceeding is oral. When both parties appear and consent to the 
Shimigilina the first person to speak about the bedel (ill-treatment) is the plaintiff. 
The situation of the case determines the next procedures.448 To assure consent and 
appearance the defendant swears in the life of one of his relatives (zemed yimut 
and others). And then he will guarantee (wa’as metirat) his appearance and give (in 
bodily injury case for example) a sheep or goat to the plaintiff. This in particular will 
be done when the case is also being investigated by the police. The guarantee 
(wa’as masterat) makes appearance mandatory, but far more than that serves to 
                                                          
445Interview with Elder A (Supra note 91). He  also shared this view and stated that if reconciliation is not effected the sin will 
pass over to descendants in a way people inherited the sin of Adam.  However the connection the system is working to 
effectively implement civil code and civil procedure codes declarations regarding arbitration. 
446Interview with Elder C, Supra note 90. He added that the system he is working in RasAmbaKebele serve subpoena to 
defendants 
446Interview with Elder C ,Supra note 90. He remarked how a very well living and reputed man in the city of Gera Keya 
Woreda appeared as a defendant to the forum and abused the elders and religious leaders but only suffered too much 
thereafter and passed away. 
447 Ibid. 
448Interview with Elder J, Elder served as Shimaglie for more than 18 years lives in Gera Keya but interviewed in Addis Ababa, 
12/11/2015 and Judge E, Supra note 17. 
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keep the social relationship unaffected so that the alleged perpetrator of the harm 
(civil or criminal) will not be evacuated from the area he has been living and the 
market he has been transacting. 449  In more serious cases (like Demisew 
Temitime’s450 case) the alleged perpetrator may be ordered not to move out of a 
certain area. 
The Shimaglewoch may talk to the parties on individual bases before talking to 
them in common. In searching for the truth elders may receive evidence from any 
one any time they deem relevant. This could be done outside the forum and on the 
motion of any of the elder’s personal capacity, even wandering in the locality and 
asking anyone in the locality in his own way.451 
Every Shimigilin’s move symbolises what they are there for (values of the system). 
For example, in the process of settlement most of them do not chose an elevated 
place but rather place themselves in between the parties. This symbolises 
impartiality and respect for the right to be heard of both parties to the maximum 
possible.452 They chose Sundays or other holidays so that they could get additional 
power to convince litigants to forgive for the sake of the Creator.453Mostly they 
settle the case in one session.454 Most cases would be settled in a day, the 
maximum could take two or four adjournments.455 
The venue for the Shimigilina could be the church, residence of one of them, or 
could be under a tree.456 Elder D stated that the venue will be arranged depending 
                                                          
449Interview with Elder B, Supra note 93. 
450Interview with Elder H, Demisew was suspected of committing homicide. Having being informed about the crime, the 
elders convene a forum of their own initiatives. Upon appearance Demisew was ordered not to move out of his work and 
market place until the process of Shimigilina was concluded.  Demisew was a rich farmer who did according to this order and 
his status has not been reduced during the Shimigilina. 
451Interview with Elder E, Supra note 104, and Elder C, Supra note 90. 
452Interview with Elder F, Supra note 95 and Judge E ,Supra note 17. 
453like St. Michael, St. Gebril, St.Mary date or other non-working days depending on the party’s interest, Interview with 
Elders C, D and E Supra notes 90, 121 and 104 respectively. 
454Interview With Elder B, F and Judge E, Supra note 93, 95 and 104 respectively. 
455Interview with Elders E and D, Supra notes 104 and 121 respectively. 
456Interview with Elder D, Judge E, Supra notes 121 and 17 respectively. 
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on the convenience of the litigants.457 Or they may convene the forum at a place 
that village people gather where it is more convenient either to call witness or 
participate in a market or reckon advice from another elder if the need arose. They  
may change the venue when the case did not come to settlement at one shot or 
when the parties feel insecure. Changing the venue in these situations is believed to 
energize elders to the benefit of the mediation.458 Changing venue may also help to 
secure position free argument. 
Ritual ceremonies would remark the conclusion of the process of Shimigilina and 
the dispute.   
6.5.8. Remedies and Rituals 
As has been explained above the justice of the system emerges when the truth of 
the case is revealed. This will be concluded by erq which is believed to halt feuds 
between the litigants and beyond. 
Before the emergence of the result of the settlement by one of the elders the elder 
wrap up a summary of the case and the necessity of resolving a dispute. The 
situations of the parties (like being brothers, poor) will be explained. The parties will 
be asked to accept the recommendation. This will be followed by the awards which 
is called kassa (compensation). This mostly takes monetary form. The amount, 
named yeshimagile, is first proposed by the shimaglewoch and can be agreed by 
the litigants. This would take account of the damage suffered by the plaintiff, the 
possible damage if the defendant would be sent to prison, and the desire not to 
damage the defendant beyond the unbearable. If the plaintiff might incur expenses 
in the future, the Shimaglewoch would also make the defendant agree to make the 
damage good until full recovery. This is believed to heal every injury. The adage 
Hatiyat beniseha, bedel bekasa (sin in repentance trespass in repatriation) indicates 
the remedial effect of compensation for any kind of injury. Depending on the case a 
                                                          
457Public participation is wide in the application of the norm it adopted in the real meaningful way. 
458Interview with Elder I, Supra note 21. 
 
277 
 
Wekesa (reprimand or blame ), that has the ability to constrain behavior in the 
future, may supplement or complement the award.459 This restraint may at time 
have more power than the effect of formal sanctions to the benefit of litigant’s 
capability. 
As indicated above the system has strong links with spirituality. This is reflected by 
the litigant faithfulness and reliance on oath, elders’ curses and blessings, sacrifices 
of animals and reference to religious principles and morals. Though some of these 
are reflected in the process, the ritual ceremony at the end of Shimigilina makes 
this connection more vivid. Erq will always be followed by rituals and other 
traditional ceremonies. After the case is settled the Shimaglewoch give thanks, 
make parties salute and kiss each other, forgive each other in the name of God and 
arrange a feast, (depending on the capacity of the parties and in both houses). 
When Shimigilina is done in churches, prayers will be arranged.460 
In minor cases only compensation may not be necessary and Digis (literally 
translated as feast), with money contributed from both parties, could conclude the 
process. Digis at any rate is a must as Erq without Digis is believed not to settle the 
dispute.461 In more serious cases, (for example, homicide cases) a religious father (a 
priest) of the litigants would praise and pray. In such cases parties slaughter a sheep 
or an ox bought in common and eats the meat using a knife in common. In homicide 
cases all male relatives of both sides attend the ceremony and the elders would 
make them pass over a rifle or a rod. This is believed to dry the blood.462 The 
purpose of passing over a rifle or a rod is to symbolise the desire to be killed by the 
rifle in case one of them defects the shimigilina. Sometimes marriage may be 
arranged between the relatives of the parties.463 
                                                          
459Unlike the non-formal system, the formal system does have such bases (Interview with Judge B, Supra note 10). 
460Elders B and I, Supra note 89 and 21respectively. 
461Interview with Elder E, Supra note 104. 
462Interview with Elders A, D, E, Supra note 91, 121 and 104 respectively. 
463Interview with Elder ‘A’, Supranote 91. 
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6.5.9. Common cases 
Elders B and E told me that most cases in the cities they serve as Shimaglie involve 
family cases. They entertain these cases in either of two ways: either as council of  
elders or as family council.464 In convening a family council the family codes apply 
and each litigant provides the court with a list of two elders and one would be 
chosen in common. In such cases elders are usually relatives of the couples or 
persons who testified the marriage. On receiving the case from the court, the 
council may call relatives of the parties to go in to the real cause of the dispute. If 
the real cause is the push of relatives, they will, in most cases, reconstruct the 
dispute and make the parties agree. If they fail to settle the case amicably, they will 
send it back to the court from which it came.  
This is different from the way they do justice convening the council of elders 
(Shimigilina) explained above. A single case may pass through both formal and non-
formal forums. The Sirgut vs. Liake case at Debrebirhan has passed through courts, 
family councils and eiders’ council (shimaglewoch). The court and the family 
councils could not save the marriage. However, the shimaglewoch (elders’ council) 
managed to settle the dispute and served social justice. This case is representative 
of other similar cases as it indicates how legal and social justice lost in the formal 
courts end up being secured by the non-formal system. The case also illustrates the 
process and the outcome of the Shimigilina system.  
 
 
 
                                                          
464The former is the traditional Shimigilina, the latter is a council to be constituted as per article…of the ANRS and article…of 
the Federal Family law. 
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6.5.9.1. The case of Sirgut VS. Liake 
Plaintiff Mrs. Sirgute (wife) 
Defendant Mr. Liake 
File opened on 29/02/2009 
Appealed on 27/7/2010 and 30/7/2010 
Finally closed on 14/10/2010. 
This is a family case No. 02430 brought before Bebre Birhan Woreda Court. The 
couples were married in 1988 and have got 4 children. The wife w/ro Sirgute 
brought the case to the court on 29/2/2009 G.C. She demanded divorce because of 
repeated violence. She listed more than 32 items and a house built on 640 sq.m of 
land to be divided equally. Laike replied to the court that the allegations were false 
and the court should dismiss the motion. In case the court did not accept his motion 
he on his side listed more than 21 items of property to be divided after the 
dissolution of the marriage. The court sent the matter to family elders, as is 
expected of the family codes, but the family councils established as per the dictates  
of the family law couldn’t reconstruct the marriage. Accordingly, the council sent 
the case back to the court and the marriage was dissolved on 22/10/2009. The 
court also decided to divide all their properties equally. 
The file was reopened at the Woreda court a year after (on 30/2/2010) to effect the 
enforcement of the court decision. The court decided (after three adjournments-
14/3/2010, 16/3/2010, 20/3/2010) to divide equally the proceeds of the sale of all 
the properties via auction. Both appealed465 against the decision regarding the 
property (not on the divorce issue which they cannot) and two files were opened in 
the North Shewa High Court.466 Shimagliwoch  (not family council) interfered in the 
                                                          
465It has been explained earlier how enforcement of decision is problematic in courts. 
466File No 02430 and File No 02409 of the North Shewa High Court. 
280 
 
middle of the proceeding.467 As a result, Sirgut’s appeal (after six adjournments) and 
Liake’s appeal (after five adjournments) were closed. The shimaglewochi (two of 
them were women)468 investigated the root cause of the problem (also talked to 
two brothers of Sirgut) at this level and made the parties agree on the following 
points: 
1. Legalise their marriage again 
2. make their property common to both and their children 
3. if a party abandons this agreement he shall forfeit his property to the other 
partner and the children 
4. The wife shall receive the house rent and administer the rent. 
The agreement was signed by the Shimaglewoch and both parties. 
The Shimaglewoch who tried to settle the matter at the High Court level were not 
the family council but were council of elders. Two religious leaders469  from Sarian 
area were also involved in the process. They were having a meeting with the 
Shimaglewoch every Sunday for five times at a local kebel. This council of elders 
found the root cause of the dispute. 
After a year from the conclusion of the Shimigilina  I had the chance to talk to Liake 
and later Sirgut.470 He confessed to me that his violence against Sirgute was wrong 
and was the very reason for the divorce. He proudly informed me that he had now 
corrected his behaviour, it is important to see here the danger of returning wowam 
to a misbehaving husband, and they are now happy together and life has changed 
remarkably after. He stated that his family dream in life was educating their 
children to the highest level and becoming wealthy via trade. This dream was 
devastated when the formal courts and the family council failed to reconstruct their 
marriage. In the process of the litigation he paid 10,000 ETB to his lawyer; Sirgut 
                                                          
467This is not required of the formal laws. The Shimagilewoch involvement was in accordance with the expectation of the 
traditional system. 
468As is discussed earlier though the system exclude women from being a Shimaglie, their involvement is not common. 
469 469Aba (lit.Father)wihib and qes (lit.priest) Fithaweq.  Sarian is about 5 kms south of DebreBirha. 
470I was not able to get the wife but confirmed via phone that she shares all what Liake stated. 
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also did the same. For more than a year he was unable to carry on the business at 
which he used to earn 30,000 ETB every month. As he alleged he stopped doing the 
business because one cannot do things like that when there is neger  (a case.)471 
This indicates how a prolonged litigation could damage the parties’ capability of 
‘’doing’’ (finding justice).  It can also be seen how the family had been impoverished 
despite the dream. The negative and positive outcomes of the case have to be seen 
vis-à-vis the litigants’ capability of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ (having justice) in their life. It 
is only when these elements are served that social justice would be realised. As far 
as the law is concerned the courts and the family council can be said to have served 
legal justice expected of in a case where one of the parties decided to end their 
marriage via divorce. The Liake case is a good example to show how legal justice of 
this sort might not necessarily end up with social justice. 
Moreover after the case is settled via the Shimigilina way Liakes’ capability of 
‘being’ and ‘doing’ is realised in the following way.472 
1. They are civilly married again (the conclusion of the agreement 
amounted to a new marriage) 
2. They re-built the house (that was auctioned for 70,000 ETB) which is 
now worth 1.2 million ETB and is being improved further 
3. Have their eldest daughter graduated from Jima University with a degree 
in law and  
4. Multiplied their trades in two areas.473 
                                                          
471Senior judges (Judges ‘’B’’ and ‘’C, Supra notes 10 and 30) at the ANRS Supreme Court also agreed on how having a case in 
courts would be counter-productive. Judge ‘’E’’ also noted that non-formal systems would leave the trader to trade, the 
farmer to till his land with the necessary time and cost and business would not be closed by attending the non-formal system. 
472Liake added that he has got another case worth Birr 5,500 (less than 220 USD) pending at the Cassation division of the 
Federal Supreme court in Addis Ababa. He admits the 1,200 birr but denies the remaining amount as being fabricated. He 
complains that he lost the case at the lower courts despite clear evidence. He paid 10% of 5,500 birr to his lawyer. 
Additionally he incurs costs in going and coming back from DebreBirhan to Addis Ababa (150 km away). He hopes to get good 
decision in his favor at the cassation level. He boldly told me that (with a sense of advice) he makes use of non-formal dispute 
resolution mechanism if he came across with any case in the future. 
473Interview with Liake, client to the courts and the non-formal system, Debrebirhan, 10/8/2015. 
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Elder B informed me that he has come across with many similar cases where the 
Shimigilina system repaired the failure in the formal system. Elder E stated that 
searching for the very cause of the dispute is what makes them effective.474 What 
has come to be interesting is how the Shimagilewoch help both parties be part of 
both the problem and the solution. He stated that whenever there is a dispute one 
of the parties always looks backward while the other looks forward. A Shimaglies 
hould help both parties look backward and forward. This particularly is important in 
family cases where women look backward (of all the pains in the past) while the 
men look forward.475 
6.5.9.2. Monetary cases 
The following case has come from a narration from one of my informants.476 It 
indicates how the non-formal system could help to complement the gaps in the 
formal system. 
In a case which Elder B entertained a woman was denied by a man of Birr 2,100 
which she gave as loan. She had no evidence at all. The Shimagliwoch called both 
and talked to them as usual. They found that the man was living with HIV virus for 
long period of time. They praised God for giving the man a long life with the virus 
and showed him their confidence on him that he will never betray such a God. He 
told the elders that he will not betray both God and the woman. He agreed that he 
owed the money to the women. He not only accepted the debt but also effected its 
                                                          
474In one case which ended in divorce the shimaglewoch made the husband and the wife settle and remarry. In a very 
private conversation they found that the real trouble lies in the husband committing immoral act (which I agreed not to 
mention here). The elders made the wife convinced of all men doing this to make their marriage lively and lovely. Now they 
are living in Bahir Dar being one of the richest in the city.In another case couples having 7 children were divorced for the 
husband changed a milk giving cow with a horse without the consent of the wife. They divided their property equally. Aft a 
year consuming all of her shares and looking convalescent she appeared before the court. The man was called and appeared 
before the court looking good but in the details told the court that he lost his peace and spent very night with full of night 
mare. The judge sent them again to reconciliation. They remarried again and now living peacefully and prosperously. Judges 
in focus group discussion agreed that there are many other similar cases. 
475Interview with Elder F, Supra note 95. 
476Interview with Elder B, Supra note 89. 
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repayment on monthly bases. The woman did not take the case to the court, as she 
had been told by professionals that she would lose the case.477 
Had the woman taken the case to courts before taking to the Shimigilina, she would 
have lost it and been further impoverished. This clearly is not only against realising 
social justice but is also doing injustice. If the courts establish effective links to the 
non-formal system, gaps in litigation (including evidence) would be reduced, fulfill 
basic needs and hence social justice. The mere application of such laws would 
create income insecurity among the poor and the formal-non-formal connections 
helps the poor to ameliorate the insecurity and increase the effectiveness of courts. 
6.5.9.3. Criminal cases 
Shimigilina has helped to halt further impoverishment. The following case indicates 
how perjury is damaging the formal system while the non-formal system rectifies 
this to prevent further impoverishment. 
A married man and a father of two, hardworking farmer kicked a woman with dula 
(a stick) during a boundary dispute. The woman fabricated a story and complained 
to the police that this man attempted to rape her. The man heard this and 
evacuated from the place for four months where his whereabouts was unknown. 
His brother asked for Shimigilina. The shimagilewoch talked to the woman and her 
father in search for the truth. After a repeated attempt the woman confessed that 
the man only had beaten her. The man was called and agreed to pay 1,500 ETB 
which he did soon. The woman told the police the truth and lifted her case.478 
Elder I added that if the woman proceeded with the case the man would have never 
returned to his locality or if he did so he would have been sent to jail serving 
rigorous imprisonment of 15 years.479 This couldn’t make the man capable of his 
                                                          
477The Ethiopian civil code under article 2472(1)declares that ‘’where the sum lent exceeds five hundred Ethiopian dollars, 
the contract of loan may only be proved in writing or by a confession made or oath taken in court’’. 
478Interview with Judge I, Supra note 341. 
479This is based on his alleged knowledge of a similar story in Addis Ababa that ended in sending the man to a 15 years 
rigorous imprisonment. 
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‘’being’’-rehabilitated or couldn’t yield lessons to others ‘’being’’ law abiding 
citizens. Thus, he concluded, the world would have been much better had all the 
office holders in the formal system done this Shimigilina way. 
There are other important cases which explain how social harmony is established to 
halt further impoverishment480 how parties are made capable of being and doing, 
how harmony is maintained in the community, how social justice in this respect is 
realized and enforcement is effective.481 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that the problems in the legal history of the courts are 
not resolved despite the various attempts to reform the system. The case study 
demonstrated the root causes of the challenges that made Ethiopians’ desire to 
improvements in fulfilling basic needs and living standards not being fulfilled by 
decision making bodies. The mismatch between law and practice simply continued. 
The reform programmes did not solve the problems of the conceptualisation of 
justice. These problems were the legacy of the past. 
The main reasons behind the problems include: 
1. Problems in identifying issues of the people, in realising these issues of 
the people and in attaining outcomes the people expect 
                                                          
480Interview with Elder A, Supra note 91. Elder Asettled 12 homicide cases. He settled the case of Aleminew who paid 12,000 
as kassa and who lives peacefully after completing his sentence for homicide. On the other hand a person who served 20 
years for another homicide case was killed by the son of the deceased just after being released from prison-just a day before 
the interview with Elder ‘A’. He told me that this was so, and common, when the parties did not go through the erq process 
however long the perpetrator served a sentence. Now the killer evacuated from the city leaving everything he has 
unattended- family protection scheme like the non-formal one. In another case (FentaChekol vs. EngidawGebiru-sons of same 
grandfather) 8 and 9 persons respectively were killed before the erq from both sides (Elder ‘A’). Judge J remembers a case 
where 6 and 7 persons are killed owing to the same reason and stated that ‘’the formal system could not halt this”. So the 
two systems should work hand in hand and integration policy, procedural laws should be adapted to this effect (Interview 
with judge J, Supra note 26). 
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2. Gaps in clearly stipulating what contribution is expected of the courts in 
building a democratic developmental state 
3. Lack of clarity in understanding what development is, how the legal 
system defines the mission of the courts and how justice is defined 
4. Insufficient role for the non-formal system and the inability to make use 
of its rich justice heritage principles. 
The case study also demonstrated that significant number of litigants present their 
cases to the non-formal systems for better process and outcome. While it is not 
given enough space by the formal system the non-formal system combines 
objectively and subjectively peoples’ secular and spiritual life and serves as a cause 
to realising peoples’s capability of ‘being’ and ‘doing’. The Chapter demonstrated 
that the application of non-formal system of dispute resolution mechanism not only 
continued but is being expnded today with important and coherent justice 
principles that could be used as the bases of Ethiopian reform program. The 
Ethiopian variant of non-formal system has important lessons regarding values in 
judicial business, the process in decision making and impacting lives as an outcome. 
The chapter questioned the assumptions that extensive use of imported change 
instruments (including reform programs) would solve all problems in the justice 
system. Case studies proved that reform programs would only be effective when 
targeted local problems using local solutions. Moreover reform programmes have 
to arrange non-hierarchal decision making powers, so that formal systems have to 
share some of the powers they monopolised and should recognize non-formal 
systems as equally responsible bodies in realizing social justice. 
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7 
Conclusion  
This study has been conducted in response to the quest for effective decisions by 
dispute settlement institutions in order to realise social justice. The study has 
therefore examined:  
1. The gap between legal and social justice in the legal history of Ethiopia. 
2. Dispute settlement institutions, constitutional imperatives and their role in 
realising legal and social justice. 
3. How legal and social justice and the role of judicial reform programmes in 
Ethiopia  improved the gap between legal and social justice, and the 
relationship between formal and non-formal dispute settlement institutions; 
in this respect the study in particular examined the non-formal system of 
dispute resolution to develop principles so as to find ways to improve the 
formal systems. 
4. People’s reaction to an ineffective dispute resolution mechanism and 
harmonisation between the formal and non-formal ways of dispute 
resolution mechanisms towards social justice. 
5. The connection between different factors of legal justice (including legal 
history of Ethiopia, litigation rates and the mentality of litigation in the 
country, prevalence of legal pluralism in the country, ability of decision 
making bodies) and the fulfillment of basic needs, improvements of living 
standards and reduction of poverty. 
6. The root causes of the challenges faced by judicial reform programmes and 
lessons to be learnt from the non-formal systems. 
Chapters One-Four covered general issues, whereas Chapters Five and Six discussed 
and analysed case studies with respect to each of these issues. The study argued 
that the realisation of social justice has been problematic for a number of reasons. 
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Chapter One explored Ethiopian legal history and suggested that Ethiopia has a long 
and uninterrupted history of modernizing its laws and judicial systems. This 
globalized the laws while the courts remained very local. While the laws were made 
amorphous, less influential and devoid of jural postulates, the courts became 
dependent on either the rulers or the public. The institutions were not effective in 
shaping the behavior of litigants despite the modernization efforts. This intensified 
resistance on the part of the formal system while giving momentum to the non-
formal system of dispute resolution that necessitated the need to redefine 
institutions, justice and their role. 
Chapter Two defined institutions in a wider perspective and argued that neo-liberal 
economic emphasis on institutions of contract and property rights is problematic so 
far as realizing social justice was concerned. It argued that constitutions are 
fundamental institutions and held that other institutions’ role should be making real 
the dictates of this basic institution. This role basically incorporates shaping 
behaviours towards enhancing the capability of the people and fulfilling social 
justice. It indicated that justice is about human right which in turn has to be about 
human capability enhancement. 
Chapters Three and Four are about legal and judicial reforms undertaken globally 
and in the Ethiopian context. These reforms are preceded by the old law and 
development movements and were to rectify mistakes in the old movement. The 
chapters demonstrated that though the new movement is dynamic the practice 
remained static. With the variation in context, the old and new law and 
development movements demonstrated that justice has been monopolized by the 
formal systems towards a thin conception of development in terms of economic 
growth. The Ethiopian variant in particular indicated that identification of problems 
and recommendations were technically done by CILC that shares the ethos of global 
financial institutions. Thus the reform talks in global languages of good governance, 
ROL and accountability. The perspectives from non-formal systems were not taken 
account of and non-formal systems are not given enough space.  
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Chapters Five and Six explained the achievements and challenges of the ongoing 
reform programmes in Ethiopia. The chapters are based on case studies and 
indicated that the successes of the judicial reform programme were important but 
were distanced from the realisation of social justice. Chapter Six in particular 
explained the contradictions and challenges in the reform and the reasons behind 
the challenges. 
This chapter draws these points and contains the conclusions of the study. The 
conclusions mainly focus on the way social justice could be realised by the formal 
courts. The first part of this chapter contains a summary of conclusions of the study 
while the second part deals with analysis of the conclusions and future work. 
7.1 Summary of conclusions 
Ethiopian constitutional and legal development has largely been outward looking. 
Currently this has been the case in the Constitution of 1995 in which Chapter Three 
on Human and Democratic Rights was influenced by international conventions. The 
contents of the right to development (which vaguely puts persons center of 
development, gives prority to respect for all human rights, recognizes realizing 
social justice, and allows wider participation) are in congruence with the contents in 
the RTD. Specifically, the right to development under Article 43 of the Constitution 
is influenced by the Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986 which in its 
part is influenced by the development conception of Amaryta Sen. This Constitution 
belongs to the 21st Century but for the most part the enforcement of the 
Constitution lags behind the century. 
The imported laws assumed formalisation as agents of engineering change. While 
the formal systems passively endorsed the laws and marginalized the non-formal 
system, the non-formal system is actively engaged in the lives of the people. All 
efforts could not substitute the deep rooted non-formalization on the part of the 
people. On the other hand the possibility of being oppressive on the part of the 
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non-formal system and the competitive advantages of the formal system indicated 
that indigenousness too didn’t guarantee the full realization of social justice.  
Contemporary reform attempts also suffered from two major problems: firstly, the 
reforms are externally derived and do not take local needs into account and tend to 
be technicist. In particular, they do not take into account the constitutional need to 
consider social justice. Secondly, they have until now tended to ignore the vital 
relationship between the formal and non-formal systems. 
More specifically, the thesis established that the formal system has many problems. 
The judicial reform programme and other change instruments have developed 
many initiatives as discussed in the previous chapter, but have not really succeeded 
in delivering an effective and socially just system for the following reasons.  
1. The role of Ethiopian courts was not clearly stipulated. The chapters proved that 
in real terms Ethiopian courts bear their impacts on lives of persons and groups. 
Constitutionally speaking Ethiopian courts were duty bound to give life to the 
right to development, which in turn means courts are duty bound to enhance 
the capability of litigants and the people. In every one of their moves and 
outcomes courts as organs of the government are expected not to impair the 
realisations of basic needs and living standards of the litigants and the people. 
Various law and reform programmes were designed and implemented but there 
remain significant challenges due to the gap between constitutional 
prescriptions, policies and expectations of poor litigants, the entire people and 
the courts. As the courts are found to be important actors on the social, 
political, economic and environmental life, there is a need to redefine judicial 
role from these perspectives: alleviating poverty and sustaining development. If 
so capability enhancement would not be hallucinogenic to the institutions 
enforcing the Constitutional imperatives. 
2. Lack of correlation between disputing and consequence sensitiveness: Rapid 
increases in disputing in Ethiopia is making the courts busy. As Chapter Five 
demonstrated, a busy court is not necessarily effective enough. The fast 
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disposition rate of courts is not necessarily among the decisive factors that 
increased disputing. Often these size of the files maybe the reason for as well as 
the result of its weakness. The increase in litigation was significantly driven by 
artificial factors and other weaknesses in the executive branch of the 
Government. Chapter Six explained that rent seeking attitudes and behaviours 
on the part of the litigants (and the executive), or failures on the part of the 
Government (example land cases, cases against Government corporations), 
unpredictability and inconsistency on the part of courts (example land cases, 
repeated cases at the federal cassation bench), ethical problems on the part of 
judges precluding adherence to the laws and binding cassation decisions 
account for the inflation in court files. 
This would deteriorate the economic status of the parties or third parties, 
loosen the social ties of the people or fragment resources particularly land so 
that the productivity of land decreases while arising in the economics of scale. 
More artificial litigation is increasing and this will increase the damage to the 
economy, the social ties of citizens and will cause an irreversible damage to the 
capability of parties. As explained in Chapter Six, the non-formal decision 
mechanisms have less of these evils. Thus, there is a need to be consequence 
sensitive to the implication of each case so that courts extend social, economic 
and environmental benefits of their outcomes towards sustaining justice under 
the Constitution. 
3. Lack of considering quality justice as basic needs of the people: As Chapters Five 
and Six indicated disputing is becoming a mass exercise in Ethiopia. This can be 
seen not only from the increase in litigation but also from the content and the 
number of people behind the litigation. Disputing happened to be the game 
between the litigant motives in demanding justice and the courts to supply 
justice. Despite that courts need to consider the real impact of its process and 
outcome upon the lives of the people. As illustrated in Chapters Five and Six the 
judicial reform program didn’t take account of these games and propose 
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fundamental solutions for. It rather focused on measuring justice in economic 
terms than the real impacts of courts performance on the real lives. Chapters 
One and Six indicated that this quality of justice as the basic structure of the 
society was primarily the basic need of the people and all other basic needs 
constitute this demand of social justice. This need has to be comprehended and 
reflected on in the supply of judicial bodies. Accordingly future works need to 
stipulate a threshold of quality performance measurement that gives specific 
attention to the realisation of social justice on individual cases. Courts need to 
give specific attention to deterring behaviors that impairs capability realisation. 
4. Opportunities have not been properly utilised; challenges have not been duly 
recognised: The Ethiopian experience provides important opportunities and 
challenges regarding reform initiatives. The opportunities include the political 
will to reform and change, the acceptable rate in disposing cases measured in 
terms of clearance, back log and congestion rate, the willingness to attract 
meritorious lawyers to the court (and the adoption of law to this effect).  
However, these efforts face many challenges. The challenges include the 
hegemonic approach to reform, counter-productive effect of the ambition to 
reform, the inability to develop reform principles from the non-formal system, 
the tradition of ignoring laws in the books, the overburdened reform 
programmes, the lack of judicial policy or philosophy in the courts and the 
inability to exploit perspectives and potentials of non-formal systems. More 
specifically the challenges pertain to securing justice on a one-to-one case basis, 
enforcing decisions and lack of professionalism among judges, the asymptotic 
dichotomy between law and justice, the dichotomized conception of justice by 
the actor in the formal and the non-formal system, the presence of radically 
diversified and conflicting understanding of justice and lack of clarity on what 
the justice system appreciates as the meaning of justice. A serious challenge 
also lies in the failure of the reform programme to take root at home, take 
lessons from the non-formal system, the failure to define justice and 
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development in the context of the judiciary. This necessitates the revision of the 
role of judges in a democratic and developmental system, and the revisiting of 
the conception of development in the context of the judiciary. 
5. Inability to create learning institutions: Good practices and challenges were 
observed during the field study towards integrating principles from the formal 
and non-formal systems. The culture of taking the exogenous as exotic didn’t 
allow lessons to be taken from the non-formal system. The inability to look 
inside made the potential benefits from the non-formal system of processing 
cases, concluding cases to the benefit of all and the adherence to the common 
principles a far-fetched exercise. As indicated in Chapter Six the attitudes of 
some of the judges towards this system also impeded the scaling up of the good 
practices of harmonizing the formal and the non-formal system in a meaningful 
way. 
Contrary to establishing learning institutions, Chapter Six indicated a recent 
move to establish special courts to deal with market oriented cases that would 
erode court competitiveness towards non-formal systems. This move has been 
influenced by the legal history of Ethiopia that not only marginalised the non-
formal system but also ignored the formal one and encouraged special bodies 
for disputing. This would make parties to prefer courts for non-market oriented 
cases. This in turn would discourage courts from being ‘’learning institutions’’ 
and reduce the global attractiveness of Ethiopian courts which in turn reduces 
investment. 
6. Inability to shape behavior of litigants and beyond: institutional quality results in 
changing the behavior of litigants and beyond. If there is a change in behavior 
litigants would be constrained from using courts as weapons to impoverish other 
litigants. Rather they would use courts to expand their freedoms towards social 
justice realisation. As explained in Chapters Five and Six, the inability on the part 
of the courts to shape behaviors beyond litigants exacerbate corruption so that 
the wealthy and the strong take the upper hands in litigation; the damage to the 
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poor and women escalates; the inconsistency and unpredictability in courts 
begets more cases; similar cases will be opened repeatedly and gives a false 
image of the work load of courts; market failures will increase and enforcement 
of decisions will be more challenging. The courts can be organs of the 
government but less of its institutions. These leave parties with more challenges 
in realizing their basic needs and living standards. 
As indicated in Chapter Six courts have too many cases to handle. An effective 
resolution of these cases could make the courts more important to constraining 
litigants’ behavior that are against the realisation of social justice and 
encouraging behaviors that realize social justice. When courts can do so they 
would qualify as institutions in the strict sense defined in Chapter Two. There is 
thus a need to synchronise the formalisation and non-formalisation efforts so 
that development defined in terms of fulfilling basic needs and living standards of 
the people benefit from pragmatic adoption and implementation of laws by the 
courts.   
7.2 Analysis 
7.2.1 The need to align decision making and poverty alleviation 
The Ethiopian Constitution declares the right to development that includes fulfilling 
the basic needs and living standards of the people and individuals. Moreover the 
GTP2 targets alleviating poverty. Though the courts are duty bound to respect, 
enforce and defend the Constitutional imperative, the laws establishing both the 
Federal and ANRS courts do not stipulate comparable objectives. Courts are 
expected to realise these objectives through the cases brought before them for 
litigation. Their reaction might be individualistic and gradual, but the Ethiopian 
courts have had a large number of cases through which they can economically, 
socially and environmentally impact not only litigants’ lives but also the lives of the 
entire community through the influence they bear on the behaviour of the people 
and the executive branch of the government. Various reform initiatives are believed 
to positively causally contribute to yield support to this great project. The 
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experience of Ethiopian endeavors indicates that wishes expressed in the books 
usually fail unless its judicial role is revisited and articulated explicitly in two ways: 
first in terms of alleviating poverty and second in terms of sustaining development. 
Chapter Five and Six demonstrated that the way courts handle and end family cases 
is eroding the very fabric of the society. The way they handle land cases is 
increasing land fragmentation and disuse which is a huge blow to the economy of 
the country that is largely dependent on agriculture. The way to getting decisions in 
contract cases and enforcing decisions is damaging the market, as the market 
cannot work with ineffective contracts. The failure in enforcing contracts leads to 
market failures, which undercuts sustainable development. The cases are 
intertwined in such a way that company and land cases have their roots in family 
cases and vice versa. Unless the objective of the courts is stipulated in clear terms, 
the negative impacts of courts on this chain effect may continue.  
The chapters also indicated a significant number of cases being brought against the 
Government. Judges appreciate this as a sign of the failures in other branches of the 
Government. This opportunity could have been exploited so that the way 
Government functions could practically be geared towards securing good 
governance and prevent rent seeking behaviour. This creates an opportunity to 
fulfill the Government’s desire of being developmental and democratic. Making 
effective decisions demands serving justice towards enhancing the capabilities of 
the parties, including the Government. 
Furthermore, Ethiopian courts have got the opportunity to positively impact the 
economic, social and environmental performance of the polity. As indicated in 
Chapter Two this is realising sustainable development. Chapter Six illustrated that 
this opportunity is not utilised. Realising social justice would be a faraway exercise 
unless dispute resolution mechanisms align their commitment towards alleviating 
poverty and sustaining development. 
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7.2.2. The need to list capabilities 
Chapter Five demonstrated that of all the cases coming to the attention of the 
courts land, family and contract (monetary) were three of the top five areas. Given 
the rate of litigation, the number of cases in this respect is large enough so that the 
courts could directly impact the entire population within Five years. Had the courts 
bore their impact, change in behavior would have been visible and repeat cases 
would not have increased at the same rate they are increasing now. 
As it is true that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, in the 
context of Ethiopia an equal and opposite reaction to poverty is not wealth but 
justice. Serving justice in courts and non-formal institutions should go beyond 
treating the symptoms of litigation which otherwise multiplies poverty. In this 
respect courts should expand the possible freedoms that litigants have towards 
realizing their capability. This may not happen over time but Ethiopians cannot wait 
too long. Courts may not always be effective in doing so but the principle of fairness 
restricts them from making people incapable. This necessitates the need to list 
capabilities and give priorities to some of the capabilities in the list. This is in 
contrast to suggestions by Rawls but combines the way Nussbaum lists capabilities 
with Sen’s notion of open-endedness.   
As far as litigants in courts are concerned it is difficult to have a complete list of 
capabilities. In Chapter Six various conceptualisations and interests within and 
among judges and litigants are explored. As explained a judge’s preference of 
health may not fit the truth preference of the litigant or the peace preference of 
the people. In some cases, where litigants hide their real interest (example artificial 
divorce indicated in Chapter Six) this will be further complicated. This makes listing 
capabilities in courts problematic. However, capabilities can be listed broadly and 
enforced within the context of Ethiopian conception of social justice.  
Thus as contradictory principles were observed in the operation of the courts, the 
first in the list of capabilities is the rule not to harm and not to allow harm to 
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happen.482 Avoiding clear injustice is the first subset in this list. Halting further 
damage to the freedoms of litigants being and doing may include designing a 
judicial reform programme based on principles that are homegrown, not serving as 
a forum with illicit motives to harm, devising mechanisms to do away with artificial 
litigation, using court resources (procedural codes) against harms to the parties, 
accessing justice to the most disadvantaged (owing to factors including geography, 
representation and gender), managing time and being time bounded in serving 
justice, and giving one-to-one attention to cases than focusing on the general 
picture.  
Allowing more opportunities to litigants towards justice is another subset of the list. 
This can be done, for example, by giving more freedoms to parties to make use of 
non-formal systems in searching the truth of the case.  
7.2.3. Quality or numerical performance measurements? 
The right of access to justice and the right to development are enshrined in the 
Ethiopian Constitution. The right to access includes the right not only to appear 
before courts but to pass through the courts in a fair and reasonable time so as 
litigants secure decisions. Short of decisions one cannot talk of accessing justice 
towards economic, social or environmental ends. Rather, one can talk in terms of 
de-capacitating litigants and the people who could have been directly and indirectly 
affected had the decision been given. The current high rate of attrition should be 
appreciated from this angle. This implies that access to justice feeds the realisation 
of the right to development. 
Despite that the current mindset of access to justice in terms of fast disposal rate 
clashes with the right to development. The rush in disposing cases with minimal 
regard to either procedural guarantees or search for truth is significantly caused by 
the mechanism courts use to measure their performance. This generated reversal 
and retrial rates against the basic demands of litigants. This further undermines the 
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fairness of proceedings, increases the rate of reopening and gives false figures of 
case load which in turn undermines the numeracy of measurement itself. A massive 
return to a mass exercise of litigation would only increase the mass exercise. So the 
courts on their part should exert efforts to reduce the attrition rate of the cases. 
The partnerships with other stake holders should contribute to reducing the 
attrition rate. 
Thus the mechanisms of measurement currently focusing on production of dead 
cases should include the measurement of productivity of courts. The quality of 
procedures the courts follow and the quality of the outcomes that follow should be 
the mechanisms to measure the performance of the courts rather than focusing on 
numerical measures that are currently deployed, which by themselves are good 
points to start but not end points to stop. As indicated in Chapter Five the numbers 
indicate an inflated image of the courts’ performance and conceal the real impacts 
of court performance on the real lives of the people and Government (like curbing 
corruption or rent seeking). The numbers do not show the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of court performances which have been seen to be 
negatively impacted during the field visit. 
7.2.4. The need to standardize change 
Chapter Two illustrated that a well-founded reform programme will be stable and 
lasts long while imposed reform programmes grow unnaturally and could not resist 
outside waves. The Ethiopian experience indicated that courts were implementing 
many reform initiatives for the last two decades. These efforts are meant to 
capacitate the knowledge, skill and attitude of the court personnel. The evaluation 
of the Federal and ANRS courts at the end of 2014/15 imply that this way of 
capacitating courts overburdened and de-capacitated them. Balloons cannot be 
expanded indefinitely. Courts burdened with cases cannot be bombarded with 
reform programmes without the proper evaluation of the success and failures of 
the ongoing reforms. Ethiopian courts have passed through CARP 1, CARP 2, Judicial 
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Reform Programme, Civil Service Reform Programme, BPR, BSC not to mention the 
citizen charter, Quick fixes, Real Time Dispatch techniques. Some change 
instruments overlap in terms of time. While the outgoing narrates success, the new 
one triggers action from clean sheets.  
Too many reform programme do not even give time to foresee the wider 
implications of the old ends and the new beginnings. As is indicated in Chapter Five, 
the Ethiopian judiciary operates under resource constrains. A poor country cannot 
live with new beginnings and new aspirations alone. Moreover the reform and 
change instruments are technical but are owned by the leader of the court who 
presides over cases but has little or no managerial or leadership knowledge and 
skills. Reforms too have to be owned by those who are directly affected by 
programing the formal and the non-formal systems. Stakeholders in both systems 
have to be consulted and informed of the reform from the inception to evaluation. 
A successful reform demands technical, legitimate and local ownership. The 
experience of having too much un-staged reform programme is due to lack of 
ownership, technicality and localisation. Lack of a coherent justice philosophy in 
Ethiopian courts, as explained in Chapters One and Six, too crucially da-capacitated 
courts so that they couldn’t censor the introduction of reform initiatives.  For these 
lack of reform would not sustain and erode the very emotion aroused at the 
launching of a reform programme. Taking unplanned, un-staged reform seriously, is 
taking the suffering of the people seriously. 
The judicial reform programme in Ethiopia had success stories as discussed in 
Chapter Four and Five. However, most informants were not able to clearly identify 
the success of each of the reform programmes. The consensus seems that the 
reform is working on as color coded filing system, recording and transcribing 
system, ICT in courts are being implemented. These could have been done by any 
one of the change instruments above. The lesson is that a well-founded reform is 
stable, capitalises on what had gone and foresees the possible sequences of other 
changes. Reform initiatives should critically evaluate earlier achievements and 
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failures and investigate its basic assumptions as some may be based on false 
assumptions. In that case the BPR, for example, can’t wipe out all the achievements 
of the earlier reform programme and start from clean sheets. The question remains 
what it is for a judicial reform programme in Ethiopian democratic developmental 
state if a newly introduced reform does not build on the earlier efforts towards: 
 Democratising the litigation process, curbing rent-seeking and enabling 
democracy as potential partner of development in a developmental 
democratic state 
 Stopping the spread of injustice and poverty 
 Making the judiciary, the litigants and the communal people capable 
both in its process and its outcome 
 Creating coherence in the justice sector, particularly among the judges 
 Establishing judicial policy and jurisprudence of the country 
 Creating healthy synchronization in the external relationships that courts 
need to have with the non-formal system 
 Making courts learning institutions both from earlier failures and the 
benefits of non-formal systems 
The frequently introduced change instruments discussed in Chapter Five didn’t give 
clear answers to these issues. 
7.2.5. Challenges of enforcement of decisions 
It can be assumed that in bringing a case to the courts litigants are intending to win 
the case. In winning the case the winner can be said to have fulfilled his function of 
being a winner. The functioning of being a winner is only a means to another 
function of being (getting the sum) or doing (educating a daughter like the Liake 
case). A frustrated winner would resort to the aid of the court towards enforcement 
of the court’s decision to these effects. As discussions on capability realization 
illustrated, enforcement of decisions makes the court and the litigants capable in a 
variety of ways. It fulfills court functioning of doing and being: being competent and 
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independent court (enforcing their decision without external aid), fulfills 
functioning of the people being (being able to litigate in a competent court), and 
parties doing (getting the fruits of the decisions).  
Chapter Five indicated that the challenges in enforcing court decisions makes the 
capability of these beings and doing problematic and worth considering. The 
Chapters illustrated how enforcement ended up being one of the most appealed 
cases at the apex courts. The files examined did not show the enforcement of 
decisions in the majority of the cases. Thus returns of the outcome of a case are 
largely eroding the economic benefit of winners. Parties in Chapter Five are seen 
incurring as high as 352,337 ETB to execute a decision. This amount is not yet 
reimbursed. Taking 550 USD as per capita income for Ethiopia 352,337 ETB would 
be an annual income for nearly 30 people in Ethiopia.483 Failure in execution is de-
capacitating the winner of the case or more people at the illegitimate benefit of the 
losing party to that extent. The reduction in economic benefit of litigation presses 
down the capability of legitimate litigants and third parties and the capability (being 
trusted) of the very institution enforcing the decisions. 
This needs to bring in the concept of responsibility in the operation of courts. 
Parties should not only be left with more opportunities after litigation but also 
should take responsibility for an illegitimate claim they bring to courts. The more 
justice is made accessible to them and the higher the opportunity to freedom of 
choice of forums, the higher should be the responsibility. Thus another list in the 
capabilities list is making litigants accountable for bearing the burden of an 
illegitimate harm inflicted on another. This makes each party to have a fair share of 
courts goods, fair access to the benefits of the goods of what courts yield and paves 
the way to correct trial errors towards fair results. This could also ease challenges of 
enforcement of decisions.  
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Chapter Five indicated the causal and positive relationships between efficient 
enforcement of decisions (contract enforcement more specifically) and the increase 
in investments. This would imply that the problems in enforcement or the lack of 
enforcement degenerates investment. In this respect property frozen at the 
commencement of the litigation is meant to lowering the risks in enforcement. If 
enforcement happens to be more challenging than getting decisions, freezing assets 
would be a double blow to the economy of the country and makes the contribution 
of courts to the attainment of sustainable economy and development insignificant. 
Reform effectiveness too has to be measured from the effectiveness in decision 
enforcement which has the effect of increasing investment, lowering risks in 
transactions, reducing the liability of creditors and increase productivity. It needs to 
give ways to capability problems on the part of courts (including knowledge, skill, 
commitment, determination, corruption, human resource, budget), and tackling 
factors that dilute enforcement.  
As explained in Chapter Six the effort on the part of the non-formal system to 
enforce decisions without disconnecting litigants from the market and the social 
ties could yield commendable lessons to the formal system. Unreasonable resource 
disconnections (human or financial) from the very social and market fabric would 
reduce the opportunity that people could generate from the connections. The 
designs in the non-formal systems might have been developed out of necessity but 
the effective enforcement of settlements demands inquiry of the very rational of 
effective enforcement of settlements. This in particular would be interesting when 
one sees the absence of frozen assets in the whole process of Shimigilina and its 
enforcement. Hearing the lessons from the voices and perspectives, beliefs, values 
of non-formal settings does pragmatically benefit the courts.  
Thus, these facts necessitate a researched and well done minimum threshold of 
enforcement schemes, amount, timing and kinds of freezing assets, synchronizing 
principles of the non-formal system of enforcement with the formal one.  
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7.2.6. Engagement 
The study of the shimigilina showed that a key attribute of the institution is their 
engagement with the parties to the dispute and with the implication of the dispute 
for community harmony. This contrasts with the more technical, mechanical and 
disengaged approach of the courts. As explained in Chapter Six judges, contrary to 
being meritorious, are becoming less professional, less expert and more 
mechanical. This has distanced judges from realising social justice. An important 
lesson from the shimigilina system is that the courts need to be more engaged: 
both in the process and the end of litigation. Even mere application of laws does 
not preclude judges from ‘’clutching the objectives of procedural laws buried under 
the dead letters of the laws’’ and apply procedural laws as simply and flexibly as 
possible so that the litigants could fully and meaningfully participate in the litigation 
process. 
As indicated in Chapter Two, human beings are complex creatures. If litigants 
biological, physical, psychological, intellectual, social, and perhaps spiritual 
elements are not only unavoidable when they come to litigation but also impact on 
decision making process and outcomes, Ethiopian judges have to learn from the 
shimigilina system as to how effectively engage in the litigation process and serve 
social justice.  
Hence, judges cannot avoid subjectivity in serving justice that needs being mitigated 
and converted into objectivity. A meritorious judge in a developmental state 
converts the fruits of subjective engagement in to objective reasons and considered 
judgments. A more effective way of engagement, while mediating subjectivity, is to 
be as caring and compassionate and as human as possible to litigants. This helps 
judges feel and share the pain of the litigants and make parties participate in the 
process in a more genuine and humanly way than by conducting mechanical 
monologues. This may also help judges to temporarily detach themselves from their 
formal position and understand the pain of the victims. This also decreases the 
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unintended negative consequences of decisions. In being so engaged, litigants 
speak meaningfully and judges listen to meaningfully.  
Rational engagement has other added advantages. Objective assessment of 
subjective elements of litigation-interaction would be feasible. Understanding the 
overall situations of litigants paves the way to sensitive reasoning so that justice 
players wouldn’t misunderstand one another. A litigant who loses a case will 
understand why he/she lost the case. Prisoners would rather feel rehabilitated than 
sardined in being sent to jail. Engagement narrows the ever widening antagonism 
between judges and clients. 
In Chapter Six it was indicated that the chance of becoming dominant in the play of 
justice leads to engagement reducing the role of chance in attaining justice, and 
empowers people towards owning the process and the outcome of a decision. 
Unpredictability, inaccessibility, perception gaps, conception differences, fabricated 
cases and retrials have increased the dominance of chance largely due to lack of 
meaningful engagement. As this severely constrains people these domains of 
unpredictability and chance have to give way to domains of legitimate claims.  
Engagement allows transparency in the courts. It reveals further opportunities in 
the case processing and shaping of better outcomes. The presence of corruption is 
noted in the courts in Chapter Six. The Chapter indicated the measures taken on 
those found corrupt in the Federal and ANRS Courts. Corruption damages the 
principle of impartiality and fair equal opportunity between litigants, and benefits 
the powerful and de-capacitates the powerless. Engagement closes the opportunity 
to manipulate and abuse disputing. Thus, another element in the list of capabilities 
is opening the door wide for firm rational engagement. This makes judges less 
mechanical experts and more meritorious professional. 
Engagement potentially reveals truth. As the adage in Chapter Six Befird kehedech 
bekloyie, yelefird yehedech doroyie tikochegnalechi (A chicken lost without justice is 
more cause for concern than a mule gone fairly judged) indicated whatever the 
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amount in litigation the most important thing for litigation in the non-formal system 
is the expected justice of the system. This implies that in terms of needs, the justice 
expected of courts is more basic need than the amount in litigation. This demands 
capable institutions or else the capability of litigants and the people would 
deteriorate. The courts are thus expected to respond to the most important need of 
the people-search for the truth of the case. Thus, a search for truth is an item in the 
court  capability list. In this respect courts could take lessons from the non-formal 
systems standards of action towards the search for truth. This is in thick agreement 
with the minimal substantive elements of ROL even more in tune with the internal 
morality of laws.  
7.2.7. Need to disconnect and reconnect 
The legal history of Ethiopia indicated that laws have been transplanted from 
outside to modernise and develop the country. Despite that the aspirations couldn’t 
inspire the formal courts. For the most part the courts were not disconnected from 
the very procedure they were following and the decisions they were giving. Though 
formal they were disconnected from both the (and later from the non-formal) 
system. The importation of laws one after the other developed the mentality of  an 
old wine in a new bottle. With an increase in the number and complexity of 
population and litigation this mentality cannot maximise and realise meaningful 
lives especially to the poor and the disadvantaged. 
Chapters Three and Six demonstrated that development requires a meritorious 
judiciary that is coherent internally. The current effort by the courts to attract the 
best graduates is commendable towards establishing a coherent judicial system. 
Though this might have been so, wide areas in the judicial system need coherence. 
Building internal consensus could range from building consensus on the very 
mission of the courts to the reduction in the reversal and amendment rate by 
higher courts. Despite that the conception of justice by the people, law schools, of 
lawyers and the courts simply involves mismatches and is unconnected.  
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The formal system has other disconnections. As Chapter One and Six indicated it 
largely has been keen towards the traditional ways of dispute resolution but acts 
contrary to it. It is expected to be developmental but is oriented otherwise. So 
many principles enmesh judges in handling a single case. A court embodying all 
principles of justice cannot keep its coherence. There is lack of consensus on the 
basic expectation of courts. The constitution is too far from the daily applications 
while the laws establishing them lack clarity. Imported laws have various and at 
times contradictory principles. 
Building internal coherence and establishing healthy external relations demand 
meritorious professionals the courts may not secure to have unless educational 
institutions and training centers revisit their curriculum towards re-connecting all 
these elements.   
7.2.8. Synchronizing efforts to integrate forums 
As indicated in the introduction to this Chapter the focus of this research has been 
on the formal systems where the principles of the non-formal systems are used to 
suggest how the formals system can be improved. In this respect the non-formal 
system indicated how institutional strength is decisive in rendering effective justice 
and sustainable development. In handling the same case the experience of non-
formal dispute resolution mechanisms in doing better with the economy of litigants, 
social ties of the litigants and the environment proves, Ceteris paribus, that 
institutional quality causally and positively impacts on sustainable development. 
The experience in the formal system shows that despite reform achievements, 
which can’t be achieved by the non-formal system, institutional weakness and 
underdevelopment are causally and negatively connected. As integrating them 
would not be a realistic recommendation, one key idea which emerges is therefore 
that there is no need for integration of the two systems, but rather to keep the two 
systems separate but co-exist by and synchronise important justice principles 
towards realizing social justice. Synchronization may reduce voluntary importation 
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of law and programmes. Future research has to dwell on the details of this 
synchronisation. 
The presence of the two separate systems is recommendable from capability 
enhancement perspectives too. The existence of non-formal systems simply 
expands litigants’ freedom to the choice of forums. That would increase human 
creativity. Winning a case in the absence of non-formal systems is a victory but in a 
reduced freedom. As the non-formal forums are forums where people fully consent 
to participate, their restriction is a restriction to this freedom and the energizing 
power that the forums have towards justice. 
Thus as far as possible both forums should expand the freedom of choice of their 
litigants. This can be done by the forums in allowing litigants to move from one to 
another freely and equally. As the principles that the non-formal systems follow 
enrich the functioning of the formal systems, principles could be screened and 
freely flow from one forum to another. Chapter Five and Six showed that the formal 
system uses mediation for example by civil society constituted family council or 
family elders. Where the efforts of these bodies have failed, the shimigilina acting 
independently have managed to settle the case successfully and restored family 
and community harmony. This is an important benefit of synchronisstion. These 
have saved costs and time. Thus this could be a basis to thinking in synchronisaing 
efforts by the courts, civil society and non-formal systems towards better results. In 
this respect, one of the courts function would be respecting the autonomy of the 
non-formal system but coordinating and administering synchronised efforts 
towards realising social justice.  
While it is clear that  plural legal systems exist in Ethiopia, current reform and 
change efforts appear to have little engagement with the traditional systems. The 
justice formal systems serve would get social legitimacy if it cures this significant 
colour blindness. Bracketing traditional local institutions, top down impositions 
would only repeat the mistakes of the law and development movement.  Judges in 
Ethiopia are not totally against the non-formal systems. This is understandable as 
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the majority of their conception of justice is influenced by the community than the 
law schools or training centers or the reform programmes. In fact the majority of 
them prefer the non-formal systems in relation to cases they come across. In the 
files consulted, and of judges interviewed, there was no indication that the result of 
mediation was found against law and moral. This is a very fertile ground to 
synchronize the two systems. Thus: 
1. The formal system takes into account the key principles of social justice in 
the Ethiopian context. In doing so key ideas of justice in the non-formal 
system should be taken into account by the formal system. 
2. Rather than integrating the two systems into one, there should be an 
attempt to synchronise or harmonise the systems. 
3. This would involve greater promotion of the role of the non-formal, because 
it is often more effective. 
4. There should be provision for formal courts to refer matters for mediation 
to the non-formal where appropriate or taking advantage of current 
provisions to do so. 
5. As indicated in Chapter Six while the non-formal systems benefit from their 
transparency and being rooted in the community and therefore avoid some 
of the problems of the formal systems, there is also the possibility of abuses 
in the non-formal system. As indicated in Chapters One and Six the 
possibility of oppression of women and the disadvantaged or presumption 
of guilt is never nil in the non-formal system. Chapter Five also indicated 
how a frustrated party in ligation by the formal system settled using the 
non-formal system for fewer amounts than he/she might deserve. The risks 
involved in risking business in the hands of invisible non-formal systems too 
may not make them attractive alternatives. 
Some of these abuses can be ameliorated by the fact that parties can resort to the 
formal system if dissatisfied with the non-formal ones and therefore it is necessary 
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to provide for some form of supervision (short of formal reviews) of the non-formal 
system. In this kinds of synchronsation it may be necessary to develop principles 
and procedures that allow limited supervision in circumstances where the non-
formal system would result in oppression or manifest injustice. What the 
supervisory system may be would be a matter for further research. 
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Appendices 
Annex 1: Consent form 
This research investigates how effective are the Federal and Amhara courts in 
decision making. Please read and choose your (level of) consent to participate in 
this interview by signing and dating this form. 
1. I confirm that the purpose of the research and interview, the collection of data, the 
way they are used (including my name, responsibility, my organization, my replies), 
have been explained to me. I also have had the opportunity to ask about the 
research and the researcher and have had satisfactory explanations. 
2. I understand that my participation in the research is absolutely voluntary and that I 
can ask questions any time in the middle of the interview and that I can withdraw 
from the interview any time without giving any reason. This would not have any 
implication as to any of my rights. The information I give will only serve this 
research. 
3. My level of consent is (one of the following to be chosen) 
 Full (my name, responsibly, organization may be referred in the 
research. 
 Partial (only the type of my organization may referred to) 
 Partial (only my specific organization may be referred to) or 
 I prefer no reference to my involvement in this research. 
4. The researcher (please select any one or more of the following): 
 May use sound recording machines 
 may use video recording machines 
 may only take hand notes 
 may use any means he considers appropriate 
5. The information I give will be kept secured and held confidentially. I also volunteer 
to be part of the follow up research or information. 
 
___________                  __________                        __________ 
Informants name               date                               signature 
_____________               ___________                        __________ 
Researcher name               date                               signature 
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Annex Two: Interview questions 
A. Interview question or areas 
Section one-personal data (the researcher will fill in) 
Name_________________ 
     Age____  
     Sex_________ 
     Level of education__________ 
Section Two-topical question or topical areas for discussion 
1. Profession (judge, lawyer…) and experience 
2. Reason for choosing the Profession 
3. Kinds of judgeship in your locality 
4. Attitude towards litigation (positive, neutral, negative) and reasons 
5. How do you perceive persons? Attitude towards labor and the means to 
establishing trust in transactions. . 
6. Reasons of litigation in the locality. Why do people litigate? 
7. Needs and aspirations of the community 
8. The basic needs and aspirations of the community, how the community prioritizes 
the basic needs and the informants judgment about these. 
9. Kinds and amount of cases in the locality, which kind of case is most common? 
Why? 
10. Any assistance arranged for the disabled or disadvantaged people in the locality by 
the decision making bodies. 
11. Justice 
 How is justice understood by the judicial authorities? 
 How is justice conceptualized by the justice system? 
 How do you understand it?  
 And what influenced you to have such an attitude (like schooling, society, 
peer or other) 
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 How do you try to achieve justice both in your decision making process and 
the outcome?  
 Is the justice produced by the existing justice system 1/very just? 2/ just? 3/ 
can’t explain 3/ not just? 4/ very unjust? 
 How do the people measure justice? How do you measure whether the 
system is just or unjust?  
 Could it have different meanings in different cases (criminal, Civil, labor and 
family) cases? 
 How do your parties in litigation perceive whether justice is being done? 
12. Alternative Decision Resolution Mechanisms (ADRMs) in the locality; 
 Kinds of ADRMs, name of the ADR, the continuity with the past ADRMS. 
 The ‘judges’’ there (nomenclature, selection criteria and process of 
selection, relationship with parties, those excluded from the service, tenure 
of service). 
 How are they made legitimate? Why are they chosen by the local people? 
 Kinds of cases, most entertained cases, the trend in the back log of cases 
and the kind of people making use of the mechanisms 
 Their implications for the entire justice systems 
 Perception of justice and the way it is reflected in their decision making 
process and the outcome.  
 How effective are they?  
 How are the ADRMs important to the improvement in the lives of the 
litigants and the entire community?  
 What is their philosophy of litigation, and justice? What is their general 
philosophical approach to disputes or conflicts? 
 What laws are applicable in the mechanism (procedural and substantive, 
written or unwritten) 
 Can you describe the procedure of these decision making bodies? 
Depending on the answer to this question other subsidiary question will 
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follow. The subsidiary questions include quality of the procedure, 
transparency, reasonableness, impartiality, speed, defense right, right to be 
heard, cost of litigation, and production of evidence, human right issues, 
flexibility, and adjournment). Further inquiries follow regarding ritual 
ceremonies and their implications as part of the procedure. 
 Venue of the ADRMs.  
13. The Judicial bodies and the ADR mechanisms 
 See if there is similarity or differences in the administration of justice 
(person, society, environment…) and note how similar or different are they. 
 See if there is (could be) interconnections between them. 
 Relationships between them, how cases may be referred from one of the 
systems to another, when and why?  
 Which mechanism is chosen by the litigants or the people and why is one of 
the mechanisms chosen over the other? 
 Lessons that one of the systems learn from the other. 
 Enforcement of decisions: mechanism and effectiveness. 
 Their influence on shaping people’s behavior (like on cooperation, 
coordinating activities, on building trust or on building confidence). 
 Select one traditional musical instrument (possibly a flute) and discuss how 
the formal and non-formal judges decide a case where four descendants of a 
deceased claim to inherit a flute of the deceased. The claimants have equal 
right to inherit the flute but represent different interest like-love to play 
with the musical instrument, attach historical importance to the flute, love 
with money, being poor or being a senior of claimants.  The descendants 
could not compromise their interest.  
14. Select a representative non-formal system of dispute resolution and discuss how 
the mechanism is effective in resolving disputes.  
15. Discussion on the judicial reform programme: issues including 
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 Discussions on the judicial reform programme (issues including its bases, 
characters, directions, difference between the federal and the regional, 
difference with the global arrangement, consensus among the professionals, 
its status right now, other change instruments at hand and the reason for 
the shift from the one to another) 
 Identify cases when court and ADR mechanisms are more effective. 
 Open question: any other relevant opinion or information that the 
informant may provide with. 
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Annex 3: Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is prepared to see how the Federal and the ANRS courts are 
making effective decisions. It is hoped that the answers you give to the questions 
would help the researcher in finding better ways of making effective decision. Bear 
in mind that your role in this respect is indispensable and take care in giving 
genuine information. The Researched would like to extend its unreserved thanks 
from the bottom of his heart for the time and resource you spent in this regard. 
If the space provided is not enough, you may use additional sheet of papers. 
Section One-personal data 
To be filled on voluntary basis or you may escape to fill one or more of themሸ 
Name __________ 
Level of education_______ 
Age_____ 
Sex____ 
Economic status, income per month ____ 
Religion_______ 
Residential area_________ 
Any visible disability or support from courts you specially need 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_______ 
Any information you would like to give____________________________________ 
Section Two-topical questions 
1. Which mechanism of dispute resolution would you prefer if you came across with a 
case?________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 what is the reason for your choice under question number 1 above 
?___________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_ 
2. what is the one good thing in your life (example affiliation, health, to participate in 
public (and in decision making bodies) without shame, 
etc__________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
3. how do you realize your choice 
above?______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_ 
4. what do you think is an obstacle for the realization and the possible ways to tackle 
the 
obstacles?____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
5. how do you understand by 
justice?______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. how is your understanding different to or similar with the understandings of courts 
and other decision making 
bodies?______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 put the following in order of their importance according to your choice to measure 
justice: 
 quality of life 
 security and safety 
 rule of law 
 quality of the justice system 
7. Put in order of their importance the basis of your understanding of justice 
 equality of wealth 
 societal recognition,  
 be capable of doing, be what one wants,  
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 procedural justice 
 reducing poverty and leading a kind of life as one reasonably choose 
 sharing equally benefits and burdens 
 fulfilling owns good 
 fulfilling others good 
 fulfilling the good of the strong 
 equality of (to be added by the informant) 
 sharing opportunities 
 to be entitled to something (to be added by the respondent) 
 avoiding clear injustices 
 raising living standard of the community (communal life) 
 
8. Which one of the following influenced your understanding of justice above? 
 Schooling (you may specifically put the school) 
 the society 
 work place  
 peer in the work place 
 custom 
 globalization 
 instinct and difficult to explain 
 biological 
9. In favor of whom would you decide if you are expected to give a traditional musical 
instrument to one of the inheritants of a deceased? 
 to the one who loves music 
 to the most poor 
 Sale the instrument and share the proceed of the sale equally amongst all. 
 To the one who keeps it best for the deceased’s musical legacy  
10. Can you explain the reason(s) for your decision 
above?______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_ 
11. How do you understand the understanding of justice by the communal 
people?______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
12. Can the courts in your locality effectively administer or realize justice? Why or why 
not?________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
13.  Can the customary courts (ADRM) effectively administer or realize the justice you 
and the community understand? Why or why 
not?________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_ 
14. Can you mention obstacles (personal, societal, global) to an effective administration 
or realization of 
justice?______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
15. What are the implication of delay in processing cases, unpredictability or 
inaccessibility in decision 
making?_____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
16. If there is any other information relevant to the discussions that you want to 
add_________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
17. You may also freely explain if courts are giving quality justice to the people and how 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
and if customary ways of settling dispute in your locality is giving quality service and 
how 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
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